Ex Parte Patek et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 23, 2010

10033328 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 23, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10/033,328 11/02/2001 Darrin M. Patek T015-P07180US 9602
33356 7590 09/23/2010
SoCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP
310 N. WESTLAKE BLVD. STE 120
WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CA 91362
EXAMINER
STRANGE, AARON N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2448
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/23/2010 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________________

Ex parte DARRIN M. PATEK, SHAUN CLEM, TODD L. KHACHERIAN,
JIMMY PU, and CHRIS REED

____________________

Appeal 2009-006218
Application 10/033,328
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
THU A. DANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

DANG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing,
as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE”
(paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery
mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision.

Appeal 2009-006218
Application 10/033,328

I. STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellants appeal the Examiner’s second rejection of claims 1-25
under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

A. INVENTION
According to Appellants, the invention relates to the field of computer
networks, and more particularly, to the management of storage networks
(Spec. 1, ¶ [0002]).

B. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIMS
Claims 1 and 22 are exemplary and reproduced below:

1. A method for sending a data item from a source to
selected destinations of a plurality of destinations in a switching
network, said method comprising:

examining said data item to determine a routing identifier
for said data item;

using said routing identifier as an index, accessing a data
structure comprising routing control values for said plurality of
destinations; and

transferring said data item from said source to said
selected destination based on said routing control values,
wherein said data item is concurrently transferred from said
source to said selected destinations based on said routing
control values.

22. A system for multicasting a frame in a router having a
plurality of input ports and a plurality of output ports,
comprising:
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a first crossbar switch for transferring said frame from an
input port of said plurality of input ports to a shared memory; a
frame pointer for referencing said frame stored in said shared
memory;

a second crossbar switch for transferring said frame using
said frame pointer to a plurality of selected output ports of said
plurality of output ports; and

a control unit for selecting said plurality of selected
output ports using a multicast data structure having
predetermined multicast routes.

C. REJECTIONS
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:

Chin US 5,617,421 Apr. 1, 1997
Flanders US 6,172,980 B1 Jan. 9, 2001
Nolan US 6,661,790 B1 Dec. 9, 2003

Memorandum from P. Almquist on “Type of Service in the Internet
Protocol Suite” (July 1992) (hereinafter “RFC 1349”)

Claims 1-7, 14, 16, 18, 21 and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as being anticipated by Chin.
Claims 8-13, 15 and 22-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Chin in view of Nolan.
Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Chin in view of RFC 1349.
Claims 19 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Chin in view of Flanders.
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II. ISSUES
1. Has the Examiner erred in finding that Chin teaches “transferring
said data item from said source to said selected destinations . . . , wherein
said data item is concurrently transferred from said source to said selected
destinations” (claim 1), as Appellants contend? In particular, does Chin
teach concurrent transfer of data item to selected destinations?
2. Has the Examiner erred in finding that Chin in view of Nolan
would have suggested “a first crossbar switch for transferring said frame
from an input port,” “a second crossbar switch for transferring said frame
using said frame pointer to a plurality of selected output ports” and “a
control unit for selecting said plurality of selected output ports” (claim 22),
as Appellants contend? In particular, would the combined teachings of Chin
and Nolan have suggested a first cross bar switch, a second crossbar switch
and a control unit?

III. FINDINGS OF FACT
The following Findings of Fact (FF) are shown by a preponderance of
the evidence.
Chin
1. Chin is directed to the interconnection of the segments of prior
segmented networks by connecting several individual LAN segments
to the ports of a switching fabric circuit, wherein a switching fabric
circuit is a circuit that provides for the processing and forwarding of
information between LAN segments in a segmented network (col. 1,
ll. 43-49).
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2. Each port includes transmit and receive circuitry according to the
LAN standard of the interswitch link to which it is connected, wherein
the ports including circuitry for processing and forwarding packets to
increase the throughput of the switching fabric circuits (col. 6, ll. 53-
67) and each switching fabric circuit creates and maintains a
forwarding table containing information about the location of
endstations (col. 7, ll. 1-16).
3. In Chin, it is determined whether the packet is a multicast packet and
the multicast packet is forwarded based on the source port of the exit
mask at step 1155 (col. 18, ll. 9-22; Fig. 11), wherein the multicast
address has a port of an exit mask that specifies less than all of the
ports of the domain which causes the packet processor of the source
port to forward the system packet to less than all of the ports (col. 17,
ll. 53-64).

IV. ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 102
As to claim 1, Appellants contend that “Chin nowhere discloses,
teaches or suggests ‘concurrently’ transferring the data item from the source
to the selected destinations” (App. Br. 6). In particular, though Appellants
admit that “Chin discloses that the multicast packet is forwarded,”
Appellants argue that “nowhere does it disclose, either explicitly or
inherently, that the multicast packet is forwarded concurrently to other
destinations” (App. Br. 7).
However, the Examiner finds “[a]s correctly noted by Appellants (Br.
6-7), Chin teaches ‘forwarding’ a multicast packet” (Ans. 11). Further, the
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Examiner explains that “Chin even provides an example of forwarding a
multicast packet, wherein a port of exit mask of ‘11000’ causes the packet
processor of port 1 to forward the [multicast] system packet to ports 4 and 5”
(id.). Thus, according to the Examiner, “[w]hile Chin does not use the term
‘concurrently’, one of ordina[ry] skill in the art, armed with even a
rudimentary understanding of multicast packet switching, would have
understood Chin’s teaching of forwarding a packet to multiple ports inside a
switch to mean concurrently forwarding the packet to each of the ports for
transmittal” (id.).
To determine whether Chin teaches concurrent transfer of data item to
selected destinations, we give the claims their broadest reasonable
interpretation. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We
note that claim 1 does not place any limitation on what “concurrently”
means, includes, or represents, other than reciting that the data item “is
concurrently transferred from said source to said selected destinations.” We
thus give “concurrently” its ordinary meaning of occurring at the same time.
Additionally, anticipation “is not an ‘ipsissimis verbis’ test.” In re
Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832-33 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Akzo N.V. v. U. S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “An
anticipatory reference . . . need not duplicate word for word what is in the
claims.” Standard Havens Prods., Inc., v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d
1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1991). That is, Chin does not need to specifically state
“concurrently” transferring of data items to anticipate claim 1.
Chin teaches determining whether a packet is a multicast packet and
forwarding the multicast packet to selected ports at step 1155 (FF 3). Since
the multicast packet is forwarded to the selected ports at the same step, we
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find the multicast packet to be concurrently transferred (i.e. transferred at the
same time) to the selected ports.
Furthermore, the ordinary meaning of a “multicast” as known by the
skilled artisan is a single stream of data (i.e., a set of packets) that is
transmitted simultaneously to selected multiple hosts who have joined the
appropriate multicast group. The skilled artisan would have understood
Chin to teach simultaneously (or concurrently) transferring of data packet
(item) to selected destinations (multiple hosts who have joined the group).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that “one of ordina[ry] skill in the
art, armed with even a rudimentary understanding of multicast packet
switching, would have understood Chin’s teaching of forwarding a packet to
multiple ports inside a switch to mean concurrently forwarding the packet to
each of the ports for transmittal” (Ans. 11). That is, we disagree with
Appellants’ contention that “Chin nowhere discloses, teaches or suggests
‘concurrently’ transferring the data item from the source to the selected
destinations” (App. Br. 6).
As for claim 14, Appellants further argue that “the office action fails
to show where Chin teaches ‘selected output queue control modules for said
plurality of selected output queues, said selected output queue control
modules used for copying said data to said plurality of selected output
queues’ as recited in claim 14” (App. Br. 8). However, the Examiner finds
that “[i]n order to transmit the packets from the selected ports, the packets
must be copied to an output queue for that port” and thus “copying data to
said plurality of output queues is an inherent part of forwarding the data
(multicast packet) to those ports” (Ans. 12).
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We agree with the Examiner. That is, Chin discloses routing the
multicast data packet to multiple ports (FF 3). Since the packet is sent
simultaneously (concurrently) to the multiple ports, copies of the data packet
must be made in order to send the packet to multiple ports.
Thus, we find that the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1 and
14, independent claim 25 falling with claim 1, and claims 2-7, 16, 18 and 21
depending from claims 1 and 14 respectively under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
As to claim 8, Appellants repeat that “[a]s discussed above [with
respect to claim 1], Chin does not disclose, teach or suggest this
[concurrently transferred] limitation” and add that “Nolan does not cure this
deficiency” (App. Br. 9). However, as discussed above, we find no
deficiency with respect to Chin.
Thus, we find that the Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 8 and
claims 9-13, depending therefrom, over Chin and Nolan under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a). Since Appellants do not provide arguments for claim 15, claim 15
also falls therewith.
As to claim 22, Appellants argue that “Chin and Nolan nowhere teach
or suggest the ‘first crossbar switch’, the ‘second crossbar switch’, nor a
‘control unit for selecting said plurality of selected output ports using a
multicast data structure having predetermined multicast routes” (App. Br.
11). However, the Examiner concludes that “the claimed ‘first crossbar
switch’ corresponds to Chin’s receive circuitry of the switch ports,” “the
‘second crossbar switch’ corresponds to the ‘processing and forwarding’
circuitry,” and “the claimed control unit corresponds to portion of the
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switching fabric circuit to maintains and uses the forwarding table to make
routing decisions” (Ans. 13).
To determine whether the combined teachings of Chin and Nolan
would have suggested the “first crossbar switch,” the “second crossbar
switch,” and a “control unit,” we give the claims their broadest reasonable
interpretation. We find that claim 22 does not place any limitation on what
“first crossbar switch,” “second crossbar switch” or “control unit” means,
includes, or represents, other than reciting that the first crossbar switch is
“for transferring said frame from an input port,” the second crossbar switch
is “for transferring said frame using said frame pointer to a plurality of
selected output ports” and the control unit is “for selecting said plurality of
selected output ports.” In fact, claim 22 does not define what is a “crossbar
switch” wherein “crossbar” is merely a label describing the “switch” without
providing any additional functionality to the switch. Thus, we interpret a
“crossbar switch” to be a switching element.
Chin is discloses a switching fabric circuit that provides for the
processing and forwarding of information between LAN segments in a
segmented network (FF 1), wherein the ports including circuitry for
transmitting and receiving data packets and circuitry for processing and
forwarding the packets to increase the throughput of the switching fabric
circuits (FF 2). One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Chin
in view of Nolan to suggest a switching fabric circuit that includes an
element for transferring the data packet from an input port, an element for
transferring the frame to selected output ports, and a control unit for selected
the output ports. Accordingly, we conclude that Chin in view of Nolan
would have suggested a switching element “for transferring said frame from
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an input port,” a switching element “for transferring said frame using said
frame pointer to a plurality of selected output ports” and “a control unit for
selecting said plurality of selected output ports” as required by claim 22.
Though Appellants add in the Reply Brief that “a crossbar switch is a
well-known switching element” and that “the receiving and processing
circuitry within each of Chin’s ports are not equivalent to first and second
crossbar switches” (Reply Br. 5), Appellants appear to be arguing that claim
22 is not anticipated by Chin. However, the test for obviousness is what
would have been suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art by the
combined teachings of Chin and Nolan. A skilled artisan would have found
it obvious that the circuits in the switching fabric circuits to comprise
switching elements, wherein the switching elements may also comprise the
crossbar switch which Appellants acknowledge as well-known switching
elements. As clarified in KSR, the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.” See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 421 (2007).
Appellants have presented no evidence that using a crossbar switch as
the switching element of Chin was “uniquely challenging or difficult for one
of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior
art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
Thus, we find that the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 22 and
claims 23 and 24 depending therefrom under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Similarly, as to claims 17, 19, and 20, Appellants merely argue that
“RFC 1349 also fails to cure this deficiency [of Chin]” and “Flanders fails to
cure this deficiency [of Chin]” (App. Br. 12). However, as discussed above,
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we find no deficiency in Chin. Accordingly, we find that the Examiner did
not err in rejecting claim 17 over Chin in view of RFC 1349 and rejecting
claims 19 and 20 over Chin in view of Flanders.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-7, 14, 16, 18, 21 and 25
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and rejecting claims 8-13, 15, 17, 19, 20, and 22-
24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

peb

SoCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP
310 N. WESTLAKE BLVD. STE 120
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