Ex Parte Petersen et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 24, 2012

11138768 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte RYAN M. PETERSEN and FRANZ MICHAEL SCHUETTE
____________

Appeal 2009-008566
Application 11/138,768
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JEAN R. HOMERE, and
ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, Administrative Patent Judges.

DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2009-008566
Application 11/138,768
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A Patent Examiner rejected claims 1-25. The Appellants appeal
therefrom under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We reverse.
A. INVENTION
The invention at issue on appeal generally relates to memory devices,
and more particularly relates to increasing the bandwidth of DDR (double
data rate) SDRAM (synchronous dynamic random access memory) modules.
(Spec. 1).

B. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
Claim 1, which further illustrates the invention, follows.
1. A method for optimizing data transfer between
memory modules and at least one memory controller using at
least one memory module, the at least one memory module
containing firmware and a plurality of double date rate (DDR)
integrated circuit chips, each of said integrated circuit chips
supporting page mode access, a bank activate command having
associated therewith a row access strobe (RAS)-to-column
access strobe (CAS) delay, a read command having associated
therewith a CAS latency, and a precharge command having
associated therewith a precharge latency, the method
comprising the step of:
setting the firmware for high-speed access including:
setting the CAS latency to a CAS latency value that is greater
than a minimum CAS latency value supported by said
integrated circuit chips at a selected frequency; and
setting at least one of the RAS-to-CAS delay and the
precharge latency to a RAS-to-CAS delay value and a
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precharge latency value, respectively, lower than the set CAS
latency value to minimize access times of consecutive accesses
in which a subsequent access is out-of-page from an
immediately previous access; using said precharge command to
close a first page where the immediately previous access
occurred; and using said bank activate command to open a
second page different than the first page to access data within
said second page using the read command.

C. REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence:
Park US 5,835,956 Nov. 10, 1998
Bondurant US 6,151,236 Nov. 21, 2000
Wark US 6,200,144 B1 Mar. 13, 2001
Pauley US 2005/0086037 Al Apr. 21, 2005

Microsoft Computer Dictionary (5th ed.) (p. 147) definition of DDR
memory.

D. REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 9, 11-17, 23, and 25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as being anticipated by Park.
Claims 2-4 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Park as applied to claims 1 and 12 above, and in further
view of Pauley.
Claims 7, 8, 21 and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Park as applied to claims 1 and 12 above, and in further
view of Wark.
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Claims 10 and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Park as applied to claims 1 and 12 above, and in further
view of Bondurant.
Claims 6 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Park and Pauley as applied to
claims 4 and 18 above, and in further view of Bondurant.
Claims 5 and 19 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Park and Pauley as applied to
claims 4 and 18 above, and in further view of Wark.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
35 U.S.C. §102
"[A]nticipation of a claim under § 102 can be found only if the prior
art reference discloses every element of the claim . . . ." In re King, 801
F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik
GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir.
1984)). "[A]bsence from the reference of any claimed element negates
anticipation." Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814
F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Analysis of whether a claim is patentable
over the prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102 begins with a determination of the
scope of the claim. We determine the scope of the claims in patent
applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving
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claims their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification as
it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The properly
interpreted claim must then be compared with the prior art.

"Claims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a
part." Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (citations omitted). "Even when guidance is not provided in
explicit definitional format, 'the specification may define claim terms by
implication such that the meaning may be found in or ascertained by a
reading of the patent documents.'" Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite
Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal single quotation marks
and citations omitted.)
35 U.S.C. §103
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the
Examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so
doing, the Examiner must make the factual determinations set forth in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). “[T]he Examiner bears
the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of
presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Furthermore, “‘there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court
can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
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U.S. 398, 418 (2007)(quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
The question of obviousness is "based on underlying factual
determinations including . . . what th[e] prior art teaches explicitly and
inherently . . . ." In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

ANALYSIS
Appellants argue that “[c]laim 1 also recites 'setting the CAS latency
to a CAS latency value that is greater than a minimum CAS latency value
supported by said integrated circuit chips at a selected frequency' which is
not found expressly or inherently in Park." (App. Br. 10). The Examiner
maintains that Park teaches selecting a default setting for the CAS latency of
2 in column 20 of Park. (Ans. 16-17). The Examiner further maintains that
after the CAS latency of 2 is selected then the CAS latency that is greater
than a minimum supported by the circuit at a selected frequency may be
changed. (Ans. 17). While we agree with the Examiner that the CAS
latency may be modified from the default value, we agree with Appellants
that Park does not teach changing the CAS latency that is defined as a
function of the clock frequency. Therefore, Park has one CAS latency for
each selected frequency which does not teach the claimed "setting the CAS
latency to a CAS latency value that is greater than a minimum CAS latency
value supported by said integrated circuit chips at a selected frequency."
Therefore, Appellants have shown error in the Examiner's showing of
anticipation of independent claim 1 and dependent claims 9, 11.
Appellants present the same arguments with respect to independent
claim 12. Since independent claim 12 contains similar limitations, we
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cannot sustain the rejection thereof along with dependent claims 13-17, 23,
and 25 containing the same limitations.
35 U.S.C. §103

With respect to dependent claims 2-8, 10, 18-22, and 24, Appellants
rely upon the same arguments advanced with respect to independent claims
1 and 12. Since these claims contain the same subject matter found lacking
in the Park reference and the Examiner has not remedied the noted
deficiency with any showings from the additional references applied, we
similarly cannot sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejections.

CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Appellants have shown error in the
Examiner's showing of anticipation of independent claims 1 and 12.

VII. ORDER
We reverse the anticipation rejection of claims 1, 9, 11-17, 23, and 25;
and the obviousness rejections of claims 2-8, 10, 18-22, and 24.
REVERSED

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