Ex Parte Parkos et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesJun 18, 201210930466 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 18, 2012) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte ARTHUR J. PARKOS and DEBORRA J. ZUKOWSKI ____________ Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, HUBERT C. LORIN, and ANTON W. FETTING, Administrative Patent Judges. LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Arthur J. Parkos, et al. (Appellants) seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1, 3-19, 21-27, 29, and 30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2002). Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 2 SUMMARY OF DECISION We AFFIRM.1 THE INVENTION Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method comprising: detecting an event which occurs during transportation of a mailpiece on the way from a sender to an addressee; then determining alternate contact information for the sender by reading said alternate contact information from the mailpiece; then sending a request including information regarding the event to the sender using the alternate contact information; receiving instructions from the sender in response to the request regarding at least one action to be taken upon occurrence of said event; and determining if the mailpiece is in a condition to allow the received instructions to be followed, and if the mailpiece is in the condition to allow the received instructions to be followed, then following said instructions and if the mailpiece is not in the condition to allow the received instructions to be followed, then destroying the mailpiece. The other independent claim, claim 21 - also drawn to a method, differs from claim 1 in adding a step of “and if the sender requests electronic delivery, then, opening the mailpiece; scanning a document contained in the 1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed Sep. 4, 2009) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Feb. 10, 2010), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Answer,” mailed Dec. 10, 2009). Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 3 mailpiece to generate scanned data; and transmitting the scanned data to the addressee.” THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Theimer Sansone ‘613 Sansone ‘880 Kuebert Lala Nguyen MacKlin Kan US 5,627,517 US 2002/0141613 A1 US 2002/0143880 A1 US 2002/0165729 A1 US 2002/0165908 A1 US 2003/0199320 A1 US 2004/0093314 A1 US 2005/0049890 A1 May 6, 1997 Oct. 3, 2002 Oct. 3, 2002 Nov. 7, 2002 Nov. 7, 2002 Oct. 23, 2003 May 13, 2004 Mar. 3, 2005 The following rejections are before us for review: 1. Claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 82, 11, 12, and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Sansone ‘613. 2. Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Kan. 3. Claims 10 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Official Notices I and II. 2 Claim 8 was inadvertently not included in the statement of the rejection as set forth in the Answer. Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 4 4. Claim 13 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and MacKlin. 5. Claims 17 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Nguyen. 6. Claim 29 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Lala. 7. Claims 6, 9, 16, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Theimer. 8. Claims 21, 22, 25, and 26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880 and Kuebert. 9. Claim 23 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Kan. 10. Claim 30 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Lala. 11. Claims 24 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Theimer. ISSUE Was an error committed in rejecting the claims on appeal under §103 over the cited prior art in error? FINDINGS OF FACT We adopt and rely on the Examiner’s factual findings stated in the Answer. Additional findings of fact may appear in the Analysis below. Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 5 ANALYSIS The rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Sansone ‘613. The Appellants argued claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, and 14 as a group (App. Br. 14-16). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and the remaining claims 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, and 14 stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2007). Analysis begins with a key legal question -- what is the invention claimed? Courts are required to view the claimed invention as a whole. 35 U.S.C. § 103. Claim interpretation, in light of the specification, claim language, other claims, and prosecution history, is a matter of law and will normally control the remainder of the decisional process. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Claim 1 is directed to a method comprising 6 steps. Step 1 (“detecting an event which occurs during transportation of a mailpiece on the way from a sender to an addressee”). There is no express definition in the Specification limiting the claim term “event”. Accordingly, it covers any happening or occurrence of a mailpiece on the way from a sender to an addressee. For example, a crash would be an event. Step 2 (“then determining alternate contact information for the sender by reading said alternate contact information from the mailpiece”). The Specification describes a telephone number as an alternate contact information. Specification [0024]. Thus this step covers reading a sender’s telephone number from the mailpiece. Step 3 (“then sending a request including information regarding the Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 6 event to the sender using the alternate contact information”). If step 1 covers a crash involving a mailpiece on the way from a sender to an addressee and step 2 covers reading a sender’s telephone number from the mailpiece, then this step covers calling the sender of the mailpiece and asking for information relative to the mailpiece involved in the crash. Step 4 (“receiving instructions from the sender in response to the request regarding at least one action to be taken upon occurrence of said event”). If step 3 covers calling the sender of the mailpiece and asking for information relative the mailpiece involved in the crash, then this step covers a sender instructing that the mailpiece be destroyed. Step 5 (“determining if the mailpiece is in a condition to allow the received instructions to be followed”). If step 3 covers calling the sender of the mailpiece and asking for information relative the mailpiece involved in the crash and step 4 covers a sender instructing that the mailpiece be destroyed, then this step covers determining whether the mailpiece can be destroyed. Step 6 (“if the mailpiece is in the condition to allow the received instructions to be followed, then following said instructions and if the mailpiece is not in the condition to allow the received instructions to be followed, then destroying the mailpiece.”). If step 3 covers calling the sender of the mailpiece and asking for information relative the mailpiece involved in the crash, step 4 covers a sender instructing that the mailpiece be destroyed, and step 5 covers determining whether the mailpiece can be destroyed, then this step covers destroying the mailpiece if it can be destroyed or, if not, destroying it. Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 7 Putting it all together, claim 1, as reasonably broadly construed in light of the Specification as it would have been interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, encompasses a method whereby when a crash occurs during transportation of a mailpiece on the way from a sender to an addressee, calling the sender for instructions via a phone number indicated on the mailpiece, and if the instructions are to destroy the mailpiece, then destroy it. To put it even more simply, the method as claimed covers calling a sender’s number on a letter and destroying the letter if so ordered. That being claim 1 reasonably broadly construed, we turn to the rejection. The Examiner takes the position that Sansone ‘880 discloses steps 1 and 2, Kuebert discloses steps 3 and 4, and Sansone ‘613 discloses steps 5 and 6. Answer 3-4. The Examiner found that it would have been obvious to combine these steps and thereby reach the claimed invention. Answer 5. The Appellants disagree, arguing that Kuebert does not disclose step 5 (“determining if the mailpiece is in a condition to allow the received instructions to be followed”). App. Br. 15. “Keubert '729 suggests only changing the delivery time or place of a mail item.” App. Br. 16. But as we read the Answer, the Examiner relied on Sansone ‘613, not Kuebert: the limitation taught by Sansone 2 [Sansone ‘613], determining if the mailpiece is in a condition to allow instructions to be followed, and if the mailpiece is in the condition to allow instructions to be followed, then following said instructions and if the mailpiece is not in the condition to allow the instructions to be followed, then destroying the mailpiece (see para. 31-32). Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 8 Answer 4. Paragraph [0031] describes a recipient having instructed the post to destroy the mail and paragraph [0032] describes a situation where if a security process determines that a mailpiece contains life-harming material then it is sent to a proper authority disposal site. By implication, in the situation that a mailpiece contains life-harming material, there necessarily was a prior step of “determining if the mailpiece is in a condition to allow the received instructions to be followed” (claim 1). In evaluating a reference it is proper to take into account not only the specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom. In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968). Accordingly, the argument is unpersuasive as to error in the rejection. The Appellants take issue with the Examiner’s position regarding claim 8, but the Examiner’s position has not been addressed with any specificity. The Examiner recognized that the prior art disclosed printing a sender’s phone number and not that of a recipient but did not find the difference patentably consequential. Answer 16. We agree. We do not see the functional distinction between information representing a sender’s phone number and not that of a recipient in the context of claim 8, which is drawn to information printed on a mailpiece. All the arguments having been addressed and found unpersuasive as to error in the rejection, the rejection is affirmed. The rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Kan. Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 9 The Appellants rely on the arguments challenging the rejection of claim 1 to challenge this rejection. App. Br. 17. Those arguments having been found unpersuasive, they are equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claim 5. The Appellants also argue that “one of ordinary skill in the art would not look to Kan ‘890 to modify the other cited references because Kan ‘890 does not suggest or contemplate delivery instructions at all, but merely carries information used in a method for processing returned mail - after delivery has been aborted.” App. Br. 17. But, as the Examiner points out, “Kan was relied upon to show that printing an electronic mail address on a mail piece would have been obvious at the time of invention. Fig. 2C, of Kan, plainly describes this feature.” Answer 17. “When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). The rejection of claims 10 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Official Notices I and II. The Appellants rely on the arguments challenging the rejection of claim 1 to challenge this rejection. App. Br. 17. Those arguments having been found unpersuasive, they are equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claims 10 and 15. Moreover, with regard to claim 10, the Examiner's reliance on Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 10 Official Notice is misplaced. While the United States Postal Service may place damaged envelopes in clear envelopes for further delivery, such steps are taken at postal service discretion and do not result in opening the mailpiece. Furthermore, such steps are not taken in response to instructions from the sender. With regard to claim 15, the Appellants argue that the Examiner's reliance on Official Notice is misplaced at least because such barcodes are not used along with receiving instructions from the sender in response to a request regarding action to be taken upon occurrence of an event. App. Br. 17-18. But the arguments are not persuasive as to error in the rejection because “[t]he question in a §103 case is what the references would [c]ollectively suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Ehrreich, 590 F.2d 902, 909 (CCPA 1979). The rejection of claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and MacKlin. The Appellants rely on the arguments challenging the rejection of claim 1 to challenge this rejection. App. Br. 18. Those arguments having been found unpersuasive, they are equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claim 13. The rejection of claims 17 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Nguyen. The Appellants rely on the arguments challenging the rejection of claim 1 to challenge this rejection. App. Br. 19. Those arguments having Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 11 been found unpersuasive, they are equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claims 17 and 18. The Appellants also argue that “one of ordinary skill in the art would not look to Nguyen ‘320 to modify the other cited references because it suggests only class of service upgrade before an item is inducted, not after an item is mailed and an event detected.” App. Br. 19. But “[w]hen a work is available in one field, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or in another. If a person of ordinary skill in the art can implement a predictable variation… § 103 likely bars its patentability.” KSR at 401. The rejection of claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Lala. The Appellants rely on the arguments challenging the rejection of claim 29 to challenge this rejection. App. Br. 20. Those arguments having been found unpersuasive, they are equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claim 29. The Appellants also argue that “one of ordinary skill in the art would not look to Lala ‘908 to modify the other cited references because it suggests only electronic commerce purchases and has no suggestion of delivery services or agreed payment for processing new delivery instructions.” App. Br. 20. But “[w]hen a work is available in one field, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field in another. If a person of ordinary skill in the art can implement a predictable variation…§ 103 likely bars its patentability.” KSR at 401. Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 12 The rejection of claims 6, 9, 16, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Theimer. The Appellants rely on the arguments challenging the rejection of claim 1 to challenge this rejection. App. Br. 20. Those arguments having been found unpersuasive, they are equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claims 6, 9, 16, and 19. The Appellants also argue that “one of ordinary skill in the art would not look to Theimer '517 to modify the other cited references because it does not apparently involve receiving new delivery instructions at all.” App. Br. 20. But “[w]hen a work is available in one field, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or another. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation… § 103 likely bars its patentability.” KSR at 401. The rejection of claims 21, 22, 25, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880 and Kuebert. The Appellants rely on the arguments challenging the rejection of claim 1 to challenge this rejection. App. Br. 22. Those arguments having been found unpersuasive, they are equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claims 21, 22, 25, and 26. The Appellants argue that the Examiner has not established that the cited references teach or fairly suggest, alone or in any proper combination, the element of “determining whether the mailpiece belongs to a category of scan-and-forward mail pieces.” The Examiner cites Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 13 to paragraph 0036 in Kuebert ‘729, but that citation does not suggest determining a category of the mailpiece at all. App. Br. 21-22. But, in fact, the Examiner relied on Sansone ‘880: “As per Claim 21, Sansone teaches detecting an event which occurs during transportation of a mailpiece on the way from a sender to an addressee (see para. 5 and 7); determining whether the mailpiece belongs to a category of scan-and-forward mail pieces (see para. 28 and 30) ....” Answer 11. The rejection of claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Kan. The Appellants rely on the arguments challenging the rejection of claim 1 to challenge this rejection. App. Br. 22-23. Those arguments having been found unpersuasive, they are equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claim 23. The rejection of claim 30 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Lala. The Appellants rely on the arguments challenging the rejection of claims 1 and 29 to challenge this rejection. App. Br. 23. Those arguments having been found unpersuasive, they are equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claim 30. The rejection of claims 24 and 27 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Theimer. The Appellants rely on the arguments challenging the rejection of Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 14 claim 1 and claims 6, 9, 16, and 19 to challenge this rejection. App. Br. 24. Those arguments having been found unpersuasive, they are equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claims 24 and 27. CONCLUSIONS The rejections of claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Sansone ‘613; claim 5 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Kan; claims 10 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Official Notices I and II; claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and MacKlin; claims 17 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Nguyen; claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Lala; claims 6, 9, 16, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, Sansone ‘613, and Theimer; claims 21, 22, 25, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880 and Kuebert; claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Kan; claim 30 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Lala; and, claims 24 and 27 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sansone ‘880, Kuebert, and Theimer, are affirmed. Appeal 2010-007170 Application 10/930,466 15 DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 3-19, 21-27, 29, and 30 is affirmed. AFFIRMED mls Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation