Ex Parte Pagano et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 26, 201713526278 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/526,278 06/18/2012 Kevin Pagano 60725/YOD (ITWO:0549) 4019 52145 7590 10/30/2017 FLETCHER YODER (ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC.) P.O. BOX 692289 HOUSTON, TX 77269-2289 EXAMINER TRAN, THIEN S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3742 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/30/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docket@fyiplaw.com sinclair@fyiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KEVIN PAGANO and KEVIN SUMMERS Appeal 2016-001475 Application 13/526,278 Technology Center 3700 Before: LINDA E. HORNER, CHARLES N. GREENHUT, and THOMAS F. SMEGAL, Administrative Patent Judges. GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1— 20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm and enter new grounds of rejection. Appeal 2016-001475 Application 13/526,278 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a metal cored welding method and system. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A welding method comprising: establishing an arc between a metal cored welding electrode and a workpiece, the metal cored welding electrode comprising a sheath and a core; feeding the metal cored welding electrode from a welding torch while cyclically moving the metal cored welding electrode in a desired pattern by a motion control assembly within the welding torch to maintain the arc only between the sheath and the workpiece and while forcing movement of the arc between the sheath and the workpiece; and advancing the welding torch or the workpiece to establish a weld bead. REJECTIONS1 Claims 1,4, 10 and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ozamoto (JP 09-094658 A, pub. April 8, 1997) and Kim (US 2008/0245774 Al, pub. October 9, 2008) as evidenced by Barhorst2 (“Metal Cored Electrode Basics”). Claims 2 and 3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ozamoto, Kim, and Nomura (US 4,441,011, iss. April 3, 1984) or Brown (US 3,818,176, iss. June 18, 1974). 1 The Examiner withdrew a rejection of claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. 2 Steve Barhorst, Metal Cored electrode Basics, The American Welder (Nov/Dec 2000), http://www.aws.Org/wj/amwelder/l 1-00/barhorst.html 2 Appeal 2016-001475 Application 13/526,278 Claims 5, 6 and 7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ozamoto, Kim, and Nakano (JP 2000-301332 A, pub. October 31, 2000). Claims 8 and 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ozamoto, Kim, and Sugitani (US 5,030,812, iss.July 9, 1991). Claims 12, 13, 15, 19 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ozamoto, Kim, and Nomura, as evidenced by Barhorst. OPINION Appellants present the same arguments concerning independent claims 1 and 12 (App. Br. 8—14; 19-20) and premise arguments concerning the remaining claims (App. Br. 15—17, 20—21), with the exception of claim 8 (App. Br. 18), only on dependency. The Examiner rejected claim 1 based on the combination of Ozamoto, Kim and Barhorst, with Barhorst cited as evidence of the inherent characteristics of Ozamoto’s cored wire.3 Final Act. 5-6. For claim 12 the Examiner added Nomura, for which Appellants do not present any additional arguments. Final Act. 10-14. Appellants make three arguments against the Examiner’s reliance on the Ozamoto, Kim and Barhorst combination: First, Appellants contend that the claimed combination yields unexpected results. App. Br. 9-11. Second, Appellants contend Ozamoto, even in light of Barhorst, does not disclose “forcing movement of the arc” “maintain[ed] only between the sheath and the workpiece.” App. Br. 12—13. Third, 3 This is discussed in the anticipation context in MPEP § 2131.01(111). 3 Appeal 2016-001475 Application 13/526,278 Appellants contend that due to the different wire diameters, Ozamoto and Kim teach away from one another. App. Br. 13—14. Beginning with Appellants’ third argument, teaching away is not a matter of finding any isolated teachings that differ in the references cited in a rejection. See App. Br. 13—14; Reply Br. 2—3. Rather, teaching away requires a disclosure that actually criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the solution claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Furthermore, the references must be considered in their entirety. Thus, Appellants’ teaching away argument fails for two reasons: Appellants have pointed only to differences in choice of wire size without any explanation or evidence as to why this difference would lead one skilled in the art to disregard the teachings of Kim concerning the controller that are relied upon by the Examiner. Second, pointing only to distinctions between Ozamoto and Kim does not, without more, identify any subject matter within claim 1 which the references, considered in their entirety, would teach against. Thus, we do not find any teaching away from the subject matter of claim 1 in Ozamoto and Kim. The point of fact that underlies Appellants’ second argument, whether Ozamoto as evidenced by Barhorst inherently discloses “forcing movement of the arc” “maintain[ed] only between the sheath and the workpiece,” is effectively determinative of Appellants’ first argument concerning unexpected results because if the claimed and prior-art processes are inherently the same, the results must also be the same and therefore cannot be regarded as unexpected. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc. 246 F.3d 1368, 1376-1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Newly discovered results of known processes directed to the same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.) 4 Appeal 2016-001475 Application 13/526,278 The Examiner reasonably found and reasoned that with the current focused on the outer sheath, and oscillating wire movement dictating movement of the arc, just as in Appellants’ invention, the inherent result would be “forcing movement of the arc” “maintain[ed] only between the sheath and the workpiece” as required by claims 1 and 12. Final Act. 5—6 (citing Ozamoto p. 2, Barhorst p. 2). This reasonably shifted the burden4 to Appellants to come forward with evidence or explanation as to why these particular results recited would not be an inherent characteristic of the prior art. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326—28 (Fed. Cir. 1984).5 We acknowledge Barhorst’s alleged shortcoming in discussing where current is concentrated without specifically or expressly teaching that this location always coincides with where the arc is located. However, Appellants have not pointed to any disclosure in their own Specification or submitted any extrinsic evidence to apprise us of what particular manipulative steps or structural characteristics bring about the particular arc location recited in claims 1 and 12. Nor have Appellants identified any disclosure or provided any evidence to demonstrate how arc movement is “forced” other than by moving the wire as is done in Ozamoto. Having carefully compared Appellants’ disclosure with that of Ozamoto and Barhorst, we are unable to find, and Appellants do not apprise us of, any differences in the structures or settings employed that would bring about differences in the arc locations. As a practical matter, it does not suffice for Appellants to merely assert, without evidence or explanation, that 4 For a detailed discussion, see MPEP § 2112. 5 The issue was anticipation in King, but “[t]he inherent teaching of a prior art reference, a question of fact, arises both in the context of anticipation and obviousness.” In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 613 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 5 Appeal 2016-001475 Application 13/526,278 the prior-art does not inherently achieve an arc only between the sheath and the workpiece (App. Br. 12—13), “challenging the PTO to prove the contrary by experiment or otherwise. The PTO is not equipped to perform such tasks.” In re King, 801 F.2d at 1327 (citing, inter alia, In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 535 (CCPA 1972)). Thus, on the record before us, Appellants have not adequately rebutted the Examiner finding of inherency. Without drawing a distinction between the claimed subject matter and that of Ozamoto and Barhorst, insofar as the arc characteristics are concerned, Appellants’ allegation of unexpected results cannot be said to be based on results that actually differ from those of the prior art, because such results must also be inherent. Bristol-Myers Squibb, supra. We acknowledge the allegation of unexpected results in the Specification. App. Br. 10-11 (citing Spec. para. 26). However, Appellants do not identify any relationship between any specific claim recitation and any specific result. Thus Appellants have not shown a nexus between the allegedly unexpected results and the claimed subject matter (MPEP § 716.02(b)) nor have Appellants shown how the results are commensurate in scope with the claimed invention (MPEP § 716.02(d)). Appellants also do not specify what specific processes form the basis for their comparisons in the Specification or provide any comparison to a product similar to that employed by Ozamoto. Thus, Appellants have also failed to provide a comparison against the closest prior art (MPEP § 716.02(e)). For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 12 and those claims dependent thereon and not separately argued. 6 Appeal 2016-001475 Application 13/526,278 Appellants’ argument concerning claim 8 amounts to pointing out that no single reference discloses the combination of the recited speed with a cored wire.6 App. Br. 17—18. The law is replete with cases in which the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is some range or other variable within the claims. . . . [I]n such a situation, the applicant must show that the particular range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range. In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Certainly, increasing the workpiece speed will increase production efficiency as the Examiner finds. Final Act. 10; Ans. 8. To the extent Appellants argue one would not expect a sufficient quality of weld with a cored wire at that speed (App. Br. 18; Reply Br. 4), again, Appellants are in the best position to enter evidence of this assertion and all that is proffered is unsupported attorney argument. The arguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence in the record. In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA 1965). Furthermore, absolute predictability that a modification will be successful is not required, all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success. See In re O ’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Here the Examiner reasonably found there was a reasonable expectation of success in increasing the workpiece speed of Ozamoto and Appellants have not entered any evidence to demonstrate otherwise. Accordingly, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8. 6 Claim 8 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein the welding torch or the workpiece is advanced at a rate of at least 59 inches per minute.” 7 Appeal 2016-001475 Application 13/526,278 Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) we enter new grounds of rejection against claims 1 and 127 as failing to comply with the written description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. As discussed above, Appellants have not directed our attention to any particular structures, manipulative steps, or combinations thereof in the Specification that will necessarily “maintain the arc only between the sheath and the workpiece.” After careful review, we are also unable to identify any such disclosure. In fact, Appellants’ Specification expresses a lack of certainty that this can even be assured: “It is believed that the arc established between the metal cored welding wire and the workpieces and/or the progressing weld puddle exists only between the sheath 48 and these elements.” Spec. p. 8, para. 25 (emphasis added). Yet Appellants nevertheless seek to preempt others from practicing a method wherein the arc is maintained only between the sheath and the workpieces, without themselves providing a specific concrete example, or technical explanation, of how this is actually achieved. “[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.” Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) (quoted in AriadPharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)). Claims 1 and 12 are inconsistent with the quid pro quo of the patent grant. Seeking a generic claim without disclosing one example assuredly falling within it runs afoul of the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349-55. That is, Appellants have not 7 We leave the dependent claims for the Examiner’s consideration. Although the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do so. See MPEP 1213.02. 8 Appeal 2016-001475 Application 13/526,278 demonstrated possession of any, much less “sufficient” species to support these generic claims, and, as such, are attempting to overreach their contribution to the field. See id. Additionally, the breadth of the claims, unpredictability of arc travel, lack of direction provided by Appellants, and the absence of working examples, lead us to also conclude that undue experimentation would be necessary to practice the claimed invention. See MPEP § 2164.01(a) (listing the factors discussed in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Thus, Appellants’ disclosure also lacks sufficient information regarding the subject matter of claims 1 and 12 to comply with the enablement requirement of35U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. DECISION The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed. We enter a new ground of rejection of claims 1 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides: When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant, within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new 9 Appeal 2016-001475 Application 13/526,278 Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R, $ 41.50(b) 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation