Ex Parte PALLARI et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 8, 201911847686 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 8, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 11/847,686 08/30/2007 51206 7590 07/10/2019 Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP/Oracle Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Vincent Francis P ALLARI UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 88325-732417 (041600US) 2540 EXAMINER MEINECKE DIAZ, SUSANNA M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/10/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com oraclepatentmail@kilpatricktownsend.com KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte VINCENT FRANCIS PALLARI and SHAWN MICHAEL ABERNATHY1 Appeal2017-009985 Application 11/847,686 Technology Center 3600 Before ANTON W. PETTING, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges. MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Non- Final Office Action rejection of claims 1-7 and 22-35, which are all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Oral arguments were presented on June 27, 2019. SUMMARY OF THE DECISION We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Oracle International Corporation. See App. Br. 3 Appeal2017-009985 Application 11/847,686 THE INVENTION The Appellants' claimed invention is directed to managing transactions and particularly to routing employee transactions for approval (Spec., para 2). Claim 1, reproduced below with the italics added, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method of routing transactions for approval, compnsmg: receiving, at a computer processor executing a particular application, one or more communications from an employee device that at least partly defines a transaction for approval, the transaction corresponding to an employee having more than one job and reporting to more than one manager; creating, by the computer processor using the particular application in response to receiving the transaction for approval, an object of an approval framework, the approval framework supporting a plurality of applications including the particular application and providing routing of transactions to the applications for approval, the object comprising logic to determine routing information for the transaction, employee information identifying the employee, and job information identifying which of the jobs of the employee correspond to the transaction; passing, by the computer processor, the created object of the approval framework from the particular application to the approval framework; determining, by the computer processor using the approval framework, an appropriate approval process definition based on the employee information and the job information of the object of the approval framework, wherein the approval process comprises one or more of the following: stages, paths, steps, hierarchies, or criteria parameters to route transactions that require approvals to one or more of the plurality of applications; calling a user-identifying object using at least part of the employee information, the user-identifying object being accessible to the approval framework, wherein the user identifying object executes logic within the user-identifying object to perform a SQL query to identify, from a database, an identifier of a user; 2 Appeal2017-009985 Application 11/847,686 receiving, as a response to the call to the user-identifying object, the identifier of the user, the user including a manager of the more than one manager for the employee; and routing, using the computer processor using the approval framework, the transaction to a device corresponding to the user for approval through one of the plurality of applications. THE REJECTION The following rejection is before us for review: Claims 1-7 and 22-35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. FINDINGS OF FACT We have determined that the findings of fact in the Analysis section below are supported at least by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 ANALYSIS Re} ection under 3 5 U.S. C. § 101 The Appellants argue that the rejection of claim 1 is improper because the claim is not directed to an abstract idea (App. Br. 16, 17; Reply Br. 2-4). The Appellants argue further that the claim is "significantly more" than the alleged abstract idea (App. Br. 13-15). The Appellants also argue that the claim does not preempt all transaction routing methods (App. Br. 17, 18). In contrast, the Examiner has determined that the rejection of record is proper (Final Action 2-7; Ans. 2-13). 2 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ( explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Patent Office). 3 Appeal2017-009985 Application 11/847,686 We agree with the Examiner. An invention is patent eligible if it claims a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bankint'l, 573 U.S. 208,216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217-18 ( citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk .... "). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981 )); "tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 4 Appeal2017-009985 Application 11/847,686 252, 267-68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 ("We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment." Id. (internal citation omitted) ( citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."). The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("Guidance"). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h)). 5 Appeal2017-009985 Application 11/847,686 Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance. If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an '"inventive concept'" sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 ( citation omitted). "A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[ s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id. Here, the Examiner has determined that claim 1 is directed to the concept of routing transactions for approval by evaluating an approval process definition and employee, manager, and job information to determine to whom to route the transaction for approval which is method of organizing human activities and therefore an abstract idea (Ans. 3). We substantially agree with the Examiner in this regard as claim 1 is directed to the steps of in italics in the claim above. These steps are directed to the creating an 6 Appeal2017-009985 Application 11/847,686 approval framework for employee transactions and routing the transaction to the user for approval. This is a method of organizing human activities and an abstract idea. In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) it was held that collecting, displaying, and manipulating data was directed to an abstract idea. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying results from certain results of the collection and analysis was held to be an abstract idea). Thus, we consider the claim to be directed to an abstract idea as identified above. Turning to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, we determine that the claim does not contain an inventive concept sufficient to "transform" the abstract nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application. The claim does not improve computer functionality, improve another field or technology, utilize a particular machine, or effect a physical transformation. Rather, we determine that nothing in the claim imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort to monopolize the judicial exception. For example, in claim 1 the steps of [ 1] "receiving ... one or more communications from an employee device that at least partly defines a transaction for approval"; [2] "creating ... an object of an approval framework"; [3] "passing ... the created object of the approval framework from the particular application to the approval framework"; [ 4] determining . . . an appropriate approval process definition"; [5] calling a user-identifying object using at least part of the employee information, the user-identifying object being accessible to the approval framework, wherein the user 7 Appeal2017-009985 Application 11/847,686 identifying object executes logic within the user-identifying object to perform a SQL query to identify, from a database, an identifier of a user; [6] receiving ... the identifier of the user, the user; and [7] routing ... the transaction to a device corresponding to the user for approval" are merely conventional steps performed by a generic computer that do not improve computer functionality. That is, these recited steps [ 1 ]-[7] "do not purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself' but are merely generic functions performed by a conventional processor. Likewise, these same steps [ 1 ]-[7] listed above do not improve the technology of the technical field and merely use generic computer components and functions to perform the steps. Also, the recited method steps [l]-[7] above do not require a "particular machine" and can be utilized with a general purpose computer, and the steps performed are purely conventional. In this case the general purpose computer is merely an object on which the method operates in a conventional manner and does not provide "significantly more" to the claim beyond a nominal or insignificant execution of the method. Id. Further, the claim as a whole fails to effect any particular transformation of an article to a different state in a manner that would render the claim "significantly more" than the abstract idea. Id. The recited steps [ 1 ]-[7] fail to provide meaningful limitations to limit the judicial exception and rather are mere instructions to apply the method to a generic computer. Considering the elements of the claim both individually and as "an ordered combination" the functions performed by the computer system at each step of the process are purely conventional. Each step of the claimed method does no more than require a generic computer to perform a generic computer function. 8 Appeal2017-009985 Application 11/847,686 Further the claim fails to add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field. Rather the claim uses well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known in the art at a high level of generality to the judicial exception. The Specification at paragraphs 35 and 44 for example describes using conventional computer components such as general purpose personal computers, cell phones, and commercially available operating systems in a conventional manner. The claim specifically includes recitations for a computer processor to implement the method but these computer components are all used in a manner that is well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field. The Appellants have not shown these claimed generic computer components which are used to implement the claimed method are not well understood, routine, or conventional in the field. The Appellants in the Appeal Brief at page 16 have also cited to Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to show that the claim is not abstract but the claims in that case were not similar in scope to those presented here in contrast and were in contrast directed to a self-referential data table. The Appellants in the Appeal Brief at page 17 have also cited to McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) but the claims in that case are distinguished from this case in being directed to rules for lip sync and facial expression animation. We note the point about pre-emption (App. Br. 17, 18). Although pre- emption "might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it, 'thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws'" (Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)), "the 9 Appeal2017-009985 Application 11/847,686 absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility" (Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). See also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert, denied, 136 S. Ct. 701, 193 (2015)("[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract."). For these reasons, the rejection of claim 1 is sustained. The Appellants have provided the same arguments for the remaining claims which are drawn to similar subject matter and the rejection of these claims is sustained as well. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-7 and 22-35 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-7 and 22-35 is sustained. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § l.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(±). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation