Ex Parte PAXTON et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 11, 2016

13160980 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 11, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/160,980 06/15/2011
909 7590 03/15/2016
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP (NV)
PO Box 10500
McLean, VA 22102
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Theodore A. PAXTON
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
081468-0394991 4442
EXAMINER
RAYMOND, BRITTANY L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1722
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/15/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docket_ip@pillsburylaw.com
heather.marthers@pillsburylaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte THEODORE A. PAXTON, TODD J. DA VIS,
TODD D. HIAR, CASSANDRA M. OWEN,
STEVEN G. HANSEN, and JAMES J. HUNTER
Appeal2014-004659
Application 13/160,980
Technology Center 1700
Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, GEORGE C. BEST, and
N. WHITNEY WILSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
decision rejecting claims 71-90 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We have
jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 The real party in interest is stated to be ASML Netherlands B.V. (Appeal
Br. 2).
Appeal2014-004659
Application 13/160,980
Claim 71 is illustrative of the appealed subject matter (emphasis
added):
71. A non-transitory computer readable medium comprising
program code that, when executed on a computer system,
instructs the computer system to perform a method, the method
compnsmg:
projecting a first pattern onto an area of a substrate coated
with a developable material layer and a first resist layer on top
of the developable material layer; and
projecting a second pattern onto an area of the substrate
coated with the developable material layer and a second resist
layer, wherein no etching of material of or on the substrate
immediately beneath the first resist layer and the developable
material layer occurs between projecting the first pattern and
projecting the second pattern,
wherein projecting the first pattern and projecting the
second pattern produces a desired patterned image on the
developable material layer.
(Appeal Br. 47 (Claims App.).)
The Examiner maintains, and Appellants appeal, the following
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a):
(a) Claims 71-73, 75, and 78 as unpatentable over Bae
(US 2005/0175937 Al, published Aug. 11, 2005) (hereinafter "Bae") in
view of Toublan et al. (US 2004/0010768 Al, published Jan. 15, 2004)
(hereinafter "Toublan");
(b) Claims 74 and 77 as unpatentable over Bae in view ofToublan
and further in view of Cauchi et al. (US 2004/0101790 Al, published May
27, 2004) (hereinafter "Cauchi");
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(c) Claim 76 as unpatentable over Bae in view of Toublan and
further in view ofLakkapragada et al. (US 2004/0005507 Al, published
Jan. 8, 2004) (hereinafter "Lakkapragada");
(d) Claims 79, 82-87, and 89 as unpatentable over Nakao
(US 2003/0091940 Al, published May 15, 2003) (hereinafter "Nakao") in
view of Cauchi and further in view of Toublan; and
(e) Claims 80, 81, 88, and 90 as unpatentable over Nakao in view
of Cauchi in view of Toublan and further in view of Bae.
With the exception of claims 72, 74, 77, 80-82, 85, 87, 88, and 90,
Appellants do not make separate substantive arguments in support of
patentability of any of the claims (see generally, Appeal Br. 7--46; Reply Br.
2-29). Accordingly, our discussion will focus on the obviousness rejection
of independent claim 71. Claims 72, 74, 77, 80-82, 85, 87, 88, and 90 will
be addressed separately.
ANALYSIS
Upon consideration of the evidence on this record and each of
Appellants' contentions, we find that the preponderance of evidence of
record supports the Examiner's conclusion that independent claims 71, 79,
and 86, and all of their dependent claims, are unpatentable over the applied
prior art. Appellants have failed to show that the Examiner erred reversibly.
We sustain the Examiner's§ 103 rejections, as listed in (a) through (e)
above, of all the appealed claims for essentially the reasons set out by the
Examiner in the Non-Final Office Action and the Answer.
We add the following for emphasis.
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Rejections (a) (Claims 7 j-73, 75, and 78) and (c) (Claim 76)
The Examiner relies on Bae for its disclosure of a process of forming
fine patterns in a substrate layer, which includes use of lower layer 23 (i.e.,
"developable material layer" (claim 71 )) (Ans. 10). The Examiner
determines that it would have been obvious to the skilled artisan to have
considered the layer under Bae's photoresist layer 23 as a developable layer
because "if a layer is etchable[,] then it is developable in an etchant while
using a resist pattern as an etching mask" (Non-Final Act. 4). The Examiner
further determines that"[ o ]ne of ordinary skill in the art would know that the
definition of development in a photolithography process is the removal of
portions of a layer in order to form a pattern" (Ans. 10).
The Examiner finds that Bae teaches each of the limitations of claim
71, with the exception of a teaching "that a computer readable medium can
be used to instruct a computer system to perform the [claimed] process" (id.
at 4). The Examiner relies upon Toublan to exemplify an executable
computer readable medium comprising program code that instructs the
computer system to perform the claimed method (id.). According to the
Examiner, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art "that
the process of Bae could be performed using program code of a computer
readable medium because Toublan teaches that double exposure processes of
a single resist layer can be stored on a computer readable medium in order to
be accurately executed by a computer system" (id.).
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.. .,., ' • ' .,. ,., ,., 'T""""ti. ., ' .,. ., ' ,.,
Appeuamsargue, mter ana, ~ mat tiae aoes not 01sc10se or suggest me
limitation "developable material layer" within the meaning of claim 71
because "[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would in no way see Bae's
... etching of layer []23 as an invitation to substitute that layer[] 23 with a
developable material layer ... similar to photoresistfilm 25" (Appeal Br. 10
(emphasis added)). In other words, Appellants' de facto position is that
developable materials within the meaning of claim 71 are limited to
photoresist. According to Appellants, the Examiner's definition is
unsupported by the record evidence and, furthermore, it "contradicts what a
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand from the teachings of
Bae" because Bae refers to "developing and etching as separate distinct
processes" (Reply Br. 2-3).
It is well established that the "PTO must give claims their broadest
reasonable construction consistent with the specification. . . . Therefore, we
look to the specification to see if it provides a definition for claim terms, but
otherwise apply a broad interpretation." In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Since applicants may amend claims
to narrow their scope, "a broad construction during prosecution creates no
unfairness to the applicant or patentee." Id.
2 Appellants assert that "claims of similar scope as claim 71 have already
been granted in earlier issued family members and similar issues as now
raised by the Examiner have been previously addressed and overcome"
(Appeal Br. 8). It is, however, well settled that the prosecution of one patent
application does not affect the prosecution of another patent application. In
re Wertheim, 541F.2d257, 264 (CCPA 1976) (holding that "it is immaterial
in ex parte prosecution whether the same or similar claims have been
allowed to others").
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Accordingly, we tum to Appellants' Specification to determine the
meaning of the term "developable material layer" as recited in claim 71.
The Specification explains that:
[i]f the developable material layer does not comprise a material
that is sensitive to radiation, . . . areas of the developable
material layer lying directly underneath areas of the first resist
layer that have been exposed to radiation (in a case of a positive
resist) ... simply develop away, once the areas of the first resist
layer are removed, by using an appropriate chemical
solvent/solution (for example, an aqueous solution).
(Spec. ii 57 (emphasis added)). Therefore, we conclude that, when claim 71
is read in light of the Specification, the claim encompasses layers that are
radiation-insensitive and removable by application of an appropriate
chemical solvent/solution.
Appellants' argument regarding the limited meaning of the claim term
"developable material layer" is unavailing. The claim as broadly worded
reasonably encompasses Bae's radiation-insensitive lower layer 23 because
the Specification does not limit the claimed "developable material layer" to
only photoresist-it explicitly states that the term encompasses a layer that
"does not comprise a material that is sensitive to radiation" (id.).
Appellants' argument that Bae refers to "developing and etching as separate
distinct processes" (Reply Br. 3) is also unavailing because Bae indicates
that the "development process" includes "wet etching" (Bae ii 16).
Therefore, Appellants have not persuasively reasoned or directed us to
persuasive evidence to establish that the Examiner's interpretation is
unreasonably broad, nor directed us to a definition in the Specification that
would establish that the claim term "developable material layer" does not
encompass Bae's lower layer 23.
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Appellants further argue that Bae does not disclose or suggest the
recited limitation "no etching of material of or on the substrate immediately
beneath the first resist layer and the developable material layer occurs
between projecting the first pattern and projecting the second pattern"
(Appeal Br. 12 (emphasis added); see also Reply Br. 6). Appellants assert
that Bae does not suggest the claimed limitation because in order to "expose
the substrate [21,] ... the substrate would be exposed to etching [and, t ]hus,
there would be an etching process applied to the substrate 21" (Reply Br. 6
(citing Bae, Fig. 2B)).
Appellants' argument is not persuasive because it does not show that
substrate 21 itself was etched, as required by the claim. Rather, Bae
discloses that only lower layer 23 is etched-substrate 21 is subject to an
implant process to deposit ion-implanted region 28 (Ans. 12 (citing Bae
,-i 25; see also ,-i,-i 41--42)). Appellants have not adduced any persuasive
technical reasoning or evidence in response to the Examiner's finding that
substrate 21 is not subject to an etching process (Ans. 12).
Appellants have, therefore, not identified reversible error in the
Examiner's determination that claim 71 is rendered obvious when the
applied prior art is considered as a whole.
With respect to dependent claim 72, Appellants argue that the
Examiner has failed to establish: (i) that the cited portions of Bae disclose
or teach the claimed "half-pitch corresponding to a kl less than or equal to
0.25" limitation and (ii) the half-pitch and numerical aperture (NA) values
used to derive kl (Appeal Br. 14-15). According to Appellants, "there is no
clear indication by the Examiner in the cited portions of Bae of what
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combination of wavelength and [NA] ... actually achieved a particular half-
pitch" (Appeal Br. 15 (emphasis in original)).
The Examiner, however, has provided reasoned findings that identify
the half-pitch and NA values taught by Bae (Ans. 14 (citing Bae iii! 17, 49,
and 51)). First, the Examiner's findings forNA are based on the equation
NA = nsin8, wherein n is the refractive index of the medium surrounding the
lens and 8 is the light beam divergence. The Examiner reasonably:
(i) assumed that Bae' s exposure is performed in air and, thus, the refractive
index is 1, and (ii) concluded that because sine is between 0 and 1 and Bae
teaches that NA is high, NA must, therefore, be closer to 1 (id. (citing Bae
iJ 17)). Second, the Examiner's findings for half-pitch are based on Bae's
disclosure of the width of the final patterns (10 nm to 150 nm), the spaces
between the final patterns (10 to 150 nm), which provide a sum total pitch
(ranging from 20 to 300 nm), i.e., a half-pitch of 10 to 150 nm (id. (citing
Bae iJ 49)). Third, the Examiner's findings for kl are based on the equation
kl =(half pitch)*NA/wavelength and Bae discloses a light source having a
wavelength of 248 nm (id. (citing Bae iJ 51 )). Therefore, according to the
Examiner, kl= (10 to 150 nm)*l/248 nm, i.e., kl= 0.040 to 0.605 nm,
which "result[s] in a kl having a range which includes 0.25 due to the range
of half pitch values" (id.).
In response to the Examiner's calculations deriving NA, half pitch and
kl based on Bae's teachings, Appellants have not persuaded us of reversible
error (see generally, Reply Br. 2-6) in the Examiner's reasoned
determination that the claim limitation "a half-pitch corresponding to a kl
less than or equal to 0.25" (e.g., claim 72) is rendered obvious when the
applied prior art is considered as a whole (Ans. 14).
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In the absence of arguments specific to their patentability, dependent
claims 73, 75, 76, and 78 fall with claim 71. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv).
Thus, we affirm rejections (a) and (c).
Rejection (b) (Claims 74 and 77)
The Examiner finds that Bae and Toublan teach each of the
limitations of claim 71, with the exception of a teaching "that the photoresist
and developable layers are baked after each exposure" (Non-Final Act. 5).
The Examiner relies upon Cauchi to exemplify baking the photoresist layer
after an initial exposure, exposing the photoresist layer a second time,
baking the photoresist layer a second time, and then developing the
photoresist layer (id.). According to the Examiner, it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art "to have performed a post
exposure bake on the substrate after each exposure because Cauchi teaches
that the baking activates the photoacid generator in the photoresist, which
promotes the solubility in a developer." (id.).
Appellants argue that Cauchi does not disclose or suggest the claim
limitations, respectively, of: (i) "after projecting the first pattern ...
applying a post exposure bake to the substrate having the first pattern on the
first resist layer and the developable material layer" (e.g., claim 74
(emphasis added)) and (ii) "after projecting the second pattern, applying a
post exposure bake to the substrate having the second pattern on the second
resist layer and the developable material layer" (e.g., claim 77 (emphasis
added)) (Appeal Br. 16-20).
Appellants assert that Cauchi cannot be combined with Bae because
Cauchi teaches "that all the bakes would be completed before development,
etch, etc." and "even if ... the bakes of Cauchi could be applied to Bae, the
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cited portions of Bae show that a first [and a seconal pattern is not provided
to layer []23 of Bae until after the completion of a pattern projection ... and
after development, etch, etc." (Reply Br. 8, 10 (emphasis added) (citing Bae,
Fig. 2A-2D)). Essentially, Appellants argue that for the resist layers and the
development layer to be considered as "having" the first and second patterns
within the meaning of the claims, the resist layers and the development layer
must first be subject to a development step. We are not persuaded.
Claims of narrower scope can be useful to clarify the meaning of
broader, independent claims under the doctrine of claim differentiation. In
re Tanaka, 640 F.3d 1246, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2011). "[T]he presence ofa
dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption
that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim."
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane).
Similar to dependent claims 74 and 77, independent claim 79 recites:
applying a first post exposure bake to the substrate having the
first pattern in the resist layer and the developable material layer
... applying a second post exposure bake to the substrate having
the second pattern in the resist layer and the developable
material layer, wherein projecting the first pattern and the second
pattern and applying the first post exposure bake and the second
post exposure bake produces a desired image in or on the
developable material layer.
(Emphasis added.)
Claims 82 and 83, however, which depend from claim 79, add a
development step in order "to form an image of the [first or second]
pattern." Such additional development steps give rise to a presumption that
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development is not required in order for the claimed layers to be considered
as "having" the first or the second patterns. 3
Given the broad scope of the "having the ... pattern" language in
claim 79, we hold that dependent claims 74 and 77, each reciting similar
language, would have been obvious in view of the combined teachings of
Bae and Toublan with Cauchi. In view of our construction, Appellants'
argument regarding the limited meaning of the claim term "having the ...
pattern" as requiring prior exposure and development is unavailing.
Therefore, Appellants have not persuasively reasoned or directed us to
persuasive evidence to establish that the Examiner reversibly erred in
combining Cauchi's method of employing post exposure bake steps with
Bae's use of a developable material layer.
Thus, we affirm rejection (b ).
Rejection (d) (Claims 79, 82--87, and 89)
The Examiner's § 103 rejection over Nakao in view of Cauchi and
further in view ofToublan includes claims 79, 83, 84, 86, and 89, which are
similar to claims 71, 74, and 77, discussed above. Rejection (d) presents
similar issues to Rejections (a)-( c ), and Appellants' arguments to claims 79,
83, 84, 86, and 89 are, likewise, similar to those already discussed (see
generally, Appeal Br. 21-36; Reply Br. 11-25).
3 Claim 82 recites the limitation "developing the resist layer and the
developable material layer to form an image of the first pattern in the
developable material layer" (emphasis added). Likewise, claim 83 recites
"after applying the second post exposure bake, developing the resist layer
and the developable material layer to form an image of the second pattern in
the developable material layer" (emphasis added).
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Specifically, the Examiner relies on Nakao's disclosure of a pattern
forming process, using layer 2lal (i.e., "developable material layer" (claims
79 and 86)) under the photoresist layer (Ans. 18). The Examiner determines
that it would have been obvious to the skilled artisan to have considered
Nakao' s hardmask layer 21a1 as a developable layer because "portions of
this layer are being removed in order to pattern the layer . . . . This would
then fall within the definition of a development step, which would mean that
an etchable layer is also a developable layer" (id. at 19 (citing Nakao iii! 102,
103); see also Non Final Act. 8). The Examiner further determines that
"[ o ]ne of ordinary skill in the art would know that the definition of
development in a photo lithography process is the removal of portions of a
layer in order to form a pattern" (Ans. 18).
The Examiner finds that Nakao teaches each of the limitations of
claims 79 and 86, with the exception of a teaching "that the photoresist and
developable layers are baked after each exposure, and that a computer
readable medium can be used to instruct a computer system to perform the
process." (Non-Final Act. 7).
As mentioned above, the Examiner relies upon Cauchi to exemplify
baking the photoresist layer after an initial exposure, exposing the
photoresist layer a second time, baking the photoresist layer a second time,
and then developing the photoresist layer (id.). As mentioned above, the
Examiner relies upon Toublan to exemplify an executable computer readable
medium comprising program code that instructs the computer system to
perform the claimed method (id. at 8).
Appellants argue that neither Nakao nor Cauchi discloses or suggests
the limitation "developable material layer" within the meaning of claims 79
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or 86 because "[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would in no way see
Nakao' s ... etching of fihn 21a[1] as an invitation to substitute that film
21 a[l] with a developable material layer ... similar to photoresist material
21 b" (Appeal Br. 23 (emphasis added); see also id. at 30). In other words,
Appellants' de facto position is that developable materials within the
meaning of claims 79 and 86 are limited to photoresist. Appellants further
argue that Cauchi is "entirely silent regarding whether [topmost] layer 115
or [antireflective] coating 125 is developable" (id. at 24, 31). According to
Appellants, the Examiner's definition is unsupported by the record evidence
and, furthermore, it "contradicts what a person of ordinary skill in the art
would understand from the teachings of Nakao and Cauchi" because Nakao
and Cauchi refer to "developing and etching as separate distinct processes"
(Reply Br. 12, 19). We are not persuaded.
The Examiner does not rely on Cauchi for teaching the limitation
"developable material layer" within the meaning of claims 79 or 86. Rather,
the Examiner relies on Nakao for teaching this limitation (Ans. 18). As
mentioned above, because the Specification does not limit the claimed
"developable material layer" to only photoresist (Spec. ,-i 57), the claims as
broadly worded reasonably encompass the method ofNakao's use of
radiation-insensitive lower layer 21a1.
Appellants further argue that Nakao and Cauchi fail to teach the
recited post exposure bakes because "the cited portions of Nakao show that a
pattern is not provided to film 21a[1] of Nakao until after the completion of
all the pattern projections in Nakao and after development, etch, etc." and
"the cited portions of Cauchi would fail to disclose applying a [first or]
second post exposure bake to the substrate having the [first or] second
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pattern in the resist layer and the developable material layer, as in claim 79"
(Appeal Br. 25). With respect to claim 86, Appellants further argue that "the
combination of the cited portions of Cauchi and Nakao would appear to
suggest no bake applied to a pattern in the resist layer AND the film 21a[1]
of Nakao" (id. at 33).
As mentioned above, the Examiner does not rely on Nakao for
teaching the "post exposure bake" limitations within the meaning of claims
79 or 86. Rather, the Examiner relies on Cauchi for teaching this limitation
(Non-Final Act. 7). In view of our above construction of claim 79 under the
doctrine of claim differentiation, Appellants' argument regarding the limited
meaning of the claim term "having the ... pattern" as requiring prior
exposure and development is unavailing. Claim 86 recites the same
language. Therefore, Appellants have not persuasively reasoned or directed
us to persuasive evidence to establish that the Examiner reversibly erred in
combining Cauchi's method of employing post exposure bake steps with
Nakao's use of a developable material layer.
Appellants further argue that the cited portions of Cauchi and Nakao
have been improperly combined because, according to Appellants, "there
would appear to be uneven shrinking and unexpected variance in size, shape
and/or location of holes in the process of Nakao ifthe bakes of Cauchi were
adopted" (Reply Br. 18). However, Appellant's unsupported conclusion that
Nakao's process would not function properly if combined with Cauchi's
post exposure bakes falls short of showing harmful error. An attorney's
arguments in a brief cannot take the place of evidence. In re Pearson, 494
F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). Therefore, none of Appellants' arguments
regarding claims 79 and 86 is persuasive of reversible error.
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In the absence of arguments specific to their patentability, dependent
claims 83 and 84 fall with claim 79 and, likewise, claim 89 falls with claim
86. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv).
Accordingly, a preponderance of evidence supports the Examiner's
obviousness determination as to claims 79, 83, 84, 86, and 89, and we
sustain the Examiner's rejection of these claims.
With respect to dependent claim 82, the Examiner relies on Nakao for
teaching the limitation "before projecting the second pattern, developing the
resist layer and the developable material layer to form an image of the first
pattern in the developable material layer" because Nakao teaches that
patterns may be developed after each exposure (Ans. 29 (citing Nakao
,-i 112) (emphasis added)).
Appellants argue that the Examiner has failed to establish that Nakao
teaches the limitation because Nakao teaches a double resist, double
exposure process that removes the first resist layer before it can project a
second pattern (Reply Br. 26 (citing Nakao ,-i,-i 118, 120)). According to
Appellants, Nakao is silent as to "incorporating 'double development' into a
single resist, double exposure process" (Reply Br. 26 (emphasis added)).
"As a general rule, the words 'a' or 'an' in a patent claim carry
the meaning of'one or more."' TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc'ns
Corp., 516 F.3d 1290, 1303 (Fed.Cir.2008). "The exceptions to
this rule are extremely limited: a patentee must evince a clear
intent to limit 'a' or 'an' to 'one."' Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc.
v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). "The subsequent use of
definite articles 'the' or 'said' in a claim to refer back to the same
claim term does not change the general plural rule, but simply
reinvokes that non-singular meaning." Id. An exception to the
general rule arises only "where the language of the claims
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themselves, the spec1ncation, or the prosecution history
necessitate a departure from the rule." Id. at 1342--43.
OJ Communique Lab., Inc. v. LogMein, Inc., 687 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2012). Appellants have not identified reversible error in the Examiner's
determination that claim 82 is rendered obvious because our broadest
reasonable interpretation of the claim is that the use of the definite articles in
the recited "the resist layer" and "a resist layer" in the claim from which it
depends on, i.e., claim 79, allows for use of one or more resist layers.
Furthermore, where the term "comprising" is used to introduce the steps in a
method claim, there is a presumption that the claim is open to including
additional, unrecited steps. See In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2004 ). Here, such unrecited steps could include the addition of a second
resist layer. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's§ 103 rejection of
claim 82 on appeal for substantially the reasons set forth in the Non-Final
Office Action, the Answer, and above.
With respect to dependent claim 85, Appellants argue that the
Examiner has failed to establish that Nakao teaches the limitation "the resist
layer and developable material layer are not developed between projecting
the first pattern and projecting the second pattern" (Appeal Br. 38). The
Examiner, however, has provided reasoned findings that Nakao teaches that
developing the photoresist after each exposure is an alternative to only
developing the photoresist after the second exposure (Ans. 29 (citing Nakao
,-i 112)). Appellants have not identified reversible error in the Examiner's
determination that it would have been obvious to the skilled artisan to
choose between developing after each exposure or developing after the
second exposure (id.). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's § 103
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rejection of claim 85 on appeal for substantially the reasons set forth in the
Non-Final Office Action, the Answer, and above.
With respect to dependent claim 87, the Examiner's§ 103 rejection is
similar to claims 71 and 77, discussed above, and presents similar issues to
Rejections (a)-( c ). Likewise, a preponderance of evidence supports the
Examiner's obviousness determination as to claim 87. Appellants'
arguments are cumulative (see generally, Appeal Br. 39--42; Reply Br. 26-
29). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's§ 103 rejection of claim 87 on
appeal for substantially the reasons set forth in the Answer (see generally,
Ans. 29-31) and above.
Thus, we affirm rejection ( d).
Rejection (e) (Claims 80, 81, 88, and 90)
With respect to dependent claims 80 and 88, the Examiner's§ 103
rejection is similar to claim 72, discussed above, and presents similar issues
to Rejection (a). Likewise, a preponderance of evidence supports the
Examiner's obviousness determination as to claim 72. Appellants'
arguments are cumulative (see generally, Reply Br. 42--44). Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner's§ 103 rejection of claims 80 and 88 on appeal for
substantially the reasons set forth in the Answer (see generally, Ans. 31-33)
and above.
With respect to dependent claims 81 and 90, Appellants argue that the
Examiner has failed to establish that Nakao teaches the limitation "wherein a
period between features of the first pattern and a period between features of
the second pattern is substantially the same" (Appeal Br. 44). According to
Appellants, Bae does not teach the limitation because "in the first exposure
of Bae, 'the spaces between the patterns have a width in the range of 3 0 to
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300 nm' ... while after the second exposure '[t]the space between the
second lower layer patterns ranges from 10 nm to 150 nm"' (id. at 45
(emphasis in original omitted)).
The Examiner, however, has provided reasoned findings that Bae
teaches that the space between features in the first mask pattern and the
space between features in the second mask pattern can have the same width
(Ans. 29 (citing Bae, Fig. 2C, iii! 39, 49)). Appellants have not identified
reversible error in the Examiner's determination that the claim limitation of
"wherein a period between features of the first pattern and a period between
features of the second pattern is substantially the same" (e.g., claims 81 and
90) is rendered obvious when the applied prior art is considered as a whole
(Ans. 29). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's § 103 rejection of claims
81 and 90 on appeal for substantially the reasons set forth in the Non-Final
Office Action, the Answer, and above.
DECISION
The Examiner's§ 103 rejections are affirmed.
TIME PERIOD
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § l.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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