Ex Parte Perkins

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 29, 2018

14606103 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/606,103 01/27/2015
46442 7590 08/31/2018
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Ford
400 W. MAPLE RD.
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
William Paul Perkins
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.
67186-149 PUSl;
83495636
CONFIRMATION NO.
3705
EXAMINER
MEMULA, SURESH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2851
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/31/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte WILLIAM PAUL PERKINS
Appeal2018-001967
Application 14/606, 103
Technology Center 2800
Before JEFFREY T. SMITH, JEFFREY R. SNAY, and
MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., Administrative Patent Judges.
SNAY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
decision rejecting claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
1 We cite to the Specification ("Spec.") filed January 27, 2015; Final Office
Action ("Final Act.") dated February 10, 2017; Appellant's Appeal Brief
("App. Br.") filed May 23, 2017; Examiner's Answer ("Ans.") dated
November 17, 2017, and Appellant's Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") filed
December 15, 2017.
2 Appellant is Applicant, Ford Global Technologies, LLC, which according
to the Appeal Brief is the real party in interest. App. Br. 1.
Appeal2018-001967
Application 14/606,103
BACKGROUND
The invention relates to a method and apparatus for battery control to
maintain or reduce temperature of one or more electrical components
associated with the battery. Spec. ,r 31. Independent claims 1, 14, and 17
are reproduced below:
1. A method, comprising:
monitoring a root mean square (RMS) current of a
component for a time window; and
adjusting a flow of current relative to a battery such that a
slope of the RMS current gradually approaches zero as the
RMS current approaches an RMS current limit for the time
window.
14. A method, comprising:
monitoring a root mean square (RMS) current of a
component for a plurality of time windows, each of the time
windows having an RMS current limit; and
adjusting a flow of current relative to a battery when an
RMS current for any one of the time windows approaches a
respective RMS current limit.
17. A system, comprising:
a battery;
a component associated with the battery; and
a control system configured to monitor a root mean
square (RMS) current of the component for a time window, the
control system further configured to adjust a flow of current
relative to a battery such that a slope of the RMS current
gradually approaches zero as the RMS current approaches an
RMS current limit for the time window.
App. Br. 11-13 (Claims Appendix).
Each of the remaining claims on appeal depends from claim 1, 14, or
17.
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Application 14/606,103
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1-13 and 16-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
as indefinite. 3
II. Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I02(a)(l) as
anticipated by Syed. 4
OPINION
Rejection I
The Examiner finds that the term "gradually" in each of claims 1, 5,
16, 17, and 19 is relative and, on that basis, indefinite. Final Act. 2. The
Examiner states the same finding with regard to the phrase "unacceptably
high" in claim 11 and "smooth" in claim 13. Id.
Appellant contends that each of the above-noted terms conveys a
well-known meaning, and that terms are not indefinite merely because they
are relative of terms of degree. App. Br. 4--7. We agree.
With regard to "gradually," the Examiner's rejection is based not on
any lack of certainty regarding the meaning of the word, but, rather, on the
Examiner's concern that its use in claim 1 would encompass multiple
possible rates of change. See Ans. 6-7. However, as Appellant correctly
observes (App. Br. 6-7), a claim is not indefinite merely because it is broad.
See In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788 (CCPA 1970) ("Breadth is not
indefiniteness."). Moreover, Appellant points to a contextual definition in
the Specification, which explains that the term, "gradually," in the context of
3 The Examiner states that the Final Office Action incorrectly includes
claims 14 and 15 under this ground of rejection. Ans. 6.
4 US 2012/0091971 Al, published April 19, 2012 ("Syed").
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Appeal2018-001967
Application 14/606,103
the claims means that "undesirable vehicle behaviors, such as rapid changes
in engine operation affecting noise and vibration," are avoided. App. Br. 4
(citing Spec. ,r,r 52, 60). Appellant's definition as set forth in the
Specification, therefore, constrains the recited gradually-adjusted current
slope to that which avoids inducement of noise and vibration.
With regard to "unacceptably high" and "smooth," the Examiner
contends that the bounds of these terms would be subjective. Ans. 11-12.
Claim 11 refers to an RMS current limit that "corresponds to an
unacceptably high operating temperature for the component." The
Specification exemplifies that condition as a temperature that exceeds a
maximum rated operating temperature for the component. Spec. ,r 49. The
term "smooth" in claim 13 regards a filtering operation performed on RMS
current data. Claim 13 ("applying a filter to a calculated RMS current to
smooth the calculated RMS current"). The Specification provides that such
a smoothing operation may be performed by using an average or other
filtering process, such as a software-based filter configured to filter out rapid
changes in the slope of the signal. Spec. ,r 4 7. When viewed in light of the
Specification, we do not read either of these terms as subjective in scope.
Again, breadth is not indefiniteness.
We do not sustain Rejection I.
Rejection II
Claims 1 and 17
With regard to Rejection II, as applied to independent claims 1 and
17, Appellant argues that Syed fails to describe adjusting current relative to a
battery such that "a slope of the RMS current gradually approaches zero."
App. Br. 8. The Examiner acknowledges that Syed fails to mention the
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Appeal2018-001967
Application 14/606,103
recited slope. Ans. 13. The Examiner contends, however, that Syed's rate
of change of RMS current is "selectable" because Syed teaches that the
described controller can be "adjusted to scale the amount of power
regulation." Id. ( citing Syed ,r 7). The Examiner reasons that such
selectability "allows for customizing the RMS slope's rate of change," such
that the recited condition could be met. Id. ( emphasis added).
The Examiner has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case
of anticipation by pointing out where all of the claim limitations appear in a
single reference. See In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re
King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1986). To anticipate a claim, a
reference must disclose, expressly or inherently, every element of the claim.
See Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628,631 (Fed.
Cir. 1987). Here, the purported adjustability of power regulation in Syed is
insufficient to support a finding that Syed describes actually controlling
current flow "such that a slope of the RMS current gradually approaches
zero." Because the Examiner does not point to evidence within Syed of
controlling current in the particular manner claimed, we do not sustain
Rejection II as applied to either claim 1 or claim 17.
Claim 14
Unlike claims 1 and 1 7, independent claim 14 does not require
adjusting current such that a slope of the RMS current gradually approaches
zero. Thus, the foregoing argument that Syed lacks description of that
feature does not apply to claim 14. Claim 14 requires "adjusting a flow of
current ... when an RMS current for any one of the time windows
approaches a respective RMS current limit." Appellant's sole argument
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Application 14/606,103
regarding claim 14 is that "Syed does not adjust current as it approaches its
threshold. Rather, it waits until the threshold is exceeded." App. Br. 8.
The Examiner agrees that Syed describes applying current control
after a predetermined threshold RMS is exceeded. See Ans. 14. ("Power
regulation is activated in response to the RMS current exceeding the
threshold."). The Examiner finds, however, that Syed's described power
regulation "functions to lower the RMS current until the RMS current drops
below the threshold." Id. Thus, "during power regulation and before the
RMS current drops below the threshold," the current is adjusted as the RMS
current "approaches" the RMS current limit. Id. That is, according to the
Examiner, Syed adjusts current as the threshold is approached from above.
Appellant does not respond to the Examiner's reasoning in the Reply
Brief. Nor does Appellant point to any aspect of claim 14 that would
preclude the Examiner's interpretation. Accordingly, Appellant does not
persuade us of reversible error. Rejection II as applied to claim 14, and each
claim depending therefrom, is sustained.
DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claim 1-13 and 16-20 under 35
U.S.C. § 112 is reversed.
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-13 and 17-20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 14--16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 is affirmed.
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Application 14/606,103
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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