Ex Parte RORK et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 26, 2018

14741020 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 26, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/741,020 06/16/2015 Joseph Paul RORK 83522300 1057
28395 7590 01/30/2018
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET
EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER SINGH, HIRDEPAL
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2631
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/30/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOSEPH PAUL RORK
and MATTHEW ATWOOD WHITAKER
Appeal 2017-009191
Application 14/741,020
Technology Center 2600
Before TERRENCE W. McMILLIN, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4—11, 13, 14, and 16—20. The rejection of claims 4,
5, and 16—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 has been withdrawn. Ans. 6. Claims
3—5, 12, and 15—20 stand objected to as being dependent upon a rejected
based claim but are otherwise allowable. Final Act. 9; Ans. 6. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal 2017-009191
Application 14/741,020
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention is directed “to a method and apparatus for
secure pairing.” Spec. 11. Claim 1, reproduced below with the disputed
limitations in italics, is representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive a request from a mobile device to utilize a vehicle
resource',
determine that a first key has been used to start a vehicle a
first time and a second key has been used to start the vehicle a
second time; and
approve the request if both the first key and the second key
were used to start the vehicle the first time and the second time,
respectively.
REJECTION
Claims 1, 2, 6—11, 13, and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Miller et al. (US 2013/0226399 Al; published
Aug. 29, 2013, hereinafter “Miller”) and Vincenti (US 2016/0055699 Al;
published Feb. 25, 2016). Ans. 4.
ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of
Miller and Vincenti teaches or suggests “receiv[ing] a request from a mobile
device to utilize a vehicle resource” and “approv[ing] the request if both the
first key and the second key were used to start the vehicle the first time and
the second time respectively,” as recited in independent claim 1, and
commensurately recited in independent claims 10 and 14?
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Application 14/741,020
The Examiner finds Miller teaches connecting a device to a vehicle
and controlling a restricted mode in a vehicle by using a two key verification
procedure to exit the restricted mode. Ans. 9 (citing Miller || 12, 26); see
also Ans. 4 (citing Miller || 12, 26). The Examiner further finds Vincenti
provides support “that the user mobile device when interfaced . . . with
vehicle would use and access the resources and functions.” Ans. 10 (citing
Vincenti || 9, 20, 24).
Appellants contend Miller’s control of the restricted mode using two-
key start does not teach a remote device resource access request. Reply Br.
2. Specifically, Appellants argue Miller’s teaching of switching a vehicle
control mode from restricted mode to full mode has nothing to do with
providing resources to a remote device requesting resources. App. Br. 4.
We are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellants’ arguments.
Appellants’ Specification describes a request as “without limitation, a
request to utilize vehicle functionality using the device, application or
account.” Spec. 135. Appellants’ Specification provides further examples
of the request being for “access.” Spec. 139. Appellants further state
“[vjehicle resources include, but are not limited to, control of vehicle
systems, user of vehicle inputs/outputs and gathering data from vehicle
sytems.” Spec. 139. Thus, the claimed “request from a mobile device to
utilize a vehicle resource,” in light of Appellants’ Specification, broadly
encompasses requests to access or utilize vehicle functions. App. Br. 8
(emphasis added).
As cited by the Examiner (Ans. 4, 9), Miller describes
“restrictions. . . remain in place so long as the vehicle is in the restricted
mode.” Miller 126. Miller further describes a “ONE-TWO New
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Application 14/741,020
Procedure” where “the primary driver may place a first programmed key in
the ignition and turn to ‘RUN’ and back to ‘OFF’” and then “the primary
driver may place a second programmed key in the ignition and turn to
‘RUN’ and back to ‘OFF,’” and the “vehicle will exit from the restricted
mode if two programmed keys are inserted and toggled from ‘RUN’ to
‘OFF.’” Id. Miller’s restricted mode “generally corresponds to a vehicle
state in which one or more vehicle controllers in the vehicle restrict the level
of functionality provided for a particular driver.” Miller 118 (emphasis
added). As further cited by the Examiner (Ans. 10), Vincenti teaches
“granting access to the set of functions of the vehicle upon receiving
credentials related to the virtual key from the mobile device.” Vincenti 120.
In other words, Miller’s One-Two New Procedure teaches a two-key start to
allow additional vehicle functionality (i.e., exit from restricted mode, and
stop restricting the level of vehicle functionality), and Vincenti teaches
granting access to vehicle function for a mobile device using virtual keys.
Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence or argument that the
claimed approving a request from a mobile device to utilize a vehicle
resource if two keys are used to start the vehicle two times, encompassing
granting access to utilize vehicle function, is not taught or otherwise
suggested by Miller’s allowing additional vehicle functionality (exiting
restricted mode) in response to a two key start (One-Two New Procedure)
and Vincenti’s mobile device being granted access to vehicle functionality.
Appellants further argue it would not be obvious to modify Miller
with Vincenti’s use of virtual keys for a mobile device to control resources
because Vincenti already has a means of controlling resources. App. Br. 4—
5; Reply Br. 3. We are not persuaded of Examiner error. The Examiner has
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Application 14/741,020
provided articulated reasoning of how the claimed features are met by the
proposed combination of the reference teachings with some rational
underpinning, specifically that it would be obvious to combine Miller and
Vincenti in order to provide access to vehicle resources and functions and
provide convenience of sharing the vehicle, as well as limiting access to the
vehicle. Ans. 10. See KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
Appellants argue the combination of Miller and Vincenti would
“needlessly complicate the system of Vincenti” and would not be obvious
“because Vincenti provides a different solution” and the combination
“provides no additional advantages.” App. Br. 5. Appellants’ argument
appears to be that Vincenti teaches away from the Examiner’s proffered
combination because Vincenti offers an alternate solution for accessing
vehicle resources. We note a reference “does not teach away from the
claimed subject matter unless the prior art reference also criticizes, discredits
or otherwise discourages the solution claimed.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d
1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
For at least the above reasons we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C
§ 103 rejections of independent claims 1, 10, and 14. For the same reasons,
we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections of claims dependent
claims 2, 6—9, 11, and 13, not argued separately. See App. Br. 7.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1,2, 6—11, 13, and 14 is
affirmed.
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Appeal 2017-009191
Application 14/741,020
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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