Ex Parte Reeser

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 3, 2017

11618253 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 3, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/618,253 12/29/2006 Brad T. Reeser GP-307979-6-OST-ALS 5517
60770 7590 04/03/2017
General Motors Corporation
c/o REISING ETHINGTON P.C.
P.O. BOX 4390
TROY, MI 48099-4390
EXAMINER
MINCARELLI, JAN P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/03/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BRAD T. REESER
Appeal 2015-0016751
Application 11/618,2532
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. FETTING, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1—15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references Appellant’s’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
August 4, 2014) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed December 1, 2014), and
the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed October 1, 2014) and Final Office
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed February 19, 2014).
2 Appellant identifies General Motors LLC as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2015-001675
Application 11/618,253
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention “relates to techniques for wirelessly
collecting vehicle information and providing that information to the vehicle
owner or other authorized person” (Spec. 12).
Claims 1 and 10, reproduced below, are the independent claims on
appeal and representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of providing fleet drivers with vehicle
information and messages from a fleet manager, comprising the
steps of:
(a) receiving at a plurality of fleet vehicles a message from
a fleet manager that is sent to each of the plurality of fleet
vehicles over a wireless cellular or satellite system;
(b) accessing vehicle data from each of the plurality of
fleet vehicles using a telematics unit on each of the vehicles in
response to receiving the message from the fleet manager;
(c) wirelessly transmitting the accessed vehicle data from
the telematics units to a central data system in response to
receiving the message from the fleet manager;
(d) constructing, for each of the fleet vehicles, a
notification email message containing the fleet manager’s
message and at least some of the accessed vehicle data obtained
from that fleet vehicle, wherein the notification email message is
constructed using a predefined template selected based on
vehicle type; and
(e) sending the notification email message for each fleet
vehicle to that fleet vehicle’s driver via an electronic messaging
system, wherein the notification email message includes both
static content obtained from the selected predefined template as
well as dynamic content.
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10. A method of providing fleet vehicle information to
a fleet manager, comprising the steps of:
(a) enrolling fleet vehicles as a group into an email
notification system that enables a fleet manager to exchange
information with the fleet vehicles;
(b) obtaining a latitude and longitude coordinate pair at
each of a plurality of the fleet vehicles using a GPS unit on the
vehicle;
(c) transmitting the latitude and longitude coordinate pair
from the vehicle to a central data system that is part of the email
notification system;
(d) constructing an email notification message using the
latitude and longitude coordinate pair transmitted to the central
data system such that the email notification message is formatted
into a plurality of regions one of which provides static content
identifying vehicle specific information whereas another region
provides dynamic content; and
(e) sending the email notification message to the fleet
manager using an email message generating system that is part
of the email notification system.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1—15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
statutory subject matter.
Claims 1—3, 6, 7, and 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Vyas (US 2004/0073468 Al, pub. Apr. 15, 2004),
Kapolka (US 2005/0060070 Al, pub. Mar. 17, 2005), and Lloyd
(US 2003/0140118 Al, pub. July 24, 2003).
Claims 4 and 5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Vyas, Kapolka, Lloyd, and Breen (US 2007/0143013 Al, pub. June 21,
2007).
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Vyas, Kapolka, Lloyd, and Lightner (US 7,174,243 Bl, iss. Feb. 6, 2007).
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Claims 10-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Breen, Vyas, and Lloyd.
Claims 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Breen, Vyas, Lloyd, and Lightner.
ANALYSIS
Non-Statutory Subject Matter
Appellant argues claims 1—15 as a group (Reply Br. 1 4). We select
independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall
with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[ljaws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS
Banklnt’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of these concepts.” Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct.
at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts,” id., e.g., to an
abstract idea. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the
inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the
elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered
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combination”’ to determine whether there are additional elements that
‘“transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice
Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. We, therefore, look to whether
the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.
See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In this regard, the Federal Circuit has instructed that claims are to be
considered in their entirety to determine “whether their character as a whole
is directed to excluded subject matter.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2015)).
The Examiner finds here that claims 1—15 are directed to a method for
collecting data regarding vehicles within a vehicle fleet and providing at
least some of that information to the vehicle owner or other authorized
person (Ans. 4). The Examiner concludes that this amounts to a
fundamental economic/business practice of asset management and that
claims 1—15 are, therefore, directed to an abstract idea that is not patent-
eligible (id.).
Appellant points to step (d) of claim 1, which calls for constructing a
notification email message containing vehicle data using a predefined
template selected based on vehicle type and to a substantially similar email
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construction step in independent claim 10 (Reply Br. 2). And Appellant
argues that the email construction steps “are not fundamental concepts —
economic or otherwise — that would render these claims abstract” (id.). Yet
the fact that the email messages are formulated in a particular way does not
distract from the fact that the claims, when considered as a whole, are
directed to “wirelessly collecting vehicle information and providing that
information to the vehicle owner or other authorized person” (see Spec. 12),
i.e. to an abstract idea.
We also are not persuaded that the specific way in which the email
messages are formulated constitutes a meaningful limitation sufficient to
transform the nature of claim 1 into a patent-eligible application of the
abstract idea (Reply Br. 3—4). There is no indication that the email
construction requires any non-conventional components or a non-
con ventional arrangement of known conventional components; nor does
Appellant otherwise point to any inventive concept related to the way the
email messages are constructed.
Appellant asserts that “[rjather than identifying a generic computer to
implement its steps, claim 1 recites telematics units in fleet vehicles, a
central data system, and an electronic messaging system all of which are
specific computer hardware” (id. at 3), and that claim 10 similarly recites
specific computer hardware, i.e., an email message generating system, a
GPS unit on a vehicle, and a central data system (id. at 4). Yet we find no
indication in the Specification that any specialized hardware is required.
Nor does Appellant point to anything in the Specification to warrant a
different view.
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We are not persuaded for the reasons set forth above that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2—15, which fall with
claim 1.
Obviousness
Independent Claim 1 and Dependent Claims 2, 3, 6, 7, and 9
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the
combination of Vyas, Kapolka, and Lloyd does not disclose or suggest
“constructing ... a notification email message . . . using a predefined
template selected based on vehicle type,” as recited in claim 1 (App. Br. 5—
7). Instead, we agree with, and adopt the Examiner’s findings and rationale
as set forth at pages 6—11 of the Answer.
Vyas is directed to a system and method for managing a fleet of
vehicles, e.g., automobiles (Vyas 148), and discloses that the system allows
a user to download or review status information for any or all of a subset of
the machines {id. at | 52; see also id. at 1115 and Figs. 10-33 (displaying
graphic user interfaces for accessing the system)). Vyas discloses that the
system also provides the user with alerts or notifications, e.g., product
maintenance recommendations, via, e.g., pagers or emails {id. at || 52, 69),
and further discloses taking vehicle type into account in assessing whether to
issue a product maintenance recommendation email {see id. at || 98—99).
Kapolka is directed to a system and method for remote vehicle
diagnostics, telematics, monitoring, configuring, and reprogramming
(Kapolka, Abstract), and discloses that a vehicle server translates user
requests into formats specific to the vehicle to which the request is directed
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(id. at | 61). Thus, for example, the vehicle server detects the vehicle type,
the vehicle bus type, and the vehicle component or sub-component that is
intended as the message recipient, and then packages the message according
to the specific communication protocol mandated by the recipient
component (id.).
Lloyd discloses the use of templates for generating graphical user
interfaces, and discloses that the user interface includes both static content,
i.e., information that is consistent between multiple persons or entities and
does not change, and dynamic content that is unique to a particular
individual (Lloyd, 1118;Fig. 17).
In rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner relies on
Vyas as disclosing the construction of email notification messages
containing vehicle data, including accounting for vehicle type (see Ans. 7
(citing Vyas 52, 69, 98—99)) and on Kapolka as disclosing the translation
of user requests into formats specific to the vehicle to which the request is
directed, e.g., a particular vehicle type (see id. (citing Kapolka 161)). The
Examiner cites Figures 10-33 of Vyas as disclosing graphical user interfaces
including both static and dynamic content but the Examiner acknowledges
that Vyas does not disclose the use of templates for generating graphical
user interfaces, and cites Lloyd to cure this deficiency (see id. at 7—8). The
Examiner then concludes that it would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellant’s invention to “construct a
predefined template (disclosed by Alexander Lloyd) based on vehicle type
(obvious in view of Kapolka’s and Vyas’s disclosure of vehicle type as one
means of constructing messages or distinguishing a specific vehicle,
respectively) into an email notification message (disclosed by Vyas)” and
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that such a person would have been motivated to “construct a template using
vehicle type because it avoids ‘the necessity of having to create a unique
[email notification message] from the ground up for each’ vehicle type
(see Alexander Lloyd paragraph 0007)” (Final Act. 8—9).
Appellant acknowledges that Vyas discloses providing vehicle status
information, e.g., product maintenance recommendations, to a user via email
(App. Br. 6). But Appellant argues that nothing in Vyas discloses or
suggests that its system constructs these emails by selecting a predefined
template based on vehicle type (id.); that neither Kapolka nor Lloyd cures
this deficiency because Kapolka “determines vehicle type so that it can
format messages sent to a vehicle in a way that they are understandable by
the vehicle components that are to receive it” (id. at 6—7); and that Lloyd has
nothing to do with email message templates (id. at 7).
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive at least because Appellant
effectively argues the references individually. “Non-obviousness cannot be
established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based
upon the teachings of a combination of references.” See In re Merck & Co.,
800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Appellant argues that Kapolka’s disclosure of “vehicle type” relates to
formatting a message to that vehicle so that the message can be understood
(see App. Br. 6—7). Yet the Examiner cites Kapolka only for its disclosure
of using “vehicle type” as a factor when deciding how to construct a
message, e.g., the email message disclosed in Vyas (Ans. 10). As for
Appellant’s assertion that Lloyd has nothing to do with email message
templates, the Examiner relies on Vyas, not Lloyd for the concept of
constructing emails (id. at 11). Lloyd discloses the use of graphical user
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interface templates, and the Examiner reasons that a person of ordinary skill
in the art would appreciate that the disclosure of Lloyd could be used in the
context of generating emails (id.).
In the absence of further explanation and/or specific, technical
arguments as to why the Examiner’s proposed modification is more than the
predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions,
we find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive of Examiner error.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We also sustain the rejection of dependent
claims 2, 3, 6, 7, and 9, which are not argued separately except based on
their dependence from claim 1.
Dependent Claims 4, 5, and 8
Claims 4, 5, and 8 depend, directly or indirectly, from independent
claim 1. Appellant does not present any arguments in support of the
patentability of these dependent claims except to argue that the additional
references relied on in rejecting the claims do not cure the alleged deficiency
in the rejection of claim 1 (App. Br. 7—8).
We are not persuaded for the reasons set forth above that the
Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 4, 5, and 8.
Independent Claim 10 and Dependent Claims 11—13
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because
the combination of Breen, Vyas, and Lloyd does not disclose or suggest the
transmission of latitude and longitude coordinates from the vehicle to a
central data system and then constructing an email message using those
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coordinates, i.e., limitations (b)-(e), as recited in claim 10 (App. Br. 8—10).
Instead, we agree with, and adopt the Examiner’s findings and rationale as
set forth at pages 12—19 of the Answer.
In rejecting claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner relies on
Breen as disclosing the transmission of latitude and longitude coordinates
from the vehicle to a central data system (Final Act. 17—18). Breen
discloses, in its Background section, that prior art tracking and monitoring
systems were known at the time that employed a geo-locator, e.g., a GPS
receiver, to determine the location of an asset on a scheduled basis and
transmit the location to a central station (Breen 14). Breen also discloses
that “location data” can be in the form of latitude/longitude coordinate pairs
(id. at 130).
The Examiner acknowledges that Breen does not disclose the sending
of an email notification; that the central data system is part of the email
notification system; or that the email notification message is formatted into a
plurality of regions one of which provides static content identifying vehicle
specific information whereas another region provides dynamic content
(Final Act. 18). The Examiner relies on Vyas and Lloyd to cure these
deficiencies (id. at 18—21). And the Examiner concludes that it would have
been obvious to a person of ordinary skill at the time of Appellant’s
invention to (1) combine Vyas’s email notification system with the method
for geolocation of a fleet of vehicles disclosed in Breen in order to quickly
and efficiently inform a fleet manager of the location of each vehicle in the
manager’s (id. at 19—20) and (2) incorporate the feature of generating an
interface with both static and dynamic areas (as disclosed in Lloyd) into
Vyas’s email notification system to avoid the need to create a unique
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presentation for each user, e.g., vehicle type (id. at 21). The Examiner, thus,
concludes that the proposed combination of Breen, Vyas, and Lloyd is no
more than a combination of old elements and yields a predictable result (id.
at 19-21).
Appellant argues that Breen teaches a geofencing system in which a
tracked asset transmits an alert to a central station when it cannot locate
itself within locally-stored geofences, and that the Breen system is designed
expressly to avoid the costly transmission of location information, such as
latitude and longitude coordinates, to a central facility (App. Br. 8).
Appellant, thus, maintains that the Breen system teaches the opposite of
what is recited in claim 10 (id.).
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Regardless of the nature of
the Breen system itself, Breen plainly discloses in the “Background” section
of the publication that it was known in art at the time of Breen’s invention
for a vehicle to transmit its location data to a central data system.
Appellant’s further argument that neither Breen nor Vyas discloses or
suggests an email notification message system formatted as recited in
claim 10 is substantially similar to Appellant’s argument with respect to
claim 1 (App. Br. 11—12). Appellant argues that Lloyd does not disclose or
suggest that its static and dynamic data are in any way related to the
construction of email message. But Appellant does not explain why the
motivation cited by the Examiner is insufficient or why the proposed
modification described by the Examiner is more than the predictable use of
prior art elements according to their established functions.
Based on the present record, we are not persuaded of Examiner error.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of
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independent claim 10, and dependent claims 13—15, which are not argued
separately.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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