Ex Parte Raikula

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 10, 2018

14102389 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 10, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/102,389 12/10/2013
42532 7590 07/12/2018
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
ONE INTERNATIONAL PLACE
BOSTON, MA 02110
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Ronald Raikula
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
FID-085 6352
EXAMINER
MINCARELLI, JAN P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/12/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
DocketingPatentBoston @proskauer.com
oandrews@proskauer.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RONALD RAIKULA
Appeal2017-002352
Application 14/102,3 89 1
Technology Center 3600
Before JASON V. MORGAN, NABEEL U. KHAN, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 5, 7-17, 20, and 22-32, which are
all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 FMR LLC ("Appellant") is the applicant, as provided for under
37 C.F.R. § 1.46, and is also identified in the Brief as the real party in
interest. See Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal2017-002352
Application 14/102,389
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Invention
Appellant's invention relates to "making charitable contributions
automatically from multiple funding sources associated with a donor."
Spec. ,r 1. 2 Namely, the invention "allow[ s] for a donor to use his or her
mobile device to initiate one or more donation transactions that link to
multiple funding sources associated with the donor, including emergent
funding sources like a charitable giving account." Spec. ,r 3.
Exemplary Claim
Claims 1 and 16 are independent. Claim 1 is exemplary and is
reproduced below.
1. A computerized method for making a charitable
contribution, the method comprising:
scanning, by a reader coupled to a mobile device, a
barcode;
converting, by an application executing on the mobile
device, the barcode into a transaction identifier associated with
a charitable contribution transaction;
generating, by the application executing on the mobile
device, a request to initiate the charitable contribution
transaction, the request including the transaction identifier and a
user identifier stored on the mobile device that is different from
the transaction identifier;
2 Throughout this Decision, we refer to: (1) Appellant's Specification, filed
December 10, 2013 ("Spec."); (2) the Final Office Action ("Final Act."),
mailed June 15, 2015; (3) the Appeal Brief, filed April 4, 2016 and the
Supplemental Appeal Brief, filed August 16, 2016 ("Appeal Br."); (4) the
Examiner's Answer ("Ans."), mailed September 28, 2016; and (5) the Reply
Brief ("Reply Br."), filed November 28, 2016.
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receiving, by a server computing device, the request to
initiate the charitable contribution transaction from the mobile
device;
determining, by the server computing device, a plurality
of characteristics associated with the charitable contribution
transaction from a database of pre-encoded charitable
contribution transactions based upon the transaction identifier,
the plurality of characteristics including a predefined
contribution amount and a processing fee amount to be
deducted from the predefined contribution amount;
identifying, by the server computing device, a user based
upon the user identifier;
determining, by the server computing device, whether the
user is associated with an existing charitable giving account;
automatically establishing, by the server computing
device, a charitable giving account for the user if the user is not
associated with an existing charitable giving account;
automatically approving, by the server computing device,
the charitable contribution transaction without requiring donor
authorization;
charging, by the server computing device, a first portion
of the contribution amount to a first account associated with the
user and a second portion of the contribution amount to a
second account associated with the user, wherein the first
account is not a charitable giving account;
depositing, by the server computing device, the first
portion of the contribution amount into the charitable giving
account; and
transmitting, by the server computing device, payment
instructions to a computing device associated with a recipient
charity, the payment instructions including instructions to debit
the first portion of the contribution amount from the newly-
established charitable giving account and instructions to waive
the processing fee amount if the processing fee amount is
greater than zero.
Appeal Br., Claims Appendix.
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REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art in rejecting the
claims on appeal:
Gruber
Marble
Merriman
Hicks et al. ("Hicks")
Kalinichenko et al.
("Kalinichenko ")
Grigg et al. ("Grigg")
US 2006/0212390 Al
US 2009/0192873 Al
US 2013/0103603 Al
US 2013/0151433 Al
US 2013/0304644 Al
US 2014/0006259 Al
REJECTIONS
Sept. 21, 2006
July 30, 2009
Apr. 25, 2013
June 13, 2013
Nov. 14, 2013
Jan.2,2014
Claims 1, 2, 5, 7-17, 20, and 22-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a), as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Final Act. 2--4.
Claims 1, 2, 5, 7-17, 20, and 22-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 5-8.
Claims 1, 2, 7-10, 12-17, 22-25, and 27-30 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Merriman,
Gruber, Kalinichenko, and Marble. Final Act. 8-25.
Claims 5 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Merriman, Gruber, Kalinichenko,
Marble, and Grigg. Final Act. 25-27.
Claims 11 and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Merriman, Gruber, Kalinichenko,
Marble, and Hicks. Final Act. 25-29.
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Claims 31 and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Merriman, Gruber, Kalinichenko,
Marble, and Hosny. Final Act. 29--32.
Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and
the issues raised by Appellant. Arguments not made are waived. See MPEP
§ 1205.02 (9th ed., rev. 7; Oct. 2015); 37 C.F.R. §§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) and
4I.39(a)(l) (2015).
ANALYSIS
Rejection Under§ 101
Issue: Whether the Examiner properly rejects the claims under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-patentable subject matter?
Appellant argues the claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 9. 3 We select
independent claim 1 as exemplary of Appellant's arguments for claims 2, 5,
7-17, 20, and 22-32. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) (2015).
The Examiner determines claim 1 is directed to a fundamental
economic practice as well as a method of organizing human activities, and,
thus, recites an abstract idea. See Final Act. 6-7; Ans. 4. The Examiner also
determines the claim does not include "any element or combination of
elements ... sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly
more than the abstract idea itself." Final Act. 6.
Appellant presents several arguments against the§ 101 rejection. We
do not find Appellant's arguments persuasive. The Examiner has provided a
comprehensive response to Appellant's arguments supported by a
3 The Appeal Brief lacks page numbers so all page numbers cited herein are
estimates.
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preponderance of evidence. See Ans. 3-8. Thus, we adopt the Examiner's
findings and conclusions. See Final Act. 5-8; Ans. 3-8.
Section 101 provides that "[ w ]hoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
provision, however, "'contains an important implicit exception: "Laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2116 (2013) ). The "abstract ideas" category embodies the longstanding rule
that an idea, by itself, is not patentable. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting
Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
In Alice, the Supreme Court sets forth an analytical "framework for
distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts." 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296-97 (2012)). The first step in
the analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts," such as an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2355.
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second
step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claims "individually
and 'as an ordered combination"' to determine whether there are additional
elements that "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
application." Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298, 1297). In other words,
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the second step is to "search for an 'inventive concept'-i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself."' Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (brackets in original) (quoting
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). The prohibition against patenting an abstract idea
'"cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the [abstract idea]
to a particular technological environment' or adding 'insignificant
postsolution activity."' Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 610-11 (2010)
(quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981)).
Initially, the Examiner determines and we agree that independent
claim 1 recites steps for a method. See Final Act. 6. As such, we agree with
the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to a statutory class of invention within
35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. Turning to the first step of the Alice inquiry, we must
determine whether claim 1, being directed to a statutory class of invention,
nonetheless falls within a judicial exception. We agree with the Examiner
that "[ f]acilitating a payment to a charitable organization is ... an abstract
idea because it is both a fundamental economic activity as well as a method
of organizing human activities" (Final Act. 6-7) and because such activities
fit squarely within the realm of abstract ideas. Appellant, in tum, does not
rebut the Examiner's determination that claim 1 is directed to a fundamental
economic activity or a method of organizing human activities, or both. See
Appeal Br. 9-13.
Rather, Appellant argues claim 1 is not abstract because "[a]s in
Enfzsh, the claims presented herein, when viewed as a whole, are directed to
a technical solution unique to computerized, automated payment
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transaction." Reply Br. 3 (citing Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
This argument is unpersuasive because claim 1, here, is unlike the
claims in Enfzsh. In Enfzsh, our reviewing court relied on the distinction
made in Alice between computer-functionality improvements and uses of
existing computers as tools in aid of processes focused on "abstract ideas"
(in Alice, as in so many other § 101 cases, the abstract ideas being the
creation and manipulation of legal obligations such as contracts involved in
fundamental economic practices). Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335-36; see also
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358-59. In Enfzsh, the§ 101 challenge was found
persuasive at the first step of the Alice analysis because the claims at issue
focused, not on asserted advances in uses to which existing computer
capabilities could be put, but on a specific improvement-a particular
database technique-in how computers could carry out one of their basic
functions of storage and retrieval of data. Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335-36.
Here we are unpersuaded because the present case is different from
Enfzsh. Specifically, the focus of claim 1 is not on an improvement in
computer-functionality, as in Enfzsh, but on an abstract idea that uses a
computer as a tool to perform a method facilitating payment to a charitable
organization.
Turning to the second step of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner
determines, and we agree, that the claimed structural elements "( e.g., a
mobile device scanning a code and a server computing device that performs
the payment processing functions), when taken in combination with the
functional elements of creating a financial account and processing a payment
to a charitable organization, together do not offer 'significantly more' than
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the abstract idea itself." Final Act. 7. The Examiner also correctly finds that
"Applicant's specification discloses mere general purpose computing
equipment for performing the steps of the invention." Final Act. 7 ( citing
Spec. ,r,r 57, 62). "Thus, the claims require no more than a generic mobile
device and a generic computer server to perform generic computer functions
that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously
known to the industry." Final Act. 7-8.
Appellant argues claim 1, like the claims in DDR Holdings, recites
"an ordered combination of elements that overcome a problem arising in the
technical field of the invention, in this case automated and electronic
payment processing of charitable contributions, including establishment of a
giving account, using mobile devices." Appeal Br. 12 (citing DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(finding an inventive concept in the modification of the conventional
mechanics behind website display to produce a dual-source integrated hybrid
display)). Appellant further argues that "[s]imilar to the claimed invention
in DDR, Applicant's claims recite elements that are necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in
the context of making charitable contributions in a computerized
environment using mobile devices." Id.
We disagree. The solution offered by Appellant's claim 1 is not
rooted in any novel computer technology, as evidenced by claim 1 's
recitation of "a generic mobile device and a generic computer server to
perform generic computer functions." Final Act. 7-8. Likewise,
Appellant's Specification identifies a problem that "[t]raditionally, making
charitable contributions has been a slow and inefficient process that requires
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donors to submit funds manually or "without effective control over those
source( s) from which the charitable donation is drawn" if the charities
"allow donors to submit contributions electronically." Spec. ,r 2.
Appellant's claimed invention seeks to solve the identified problem by
"allow[ing] for a donor to use his or her mobile device to initiate one or
more donation transactions that link to multiple funding sources associated
with the donor." Spec. ,r 3.
This problem is a business problem, not a technical problem. Claim 1
recites a specific way and specific context for facilitating charitable
contributions from different accounts-namely, by "charging, by the server
computing device, a first portion of the contribution amount to a first
account associated with the user and a second portion of the contribution
amount to a second account associated with the user." See claim 1, Spec.,
,r,r 37, 45, 49. While these steps limit the scope of the abstract idea, the
limitations are not sufficient to transform Appellant's otherwise patent-
ineligible abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. Fundamentally,
the solution Appellant offers is "an entrepreneurial, rather than a
technological, one." DDR, 773 F.3d at 1265 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
Appellant argues claim 1 is nonetheless patentable because it does
"not monopolize or preempt others from employing similar methods for the
alleged abstract ideas of 'making a charitable contribution' or 'creation of a
charitable giving account."' Appeal Br. 14 ( citing Tuxis Technologies, LLC
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2014 WL 4382446 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014)). We are
unpersuaded, however, because Appellant's cited case is not controlling law
and does not have legal weight commensurate with guidance from the
Federal Circuit, which is our reviewing court. Rather than preemption, the
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Federal Circuit instructs that the Alice two-step analysis is the test for
whether claims are statutory. "While preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). "Where a patent's claims are deemed
only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework,
as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made
moot." Id.
Appellant argues claim 1, when considered as an ordered
combination, "provide[ s] unconventional steps that confine [ the claim] to
particular computer hardware configured for a particular useful application,
like the claims in Bascom. Reply Br. 5 ( citing Bascom Global Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349--52 (Fed. Cir.
2016)).
We disagree because claim 1 's invocation of "a generic mobile device
and a generic computer server to perform generic computer functions" (Final
Act. 6) does not transform the claimed subject matter into a patent-eligible
application. Claim 1 does not require any nonconventional computer
components, or even a "non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of
known, conventional pieces," but merely calls for performance of the
claimed functions "on a set of generic computer components." Bascom, 827
F.3d at 1349--52. Nor does claim 1 require an inventive distribution of
functionality within a network, thus distinguishing the claims at issue from
those in Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350 (finding sufficient inventive concept in
"the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the
end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user").
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Appellant further argues "Federal Circuit decisions (McR04 and
Amdocs5) support a finding that Applicant's claims are patent eligible"
because claim 1 recites "certain computing devices arranged and operating
in a narrow, unconventional configuration that results in more efficient
transaction processing." Reply Br. 5 (footnote numbers changed).
We are unpersuaded because Appellant fails to provide evidence
demonstrating how the claimed computing devices are arranged and
operating in a narrow, unconventional configuration.
Because Appellant's representative claim 1 is directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract concept and does not recite something "significantly
more" under the second prong of the Alice analysis, we sustain the
Examiner's rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to non-patentable subject matter in light of Alice and its progeny. The
rejection of claims 2, 5, 7-17, and 22-32, which are not argued separately, is
sustained for the same reasons.
Rejection Under§ 112, first paragraph
Issue: Whether the Examiner errs in finding Appellant's
Specification (the "Specification") lacks written support for the limitation
"automatically establishing, by the server computing device, a charitable
giving account for the user if the user is not associated with an existing
charitable giving account," as recited in claim 1.
4McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
5 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300 (Fed.
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017)
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The Examiner finds the Specification lacks written support for the
limitation "automatically establishing, by the server computing device, a
charitable giving account for the user if the user is not associated with an
existing charitable giving account," as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 2--4.
Specifically, the Examiner finds:
The only support for the newly amended steps and limitations is
the following sentence in paragraph 52 of Applicant's
specification: "The server computing device can charge the
contribution amount to an alternative funding source (e.g., a
credit card), allocate those funds into a new charitable giving
account, and then distribute the funds from the charitable giving
account to the recipient charity." Therefore, Applicant fails to
disclose any specifics about creating a charitable giving account
other than that one conclusory sentence.
Final Act. 3 ( citing ,r 52).
Appellant argues the Specification "is sufficiently detailed such that
one of ordinary skill in the art would understand both how to create an
account and why creation of the account is important in solving the
problems addressed by the invention." Appeal. Br. 18 (citing ,r,r 51-53).
Whether a specification complies with the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), is a question of fact and is assessed on a
case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Paulding, Inc., 230
F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935
F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The disclosure, as originally filed, need
not literally describe the claimed subject matter (i.e., using the same terms or
in haec verba) in order to satisfy the written description requirement. But
the Specification must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the
art that, as of the filing date, Appellant was in possession of the claimed
invention. See Purdue, 230 F.3d at 1323. A written-description question
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often arises when an applicant, after filing a patent application, subsequently
adds "new matter" to the claims not present in the original application. Vas-
Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560. When an applicant amends a claim to introduce
new elements or limitations or adds claims during prosecution, for example,
the newly claimed subject matter must find written description support in the
original specification. Id.
We find Appellant's argument unpersuasive. The limitation at issue
was newly added by amendment during prosecution and lacks express
support in the original Specification. See Amendment filed May 12, 2014.
Although the portion of the Specification cited by Appellant discloses
allocating credit card funds into a new account, it does not explicitly disclose
"automatically establishing the new account." Appellant, although block-
quoting paragraphs 51-53, provides no further explanation. See Appeal
Br. 15-1 7. Appellant, therefore, also fails to demonstrate that the
Specification provides implicit or inherent support for automatically
establishing a charitable giving account, as set forth in claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1, under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a). For similar reasons, we also sustain the Examiner's
rejection of claims 2, 5, 7-17, and 22-32 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
Rejections Under§ 103
Issue: Whether the Examiner errs in finding claim 1 is obvious over
the combination of Merriman, Gruber, Kalinichenko, and Marble.
Appellant argues "the methodology for opening a financial account
that is taught in Kalinichenko would be undesirable for integration into
Applicant's claimed invention." Appeal Br. 20. "As such, one of ordinary
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skill in the art would not look to Kalinichenko' s method of opening a
financial account via a mobile device as a way to solve the deficiencies of
Merriman and Gruber, and Applicant submits that the combination ...
cannot be used to render Applicant's claims obvious." Appeal Br. 21.
Appellant's argument that Kalinichenko's methodology "would be
undesirable for integration into Applicant's claimed invention" (Appeal
Br. 20) is unpersuasive because whether a reference is desirable for
integration into the claimed invention is not the standard for obviousness.
Rather, the standard for obviousness is whether a skilled artisan would have
had reason to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the
claimed invention. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d
1186, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Appellant's argument that "one of ordinary
skill in the art would not look to Kalinichenko' s method of opening a
financial account via a mobile device as a way to solve the deficiencies of
Merriman and Gruber" is unpersuasive because Appellant does not
specifically address the Examiner's rationale for combining the references
and so fails to persuade us the Examiner's articulated reasoning lacks some
rational underpinning. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds [require] some articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness") ( cited with approval in KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398,418 (2007)).
Next, Appellant argues "Merriman, Gruber and Kalinichenko further
fail to teach ... the element of 'payment instructions including instructions
to debit the first portion of the contribution amount from the newly-
established charitable giving account and instructions to waive the
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processing fee amount if the processing fee amount is greater than zero'"
because Marble "does not teach automatically establishing a charitable
giving account as set forth in Applicant's claims." Appeal Br. 21.
Appellant's argument unpersuasively attacks Marble individually
when the Examiner's rejection is based on the combination of Merriman,
Gruber, Kalinichenko, and Marble. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) ("Non-obviousness cannot be established
by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the
teachings of a combination of references."). In particular, the argument is
unpersuasive because Appellant does not address the Examiner's
combination of Merriman, which the Examiner finds teaches "payment
instructions to a computing device associated with a recipient charity" (See
Final Act. 11 ), Gruber, which the Examiner finds teaches "payment
instructions including instructions to debit the first portion of the
contribution amount from the newly-established charitable giving account"
(See Final Act. 12), and Marble, which the Examiner finds teaches
"instructions to waive the processing fee amount if the processing fee
amount is greater than zero" (See Final Act. 17).
For the reasons discussed, Appellant has not shown error in the
Examiner's factual findings or conclusion of obviousness. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of independent claim 1.
Independent claims 16 and 30 and dependent claims 2, 5, 7-15, 17, 20, 22-
29, 31, and 32 are not argued separately and so the rejections of these claims
are sustained for the same reasons given for independent claim 1. See
Appeal Br. 22.
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 7-17, 20, and
22-32 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 7-17, 20, and
22-32 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1, 2, 5, 7-17, 20, and
22-32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (1) (iv).
AFFIRMED
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