Ex Parte Ozbek

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 13, 2017

11574130 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 13, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/574,130 02/22/2007 Mehmet Ozbek 101670-0417278 1951
20350 7590 10/17/2017
KTT PATRTrK TOWNSFND fr STOrKTON T T P
EXAMINER
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
XAVIER, ANTONIO J
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Atlanta, UA 5U5UV 2623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/17/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
KT S Docketing2 @ kilpatrick. foundationip .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MEHMET OZBEK
Appeal 2015-005974
Application 11/574,1301
Technology Center 2600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, KEVIN C. TROCK, and
NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
TROCK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Introduction
Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—3 and 10—12.2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellant states Mehmet Ozbek is the real party in interest and/or Arcelik
Anonim Sirketi, a Turkish Joint Stock Company, is the real party in interest.
Supp. App. Br. 2.
2 Claims 4—9 have been cancelled. Supp. App. Br. 28.
Appeal 2015-005974
Application 11/574,130
Invention
The claimed invention is directed “to a household appliance
comprising a display unit which enables the user to easily follow the
operation status.” Spec. 1:1—2.
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A household appliance utilized as a washer/dryer comprising a
body, a door attached on the body forming an interior, a window
positioned on the body or on the door allowing monitoring of the
interior, and a control card enabling control of the household
appliance and a display unit isolated from the interior by mounting on
the window allowing the user to monitor simultaneously the interior
of body through the display unit and then through the window and
data delivered by the control card and wherein the door further
comprises an inner frame, an outer frame, and a panel interposed
between the inner frame and the outer frame, and the display unit
engaged between the panel and the outer frame.
Rejections
Claims 1—3 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Takao et al. (JN 2001133130 A; May 18, 2001), Lieb et
al. (US 5,589,958; Dec. 31, 1996), and Kim (US 2004/00089031 Al; May
13,2004).
Claims 1—3 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lieb, O’Keeffe (US 2004/0160388 Al; Aug. 19, 2004)
and Kim.
Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lieb, O’Keeffe, Kim, and Barnes et al. (US 6,559,427 Bl;
May 6, 2003).
Claims 10-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
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Application 11/574,130
unpatentable over Takao, Lieb, Ma (US 5,796,454; Aug. 18, 1998), and
Kim.
Claims 10-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lieb, O’Keeffe, Ma, and Kim.
Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lieb, O’Keeffe, Ma, Kim, and Barnes.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections and the evidence of
record in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred. We
disagree with Appellant’s arguments and conclusions. We adopt as our own,
(1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Office Action
from which this appeal is taken and (2) the findings and reasons set forth in
the Examiner’s Answer. We concur with the conclusions reached by the
Examiner and further highlight specific findings and argument for emphasis
as follows.
Independent Claims 1 and 10
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims
1 and 10 because the prior art references do not teach or suggest the recited
claim limitations. Supp. App. Br. 9-16, 18—25; Reply Br. 2—11.
Appellant first argues that the Examiner incorrectly interpreted the
term “window” to include any transparent surface, including the body or the
door itself. Supp. App. Br. 11. Appellant argues that the “window” is a
separate element from the body or the door and that interpreting “window”
as any transparent surface, including the body or the door, misinterprets the
claim. Id.
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Application 11/574,130
The Examiner explains, however, that the door as disclosed in the
Specification refers to a high level combination of components and includes
a variety of sub-components, including the recited window. Ans. 27. The
Examiner argues that the window, therefore, cannot be separated
conceptually from the door as argued by Appellant, because they refer to the
same overlapping combination of sub-components. Id. The Examiner cites,
for example, Figure 3 from the Specification, which depicts an “exploded
view of a window” 12 and Figure 4 depicts an “exploded view of a washer
dryer door” 3. Id. (citing Spec, 15, 16, 21). The Examiner notes that the
sub-components identified in Figure 3, including items 4 (inner frame), 5
(outer frame), and 9 (panel) related to the window, are also included in the
depiction of the door in Figure 4. Ans. 27. The Examiner notes that the
Specification explains that the “window (12) is produced preferably of glass
or a similar transparent material that allows light to pass through.” Id. at 28
(citing Spec. 123 (emphasis added)). The Examiner concludes, and we
agree, a reasonably broad interpretation of the term “window” in light of the
Specification would include a transparent surface, including but not limited
to portions of the body or door itself, such as a sub-component. Id.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Takao teaches a door including
a sub-portion with a display overlay. Id. (citing Takao Tflf 29—33; Figs. 4, 5).
The Examiner also finds, and we agree, that Takao teaches a portion of the
door serves as a perimeter/border to a central/window portion including a
display overlay. Id. at 29 (citing Takao Fig. 5).
In reply, Appellant asserts that the “Examiner admits that the ‘window’
is a transparent surface and that element 24 is the ‘display overlay,’”
[therefore] it follows that Takao teaches away from the present invention as
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Application 11/574,130
it does not teach a window at all.” Reply Br. 5—6. We disagree. The
Examiner finds, and we agree, “Takao teaches ... a window positioned on
the body or on the door allowing monitoring of the interior.” Final Act. 14
(citing Takao 32—33). The Examiner further explains that “Takao,
paragraphs [0029]-[0033] also teach a portion of the door serves as a
perimeter/border to a central/window portion.” Ans. 29. Appellant’s
argument that if the “display overlay” (element 24) is removed from the
door, then it follows that there is no separate “window,” is unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that Takao teaches the disputed
limitations.
Appellant also argues that the references do not provide support for
using the two pixel states as taught by Takao to provide for three distinct
display states. Supp. App. Br. 11—12. Appellant argues that the Examiner
improperly found that “Takao inherently contained a combination of active
and inactive pixels to form a display that provides simultaneous monitoring
of the interior,” arguing that Takao teaches away from monitoring the
interior because “light 19 is not on when in the intercepting [pixel] state and
strongly points that you cannot see the housed articles inside through the
surface of the door 17.” Supp. App. Br. 14.
The Examiner explains, however, and we agree,
display of an information-display screen using pixels which are
only capable of two states inherently requires a display with a
combination of the two pixel states (i.e., (1) transparent/see
through or (2) blocking/intercepting states) to form distinct
images. Examiner also provided teaching references including
detailed explanations regarding the fundamental operation of a
transparent LCD with two states and how pixel combinations
(i.e., third display state as described by Examiner) are required
to display distinct images such as the expressly disclosed
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Application 11/574,130
information-display screen as shown in Fig. 5 of Takao.
Ans. 31.
The Examiner further explains, and we agree, “[o]ne of ordinary skill
in the art would understand Takao is not limited to providing only a
completely transparent display or a completely opaque display. The
dynamic images required to provide an information-display screen as shown
in Fig. 5 of Takao clearly require different combinations of on/off pixel
states to display different distinct images.” Ans. 33. The Examiner finds,
and we agree, “pixels which are not diffused to block light for a particular
image will remain in a transparent state allowing the user to simultaneously
monitor the interior and the data delivered by the control card.” Id.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner Takao teaches, and one of
ordinary skill in the art would understand, that pixels capable of existing in
one of two states can be used in various combination to produce three
distinct display states.
Moreover, we agree with the Examiner that Takao does not teach away
from monitoring the interior, because having an interior light as Appellant
argues is not recited in the claims. See Supp. App. Br. 13—14. The
Examiner finds, and we agree, that ambient light from the room would
provide sufficient light for viewing the interior through pixels when they are
in a transparent state. Ans. 35. This finding is consistent with the
Specification because the Specification does not disclose an interior light
and an interior light is not recited by the claims.
Appellant next argues that the switchable window taught by Leib is not
a display unit because it does not display any data. Supp. App. Br. 15.
Appellant argues that the PDLC (polymer-dispersed liquid crystal) described
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Application 11/574,130
by Leib is only an on/off window and is not comprised of pixels. Id.
Appellant argues that Leib only teaches a window to see inside of each
cabinet or appliance compartment, and that such a window is not a display.
Id. at 15—16.
The Examiner notes, however, and we agree, Appellant has not
claimed any specific display or the display of any specific data. Ans. 39.
Therefore, a reasonably broad interpretation of the recited “display” may
include a single window/pixel. Id. The Examiner also finds, and we agree,
a reasonably broad interpretation of the recited “data delivered by the control
card” may include, but is not limited to, the display of the operation status of
an appliance (e.g. opaque in a normal state of operation provides a quick
visual status that the appliance is functioning normally). Id. at 39-40. The
Examiner notes, and we agree, although the Specification discloses specific
examples of temperature, duration and operation status of the appliance as
types of data, specific limitations from the Specification may not be read
into the claims. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d
870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 10. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims.
Dependent Claims 3 and 12
Appellant argues that Leib does not let the user view the interior and a
display simultaneously because Leib teaches an on/off (opaque/transparent)
window, which is not a display. Supp. App. Br. 17, 26. However, claims 3
and 12 stand rejected by the combination of Leib and O’Keeffe with other
references. The Examiner finds, and we agree, O’Keeffe expands upon the
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Application 11/574,130
teachings of Lieb and teaches an active matrix display with a plurality of
smaller sized pixels and specific examples of data displayed on a window
using PDLC, the same display technique used by Lieb.
The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). One cannot show non-obviousness
by attacking references individually where, as here, the rejection is based on
a combination of references. Id. Each reference cited by the Examiner must
be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with
the prior art as a whole. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claims 3 and 12. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims.
Remaining Claims 2 and 11
Appellant has not presented separate, substantive arguments with
respect to dependent claims 2 and 11, and does not address with any
particularity the specific limitations recited by those claims. See Supp. App.
Br. 10-27. As such, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
these claims. See In reLovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We
conclude that the Board has reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require
applicants to articulate more substantive arguments if they wish for
individual claims to be treated separately.”) Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 2 and 11. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—3 and 10—12.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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