Ex parte PLOG et al.

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Aug 4, 1998

08082326 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 1998)

Application for patent filed June 24, 1993. According to appellants,1
this application is a continuation of Application No. 07/554,603, filed July
18, 1990, now abandoned, which is a continuation of Application No.
07/369,567, filed June 21, 1989, now abandoned.
1
THIS OPINION WAS NOT WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today (1)
was not written for publication in a law journal and (2) is
not binding precedent of the Board.
Paper No. 29
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
_____________
Ex parte JURGEN PLOG, THOMAS E.F. WILLE,
and RALPH VON VIGNAU
_____________
Appeal No. 95-0665
Application 08/082,3261
______________
ON BRIEF
_______________
Before HAIRSTON, KRASS and LEE, Administrative Patent Judges.
LEE, Administrative Patent Judge.
ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
On April 15, 1998, we rendered a decision sustaining the
rejection of claims 6-8 and reversing the rejection of claim
9. The appellants have filed a request for reconsideration
Appeal No. 95-0665
Application 08/082,326
2
(Paper No. 28), contending that claims 6-8 are patentable over
art.
In the request for reconsideration, the appellants point
out
that in column 26, lines 36-40 of Frieder, the reference to
granting access to the main store on a "fixed priority basis"
does not contemplate interrupting an already commenced but yet
unfinished memory access to accommodate a higher priority
memory access. The appellants refer to column 27, lines 31-49
of Frieder and state that once access to memory is granted
based on the fixed priority scheme, the access is completely
performed before the arbitration circuit is released for
granting the next access to memory.
The appellants have, evidently, misinterpreted our
opinion. We did not express the view that Frieder itself
discloses having a high priority memory access interrupt a low
priority memory access in mid-stream. Apparently, as pointed
out by the appellants, it does not. The rejection is one for
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, not for anticipation under
35 U.S.C.
§ 102.
Appeal No. 95-0665
Application 08/082,326
3
Frieder discloses that access to memory by the various
processors including execution and auxiliary processors are
granted on a "fixed priority basis". That would have
reasonably informed one with ordinary skill in the art that
some processors are higher ranked in priority as far as a
memory access is concerned. In our initial decision, we noted
that the concept of
an interrupt is not foreign in Frieder and pointed out that
Frieder specifically discloses interrupting an auxiliary
processor’s activities when an execution processor needs the
services of the auxiliary processor. We then concluded that
it would have been prima facie obvious to one with ordinary
skill in the art that the memory access of a less privileged
processor can get interrupted by the memory access request of
a higher privileged processor and thus not get completed until
later. With an appreciation for interrupts, one with ordinary
skill in the art would have readily recognized that it is not
necessary that something not yet finished be allowed to
continue to the end if a higher priority activity is pending.
Nothing in the request for reconsideration persuades us that
our conclusion is incorrect.
Appeal No. 95-0665
Application 08/082,326
4
It should be noted that teachings from a reference are
not limited to the preferred embodiments or the specific
working examples in the reference. In re Burckel, 592 F.2d
1175, 1179, 201 USPQ 67, 70 (CCPA 1979); In re Bode, 550 F.2d
656, 661, 193 USPQ 12, 17 (CCPA 1977); In re Snow, 471 F.2d
1400, 1403, 176 USPQ 328, 329 (CCPA 1973). A reference is
good not just for
what it expressly teaches but also for what it would have
reasonably suggested to one with ordinary skill in the art.
In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750, 192 USPQ 278, 280 (CCPA
1976).
The appellants make other arguments specifically
addressing how the various registers means identified by the
examiner in the examiner’s answer on page 5 do not satisfy the
claimed register means for each processor. However, because
the examiner’s position is explained in the examiner’s answer,
the place for presenting arguments against it is in the reply
brief. The appellants may not raise these arguments for the
first time in a request for reconsideration. Accordingly,
these arguments are not considered.
Conclusion
Appeal No. 95-0665
Application 08/082,326
5
For the foregoing reasons, the request for
reconsideration is granted in the sense that we have
reconsidered our initial decision. However, for reasons
explained above, we decline to make any change in our initial
decision.
KENNETH W. HAIRSTON )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
ERROL A. KRASS )
Administrative Patent Judge ) APPEALS AND
)
) INTERFERENCES
)
JAMESON LEE )
Administrative Patent Judge )
Corporate Patent Counsel
U.S. Philips Corporation
Patent Department
580 White Plains Rd.
Tarrytown, NY 10591