Ex Parte Piltingsrud

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 11, 2017

14591151 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 11, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/591,151 01/07/2015 Steve Piltingsrud 40726.0002USC1 9476
23552 7590 09/13/2017
MERCHANT & GOULD P.C.
P.O. BOX 2903
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402-0903
EXAMINER
KELLY, CATHERINE A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3634
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/13/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
US PT023552@ merchantgould .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVE PILTINGSRUD1
Appeal 2017-000566
Application 14/591,151
Technology Center 3600
Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
TERRENCE W. McMILLIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1, 4—8, 10, and 21—26, which are the only claims
pending in the application. Claims 2, 3, 9, and 11—20 are canceled. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellant identifies Amesbury Group, Inc. as the real party in interest. Br.
3.
Appeal 2017-000566
Application 14/591,151
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention is generally directed to a
window opening limit device. Spec. 14.2
Claims 1 and 6 are representative and reproduced below (with the
disputed limitations emphasized)'.
1. A window opening limit device comprising:
a bezel comprising a front face;
a housing secured to a rear of the bezel, wherein the
housing includes opposed walls, each wall defining a sliding
surface;
a button comprising sliding projections configured to
slidably engage with the sliding surfaces, and wherein the
button is configured to pivot about the at least one sliding
projection, and wherein the button comprises a locking end;
and
a spring for biasing the locking end toward a projected
position, wherein when in the projected position, the locking
end projects beyond the front face.
6. A window opening limit device comprising:
a bezel;
a slider slidably engaged with the bezel;
a button movably engaged with the slider, wherein the
button is positionable in a retracted position disposed within
the slider, and a projected position projecting from the slider;
and
2 Our Decision refers to the Final Action mailed Oct. 21, 2015 (“Final
Act.”); Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed Feb. 22, 2016 (“Br.”); the Examiner’s
Answer mailed July 29, 2016 (“Ans.”); and the original Specification filed
Jan. 7,2015 (“Spec.”).
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Application 14/591,151
a projecting spring for biasing the button linearly toward
the projected position.
Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1, 4, 5, and 21—26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Liang et al. (US 7,637,544 B2; issue Dec. 29, 2009)
(“Liang”).
Claims 6—8 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Prete et al. (US 5,553,903; issued Sept. 10, 1996) (“Prete”).
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments in the Appeal Brief and are not persuaded the Examiner has erred.
Unless otherwise noted, we adopt as our own the findings and reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the Office Action from which this appeal is taken
(Final Act. 2—6) and in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 6—13), and we concur
with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. For emphasis, we consider
and highlight specific arguments as presented in the Briefs.
Rejection of Claims 1, 4, 5, and 21—263 under § 102(b)
Appellant argues Liang does not disclose the disputed limitation of
claim 1 because Liang does not disclose slidable movement of the button
projections. Br. 14—16. In particular, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s
finding “that the movement of rotation members 43 and 44 of Liang is both
pivoting and sliding is unreasonable” because “Liang does not describe
3 Appellant argues claims 1, 4, 5, and 21—26 as a group, focusing on claim 1.
Br. 14—17. Thus, we decide the rejection of these claims on the basis of
representative claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Application 14/591,151
sliding motion” and “no person of skill in the art considers an element that
pivots against another element to also be ‘sliding’ against that other
element.” Id. at 15. Appellant also argues that the Examiner’s interpretation
of sliding “conflates the plain meaning” of the terms “pivot” and “‘slide.’”
Id. at 16.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner
erred. The Examiner notes that claim 1 does not require “linear sliding” and
that the term “slide” is defined as “[t]o move over a surface while
maintaining smooth continuous contact.” Ans. 9 (citing American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2011)). Appellant does not
propose another definition of “slide” or “slidably.” Thus, we conclude the
Examiner “has correctly interpreted the definition of sliding ... in the
broadest reasonable manner” and has not redefined the term “sliding” as
“pivoting.” See id. at 10. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that the
movement of the projections 43 and 44 of Liang within the cylindrical
apertures 31 and 32, respectively, “is a sliding movement as the projections
engage the cylindrical sliding surfaces surrounding them and move in a
rotational manner while maintaining smooth continuous sliding contact with
the cylindrical surfaces; that is, they slide along the inner perimeter of the
cylindrical surface.” Id. at 9. Although Liang does not state that the
protrusions slide within the cylindrical apertures, we agree with the
Examiner that “the lack of the term ‘sliding’” in Liang does not mean that
Liang does not disclose the “slidably engage” limitation of claim 1. See id.
at 10. Further, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “no
person of skill in the art considers an element that pivots against another
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Application 14/591,151
element to also be ‘sliding’ against that other element” (Br. 15) because it is
merely unsupported attorney argument.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding that
Liang discloses the disputed limitation of claim 1 and, therefore, Liang
anticipates claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Thus, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, as well as dependent claims 4, 5, and 21—
26.
Rejection of Claims 6—8 and 104 under § 102(b)
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Prete discloses the
disputed limitation of claim 6 because “Prete does not disclose the button
disposed within the slider” and the Examiner’s interpretation of the term
“within” exceeds the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. Br. 17—21
(emphasis omitted). Specifically, Appellant argues “the bolt 60 of Prete is
not disposed within the latch 90 of Prete; instead, the latch 90 projects into
the bolt 60.” Id. at 18. Regarding the interpretation of “within,” Appellant
argues the Examiner has ignored the definition “[i]n the inner part or parts
of, inside,” which is supported by the Specification. Id. at 19. According to
Appellant, “the specification and drawings compel the conclusion that the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the term ‘within’ be consistent with a
definition where the button is located or contained in the slider housing.” Id.
at 20 (citing Figs. 5D, 6D, 6E; || 38—40). Appellant also argues “the
Examiner commits legal error in consulting the dictionary for an alternative
definition” and even if the consultation was appropriate, the definition of
4 Appellant argues claims 6—8 and 10 as a group, focusing on claim 6. Br.
17—21. Thus, we decide the rejection of these claims on the basis of
representative claim 6. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv)
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“within” is inconsistent with the manner the term is used in the
Specification. Id. at 21.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner
erred. Regarding the interpretation of “within,” we conclude the Examiner’s
interpretation of the term as “‘not exceeding the limits or extent of in
distance or in time; not exceeding the fixed limits of, not beyond’” is
reasonable and appropriate for several reasons. Ans. 11. First, Appellant’s
argument that the term should be interpreted more narrowly to be consistent
with the Specification and drawings is not persuasive because while we
interpret claims broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we must
not import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See Phillips v.
AWHCorp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (enbanc). Second, the
Examiner did not commit legal error by consulting and relying on the
dictionary definitions of “within.” See Final Act. 6 (citing American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Fanguage (5th ed. 2011)). As our
reviewing court held in Phillips, “[dictionaries or comparable sources are
often useful to assist in understanding the commonly understood meaning of
words,” and judges “may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing
claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any
definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.”
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322—23 (citations omitted). Here, Appellant
acknowledges the Specification does not have a special definition for the
term “within.” See Br. 20. And, as the Examiner determines, and we agree,
“the definition used by [the] examiner is in keeping with [AJppellanf s
disclosure as [AJppellanf s disclosed button does not exceed the limits of the
slider in the retracted position.” Ans. 12. Third, contrary to Appellant’s
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Application 14/591,151
argument, the Examiner has not ignored Appellant’s preferred interpretation
of “[i]n the inner part or parts of, inside” but has used “the second and third
[] of five definitions provided by the dictionary” to derive the broadest
reasonable interpretation of “within.” See id. 11.
Based on the Examiner’s broadest reasonable interpretation of
“within,” we agree with the Examiner that Prete discloses the claimed button
in a retracted position “within the slider” because “in the retracted position
the button [60] does not exceed the limit of the slider [92].” Id. at 11—12
(citing Prete Fig. 2). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred
in finding that Prete discloses the disputed limitation of claim 6 and,
therefore, anticipates claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Thus, we sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6, as well as dependent claims 7, 8, and
10.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 4—8, 10, and 21—26
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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