Ex Parte Rykowski et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 17, 2010

10455146 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 17, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
________________

Ex parte RONALD F. RYKOWSKI and
RICHARD E. ALBRECHT
________________

Appeal 2009-003868
Application 10/455,146
Technology Center 2600
_________________

Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, MARC S. HOFF, and
THOMAS S. HAHN, Administrative Patent Judges.

HAHN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

Appellants invoke our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-6, 9-15, 18-27, 30, and 31.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse.

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing,
as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE”
(paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery
mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE3
Appellants claim an apparatus and method for calibrating a visual
display having an array of pixels and corresponding subpixels by
determining chromaticity and luminance values for registered subpixels.
Determined chromaticity and luminance values are converted to measured
tristimulus values, and target chromaticity and luminance values for a given
color are converted to target tristimulus values. Differences between
measured and target tristimulus values are determined to calculate correction
factors for each registered subpixel.4 Claim 1 is illustrative:

1. A method for calibrating a visual display sign, the method
comprising:
(a) analyzing a visual display sign, the sign comprising an array of
pixels and corresponding subpixels;
(b) locating and registering multiple subpixels of the visual display
sign;

2 This appeal is related to commonly owned Appeal No.: 2009-004176
(Application: 10/653, 559). We do not concur with the Appellants’ nor the
Examiner’s statements that there is no related appeal “hav[ing] a bearing on
the Board’s decision in this appeal” (Br. 2; Ans. 3). The submitted
arguments for both this appeal and also Appeal No.: 2009-004176 are
directed to the same cited art to address substantively similar bases for
rejections. We further find the Examiner’s discussions in both of the
Examiner’s Answers “Response to Argument” sections are substantively the
same for the two appeals. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 (c)(1)(ii).
3 Throughout this opinion we refer for their respective details to the
Specification filed June 4, 2003, Appeal Brief filed Mar. 21, 2008, and
Examiner’s Answer mailed May 14, 2008.
4 See generally Spec. ¶¶ [0001], [0016], [0026], [0032], [0035], [0036], and
[0046]; Figs. 1-3.
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(c) determining a chromaticity value and a luminance value for each
registered subpixel;
(d) converting the chromaticity value and luminance value for each
registered subpixel to measured tristimulus values;
(e) converting a target chromaticity value and a target luminance
value for a given color to target tristimulus values;
(f) calculating correction factors for each registered subpixel based on
a difference between the measured tristimulus values and the target
tristimulus values; and
(g) sending the correction factors to the visual display sign.

REJECTIONS5
The Examiner relies on the following prior art to show
unpatentability:6
Watanabe US 4,825,201 Apr. 25, 1989
McManus US 5,479,186 Dec. 26, 1995
Greene US 6,243,059 B1 June 5, 2001
Mendelson US 6,559,826 B1 May 6, 2003
Cottone US 6,677,958 B2 Jan. 13, 2004
Nakano US 6,822,802 B2 Nov. 23, 2004

5 A rejection of claim 31 under § 112, first paragraph (Final Action, mailed
July 24, 2007, ¶ 2) is withdrawn (Ans. 15).
6 Effective filing dates for these documents precede Appellants’ earliest
effective filing date and are not at issue.
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The Examiner, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), rejected:
1. Claims 1, 3-6, 10, 11, 13-15, 18, 22, 23, and 30 as unpatentable over
Greene and Cottone (Ans. 5-10);
2. Claims 2 and 12 as unpatentable over Greene, Cottone, and
Mendelson (Ans. 10);
3. Claims 9, 19-21, 26, and 27 as unpatentable over Greene, Cottone,
and Watanabe (Ans. 10-12);
4. Claims 24 and 25 as unpatentable over Greene, Cottone, and Nakano
(Ans. 13); and
5. Claim 31 as unpatentable over Greene, Cottone, Watanabe, and
McManus (Ans. 13-15).
ISSUE
The dispositive issue, based on the Examiner’s findings and
conclusions and the Appellants’ contentions, is whether the Examiner, under
§ 103(a), erred in combining Greene and Cottone to teach or suggest
converting measured subpixel chromaticity and luminance values to
measured tristimulus values, and converting target chromaticity and
luminance values for a given color to target tristimulus values as recited
claim 1.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 3-6, 10, 11, 13-15, 18, 22, 23, and 30
Appellants premise their patentability arguments for these
claims on limitations recited in claim 1 (Br. 12-20). In part,
Appellants assert that the Examiner failed to provide an “apparent
rational reason” for combining Greene and Cottone to teach or suggest
converting chromaticity and luminance values into measured and
target tristimulous values as recited in steps (d) and (e) of claim 1 (Br.
16-18).
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The Examiner acknowledges that Greene does not teach
converting chromaticity and luminance values into tristimulus values
as recited in steps (d) and (e) of claim 1 (Final Action, p. 3). The
Examiner finds Cottone, though, teaches that:
the conversion between the CIE chromaticity coordinates (x, y) and
luminance value Y into the CIE tristimulus value (XYZ) is well
known in the art (Cottone---Col. 5, lines 9-15 and 50-52). At the time
the invention was made, it would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art to convert the chromaticity and luminance
values into tristimulus values as taught by Cottone et al. in the method
for calibrating a visual display taught by Greene et al. so as to increase
the precision of color/brightness values. Furthermore it is well known
that color can be represented in different formats and any known
method of defining color/brightness will perform equally well at
helping calibrate a display.
(Final Action, pp. 3, 4).
Quoting the Examiner’s above discussion directed to combining
Greene and Cottone, Appellants argue that “the Examiner has failed to
provide any articulated reasoning as to why it would have been obvious to
increase the precision of color/brightness values of Greene according to the
combined method of Cottone” (Br. 17). Disputing such arguments, the
Examiner states that:
The reason provided for combining Greene with Cottone (i.e. to
increase the precision of color/brightness values) is a valid motivation.
Furthermore, the conversion of chromaticity and luminance values to
tristimulus values is simply a conversion, like converting radians to
degrees. Lastly, tristimulus values are more precise because the
values are in one format as opposed to two (i.e. one luminance value
and two chromaticity values).
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(Ans. 21.) We find the Examiner’s remaining discussion (see Ans. 21, 22)
to be conclusion statements.
On this record, we are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. Turning
to the Examiner’s reasoning, we find an alternative rationale asserted,
namely, (i) “conversion of chromaticity and luminance values to tristimulus
values is simply a conversion, like converting radians to degrees;” or (ii)
“tristimulus values are more precise because the values are in one format as
opposed to two . . .” (Ans. 21).
Concerning the first rationale, Appellants assert that “the Examiner
simply alleges that any method of defining color/brightness will perform
equally well, without any explanation of how or why this may be the case”
(Br. 17). We also do not find that the Examiner has addressed or provided
an explanation for how or why conversion to tristimulus values performs
equally well as chromaticity and luminance values or another value
conversion. Concerning the other rationale, i.e., precision of tristimulus
values, the Examiner asserts that “tristimulus values are more precise
because the values are in one format as opposed to two (i.e. one luminance
value and two chromaticity values)” (Ans. 21). Again, we do not find that
the Examiner has provided reasoning with rational underpinning to support
the conclusion that conversion to tristimulus values increases precision for
color/brightness values.
Our reviewing court has stated that an Examiner’s articulated
reasoning for a rejection under § 103(a) must posses a rational underpinning
to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977,
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988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Concordantly, the Supreme Court has stated that
“‘rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory
statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.’” KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting Kahn, 441 F.3d
at 988).
Based on the record, we find the Examiner erred in modifying Greene
with Cottone because we do not find articulated reasoning possessing a
rational underpinning to support the combination. In particular, we do not
find that the Examiner articulated reasoning for how or why the Cottone
conversion to tristimulus values (i) performs equally well as chromaticity
and luminance values; or (ii) alternatively increases precision.
For the above reasons, we will reverse the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claim 1 and also will reverse the rejection of
independent claims 11 and 23 that substantively recite the same
disputed limitations (Br. 20). Further, for the same reasons, we will
reverse the rejection of the claims in this group that are dependent
from these independent claims.
Claims 2, 9, 12, 19-21, and 24-27
Appellants argue that these dependent claims are patentable
because their base independent claims 1, 11, and 23 are patentable
(Br. 21, 22). These claims are rejected under § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Greene, Cottone, and various combinations of Mendelson,
Watanabe, and Nakano (Ans. 10-13). Appellants contend that the
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further cited references fail to cure the asserted Greene and Cottone
deficiencies (Br. 21, 22). On reviewing the additional references, we
find that the Greene and Cottone deficiencies are not cured. The
Examiner continues reliance on Greene and Cottone as not being
deficient for the disputed base independent claim limitations (Ans.
27).
For the reasons discussed supra, we will also reverse the
rejections of these dependent claims.

Claim 31
This is an independent claim rejected under § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Greene, Cottone, Watanabe, and McManus (Ans.
13-15). Appellants argue that claim 31 is patentable because the cited
references, either alone or in combination, fail to disclose or suggest
limitations that are similar to the disputed claim 1 limitations (Br. 23).
The Examiner continues reliance on Greene and Cottone as not being
deficient for the claim 1 disputed limitations (Ans. 27).
For the reasons discussed supra, we will also reverse the
rejection of claim 31.

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ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-6, 9-15, 18-27, 30, and 31
is reversed.
REVERSED

KIS

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