Ex Parte Pettersson et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 27, 201712406798 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 27, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/406,798 03/18/2009 Jens Pettersson 04189 - P0013A 6100 137670 7590 ABB - Whitmyer IP Group LLC 600 Summer Street Stamford, CT 06901 EXAMINER KWAK, DEAN P ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1798 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/27/2017 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JENS PETTERSSON, LARS LEDUNG, and PATRIK WESTERLUND Appeal 2015-005256 Application 12/406,798 Technology Center 1700 Before TERRY J. OWENS, PETER F. KRATZ, and CHRISTOPHER C. KENNEDY, Administrative Patent Judges. KRATZ, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 14—27 and 29—33. Oral argument was presented at a Hearing conducted on April 25, 2017. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6. Appellants’ claimed invention is directed to a device for controlling material separation process. Claim 14 is illustrative and reproduced below: 14. A device for controlling a material separation process, comprising: at least one processor, at least one computer-readable medium, and Appeal 2015-005256 Application 12/406,798 a state estimating unit implemented through software stored in the computer-readable medium and programmed to execute on the at least one processor, the software including instructions: to receive at least one measured process output variable in said material separation process that is indicative of the degree of separation between a desired material and an undesired material, and to estimate the state of the process at a certain instant in time by applying the measured output variable and external constraints for a prediction time interval on a model of the material separation process, said model being based on at least one input variable that can be manipulated and said output variable, and an optimizing unit implemented through software stored in the computer-readable medium and programmed to execute on the at least one processor, the software including instructions: to optimize an objective function that involves at least one predicted controlled process output variable and said external constraints, where said predicted controlled process output variable is defined by said process model based on said state and this optimising takes place under either or both of constraints imposed by said process model and said external constraints through adapting said input variables, to provide at least one set point value for each input variable for said prediction time interval, for use in regulating said separation process in order to influence the separation process for separating the desired material from bulk material, to, when optimizing the objective function, maximize the recovery of the desired material in the separation process or minimize the amount of additives or the amount of energy used. The Examiner relies on the following prior art references as evidence in rejecting the appealed claims: Pollock US 6,733,662 B2 May 11,2004 Persson et al. US 2004/0260421 A1 Dec. 23, 2004 2 Appeal 2015-005256 Application 12/406,798 The Examiner maintains the following grounds of rejection: Claims 14—27 and 29-33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicants regards as the invention. Claims 14—27 and 29-33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. Claims 14—24, 26 and 29—33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Persson. Claim 25 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Persson in view of Pollock. We reverse the stated rejections for substantially the reasons argued by Appellants, as discussed below (App. Br.; Reply Br. 6—8). For each of the stated rejections, the Examiner bears the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case establishing the non-patentability of the rejected claims. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Indefmiteness Rejection The test for compliance with the requirements of § 112, second paragraph is whether the claims set out and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity when read in light of the application disclosure as they would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (CCPA 1971). The Examiner appears to be arguing, in a conclusory way, that the rejected claims are indefinite because they lack sufficient detail respecting the manner in which the structure is connected, how data is measured and received, whether subsequent steps are required, and the manner in which the optimization is performed rendering the terms “optimize” or optimizing” 3 Appeal 2015-005256 Application 12/406,798 relative (Ans. 3 4). In this regard, the Examiner appears to have improperly equated breadth with indefmiteness under § 112, second paragraph. In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 693 (CCPA 1971). It is well-settled that a claim term can be broad without being indefinite. In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788 (CCPA 1970); In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908 (CCPA 1970). For reasons argued by Appellants (App. Br. 10—11; Reply Br. 6—8), the Examiner has not reasonably explained, in the first instance, why the claim language, as it would have been interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of Appellants’ Specification and the prior art, fails to set out and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity. Accordingly, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner has not carried the burden to establish that any of the rejected claims fail to satisfy the requirements of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 14—27 and 29—33 under the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Lack of Enablement Rejection The Specification is presumed to be in “compliance with the enabling requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, unless there is reason to doubt the objective truth of the statements contained therein.” In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (CCPA 1971). In this regard, it is well settled that the Examiner has the “burden of giving reasons, supported by the record as a whole, why the specification is not enabling... [and] [sjhowing that the 4 Appeal 2015-005256 Application 12/406,798 disclosure entails undue experimentation is part of the PTO’s initial burden...” In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504 (CCPA 1976); see also Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 223. In determining whether any given disclosure requires undue experimentation to practice the claimed subject matter, the Examiner should consider, inter alia, the amount of direction or guidance presented, the presence or absence of working examples, the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the relative skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, the quantity of experimentation necessary, and the predictability or unpredictability of the art. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Determining enablement is a question of law based on factual underpinnings. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Here, the Examiner maintains that the Specification is directed to a separation process system employing particular models, it is unclear how each structure is connected to perform the claimed functions, such as how data is measured and received, the independent claims 14, 20, and 29 lack a cycle step with a determined maximum value, and such features that are critical should be recited in the claims (Ans. 2—3). In contending a lack of enabling support for the claimed device for controlling a material separation process, the Examiner alleges a lack of clearness in ways of proceeding with certain method steps or device system functions as well as an alleged omission of certain critical steps and a lack of detail as to structural connections; however, the Examiner fails to appropriately address and present a factual consideration of, inter alia, the totality of the direction or guidance presented in the Specification, the nature of the invention claimed (device for controlling a material separation process), the state of the prior art, the relative skill of one of ordinary skill in 5 Appeal 2015-005256 Application 12/406,798 the art, the quantity of experimentation necessary, and the predictability or unpredictability of the art. As argued by Appellants, the Examiner has not discharged the burden of establishing that the claimed invention would not have been enabled to one of ordinary skill in the art (App. Br. 7—10; Reply Br. 2-6). In other words and while the Examiner has raised some concerns the Examiner perceives with respect to the disclosed invention, the Examiner has not carried the burden to establish that one of ordinary skill in the art armed with the disclosures set forth in the subject Specification and given the state of the prior art would not have been enabled to make and use the subject matter of any of the rejected claims without undue experimentation. On this record, the Examiner’s analysis fails to establish that the relative skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, the state of the prior art, and the nature of the invention are such that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been able to carry out the claimed method steps without undue experimentation based on the guidance provided in Appellants’ Specification. Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 14—27 and 29—33 under the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Anticipation Rejection In order for the Examiner to carry the burden of establishing a prima facie case of anticipation, the Examiner must establish where each and every element of the claimed invention, arranged as required by the claim, is found in a single prior art reference, either expressly or under the principles of 6 Appeal 2015-005256 Application 12/406,798 inherency. See generally, In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, the Examiner has not established that Persson describes a device corresponding to the claimed device, by specifying how the cited portions of Persson describe a device for controlling a material separation process that includes elements/features corresponding to all of the recited elements/features of independent claims 14, 20, and/or 29, and arranged as required by these claims. Rather, in the anticipation rejection of claims 14—24, 26 and 29—33 by Persson, the Examiner reversibly errs in failing to give any patentable weight to the stored software instructions (processor configuration) for controlling the material separation process, as claimed by Appellants, in applying Persson as an anticipatory reference (App. Br. 12—13; Reply Br. 8—11; see Ans. 6—7). In this regard, the Examiner has not directed us to any credible evidence demonstrating that the production process processing control system of Persson that is disclosed as preferably applied to control of chemical additives to a pulp and paper production process using a sulfate process is configured or otherwise set up to perform the material separation process control functions required by any of the rejected appealed claims, as required by independent claims 14, 20 and/or 29 (see generally Ans.; Persson || 89, 90). It follows that we shall reverse the Examiner’s anticipation rejection on this record. Obviousness Rejection 7 Appeal 2015-005256 Application 12/406,798 The Examiner’s separate obviousness rejection of dependent claim 25 is built on the faulty foundation of the afore-discussed anticipation rejection and the additionally applied Pollock references is not applied by the Examiner in a manner to cure the aforementioned deficiency (Ans. 9). Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejection. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s decision to reject the appealed claims is reversed. REVERSED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation