Ex Parte Ryu et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 21, 2013

11843318 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/843,318 08/22/2007 Jihan Ryu P000302-RD-JMC 4865
65798 7590 10/21/2013
MILLER IP GROUP, PLC
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
42690 WOODWARD AVENUE
SUITE 200
BLOOMFIELD HILLS, MI 48304
EXAMINER
DAGER, JONATHAN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3663
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/21/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JIHAN RYU and CHANDRA S. NAMUDURI
____________

Appeal 2012-000245
Application 11/843,318
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, GAY ANN SPAHN, and
GEORGE R. HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jihan Ryu and Chandra S. Namuduri (“Appellants”) appeal under 35
U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4-13, 15-
18, and 20. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A roll control system for a vehicle, said system
comprising:
a lateral acceleration sensor for determining the lateral
acceleration of the vehicle and providing a lateral acceleration
signal;
a speed sensor for determining the speed of the vehicle
and providing a vehicle speed signal;
a sensor for measuring a steering angle of the vehicle and
providing a steering angle signal;
a damper with controllable friction force provided at each
wheel of the vehicle; and
a controller for reducing the roll motion of the vehicle
when it is turning by controlling the friction response of one or
more of the wheel dampers, said controller receiving the lateral
acceleration signal, the vehicle speed signal and the steering
angle signal, and calculating a friction control signal that
includes calculating a first current control signal based on the
lateral acceleration signal and a second current control signal
based on the steering angle signal.
REJECTIONS
Appellants request our review of the following rejections (App. Br.
10):
Claims 1-5, 11, 12, 14, and 17-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Suchta (US 2005/0253350 A1, pub. Nov. 17,
2005);
Claims 1, 2, 5-7, 11-13, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§102(b) as anticipated by Bodie (US 2002/0128760 A1, pub. Sep. 12, 2002);
and
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Claims 8-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Bodie.
ANALYSIS
Anticipation Based on Suchta
Claims 1-3, 5, 11, 12, 14, and 17-19
Appellants argue that claims 1, 11 and 17 are not anticipated by
Suchta, because Suchta lacks “a system or method configured to control the
roll motion of the vehicle by providing a current control signal to the
dampers.” See App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 2. We are not persuaded by
Appellants’ argument, for the following reasons.
First, with respect to the term “current” in the claimed “current control
signal,” we note that the Examiner found Suchta’s activation signal “causes
an increase in the shear strength of the MR fluid 222” in an MR damper 200,
thereby locking the damper 200. See Ans. 6 (quoting Suchta, para. [0025]).
The Examiner also found that the shear stress characteristics of the MR fluid
222 in Suchta are determined by a magnetic field or flux density generated
by an “electrical current.” See Ans. 7-8 (quoting Suchta, para. [0024]); see
also Ans. 9-10. That is, Suchta’s activation signal activates the damper 200
at least in part by actuating an electric current delivered to the damper 200.
Appellants’ Specification similarly describes a “current” signal as
controlling an MR damper by controlling an electric current delivered to an
MR damper. See, e.g., Spec. paras. [0016]-[0017]. Accordingly, we agree
with the Examiner that Suchta’s activation signal is therefore a “current”
signal as recited in claim 1.
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Appellants further argue Suchta’s activation signal is not a “control”
signal, because “the activation signal is either ON or OFF based on various
criteria” such that it “is a one shot activation signal, not a current control
signal.” See Reply Br. 2. We are not persuaded by this argument because,
under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the claimed “control signal”
includes a binary on/off signal such as disclosed in Suchta (see para.
[0026]), in addition to the more nuanced continuously variable control signal
discussed in paragraphs [0016] and [0034] of Appellants’ Specification. See
Ans. 6. An on/off control is still a control. Indeed, Appellants concede as
much when they admit that Suchta’s activation signal “controls” the
dampers in this manner. See Reply Br. 2, ll. 19-20.
Appellants additionally argue that Suchta does not disclose the
language in claim 1 directed to “calculating” a current control signal. See
Reply Br. 2, ll. 19-23. However, even a binary on/off system such as Suchta
calculates a current control signal. The “on” state corresponds to a first
current delivered to an MR damper to lock the damper. See Ans. 7 (quoting
Suchta, para. [0024], describing “appropriate selection” of a “maximum
current” to lock the MR damper). The “off” state corresponds to a second
current delivered to an MR damper to unlock the damper, which is different
from the first current and may very well be zero current. See Ans. 7
(quoting Suchta, para. [0024], describing the unlocked state as being zero
current). Appellants have failed to explain why choosing between a
maximum current and a zero current cannot be considered to be
“calculating” a current.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of Examiner error by
Appellants’ arguments.
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Turning to Appellants’ arguments with respect to claims 1 and 17,
Appellants argue that claims 1 and 17 are not anticipated by Suchta, because
Suchta lacks “a system or method configured to control the roll motion of
the vehicle . . . by calculating a control signal that includes calculating a first
current control signal based on the lateral acceleration signal and a second
current control signal based on the steering angle signal.” See App. Br. 12;
Reply Br. 2. The language at issue in claim 1 is “calculating a friction
control signal that includes calculating a first current control signal based on
the lateral acceleration signal and a second current control signal based on
the steering angle signal.” See App. Br., Clms. App’x. Claim 17 has similar
language.
In applying the claim language to Suchta, the Examiner found that
Suchta discloses calculating a current control signal in two distinct
scenarios, as illustrated in its Figure 5. See Ans. 6-7 (citing Suchta,
para. [0026]). Both scenarios require the vehicle speed (V) to be equal to or
greater than a threshold speed (th-1). See Ans. 7 (citing Suchta,
para. [0026]). In the first scenario, if V ≥ th-1 and if the vehicle steering
angle (δ) is equal to or greater than a threshold steering angle (th-2), then an
“ON” activation signal is sent. See Ans. 7 (citing Suchta, para [0026]). In
the second scenario, if V ≥ th-1 and if the vehicle lateral acceleration (α) is
equal to or greater than a threshold lateral acceleration (th-3), then an “ON”
activation signal is sent. See Ans. 7 (citing Suchta, para. [0026]).
Appellants assert these two scenarios “have absolutely nothing to do
with calculating two different current control signals (i.e., a first current
control signal based on the lateral acceleration signal and a second current
control signal based on the steering angle signal).” Reply Br. 2. We are not
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persuaded by this argument. Calculating a first current control signal based
on a lateral acceleration signal corresponds to the “α ≥ th-3 ?” decision block
in Figure 5. If α ≥ th-3, then the first current control signal is calculated as
the maximum current. If α < th-3, then the first current control signal is
calculated as zero current. Similarly, calculating a second current control
signal based on a steering angle signal corresponds to the “δ ≥ th-2?”
decision block in Figure 5. Appellants are correct that the end result of
Suchta’s Figure 5 process is sending one “on” (maximum current) or “off”
(zero current) signal. See Suchta, para. [0026] and Fig. 5. Nonetheless, in
order to reach that end result, a first current on/off control signal is
calculated based on the lateral acceleration signal (α), and a second current
on/off control signal is calculated based on the steering angle signal (δ).
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of Examiner error by
Appellants’ arguments with respect to claims 1 and 17.
Finally, Appellants argue that claim 11 is not anticipated by Suchta,
because Suchta lacks a system “configured to control the roll motion of the
vehicle . . . wherein a controller uses a vehicle lateral acceleration signal for
determining the current control signal for the dampers.” See App. Br. 12.
We are not persuaded by this argument, for the reasons already discussed
supra. Namely, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Suchta discloses
a system 300 configured to control the roll motion of a vehicle 100, wherein
a controller 320 uses a vehicle lateral acceleration signal 315 for determining
the current control signal for dampers 200. See Ans. 6 (citing Suchta, Fig 4.
and paras. [0025]-[0026]). Therefore, we are not persuaded of Examiner
error by Appellants’ argument.
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 11, and 17, and claims 2-5, 12, 14, and 18-20 dependent thereon
and not argued separately therefrom, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated
by Suchta.
Claims 4 and 20
Appellants argue claims 4 and 20 are not anticipated by Suchta. See
App. Br. 13. Appellants first rely on the arguments discussed supra for the
respective parent claims 1 and 17, and for the same reasons as discussed
supra, we are not persuaded of Examiner error. Appellants then assert “it
follows [from the parent claim analysis] that Suchta cannot teach or suggest
using the maximum of the current control signals as recited in claim 4 or
selecting the current control signal from the larger of the current control
signals as recited in claim 20.” See App. Br. 13. Appellants’ argument fails
to provide a persuasive explanation as to why the specific findings made by
the Examiner (Ans. 8) are in error. Appellants’ arguments merely assert that
Suchta does not teach or suggest the claim language. However, Appellants’
bald assertion that Suchta does not disclose the language of claims 4 and 20
does not adequately explain how the Examiner’s findings might be
erroneous. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“we hold
that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior
art.”). Thus, we are not apprised of Examiner error by Appellants’
argument.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4 and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Suchta.
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Anticipation and Obviousness Based on Bodie
Appellants argue that the rejection of claims 1, 11, and 17 as
anticipated by Bodie is moot, because independent claims 1, 11, and 17 were
amended to include the subject matter of claims 3, 14, and 19, respectively,
and claims 3, 14, and 19 were never rejected by the Examiner as being
anticipated by Bodie.
A review of the file history of the underlying application on which
this appeal is based reveals that the Office Action mailed August 10, 2010
rejected claims 1, 2, 5-7, 11-13, 17, and 18 as anticipated by Bodie, and
claims 8-10 as unpatentable over Bodie, but did not reject dependent claims
3, 14, and 19 as either anticipated by or unpatentable over Bodie. Non-Final
Rej. 6 and 9. Appellants amended each of the independent claims 1, 11 and
17 to include the limitations of their respective dependent claims 3, 14, and
19, and canceled dependent claims 3, 14, and 19. See Amdt. filed Nov. 9,
2010, at 2-5. The Office Action mailed January 19, 2011 stated that:
“claims 1, 11, and 17 remain rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as anticipated
by Bodie (US 2002/0128760) for those reasons cited above, and those
mentioned in the prior office action, which is incorporated herein,” and
“claims 2, 4-10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, and 20[] remain rejected under their
respective grounds/rationales and applicable prior art for those reasons cited
above, and those mentioned in the prior office action which is incorporated
herein.” Final Rej. 6-7.
Because the Examiner failed to make appropriate findings of fact in
support of the rejection of independent claims 1 (which includes the subject
matter of cancelled claim 3), 11 (which includes the subject matter of
cancelled claim 14), and 17 (which includes the subject matter of cancelled
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claim 18) as anticipated by Bodie, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claims 1, 11, and 17, and claims 2, 5-7, 12, 13, and
18 dependent thereon, as anticipated by Bodie. For the same reason, we do
not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8-10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Bodie.

DECISION
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1-5, 11, 12, 14, and 17-20 as
anticipated by Suchta.
We REVERSE the rejection of claims 1, 2, 5-7, 11-13, 17, and 18 as
anticipated by Bodie, and the rejection of claims 8-10 as unpatentable over
Bodie.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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