Ex Parte Plesnik

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 22, 2016

13738361 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 22, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/738,361 01/10/2013 Martin Plesnik ALC 3853 4874
76614 7590
Terry W. Kramer, Esq.
Kramer & Amado, P.C.
330 John Carlyle Street
3rd Floor
Alexandria, VA 22314
12/27/2016 EXAMINER
AHMAD, SHAHZEB K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2838
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/27/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mail@krameramado.com
ipsnarocp @ alcatel-lucent, com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARTIN PLESNIK1
Appeal 2015-008263
Application 13/738,361
Technology Center 2800
Before BRADLEY R. GARRIS, MICHAEL P. COLAIANNI, and
LILAN REN, Administrative Patent Judges.
GARRIS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 1—5 and 7—10 as unpatentable
over Frank (US 7,054,168 Bl, issued May 30, 2006) in view of Bretz et al.
(US 6,894,468 Bl, issued May 17, 2005) (“Bretz”) and claim 6 over these
references in combination with Gao et al. (US 2013/0121044 Al, published
May 16, 2013) (“Gao”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6.
1 Alcatel Lucent is identified as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2015-008263
Application 13/738,361
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
Appellant claims a power converter having synchronous rectifying
elements 214/215 and producing a secondary voltage, the converter
comprising driving circuitry 205/206 for the synchronous rectifying
elements, blocking circuitry 256/258 connected between the driving circuitry
and the synchronous rectifying elements, and control circuitry 254
configured to activate the blocking circuitry when the secondary voltage is
below a preconfigured value (independent claim 1, Fig. 2). Appellant also
claims a method of controlling a power converter having synchronous
rectifying elements controlled by a control voltage comprising, in the event
that secondary voltage is below a predetermined value, blocking the control
voltage from reaching the synchronous rectifying elements (independent
claim 7).
A copy of claims 1 and 7, taken from the Claims Appendix of the
Appeal Brief, appears below.
1. A power converter fed by a primary voltage, said power converter
having synchronous rectifying elements and producing a secondary voltage,
the power converter comprising:
driving circuitry for said synchronous rectifying elements;
blocking circuitry connected between said driving circuitry and said
synchronous rectifying elements;
secondary voltage sampling circuitry; and
control circuitry which is configured to activate said blocking
circuitry when said secondary voltage sampling circuitry indicates the
secondary voltage is below a preconfigured value.
7. A method of controlling a power converter fed by a primary
voltage and producing a secondary voltage, wherein said power converter
comprises synchronous rectifying elements controlled by a control voltage;
the method comprising:
sensing said secondary voltage; and
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Application 13/738,361
in the event that said secondary voltage is below a predetermined
value, blocking said control voltage from reaching said synchronous
rectifying elements.
Appellant presents arguments concerning independent claims 1 and 7
(App. Br. 4—6) with no additional arguments specifically directed to
dependent claims 2—6 and 8—10 (id. at 7—8). Therefore, the dependent
claims will stand or fall with their parent independent claims.
The Examiner finds that the claim 1 limitation “blocking circuitry
connected between said driving circuitry and said synchronous rectifying
elements” is satisfied by Frank’s circuit 150 and the components therein
(Final Action 6—7). In addition, the Examiner finds that Frank does not
disclose control circuitry configured to activate blocking circuitry when
secondary voltage is below a preconfigured value as required by claim 1 but
concludes that it would have been obvious “to modify the teachings of Frank
to incorporate a comparator as taught by Bretz [thereby resulting in the
claim 1 control circuitry]” (id. at 7).
Appellant quotes the blocking circuitry limitation of claim 1 and
challenges the Examiner’s finding that Frank’s circuit 150 satisfies this
limitation (App. Br. 4). Specifically, Appellant argues that “Frank’s 150 is
actually an ‘undershoot eliminator circuit’ . . . [and] is not connected
between driving circuitry and synchronous rectifying elements as claimed”
(id.).
In response, the Examiner refers to Figure 1 of Frank and gives two
reasons for believing circuit 150 is connected between driver circuit 160 and
synchronous rectifying elements 120/122 as required by claim 1 (Ans. 4).
First, the Examiner describes the flow of operation in Frank’s Figure 1 and
contends “[fallowing that flow of operation Component 150 is seen to be
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Application 13/738,361
connected between both of those components [i.e., driver circuit 160 and
synchronous rectifying elements 120/122]” (id.). Second, the Examiner
states “Components 120 and 122 are connected mutually at node Component
135 which is connected to Component 150 which is further connected to
Component 160” (id.) and contends “[b]ased on this connection scheme
Component 150 is also connected between Components 120+122 and 160”
(id.).
We perceive no convincing merit in either of the Examiner’s above
contentions. We agree with Appellant that “the plain meaning of ‘between’
[in claim 1] requires the recited blocking circuit to be interposed between the
driving circuitry and the synchronous rectifying elements” (App. Br. 4) and
that “[t]he plain meaning of ‘connected between’ [in claim 1] refers to
blocking circuitry between the driving circuitry and the synchronous
rectifying elements” (Reply Br. 3). The Examiner fails to provide any
rational underpinnings for the contentions that the flow of operation and the
connection scheme in Figure 1 of Frank somehow satisfy the claim 1
requirement for blocking circuitry “connected between said driving circuitry
and said synchronous rectifying elements.”
For this reason, we do not sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of
claim 1 and claims 2—6 that depend therefrom.
Appellant does not present separate arguments specifically directed to
the limitations of method claim 7. Instead, Appellant quotes the blocking
circuitry limitation of claim 1 and states without embellishment “[sjimilar
subject matter appears in claim 7” (App. Br. 4). Likewise, Appellant quotes
the control circuitry limitation of claim 1 and again states without
embellishment “[sjimilar subject matter appears in claim 7” (id. at 5).
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Appeal 2015-008263
Application 13/738,361
In fact, claim 7 contains no recitation of the claim 1 limitations
involving (1) blocking circuitry, (2) such blocking circuitry being connected
between driving circuitry and synchronous rectifying elements, (3) control
circuitry, or (4) such control circuitry configured to activate blocking
circuitry when secondary voltage is below a preconfigured value. As a
consequence, Appellant’s arguments regarding these claim 1 limitations
(App. Br. 4—5) have no apparent relevance to claim 7. While claim 7 recites
a blocking step, we agree with the Examiner that Frank’s method performs
this claimed step (Final Action 11—12). Moreover, we emphasize that
Appellant fails to address with any reasonable specificity, and accordingly
fails to show error in, the Examiner’s finding that Frank performs the
function of blocking control voltage from reaching synchronous rectifying
elements as required by claim 7.
Under these circumstances, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection
of method claims 7—10.
The decision of the Examiner is affirmed-in-part.
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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