Ex Parte Rippe et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 29, 2017

13628447 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 29, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/628,447 09/27/2012 Christopher M. Rippe CAN-0004 9642
50437 7590 10/03/2017
DUFT BORNSEN & FETTIG, LLP
1526 SPRUCE STREET
SUITE 302
BOULDER, CO 80302
EXAMINER
MONTOYA, OSCHTA I
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2421
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/03/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @ dbflaw. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHRISTOPHER M. RIPPE, JONATHAN E. FARB,
THOMAS M. MORETTO, and TIMOTHY R. WHITTON
(Applicant: Canoe Ventures)
Appeal 2017-002511
Application 13/628,447
Technology Center 2400
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., KEVIN C. TROCK, and
JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judges.
LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—3, 5, 7—9, 11, 13—15, and 17. Claims 4, 6,
10, 12, 16, and 18 have been canceled. See App. Br. 13, 15, 17 (Claims
App’x). We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
Appeal 2017-002511
Application 13/628,447
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s invention generally relates to the insertion of assets, such
as advertisements, into Content On Demand (COD) content and the
synchronization of data relating to asset insertion. Spec. 2. Claim 1,
which is illustrative, reads as follows:
1. A system operable with a plurality of multi system
operators (MSOs) to maintain data associated with asset
insertions in Content On Demand (COD) content, the system
comprising:
a database operable to maintain campaign data of a
plurality of assets;
a processor operable to monitor insertions of at least a
portion of the assets in a first COD content to record campaign
data of the inserted assets; and
a storage module operable to store the recorded campaign
data of the inserted assets in a list,
wherein the processor is further operable to detect a
request for asset insertions in a second COD content, to
determine that the database of campaign data is unavailable for
the asset insertion request of the second COD content, to retrieve
the list of campaign data from the storage module, and, in
response to determining the unavailability of the database, to
direct asset insertions in the second COD content based on the
list of campaign data,
wherein the processor is further operable to record the
insertions of the assets in the second COD content and to
synchronize the database with the recorded asset insertions when
the database comes available to update the campaign data of the
database.
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References
on the following prior art in rejecting the claims:
US 2001/0039550 A1 Nov. 8, 2001
US 2007 /0088801 A1 Apr. 19, 2007
US 2008/0127257 A1 May 29, 2008
Rejections
Claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Levkovitz and
Kvache. Non-Final Act. 3—5.
Claims 3,9, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Levkovitz, Kvache, and Putzolu.1
Non-Final Act. 5—6.
The Examiner relies
Putzolu
Levkovitz et al.
(“Levkovitz”)
Kvache
ANALYSIS
Claim 1
Appellant contends the combination of Levkovitz and Kvache fails to
teach or suggest:
wherein the processor is further operable to detect a
request for asset insertions in a second COD content, to
determine that the database of campaign data is unavailable for
the asset insertion request of the second COD content, to retrieve
the list of campaign data from the storage module, and, in
response to determining the unavailability of the database, to
1 Although the heading of the rejection states the rejection is based on
Levkovitz and Putzolu, the Examiner relies on Kvache in the body of the
rejection. Non-Final Act. 5 (citing Kvache 128). We determine the
omission of Kvache from the heading to be a harmless, typographical error
and treat the rejection as being based on Levkovitz, Kvache, and Putzolu.
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direct asset insertions in the second COD content based on the
list of campaign data,
wherein the processor is further operable to record the
insertions of the assets in the second COD content and to
synchronize the database with the recorded asset insertions when
the database comes available to update the campaign data of the
database,
as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 6—10; Reply Br. 2—3. Appellant argues
Kvache “does not discuss synchronizing a database based on changes that
occurred while the database was offline” but, instead, “discusses a technique
for serially applying an update to a first database, followed by a second
database.” App. Br. 7 (citing Kvache 128). Appellant argues Kvache does
not teach “using either of its Interactive Program Guide (IPG) databases to
synchronize the other.” Id. Appellant further argues Kvache does not
disclose how or why a database could be synchronized based on events that
occurred while the database was offline. Id.
Appellant argues although Levkovitz teaches inserting advertisements
into content and “may even record how/when those advertisements are
inserted into the content,” Levkovitz does not teach that the recorded
information is used to update campaign data in a database that has gone off­
line, as required by claim 1. App. Br. 8. Appellant further argues Levkovitz
fails to teach the disputed limitations because “Levkovitz does not explain
what, if anything, should be done if a database of campaign data becomes
unavailable.” App. Br. 9 (citing Levkovitz || 151, 154).
We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive. Levkovitz
describes an ad server that selectively provides content items, such as
advertisements (e.g., assets), and selects the content items from a content
inventory stored in a memory unit of the ad server. Levkovitz 1152.
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Levkovitz teaches that the memory unit includes both volatile and non­
volatile memory units and that the ad server may serve the content directly
from the volatile memory. Levkovitz 153, 154. Levkovitz further
teaches that the ad server also stores a log tracking the activity or servings
done by the ad server. Levkovitz 1154. As found by the Examiner (Ans. 3
(citing Levkovitz || 132, 154, 171, 189), Levkovitz teaches copying the data
stored in the volatile memory to the non-volatile memory at pre-defmed
intervals to “limit the data loss in case of a power outage which may erase
the volatile memory unit 118” (Levkovitz 1154). The Examiner finds, and
we agree, Kvache teaches redirecting requests to a secondary database when
a primary database is unavailable. Ans. 2 (citing Kvache 128). As such, the
Examiner finds the combined teachings of the references teach or suggest
the disputed limitations. Modifying the system of Levkovitz to include a
backup ad server or database, as taught by Kvache, and performing
synchronization as taught by Levkovitz would have predictably used prior
art elements according to their established functions—an obvious
improvement. KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). The
Examiner’s findings are reasonable because the skilled artisan would “be
able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”
since the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Appellant does not present evidence
that the resulting arrangement was “uniquely challenging or difficult for one
of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior
art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
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Appellant further contends the combination of Levkovitz and Kvache
is improper because “the Examiner has provided no articulated reasoning
that indicates how or why asset integration would be tracked while a
database of campaign data is offline, and has further provided no articulated
reasoning why the database of claim 1 would be updated based on insertions
that occurred while the database was offline.” App. Br. 9.
Despite Appellant’scontention, “[i]n determining whether the subject
matter of a patent claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the
avowed purpose of the patentee controls.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419. Here, the
Examiner finds it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
to modify Levkovitz’ system with the teachings of Kvache “to provide the
media at all times for the benefit of giving good quality of service.” Non-
Final Act. 4. As such, the Examiner has provided articulated reasoning with
a rational underpinning as to why one skilled in the art would have found it
obvious to combine the teachings of Levkovitz and Kvache. See id.
Modifying the system of Levkovitz to include a secondary or backup
database, as taught by Kvache, would have predictably used prior art
elements according to their established functions—an obvious improvement.
See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1; independent claims 7 and 13, which recite corresponding
limitations and are not separately argued with particularity (see App. Br. 10);
and claims 3, 5, 9, 11, 15, and 17, which depend from claims 1, 7, and 13
and are not separately argued with particularity (see id.).
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Claim 2
Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and recites that
the processor is further operable to establish a recording
period for asset insertions, to record campaign data of assets
inserted in a plurality of COD content selections during the
recording period, to determine that the database after the
recording period is unavailable, and to direct subsequent asset
insertions based on the campaign data recorded during the
recording period.
Appellant contends the combination of Levkovitz and Kvache fails to
teach or suggest the limitations recited in claim 2. App. Br. 10—11.
Appellant argues Kvache does not teach or suggest the limitations of claim 2
because Kvache “does not discuss any kind of recording period during
which the insertion of assets into content would be recorded/tracked” and
“also does not explain why such recorded data would be used to direct future
asset insertions.” App. Br. 11 (citing Kvache |28). Appellant argues
Levkovitz does not teach or suggest the limitations of claim 2 because
Levkovitz does not “discuss why recorded campaign data would be used to
direct future asset insertions if a database of campaign data goes offline.”
Id. (citing Levkovitz || 122, 133, 137, 142, 145, 154, 171, 191). Appellant
further argues “[s]ince none of the cited references discuss how or why
recorded asset insertion data would be used to direct future asset insertions, a
person of ordinary skill in the art, even after reading the references above,
would be at a loss to implement this feature.” App. Br. 11.
We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive. Appellant’s
argument regarding Kvache not teaching “any kind of recording period
during which the insertion of assets into content would be recorded/tracked”
(App. Br. 11) is not persuasive because the Examiner relies upon Levkovitz,
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Application 13/628,447
not Kvache, for teaching the claimed “recording period” (Ans. 3 (citing
Levkovitz || 154, 171)). Appellant’s arguments regarding the references
not discussing how or why recorded asset insertion data would be used to
direct future asset insertions are similar to the arguments presented with
respect to the patentability of claim 1 and are unpersuasive for the same
reasons.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 2.
Appellant contends claims 8 and 14, which recite corresponding
limitations, are patentable over Levkovitz and Kvache for reasons similar to
the reasons presented regarding the patentability of claim 2. App. Br. 11.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 8
and 14 for the reasons discussed supra with respect to claim 2.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—3, 5, 7—9, 11, 13—15,
and 17.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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