Ex Parte Ohri et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 3, 201612724448 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 121724,448 03/16/2010 31554 7590 03/07/2016 CARTER, DELUCA, FARRELL & SCHMIDT, LLP 445 BROAD HOLLOW ROAD SUITE420 MELVILLE, NY 11747 RachitOhri UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. H-US-01804 (1603-63) 7350 EXAMINER VU, QUYNH-NHU HOANG ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3763 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/07/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): docket@cdfslaw.com tgiordano@cdfslaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RACHIT OHRI and PHILLIP BLASKOVICH Appeal2013-002056 Application 12/724,448 Technology Center 3700 Before WILLIAM A. CAPP, THOMAS F. SMEGAL, and JAMES J. MAYBERRY, Administrative Patent Judges. MAYBERRY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Rachit Ohri and Phillip Blaskovich (Appellants) seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to delivery devices for pH dependent forming materials that prevent premature gelling of those materials. Spec. i-f 2. Claim 1, reproduced below, is the sole independent claim and is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: Appeal2013-002056 Application 12/724,448 1 1. A delivery device comprising: at least one lumen; a means for aiding in expelling pH dependent forming materials from the lumen; and an opening configured to expel the pH dependent forming materials from the delivery device in vivo, wherein at least a portion of a surface of the delivery device has a surface functionality for modulating pH of a microenvironment near the surface for minimizing premature gelling of the pH dependent forming materials in contact with the surface and minimizing clogging of the delivery device. Appeal Br. 22, Claims App. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Capozzi Reynolds Yokoyama Chinn Parthasarathy Latini us 4,978,336 us 6, 123,685 US 7,914,484 B2 us 2006/0105012 1A..l US 2007/0160504 Al US 2009/0012465 Al REJECTIONS Dec. 18, 1990 Sept. 26, 2000 Mar. 29, 2011 l\1ay 18, 2006 July 12, 2007 Jan. 8,2009 I. Claims 1, 12, 15, 16, 18, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Capozzi. II. Claims 2-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Parthasarathy. III. Claims 2, 3, 5-7, and 9-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Chinn. IV. Claims 13 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and (Parthasarathy or Chinn) and Latini. 2 Appeal2013-002056 Application 12/724,448 V. Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Reynolds. VI. Claims 19 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Yokoyama. VII. Claims 22 and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi. ANALYSIS Rejection I Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, "wherein at least a portion of a surface of the delivery device has a surface functionality for modulating pH of a microenvironment near the surface for minimizing premature gelling of the pH dependent forming materials in contact with the surface and minimizing clogging of the delivery device." Appeal Br. 22, Claims App. In rejecting claim 1 as anticipated by Capozzi, the Examiner finds that Capozzi' s device includes space 84 and outlet 88, where the two different constituents delivered by Capozzi's device are mixed. Final Act. 2 (referencing Capozzi's Figure 8). The Examiner finds that these internal surface features would perform the function of modulating the pH of a microenvironment represented by the combined components. Id.; see also Answer 10-11 ("Capozzi fully discloses that the surfaces at the space 84 and/or outlet 88 pertaining of function for modulating pH of the microenvironment near the surface, for minimizing premature gelling of the pH dependent forming materials and clogging of the delivery device"). "A patent applicant is free to recite features of an apparatus either structurally or functionally. Yet, choosing to define an element functionally, 3 Appeal2013-002056 Application 12/724,448 i.e., by what it does, carries with it a risk." In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Functional language is not given patentable weight if the prior art structure can inherently perform the function. See id. The Examiner has the burden to provide a "reason to believe that ... the claimed subject matter may, in fact, be an inherent characteristic of the prior art." Id. at 1478. Once the Examiner satisfies this burden, it shifts to Appellants to provide evidence to the contrary. See In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971) ("[W]here the Patent Office has reason to believe that a functional limitation ... may, in fact, be an inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority to require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on."). Here, the Examiner satisfies the initial burden of providing reasoning on how Capozzi' s structure inherently performs the recited function, which shifts the burden to Appellants to rebut this finding. See Final Act. 2; Answer 10-11. In response, Appellants merely provide the conclusory statement that Capozzi fails to disclose the functional claim limitation. See Appeal Br. 8. This response is insufficient to rebut the Examiner's finding. In their Reply Brief, Appellants further argue that, when read in light of the Specification, the functional limitation at issue would be understood to be more than just the surface of the device itself, as the Examiner finds. Reply Br. 3--4. Specifically, Appellants quote the Specification that indicates that the functional language of claim 1 may be achieved by imparting a charge on the surface of the delivery device or providing functional groups that modulate the pH on the surface. Id. at 3. 4 Appeal2013-002056 Application 12/724,448 vV e are not persuaded by this argument---claim 1 does not require the recited function be accomplished by a charge imparted on the surface of the delivery device or the surface including certain functional groups. Appellants' argument improperly attempts to read claim limitations from the Specification into claim 1. See In re Van Geuns, 9 88 F .2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[L ]imitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.") (citation omitted). Indeed, claim 2, which depends from claim 1, adds the additional limitation requiring the surface to comprise a charged polymer. See Appeal Br. 22, Claims App. As Appellants' arguments fail to rebut the Examiner's finding that Capozzi' s structure would perform the recited functional limitation of claim 1, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Capozzi. Appellants fail to provide any additional arguments for the separate patentability of claims 12, 15, 16, 18, and 21. Appeal Br. 8-9. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of these claims as anticipated by Capozzi as well. Rejection II Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and further recites "wherein the surface of the delivery device comprises a charged polymer." Appeal Br. 22, Claims App. The Examiner finds that Capozzi fails to disclose the subject matter of claim 2. Final Act. 4. The Examiner further finds that Parthasarathy discloses this subject matter. Id. The Examiner determines that: It would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to modify the device of Capozzi with a surface of the delivery device includes a charge polymer, as taught by either Parthasarathy, in order to improve the biological function of the article, the lubricity on 5 Appeal2013-002056 Application 12/724,448 the surface and prevent clogging on the surface of the coated delivery device. Id. Appellants argue that "one skilled in the art reviewing Parthasarathy would have no reason to apply Parthasarathy's anion exchange materials to the recited delivery device, and one skilled in the art reviewing Parthasarathy would have no reason to expect to succeed in arriving at the recited delivery device." Appeal Br. 10. We agree. "Rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Here, the Examiner's reasoning lacks the requisite rational underpinning. Parthasarathy teaches an anion exchange material used to remove negatively charged molecules from biological material. Parthasarathy, Abstract. The Examiner's reasoning fails to adequately explain why an artisan of ordinary skill would include Parthasarathy' s ion exchange material on the surface of Capozzi's device. That is, the Examiner fails to explain how Parthasarathy's ion exchange material, which removes negatively-charged molecules from a medium, would "improve the biological function of [Capozzi's device], the lubricity on the surface and prevent clogging on the surface of [Capozzi's] coated delivery device." See Final Act. 4. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Parthasarathy. We also do not sustain the rejection of claims 3-11, which 6 Appeal2013-002056 Application 12/724,448 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 2, as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Parthasarathy. Rejection III Under Rejection III, the Examiner finds that Chinn discloses the subject matter of dependent claim 2: "wherein the surface of the delivery device comprises a charged polymer." Final Act. 5. The Examiner determines that: Id. It would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to modify the device of Capozzi with a surface of the delivery device includes a charge polymer, as taught by Chinn, in order to improve the biological function of the article, the lubricity on the surface and prevent clogging on the surface of the coated delivery device. Appellants argue that "one skilled in the art would not look to combine a pro-fibrotic coating, utilized to promote a local response leading to thrombus formation, as in Chinn, with a syringe system for delivering an adhesive, as in Capozzi." Appeal Br. 14. We agree. Once again, the Examiner fails to provide a rational underpinning to support the determination of obviousness. See KSR Int'! Co., 550 U.S. at 418. The Examiner's reasoning does not adequately explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would employ the pro-fibrotic coating of Chinn on Capozzi' s device or how a material disclosed to promote hemostasis in the body when used to coat medical implants would "improve the biological function [], the lubricity on the surface and prevent clogging on the surface of' Capozzi's device. See Final Act. 5. 7 Appeal2013-002056 Application 12/724,448 Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Chinn. We also do not sustain the rejection of claims 3, 5-7, and 9-11, which depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 2, as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Chinn. Rejection IV Claim 13 depends, indirectly, from claim 1 and further recites "wherein the tip assembly comprises a charged polymer," that is, subject matter similar to that recited in claim 2. Appeal Br. 24, Claims App. Claim 14 depends from claim 13 and further recites "wherein the charged polymer comprises a coating on the tip assembly." Id. at 25, Claims App. In rejecting claims 13 and 14 as obvious over Capozzi and either Parthasarathy or Chinn and Latini, the Examiner relies on the same rationale for how Parthasarathy or Chinn disclose the subject matter of claim 13 as discussed above in connection with our analysis of claim 2 under Rejections II and III. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above in our analysis of Rejections II and III, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 13 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and (Parthasarathy or Chinn) and Latini. Rejections V and VI In traversing Rejections V and VI, Appellants argue that Reynolds (Rejection V) and Yokoyama (Rejection VI) fail to cure the deficiency in the Examiner's anticipation rejection of claim 1. Appeal Br. 18-19, 19-20. As discussed above in connection with our analysis of Rejection I, we find no 8 Appeal2013-002056 Application 12/724,448 deficiency in the Examiner's rejection. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Reynolds and the Examiner's rejection of claims 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Yokoyama. Rejection VII In traversing Rejection VII, Appellants do not provide any arguments for the separate patentability of claims 22 and 23 but instead rely on their arguments with respect to Rejection I. 1 As discussed above in connection with our analysis of Rejection I, these arguments are unpersuasive of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 12, 15, 16, 18, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Capozzi. We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claims 2-11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Parthasarathy. We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claims 2, 3, 5-7, and 9-11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Chinn. 1 Appellants do state that "nowhere does Capozzi disclose or suggest" the subject matter of claims 22 and 23. Appeal Br. 20. This contention is misplaced as these facts are not in dispute-the Examiner determines that the subject matter of claims 22 and 23 would be obvious over Capozzi, not that Capozzi anticipates these claims. See Final Act. 8. 9 Appeal2013-002056 Application 12/724,448 \Ve reverse the Examiner's rejection of claims 13 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and (Parthasarathy or Chinn) and Latini. We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Reynolds. We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi and Yokoyama. We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Capozzi. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal maybe extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2015). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation