Ex Parte Pham et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 18, 2017

12674135 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/674,135 02/18/2010 Batung Pham PA-0001191-US 4305
87059 7590
Cantor Colburn LLP - Carrier
20 Church Street, 22nd Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
EXAMINER
COX, ALEXIS K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3744
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/20/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptopatentmail@cantorcolbum.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BATUNG PHAM, PIERRE DELPECH, and PHILIPPE RIGAL
Appeal 2015-007125
Application 12/674,1351
Technology Center 3700
Before MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, THOMAS F. SMEGAL, and
BRENT M. DOUGAL, Administrative Patent Judges.
SMEGAL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Batung Pham et al (Appellants) seek our review under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134 of the Examiner’s rejection2 of claims 1 and 5—9 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Lifson (US 2004/0050093 Al, pub. Mar. 18,
2004); of claims 2 and 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Lifson
and Haglid (US 2002/0164944 Al, pub. Nov. 7, 2002); and of claim 4 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Lifson, Haglid, and Wrack (US
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Carrier Corporation.
Br. 1.
2 Appeal is taken from the adverse decision of the Examiner as set forth in
the Final Office Action, dated July 3, 2014 (“Final Act.”).
Appeal 2015-007125
Application 12/674,135
2006/0150644 Al, pub. July 13, 2006).3 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1, the sole independent claim, is reproduced below and
illustrates the claimed subject matter, with disputed limitations emphasized.
1. An integrated air conditioning system, comprising:
a first air conditioning unit having a first evaporator with
a first input and a first output, the first evaporator exchanging
thermal energy between a first refrigerant flow and a working
fluid, said first air conditioning unit having a first compressor;
a second air conditioning unit having a second evaporator
with a second input and a second output, the second evaporator
exchanging thermal energy between a second refrigerant flow
and the working fluid said second air conditioning unit having a
second compressor;
a first conduitfluidly connecting saidfirst input with said
second output to convey the working fluid therebetween; and
a second conduit fluidly connecting said second input
with said first output to convey the working fluid therebetween,
wherein saidfirst and second conduits and saidfirst and second
evaporators form a working fluid circuit.
ANALYSIS
Anticipation of Claims 1 and 5—9 by Lifson
We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner fails to
establish anticipation of claims 1 and 5—9 by Lifson. See Br. 4—6.
3 Claims 10-16 are withdrawn as being directed to a non-elected invention.
Br. 1. The Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 1—9 under 35 U.S.C.
§112, second paragraph. Ans. 2
2
Appeal 2015-007125
Application 12/674,135
The Examiner finds that Lifson anticipates independent claim 1 and
dependent claims 5—9 by disclosing first and second air conditioning units,
each including, inter alia, evaporators with an input and an output for
exchanging “mass and thermal energy between a first refrigerant flow
(refrigerant flowing through first air conditioning unit loop of Lifson) and a
working fluid (refrigerant flow between air conditioning units of Lifson).”
final Act. 3^4. The Examiner also summarizes Lifson as disclosing “a first
conduit (94) fluidly connecting the first input with the second output, and a
second conduit (46) fluidly connecting the second input with the first
output,” so that “the features upon which [Appellants rely] (i.e., [that] the
inputs and outputs of the first and second evaporators are working fluid
inputs and outputs, and not refrigerant inputs and outputs) are not recited in
the rejected claim(s).” Ans. 3.
However, the Examiner appears to misread Lifson. While the claims
recite that a “first conduit and second conduit convey working fluid between
(i) the first input and the second output and (ii) the second input and the first
output,” we agree with Appellants that “[t]here is no first conduit or second
conduit for directing the working fluid in Lifson in the manner recited in
claim l.”4 Br. 6 (emphasis added). In particular, we agree with Appellants
that “[e]vaporator 20 and evaporator 32 in Lifson completely lack inputs and
outputs for a conveying a working fluid, as recited in claim 1.” Id.
(emphasis added).
[Ujnless a reference discloses within the four comers of the
document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of
4 Lifson, disclosing a vapor compression system that does not include
conveying a working fluid between evaporators, may be used as part of an
air conditioning system such as recited by claim 1. See Lifson 12.
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Appeal 2015-007125
Application 12/674,135
the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited
in the claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing
claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
NetMoneyIN, Inc., v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
For the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s decision
rejecting claims 1 and 5—9 as anticipated by Lifson.
Obviousness of Claims 2 and 3 over Lifson and Haglid; and of Claim
4 over Lifson, Haglid, and Wruck
Regarding the claims 2—4, each of the Examiner’s rejections is based
on the same unsupported findings discussed above with respect to the
disclosure of Lifson. See Final Act. 5—7; Ans. 3. The addition of Haglid or
Wruck does not remedy the deficiencies of Lifson, as discussed supra.
Accordingly, for similar reasons as discussed above for claim 1, we
do not sustain the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 2 and 3 over Lifson
and Haglid, and of claim 4 over Lifson, Haglid, and Wruck
DECISION
The Examiner’s prior-art rejections are reversed.
REVERSED
4