Ex Parte Romero et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Aug 22, 2012

11270092 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 22, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
________________

Ex parte GABRIEL LEANDRO ROMERO, FREDERICK
GROURGE SMITH, and BRIAN EDWARD BURDICK
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Appeal 2010-003695
Application 11/270,092
Technology Center 2600
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Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the rejection
of claims 1, 2, and 4-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
The Invention
“The present invention is directed generally toward data processing
and particularly, to a method and system, for reducing the timing effects of
intersymbol interference in high-speed data transmissions.” Spec. p.1, ll. 4-6
(“Technical Field”).
Exemplary Claim
Exemplary independent claim 1 under appeal reads as follows
(emphasis added to contested limitations):
1. A method for reducing timing effects of intersymbol
interference in a high-speed data transmission, comprising steps
of:
establishing a training sequence between a transmitter
physically connected by a conductor to a receiver;
analyzing data received at the receiver;
skewing a timing of transition bits, the transition bits being
sent to the receiver from the transmitter following a stable
data stream sent by the transmitter; and
responsive to analyzing data received at the receiver, adjusting
a variable transition time for the transition bits sent by the
transmitter to optimize timing and reduce timing effects of
intersymbol interference.

1 Throughout this Decision, we refer to the Final Office Action (FOA)
mailed Apr. 13, 2009, the Appeal Brief (App. Br.) filed July 13, 2009, the
Examiner’s Answer (Ans.) mailed Oct. 1, 2009, and the originally-filed
Specification (Spec.).
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Prior Art
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Chen US 4,958,243 Sept. 18, 1990
Crespo US 5,020,078 May 28, 1991
Willekes US 2002/0075824 Al June 20, 2002
Deas US 6,480,021 B2 Nov. 12, 2002
Lakshmipathi US 7,352,819 B2 Apr. 1, 2008
(filed Dec. 24, 2003)
Rejections on Appeal
A. The Examiner has rejected claims 1, 4, 7, 9-11, and 13-19 under
35 U.S.C § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Deas in view of Lakshmipathi
(Ans. 3-8).
B. The Examiner has rejected claim 2 under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Deas and Lakshmipathi in view of Willekes (Ans.
8).
C. The Examiner has rejected claims 5, 6, and 20 under 35 U.S.C
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Deas and Lakshmipathi in view of Chen
(Ans. 9-10).
D. The Examiner has rejected claims 8 and 12 under 35 U.S.C
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Deas and Lakshmipathi in view of
Crespo (Ans. 10-11).
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GROUPING OF CLAIMS
Based upon Appellants’ arguments, we select representative claim 1
to decide this appeal for the claim group consisting of claims 1, 4, 7, 9-11,
13-19. (See App. Br. 12).
To the extent that Appellants have presented separate arguments, we
individually address the various rejections of claims 2; 5, 6, 20; 8, and 12.
(See App. Br. 13-15).
We have only considered arguments raised by Appellants’ in the
Brief. Arguments Appellants could have made, but chose not to make in the
Brief have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2009).
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
When it is necessary to select elements of various teachings in order
to form the claimed invention, we ascertain whether there is any suggestion
or motivation in the prior art to make the selection made by applicant.
Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
In KSR, the Court held the following:
Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated
teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known
to the design community or present in the marketplace; and
the background knowledge possessed by a person having
ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether
there was an apparent reason to combine the known
elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. To
facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit. See
In re Kahn, 441 F. 3d 977, 988 (C.A. Fed. 2006)
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(“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained
by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). As our
precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not seek
out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter
of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the
inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill
in the art would employ.
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
ISSUES
35 U.S.C § 103(a): Claims 1, 4, 7, 9-11, 13-19
Appellants assert their claimed invention is not obvious over Deas in
view of Lakshmipathi (App. Br. 10-13).
Specifically, Appellants contend that the combination of Deas and
Lakshmipathi does not teach or suggest “establishing a training sequence
between a transmitter physically connected by a conductor to a receiver,”
and “skewing a timing of transition bits, the transition bits being sent to the
receiver from the transmitter following a stable data stream sent by the
transmitter,” as recited in independent claim 1. (App. Br. 10).
Further, Appellants contend that “Lakshmipathi cannot be combined
with Deas, because Lakshmipathi teaches away from [the recitation in claim
1 of] ‘between a transmitter physically connected by a conductor to a
receiver.’” (Id.).
Issue 1(a): Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of
Deas and Lakshmipathi teaches or suggests “establishing a training sequence
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between a transmitter physically connected by a conductor to a receiver” as
required by claim 1
Issue 1(b): Did the Examiner err in establishing proper motivation to
combine Lakshmipathi with Deas?
Issue 1(c): Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of
Deas and Lakshmipathi teaches or suggests “skewing a timing of transition
bits, the transition bits being sent to the receiver from the transmitter
following a stable data stream sent by the transmitter,” as required by claim
1?
35 U.S.C § 103(a): Claim 2
Appellants assert their claimed invention is not obvious over Deas and
Lakshmipathi in view of Willekes. (App. Br. 13).
Further in this regard, Appellants contend that Willekes adds nothing
to cure the deficiency of the combination of Deas and Lakshmipathi, and
that the combination of Deas and Lakshmipathi “does not teach or suggest
‘establishing a training sequence between a transmitter physically connected
by a conductor to a receiver.’” (Id.).
Further, Appellants also contend that, because Lakshmipathi teaches
using a wireless network, Lakshmipathi actually teaches away from a
transmitter being physically connected to a receiver such that the
combination of Deas, Lakshmipathi, and Willekes does not render claim 2
unpatentable. (Id.).
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Thus, based upon Appellants’ arguments, we find that Issues 1(a) and
1(b), supra, are dispositive with respect to the rejection of claim 2.
35 U.S.C § 103(a): Claim 5, 6, and 20
Appellants assert their claimed invention is not obvious over Deas and
Lakshmipathi in view of Chen. (App. Br. 14).
Further in this regard, Appellants contend that Chen adds nothing to
cure the deficiency of the combination of Deas and Lakshmipathi, and that
the combination of Deas and Lakshmipathi “does not teach or suggest
‘establishing a training sequence between a transmitter physically connected
by a conductor to a receiver.’” (Id.).
Further, Appellants also contend that, because Lakshmipathi teaches
using a wireless network, Lakshmipathi actually teaches away from a
transmitter being physically connected to a receiver such that the
combination of Deas, Lakshmipathi, and Chen does not render claims 5, 6,
and 20 unpatentable. (Id.).
Thus, based upon Appellants’ arguments, we find that Issues 1(a) and
1(b), supra, are dispositive with respect to the rejection of claim 5, 6, and 20.
35 U.S.C § 103(a): Claim 8 and 12
Appellants assert their claimed invention is not obvious over Deas and
Lakshmipathi in view of Crespo. (App. Br. 15).
Further in this regard, Appellants contend that Crespo adds nothing to
cure the deficiency of the combination of Deas and Lakshmipathi, and that
the combination of Deas and Lakshmipathi “does not teach or suggest
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‘establishing a training sequence between a transmitter physically connected
by a conductor to a receiver.’” (Id.).
Further, Appellants also contend that, because Lakshmipathi teaches
using a wireless network, Lakshmipathi actually teaches away from a
transmitter being physically connected to a receiver such that the
combination of Deas, Lakshmipathi, and Crespo does not render claims 8
and 12 unpatentable. (Id.).
Thus, based upon Appellants’ arguments, we find that Issues 1(a) and
1(b), supra, are dispositive with respect to the rejection of claim 8 and 20.
ANALYSIS
Issue 1(a): We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of
Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with
Appellants’ conclusions with respect to claims 1, 4, 7, 9-11, 13-19, and we
adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in
the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons and rebuttals
set forth by the Examiner (Ans. 3-15; FOA 2-4) in response to Appellants’
Arguments (App. Br. 10-15).
We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner, and find
that Appellants have not provided sufficient persuasive evidence or
argument to persuade us the Examiner’s interpretation that the use of
conventional training sequences in either a wired or wireless configuration is
in error. Accordingly, we find that the Examiner’s position that “[t]he
functionality of a training sequence is independent of the channel used to
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transmit it . . . [a] training squency [sic] can be transmitted through a wired
channel or a wireless channel,” (FOA 4), is not unreasonable.
In further support of the Examiner’s conclusion that establishing a
training sequence is obvious, and in agreement with the Examiner’s
“Response to Argument,” we additionally find that “Deas teaches
transmitting variants of data pattern combinations to obtain adjustment
information before operation starts (see Deas at col. 7, lines 11-18 and col. 4,
lines 61-64). Since the data patterns are known data, the data patterns can be
called training sequence.” (Ans. 12).
As additional support of obviousness, and although not relied upon in
reaching our decision, we find that the prior art of record Crespo (in a
similar field of endeavor) teaches the use of training sequences in a
physically wired configuration. (See Crespo at least at FIG. 4, training
sequence source 83; col. 7, l. 59 through col. 8, l. 41, and col. 9, ll. 27-42).
Thus, on this cumulative basis, we find that the use of conventional
training sequences in either a physically wired or wireless configuration is
known, and the Examiner’s stated motivation2 to modify Deas’ physically
connected (wired configuration) to incorporate Lakshmipathi’s training
sequence (in a wireless configuration) is not unreasonable as it provides an

2 With respect to motivation, the Examiner stated “[i]t would have been
obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the invention was made to
modify the invention of Deas, and to have a training sequence, as taught by
Lakshmipathi, thus allowing for increasing channel capacity, as discussed by
Lakshmipathi (see Lakshmipathi at col.1, lines 10-16).” (See Ans. 5; FOA
6-7).
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“articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” as required by KSR.
(Ans. 5).
Issue 1(b): We have reviewed the Examiner’s stated basis for
motivation to modify the teachings of Deas with Lakshmipathi, and we
disagree with Appellants’ conclusions in this regard, i.e., that “[n]othing in
Lakshmipathi teaches or suggests the existence of a physical connection
between a transmitter and a receiver . . . not only does Lakshmipathi not cure
the deficiencies of Deas, Lakshmipathi teaches away from a combination
with Deas.” (App. Br. 10).
A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary
skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the
path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from
the path that was taken by the applicant. Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta
Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). A
reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for
an alternative invention from amongst options available to the ordinarily
skilled artisan, and the reference does not discredit or discourage
investigation into the invention claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
We do not find that the use of a training sequence is limited to either a
wired or wireless configuration, and we agree with the Examiner’s finding
that “[t]he functionality of a training sequence is independent of the channel
used to transmit it . . . [and it] can be transmitted through a wired channel or
a wireless channel.” (FOA 4).
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Accordingly, we find that the Examiner set forth a rational basis to
combine the teachings of Deas and Lakshmipathi, and the cited art does not
“teach away” from the prior art combination set forth by the Examiner.
Issue 1(c): We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of
Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with
Appellants’ conclusions with respect to claims 1, 4, 7, 9-11, 13-19, and we
adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in
the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons and rebuttals
set forth by the Examiner (Ans. 3-15; FOA 2-4) in response to Appellants’
Arguments (App. Br. 10-15).
We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner, and find
that Deas teaches that data patterns are transmitted from the driver to the
receiver before operation starts (see Ans. 13 (citing Deas at col. 7, ll. 11-18
and col. 4, ll. 61-64)). The timing adjustment of the transmitted data bits
results in a “stable data stream.”
Claim 1 recites, in pertinent part, “skewing a timing of transition bits,
the transition bits being sent to the receiver from the transmitter following a
stable data stream sent by the transmitter.” However, we note that
Appellants’ arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the claim.
(App. Br. 12).
While Appellants’ specification may provide further unrecited details
regarding the relationship between the so-called “transition bits” and “steady
state bits” (e.g., see Spec. at p. 9, ll. 3-15), we will not import these
limitations into the claims. Instead, under the broadest reasonable
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interpretation standard applied to claim 1, we find that the prior art cited by
the Examiner teaches or suggests the claim limitation related to the skewing
of transition bit timing cited above.
Thus, we find that Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred are
unpersuasive, and we find that the combination of the cited art discussed
above is proper and teaches or suggests the limitations in claim 1 that recite
“establishing a training sequence between a transmitter physically connected
by a conductor to a receiver,” and “skewing a timing of transition bits, the
transition bits being sent to the receiver from the transmitter following a
stable data stream sent by the transmitter.”
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 4, 7, 9-
11, and 13-19.
In addition, as the various rejections of claims 2; 5, 6, and 20; and 8
and 12 under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) (identified supra) turn on Issues 1(a) and
1(b) based upon Appellants’ arguments, we sustain the Examiner’s
unpatentability rejection of claims 2, 5, 6, 8, 12, and 20.
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 4, 7, 9-11, and 13-19
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Deas and Lakshmipathi
is affirmed.
The decision of the Examiner to reject claim 2 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Deas and Lakshmipathi in view of
Willekes is affirmed.
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The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 5, 6, and 20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Deas and Lakshmipathi in view
of Chen is affirmed.
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 8 and 12 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Deas and Lakshmipathi in view
of Crespo is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

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