Ex Parte Riley et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 25, 2017

14527976 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 25, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/527,976 10/30/2014 Matthew T. Riley 6699-00201 1047
35690 7590 09/27/2017
MEYERTONS, HOOD, KIVLIN, KOWERT & GOETZEL, P.C.
P.O. BOX 398
AUSTIN, TX 78767-0398
EXAMINER
HARMON, COURTNEY N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2159
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/27/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent_docketing@intprop.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MATTHEW T. RILEY and QUINLAN J. HOXIE
Appeal 2016-008122
Application 14/527,9761
Technology Center 2100
Before NABEEL U. KHAN, AMBER L. HAGY, and
AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.
KHAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection
of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
1 Appellants identify Swiftype, Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-008122
Application 14/527,976
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
Appellants’ invention relates generally to “[automatically creating
and modifying a search engine for a website.” Abstract.
Exemplary independent claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A method for customizing a search engine, comprising:
a computer server receiving user input from a user
providing a search query to a search engine, wherein the user
input is provided to a first website and wherein the search engine
is specific to a second website, and wherein the user is an
administrator of the second website;
the computer server providing a plurality of search results
of the second website based on the search query, wherein the
plurality of search results are displayed to the user via a first
graphical user interface on the first website;
the computer server receiving input specifying a
modification to the search results, wherein the input is provided
to the first website, wherein the input is based on user input to
the first graphical user interface;
the computer server automatically modifying the search
engine based on the input, wherein the modification to the search
engine is specific to the search query, and wherein the
modification applies to all users of the search engine.
References and Rejections
1. Claims 1, 2, 5, 9, 11, 12, 15, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Frieden (US 2008/0016098 Al,
January 17, 2008) and Sexton, How to put Google Custom Site Search Into
Your Current Website Design. Final Act. 6—22.
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Application 14/527,976
2. Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Frieden, Sexton, and Schramm-Apple (US 2004/0078224
Al, April 22, 2004). Final Act. 22—23.
3. Claims 3, 4, 8, 13, 14, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Frieden, Sexton, and Bostock (US 8,312,009
Bl, November 13, 2012). Final Act. 23—30.
4. Claim 6, 7, 16, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Frieden, Sexton, and Chung (US 2012/054176 Al,
March 1, 2012). Final Act. 30—33.
ANALYSIS
Claim 1
Claim 1 recites a “first graphical user interface” that both displays a
“plurality of search results” and is used to input modifications to the search
results. Claim 1 also recites that the “modification to the search engine is
specific to the search query.” Appellants argue Frieden fails to teach or
suggest these limitations. In particular, Appellants argue that the search
results are displayed in “user interface 102” shown in Figure 1A of Frieden,
while the search results are modified using an “administration console” that
is different than the user interface 102. See App. Br. 8. Appellants further
argue “Frieden does not describe modification of search results that is
specific to a search query.” App. Br. 9. Instead, according to Appellants,
“the administrative console is clearly for modifying the behavior of the
search engine as a whole and not for modification of search results that is
‘specific to the search query.’” Id.
We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. Frieden discloses “[t]he
user interface 102 can be used to display search results including ordered
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Application 14/527,976
search results.” Frieden |12, Figs. 1A, 5. However, it is the administrative
console that is used to modify the search engine by selecting the “search
independent rank” of objects in the system (objects such as documents and
users). Frieden || 13—14, 112—120; Figs. 6A, 6B. We agree with
Appellants that user interface 102 is not the same user interface as the
administrative console and thus does not satisfy the claim limitations
requiring the “first graphical user interface” to both display search results
and to receive input for modifying the search results.
We also agree with Appellants that modifications done through the
administrative console are not “specific to the search query” but rather are to
the search engine more broadly. Indeed, Frieden repeatedly describes these
modifications as modifications to “search independent ranks” of the
system’s objects. Frieden || 13—14. According to Frieden, “[ejach object
(user, document and tag) can have search-independent rank of its quality
which does not depend on any search query.'1'’ Frieden 114 (emphasis
added). “The rank factors can be used to adjust the operation of the system”
and to indicate the order of the search results. Frieden || 112—113. We,
therefore, agree with Appellants that Frieden does not teach or suggest
“modification to the search engine [that] is specific to the search query,” as
recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 1 and independent claims 11 and 20, which contain
substantially similar limitations and were rejected on similar bases. See
Final Act. 11—21. The dependent claims stand with their aforementioned
independent claims.
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Application 14/527,976
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—20 is reversed.
REVERSED
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