Ex Parte Qu et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 23, 2018

13927213 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
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APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/927,213 06/26/2013 Qiuping Qu 83379157 8375
28395 7590 02/27/2018
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET
EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER HAMAOUI, DAVID E
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3747
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/27/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte QIUPING QU, GARLAN J. HUBERTS, and
CHRISTOPHER PAUL GLUGLA
Appeal 2016-001367
Application 13/927,213
Technology Center 3700
Before STEVEN D.A. MCCARTHY, THOMAS F. SMEGAL, and
PAUL J. KORNICZKY, Administrative Patent Judges.
SMEGAL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
rejections2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 1, 4, 5, 9, 11—13, 15, and 16
as unpatentable over Okamura (US 6,865,929 B2, iss. Mar. 15, 2005)3; of
claims 2, 7, and 14 as unpatentable over Okamura and Daniels (US
6,998,846 B2, iss. Feb. 14, 2006); of claim 6 as unpatentable over Okamura,
Ishii (US 6,085,132, iss. July 4, 2000) and/or Shelby (US 2007/0215130 Al,
1 Appellant is the Applicant, FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
which according to the Appeal Brief, is the real party in interest. Appeal Br.
2.
2 Appeal is taken from the adverse decision of the Examiner as set forth in
the Final Office Action, dated September 23, 2014 (“Final Act”).
3 Claims 3 and 10 were canceled in an amendment dated July 10, 2014.
Appeal 2016-001367
Application 13/927,213
pub. Sept. 20, 2007); and of claim 8 as unpatentable over Okamura and
Inada (US 7,624,717 B2, iss. Dec. 1, 2009). We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1 and 9 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below,
illustrates the claimed subject matter, with a disputed limitation emphasized.
1. A method for controlling an engine, comprising:
generating digital feedback signals from a plurality of
ignition coils each combustion cycle, at least a first digital
feedback signal generated in response to an ignition control
signal prior to spark discharge, the first digital feedback signal
terminates when the ignition coil charges to a first threshold, the
first threshold being less than a spark discharge threshold;
generating a third signal being either a digital feedback
signal or a pre-discharge ionization signal after the first digital
feedback signal; and
controlling the engine in response to the digital feedback
signals and the third signal.
ANALYSIS
First Rejection: Obviousness of Claims 1, 4, 5, 9, 11—13, 15, and 16
over Okamura
Appellant initially argues claims 1, 4, 5, 11—13, 15, and 16 together in
contesting the rejection of these claims as obvious over Okamura. See
Appeal Br. 3—7; Reply Br. 2—3. We select claim 1 as the representative
claim for this group, and the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellant also presents an additional
argument for claim 9 (Appeal Br. 5—6; Reply Br. 2—3), which we address
infra.
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Appeal 2016-001367
Application 13/927,213
The Examiner finds that “Okamura discloses a method for controlling
an engine ... in response to the digital feedback signals and the third
signal,” as recited by claim 1. Final Act. 5—6. Although acknowledging
“this is not explicitly disclosed,” the Examiner reasons that “it would have
been obvious to control the engine at least in response to a positive failure
determination as this is a well known technique.” Id. at 6.
In taking issue with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions,
Appellant first contends that “Okamura does not teach or suggest generating
a first digital feedback signal ‘in response to an ignition control signal,’ as
claimed [but instead] discloses that the failure determination signal... is
directly in response to the constant current flowing by primary current. . .
and this just so happens to occur during the period in which the ignition
signal is high.” Appeal Br. 3 (citing Okamura, col. 4,11. 11—14) (emphasis
added). Appellant also contends that “[a]s shown in Figure 6, Okamura is
simply detecting the current of the primary coil and determining normal
operation when the corresponding mask signal exceeds the threshold levels
Vref2 and Vref4.” Id. at 3^4 (citing Okamura, col. 7, 11. 25—41).
However, the Examiner correctly reasons that “the ignition [control]
signal (Appellant: fig 2: 204. Okamura: Fig 6: A) is generated purposefully
by the controller; the current (Appellant: fig 2: 202. Okamura: Fig 6: B) is
what happens to the circuit when the command for ignition is sent; and the
feedback signal (Appellant: fig 2: 200. Okamura: Fig 6: C) is the measured
ion activity that takes place in the combustion chamber during and around
this ignition related activity.” Ans. 6.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the failure determination signal
“is a phenomenon that happens in direct correlation to (‘in response to ’) the
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Application 13/927,213
above described ignition related activity (i.e. ignition command and increase
in current),” which “is precisely the same manner in which the signal is
produced in the present invention.” Id. The Examiner also correctly
observes that Appellant’s controller “detects the signal as an effect that
occurs when the ignition related activity occurs,” and “[t]he fact that this
direct correlation is expected is the foundation for the method of Okamura
(and of the present invention),” because “[t]he system knows what the
feedback signal should look like in response to the ignition related activity
if the system is operating properly and thus it can determine abnormalities if
the signal isn't what it was expecting.” Id. at 7.
Appellant next contends that “there is no disclosure, whatsoever, in
Okamura to teach or suggest ‘controlling the engine in response to the
digital feedback signals and the third signal,’ as claimed by Appellant,”
observing that “the Examiner does not attempt to argue that such a
disclosure is present in Okamura,” but “simply provides the following
conclusory statement—‘it would have been obvious to control the engine at
least in response to a positive failure determination as this is a well known
technique.’” Appeal Br. 4. From the foregoing, Appellant contends that
“the [Examiner] improperly used a rationale found in Appellant’s
specification as a reason for obviousness in its rejection,” thus relying “on
improper hindsight. . . obtained from the invention itself.” Id.
Appellant also argues that Okamura “clearly explains that the singular
goal and purpose of its combustion detection method is to be used to better
diagnose the cause of a combustion failure to ‘reduc[e] [the] number of man­
hours of inspection items in a case of making repairs.’” Id. (citing Okamura,
col. 2,11. 58—62). From the foregoing, Appellant concludes that “Okamura
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Application 13/927,213
does not teach or suggest controlling the engine in response to detecting a
failure condition, rather its sole focus is on identification of the cause of such
failure to facilitate efficient repair.” Id. at 4—5; Reply Br. 2 (emphasis
added).
We disagree. While explaining that “[tjhere is no shortage of
documentation describing engine controllers that [] monitor engine activity
and act accordingly, especially where errors are detected,” and specifically
referring to examples of various existing classes of technology in the Patent
Office classification system, the Examiner reasons that “the claim language,
‘'controlling the engine in response to the digital feedback signals and the
third signal’ . . . effectively amounts to doing anything in response to the
discussed signals.” Ans. 8. The Examiner also explains that “the claim does
not even require that the recited controlling of the engine (the final limitation
of claim 1) take place by an electronic controller.” Id.
While next observing that “Okamura discloses ... a combustion state
detection apparatus of an internal combustion engine for identifying a failure
part and reducing the number of man-hours of repair,” Appellant contends
that “Okamura does not teach or suggest controlling the engine in response
to detecting a failure condition, rather its sole focus is on identification of
the cause of such failure to facilitate efficient repair.” Appeal Br. 4—5
(emphasis added). Furthermore, in alleging that “the Examiner’s one
sentence that ‘it would have been obvious to control the engine’ is
conclusory,” Appellant also contends that “[t]his conclusory statement is not
supported by explicit analysis or ‘articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.’” Id. at 5.
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Application 13/927,213
We again disagree. As the Examiner explains, “Okamura is drawn to
detecting a part failure,” so that “[i]f some part fails, you control the engine
... to mitigate the effects of the failure or to prevent future failures.” Ans.
10.
Claim 9
In addition to reasserting several of the contentions that we did not
find persuasive for claim 1, Appellant also contends that “Okamura does not
teach or suggest that a first digital signal is being asserted ‘in response to a
first ignition control signal transition.’” Appeal Br. 5. Referring to an
annotated drawing of Figure 6 of Okamura, Appellant contends that “the
‘first digital feedback signal’ relied upon by the Examiner is asserted
AFTER the first ignition signal transition,” which “is not the same as
Appellant's disclosure and as is described in the claimed subject matter.” Id.
at 6.
However, we agree with the Examiner “that the grounds for
[Appellant’s] alleged distinction are based on a mischaracterization of
Okamura,” because “the feedback signal is purely reactive-it is a
measurement of ion activity that takes place during and around the ignition
related activity,” concluding that “[i]t is not issued by the controller.” Id. at
11.
Based on the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
1, 4, 5, 9, 11—13, 15, and 16 as obvious over Okamura.
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Application 13/927,213
Second—Fourth Rejections: Obviousness of Claims 2, 7, and 14 over
Okamura and Daniels; of Claim 6 over Okamura, Ishii and/or Shelby; and
of Claim 8 over Okamura and Inada.
We understand Appellant’s appeal of the rejection of claims 2, 6—8,
and 14 to rest on the arguments presented against the rejections of claims 1
and 9, which we found not demonstrative of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1, 4, 5, 9, 11—13, 15, and 16 over Okamura, as set forth
supra. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s unpatentability rejections of claims
2, 7, and 8 over Okamura and Daniels; of claim 6 over Okamura, Ishii and/or
Shelby; and of claim 8 over Okamura and Inada.
DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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