Ex Parte Roos et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 12, 2017

13280384 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 12, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/280,384 10/25/2011 Bryan Nathaniel Roos P015783-PTUS-RRM 1093
72823 7590
Quinn IP Law
21500 Haggerty Road
Suite 300
Northville, MI 48167
EXAMINER
DECKER, PHILLIP
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3749
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/20/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
adomagala@quinniplaw.com
U S Docketing @ quinniplaw .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BRYAN NATHANIEL ROOS,
EUGENE V. GONZE, HALIM G. SANTOSO, and
BRIAN L. SPOHN
Appeal 2016-002745
Application 13/280,384
Technology Center 3700
Before LYNNE H. BROWNE, ANNETTE R. REIMERS, and
NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges.
BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bryan Nathaniel Roos et al. (Appellants) appeal under 35 U.S.C.
§134 from the rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
Appeal 2016-002745
Application 13/280,384
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a system and method for heating a vehicle
cabin. Spec. 11. Claims 1, 11, and 19 are independent. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of heating a cabin of a motor vehicle having an
internal combustion engine operatively connected to an
exhaust system having a catalyst, a controller, and a heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system, the method
comprising:
detecting a request to increase temperature inside the
cabin;
supplying fuel and air to the engine;
motoring the engine to pump the fuel and air into the
exhaust system;
heating, via the controller, the catalyst to combust the fuel
and air inside the catalyst such that a stream of post-combustion
exhaust gas is generated; and
channeling, via the controller, the generated stream of
post-combustion exhaust gas to the HVAC system such that a
temperature of a coolant circulated through the HVAC system is
increased to heat the cabin.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Maus US 5,340,020 Aug. 23, 1994
Kuhn US 5,941,220 Aug. 24, 1999
Zubeck US 7,621,262 B2 Nov. 24, 2009
Roos US 2010/0212981 A1 Aug. 26, 2010
Mashita JP 9-125939 May 13, 1997
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1—4, 6, 11—13, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Kuhn and Roos.
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Appeal 2016-002745
Application 13/280,384
II. Claims 7—9, 16, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kuhn, and Roos, and Mashita.
III. Claims 5, 14, and 191 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kuhn, Roos, and Maus.
IV. Claims 10 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kuhn, Roos, Mashita, and Zubeck.
V. Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Kuhn, Roos, Maus, and Mashita.
ISSUE
The dispositive issue in this Appeal is the meaning of the claim terms
“motoring” or “motor” in the context of the limitations “motoring the
engine,” “motor the engine,” and “motoring via the controller the engine”
appearing in independent claims 1,11, and 19, respectively. Appeal Br. 18,
20, 21 (Claims App.). The Examiner framed this issue succinctly stating that
“[i]f the term is construed given its plain meaning, then the rejection based
on the prior art should be maintained. If the Board finds that the key term is
specially defined by the specification, then the rejections should be
overruled.” Ans. 17—18.
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, we note that although the Specification discusses
the conditions under which motoring the engine occurs (see, e.g., Spec.
120), the Specification does not set forth an explicit definition of the terms
1 Although the rejection of claim 19 is listed separately from the rejection of
claims 5 and 14 in the Final Action, claims 5,14, and 19 are all subject to
the same ground of rejection.
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Appeal 2016-002745
Application 13/280,384
“motoring” or “motor” such that Appellants acted as their own
lexicographer. For an inventor to act as his or her own lexicographer, the
definition must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity,
deliberateness, and precision. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa ’per
Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However, the fact that
Appellants did not act as their own lexicographer does not end our inquiry.
Rather, in construing claim terms, the general meanings gleaned from
reference sources, such as dictionaries, must always be compared against the
use of the terms in context, and the intrinsic record must always be consulted
to identify which of the different possible dictionary meanings is most
consistent with the use of the words by the inventor. “Where there are
several common meanings for a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to
point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper meanings.”
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (quoting Renishaw PLC, 158 F.3d at 1250; Ferguson
Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Resources, Inc. v. Mega
Sys.,LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Here, the Examiner has proffered a broad definition of the claim terms
“motoring” and “motor” (see Ans. 17), and Appellants have proffered a
different, narrower definition of these claim terms. See Appeal Br. 9. Thus,
the question before us is which definition is the broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the use of the term in the Specification.
As noted supra, in discussing the conditions under which motoring
the engine occurs, the Specification states that motoring occurs “when a
supply of fuel to the engine is shut off and no combustion takes place in the
cylinders.” Spec. 120. In discussing the claimed method, the Specification
further states that “[t]he controller 46 is also configured to supply fuel and
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Appeal 2016-002745
Application 13/280,384
air to the cylinders 26 and direct the motor-generator 42 to motor the engine
without combusting the mixture inside the cylinders 26” and that “[t]he
controller 46 is additionally configured to heat the catalysts 40 by activating
the heating elements 41 to thereby combust within each respective catalyst
the mixture of fuel and air that was pumped into the exhaust system 3 8 and
thereby heat the catalysts.” Spec. 24, 25 (emphasis added). Thus, taken
in context, the claim terms “motoring” and “motor” preclude combustion in
the engine. Accordingly, the definition proffered by the Examiner is
unreasonable, and the definition proffered by Appellants is the broadest
reasonable interpretation of these claim terms.
Given that the rejections are premised on the Examiner’s
unreasonably broad interpretation of the claim terms “motoring” and
“motor” as used in the instant application, the rejections must fail. For this
reason, we do not sustain the Examiner’s decisions rejecting independent
claims 1,11, and 19, their respective dependent claims.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—20 are REVERSED.
REVERSED
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