Ex Parte Racha et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 31, 201714489941 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/489,941 09/18/2014 Srini Racha 83474805 7737 28395 7590 04/04/2017 RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER 1000 TOWN CENTER LEE, SIU M 22ND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2632 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/04/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing @brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SRINI RACHA and DAVID MARVIN GERSABECK Appeal 2016-007457 Application 14/489,941 Technology Center 2600 Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2016-007457 Application 14/489,941 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—20, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. THE INVENTION The claims are directed to selective mobile application lockout based on determining speed and interface-usage thresholds are exceeded. Spec., Title, claim 1. Claim 1, reproduced below with an argued limitation emphasized in italics, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A system comprising: a processor, in communication with a mobile device interface, configured to: receive a mobile device speed; determine if the mobile device speed is above a predetermined threshold; determine if an interface-usage threshold of the interface has been exceeded', and lock out a foreground application from use if the mobile device speed is above the predetermined threshold and the interface-usage threshold has been exceeded. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Langberg et al. US 5,852,630 Dec. 22, 1998 (“Langberg”) Schlesener et al. US 2010/0113073 Al May 6, 2010 (Schlesener”) 2 Appeal 2016-007457 Application 14/489,941 REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: Claims 1—15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schlesener. Final Act. 4—9. Claims 16—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schlesener and Langberg. Final Act. 10-13. APPELLANTS’ CONTENTION According to Appellants, Schlesener locks out texting capabilities based on detecting poor typing proficiency and, although arguably teaching an “interface-related-usage,” fails to teach or suggest “interface-usage” or the “related interface-usage” threshold, as recited by claim 1. App. Br. 5—6. ISSUE ON APPEAL Whether the Examiner erred in interpreting the disputed phrase “interface usage threshold” to include Schlesener’s threshold of number of uses of a backspace function and frequency of using the backspace function. CONTENTIONS AND ANALYSIS Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2—13) and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (Ans. 2—5) and concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following points for emphasis. 3 Appeal 2016-007457 Application 14/489,941 Appellants argue the Examiner’s interpretation of the phrase “interface usage threshold” is overly broad.1 App. Br. 5—6. Appellants note the steps of Schlesener relied upon by the Examiner for teaching the disputed interface usage threshold are based on a determination of poor typing ability indicated by excessive misspellings or backspacing. App. Br. 6. “[Appellants] point[] out, however, that the basis in Schlesener for preventing interface usage is that a user is a poor typist, not the interface- usage exceeding a threshold.” Id. Appellants argue, because “[t]he claims base lockout on over-use of interface” rather than typing skills as per Schlesener, the methods produce different results. Id. For example, according to Appellants, a fast, accurate typist would not be locked-out by Schlesener’s method, but would be by that of Appellants. Id. Furthermore, a slow, unskilled typist making numerous spelling mistakes would be locked-out by Schlesener, but not necessarily by the claimed method. Id. The Examiner responds, although the Specification provides non limiting examples, it does not set forth a “clear definition of the [disputed phrase] ‘interface-usage threshold.’” Ans. 4. Those non-limiting examples include use of the keyboard or keypad, tapping a screen, or otherwise providing input that is measured and found to be excessive over a predefined period of time. Ans. 3 (paraphrasing Spec. 142). Therefore, the [E]xaminer takes a broadest reasonable interpretation of the threshold of the metrics (threshold of number of uses of a backspace function and frequency of using 1 Appellants indicate a willingness to amend the claims and include proposed claim language toward furthering prosecution. App. Br. 6. Because the proposed language has not been entered, any issue of whether such language would distinguish over the art of record is not before us, and we decline the invitation to issue an advisory opinion addressing the proposed language. 4 Appeal 2016-007457 Application 14/489,941 the backspace function) as the claimed interface-usage threshold of the interface, and when the number of usage of the backspace is over a threshold and determine that the current typing proficiency is substandard and disable manual entry and transmission of outgoing text messages [as disclosed by Schlesener]; thus [satisfying] the claimed limitation. Ans. 4—5. Appellants reply, arguing Schlesener’s consideration of a backspace usage threshold or a correction incidence threshold is in connection with identifying poor typing, but “[t]he number of times a user simply uses the interface, for any reason (as claimed), is not what Schlesener considers.” Reply Br. 3. We are not persuaded of error because Appellants provide insufficient evidence or reasoned argument rebutting the Examiner’s interpretation of the phrase interface-usage threshold, as recited by claim 1. During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404—05 (CCPA 1969). Because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Am. Acad., 367 F.3d at 1364). Specifically, Appellants fail to provide sufficient evidence or reasoned argument that the Examiner’s interpretation is either inconsistent with the Specification or otherwise unduly broad to persuade us Schlesener’s number of uses of a backspace function and frequency of using the backspace function is not included in, or does not teach or suggest the disputed interface-usage threshold. Furthermore, Appellants’ argument concerning 5 Appeal 2016-007457 Application 14/489,941 potential differences in the results produced by embodiments of the claimed invention versus Schlesener’s method are unpersuasive because Appellants have not identified any differences in the respective underlying methods that are reflected in the claims themselves. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (limitations not appearing in the claims cannot be relied upon for patentability). Our reviewing court guides it is irrelevant that the prior art and the present invention may have different purposes. See Nat 7 Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“A finding that two inventions were designed to resolve different problems ... is insufficient to demonstrate that one invention teaches away from another.”). That is, it is sufficient that references suggest doing what Appellants did, although the Appellants’ particular purpose was different from that of the references. In re Heck, 699 F.2d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 538—39 (CCPA 1967)). “Obviousness is not to be determined on the basis of purpose alone.” In re Graf, 343 F.2d 774, 111 (CCPA 1965). “Common sense teaches . . . that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007); see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the rejections of independent claim 1 and, for the same reasons, independent claims 11 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Schlesener together with the rejections of dependent claims 2—10, 12— 6 Appeal 2016-007457 Application 14/489,941 15, and 17—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), which depend therefrom and which were not argued separately with particularity. CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err in interpreting the disputed phrase “interface usage threshold” to include Schlesener’s threshold of number of uses of a backspace function and frequency of using the backspace function. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—20. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation