Ex Parte O

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 28, 2018

11318972 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 28, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
11/318,972 12/27/2005
46321 7590 07/02/2018
CRGOLAW
STEVEN M. GREENBERG
7900 Glades Road
SUITE 520
BOCA RATON, FL 33434
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Patrick O'Sullivan
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
LOT920050119US1 (114) 5392
EXAMINER
BOSWELL, BETH V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/02/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@crgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PATRICK O'SULLIVAN
Appeal 2016-004441 1
Application 11/318,9722
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. PETTING, MEREDITH C. PETRA VICK, and
MATTHEWS. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1-9 and 11-19. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references Appellant's Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.," filed
August 4, 2015) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed March 25, 2016), the
Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed January 25, 2016), and Final Office
Action ("Final Act.," mailed March 12, 2015).
2 Appellant identifies International Business Machines Corporation as the
real party in interest (Appeal Br. 2).
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant's claims relate to a method, system and computer program
product for using an employee's presence awareness data to generate the
employee's time card based upon the repeatedly collected presence
awareness data. (Abs.).
Claims 1, 9, and 12 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1
reproduced below, with minor formatting changes and added bracketed
notations, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method for computing employee work patterns
through presence and place awareness, the method comprising:
[a] initially setting a status of an employee to idle;
[b] repeatedly and concurrently collecting both presence
and also place awareness data in place awareness logic executing
in memory by a processor of a computing system by monitoring
both presence and also place awareness data to detect an activity
of the employee interacting with the computing system, detecting
the activity for the employee, the activity including interaction
with the computing system, determining whether the employee
is idle, in response to determining that the employee is not idle,
setting the status of the employee to active, in response to
determining that the employee is idle, logging a time, a date, and
an application the employee interacted with during the activity
before becoming idle, determining that the employee is active
upon determining that there is no activity by the employee,
logging a time and also a date for the employee being active
before the employee becoming idle; and,
[ c] generating by the processor a time card for the
employee based upon the repeatedly collected presence
awareness data.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 9, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite.
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Claims 1-9 and 11-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 1, 7, 9, 11, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Mcfarlane (US 2002/0111887 Al, pub. Aug. 15, 2002)
and Skinner (US 6,622,116 B2, iss. Sept. 16, 2003).
Claims 2, 8, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Mcfarlane, Skinner, and Miller (US 2005/0171830 Al,
pub. Aug. 4, 2005).
Claims 3---6 and 14--19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Mcfarlane, Skinner, and DeHaas (US 2005/0108383 Al,
pub. May 19, 2005).
ANALYSIS
Indefiniteness
Independent claim 1 recites, "initially setting a status of an employee
to idle." Independent claims 9 and 12 include a similar limitation. The
Examiner rejects claims 1, 9, and 12 as indefinite because the Examiner
finds "[t]he scope of 'initially setting ... 'is unclear" (Final Act. 7). More
particularly, the Examiner finds that "'[i]nitially setting a status' is a
conditional based command wherein the system or the user must know the
condition to perform the step of initially 'setting,"' and as such, "it is unclear
as to when the initial condition starts" (Ans. 14).
In response, Appellant points out that the Specification "explains how
a 'status of an employee can be set to idle as the employee will not yet have
interacted with the host computing environment'" (Appeal Br. 7 ( citing
Spec. ,r 21); see also Reply Br. 2)). In light of this disclosure, we agree with
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Appellant that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the
limitation to refer to "setting the status of an employee after the employee
logs into the computing system, but prior to the employee further interacting
with the computing system" (Appeal Br. 7; see also Reply Br. 2).
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), of claims 1, 9, and 12. See Orthokinetics, Inc. v.
Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (The test
for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is whether "those
skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in
light of the specification.").
Non-statutory subject matter
Appellant argues claims 1-9 and 11-19 as a group (see Appeal Br. 7-
15; see also Reply Br. 4--10). We select independent claim 1 as
representative. Claims 2-9 and 11-19 stand or fall with independent claim
7. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
"new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted§ 101
to include an implicit exception: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas" are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS
Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012), "for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
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that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice Corp., 134
S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to "determine whether the
claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts," id.,
e.g., to an abstract idea. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible
concept, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second
step where the elements of the claims are considered "individually and 'as
an ordered combination'" to determine whether there are additional elements
that "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application."
Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that "all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas." Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. We, therefore, look to whether
the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.
See Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Here, in rejecting the claims, the Examiner determined that
independent claim 1 is "directed to the abstract idea of organizing human
activities through fundamental economic practices i.e. categorizing users'
activity" (Final Act. 8; see also Ans. 14--15), and more particularly, directed
to "the problem of monitoring employee's work activity and use of
employer's resources" (Ans. 15). The Examiner further determined that
independent claim 1 "require[ s] the additional limitations of a processor, a
memory and additional programs to perform the recited data collection, data
storing and data categorization" (Final Act. 8).
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In response, Appellant argues that the present "claims are not directed
to an 'abstract idea"' (Appeal Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 9--1 O); but rather,
"directed to a specific way of doing something with a computer-
electronically tracking employee work attendance through an employee
computing workstation through presence and place awareness data" (Appeal
Br. 11 ). Appellant also argues that the present claims are not directed to
an abstract idea because they are "not simply directed to organizing human
activity, fundamental economic principles, an idea of itself, or a
mathematical relationship or formulas" (see Appeal Br. 12-14). We are not
persuaded by Appellant's arguments.
At the outset, we note that the Supreme Court in Alice did not rigidly
define or otherwise restrict the universe of abstract ideas to one or more of:
a building block of human ingenuity, a fundamental economic practice, and
an algorithm. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 ("we need not labor to delimit
the precise counters of the 'abstract ideas' category"). And, here the
Examiner does not find that the claims are directed to a fundamental
economic practice, an idea of itself, or an algorithm. Furthermore, "[ a ]n
abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction."
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Under step one of the framework set forth in Alice, we agree with the
Examiner that the invention is broadly directed to "categorizing users'
activity" (Final Act. 8), and more particularly, directed to "monitoring
employee's work activity and use of employer's resources" (Ans. 15). And
based on our review of independent claim 1, we also agree with the
Examiner that independent claim 1 involves nothing more than "storing,
retrieving and processing data" (Appeal Br. 8) and is similar to the steps that
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the Federal Circuit determined were patent ineligible in Electric Power
Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In Electric Power, the method claims at issue were directed to
performing real-time performance monitoring of an electric power grid by
collecting data from multiple data sources, analyzing the data, and
displaying the results. Elec. Power Grp. LLC, 830 F.3d at 1351-52. The
Federal Circuit held that the claims were directed to an abstract idea,
explaining that "[ t ]he advance they purport to make is a process of gathering
and analyzing information of a specified content, then displaying the results,
and not any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing those
functions." Id. at 1354. Here, we find independent claim 1 is directed to
"[a] method for computing employee work patterns through presence and
place awareness," and includes steps for "initially setting a status of an
employee to idle," "collecting both presence and also place awareness data"
in order "to detect an activity of the employee," and then "generating ... a
time card for the employee based upon" the data. The claim also includes
steps for "determining whether the employee is idle" or not idle based on
whether or not there is employee activity using the collected data, and then
logs this information.
Accordingly, we find that independent claim 1 involves nothing more
than collecting and analyzing data, receiving and storing data, and
generating a time sheet based upon the data, without any particular inventive
technology- activities squarely within the realm of abstract ideas. See,
e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC, 830 F.3d at 1353-54 (when "[t]he focus of the
asserted claims" ... "is on collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis," the claims are
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directed to an abstract idea). See also Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v.
Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344--45 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (claims
reciting "generalized software components arranged to implement an
abstract concept [ of generating insurance-policy-related tasks based on rules
to be completed upon the occurrence of an event] on a computer" not patent
eligible).
We are also unpersuaded by Appellant's contention that the claimed
invention is necessarily rooted in computer technology (Appeal Br. 11-12;
see also Reply Br. 7-10). We first note that the claimed invention does not
address a problem unique to the Internet or computer networks. Cf
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363,
13 71 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("claims here do not address problems unique to the
Internet, so DDR has no applicability"). Here, as the Examiner points out,
Appellant's
claims seek to address a problem that existed and continues to
exist outside of the realm of the technology associated with the
additionally recited elements - the problem of monitoring
employee's work activity and use of employer's resources. The
proposed solution is one that could have been implemented
directly by an operator performing analogous functions by hand
and/or with the assistance of a general purpose computer applied
to facilitate the functions at a high level of generality or with the
assistance of additional elements performing well-known,
conventional functions.
(Ans. 15). We find the Examiner's position to be supported by the
Specification which identifies that its claimed invention allows an "employer
[to] track the attendance record for employees without having to dedicate
personnel to visually account for each employee during times of work"
(Spec. ,r 2). That is, it was known in the prior art to track employee
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attendance records using dedicated personnel. Thus, we find the focus of
independent claim 1 is not on any technological advancement, but rather on
the performance of an abstract idea "for which computers are invoked
merely as a tool." See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
We also are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that "the claimed
solution in the instant Application is necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of tracking the actual presence of an employee in a working posture rather
than merely tracking the proximity of the employee to the workplace"
(Appeal Br. 12). More particularly, Appellant argues that "the innovative
concept ... of monitoring employee's work activity and use of employer's
resources of Appellant[' s] claims are achieved by the complicated process
and sub-process" recited by limitation [b] of independent claim 1 (Reply Br.
9--10).
In DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256
(Fed. Cir. 2014), the Federal Circuit determined that the claims addressed
the problem of retaining website visitors who, if adhering to the routine,
conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be
transported instantly away from a host's website after clicking on an
advertisement and activating a hyperlink. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
The Federal Circuit, thus, held that the claims were directed to statutory
subject matter because they claim a solution "necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks." Id. In contrast, there is no indication here that the
claimed invention requires something other than the normal, conventional
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computer functions of receiving and analyzing data in order to generate
results, i.e., time card. In this regard, we note that the Specification
discloses broadly that "[p ]resence and place awareness data 140 can be
acquired whenever the employee computing users 110 interact with the
computing applications 130" (Spec. ,r 15). The Specification further
discloses "[ t ]he client computing platform 21 O" includes "place awareness
logic 250 can include program code enabled to publish the availability and
willingness of the end user to communicate with other computing devices
over the computer communications network 220" (id. ,r 19). The
Specification still further discloses
[t]he server computing platform 230 can include a data
acquisition process 270 enabled to receive presence awareness
data and place awareness data from the client computing
platform 210 . . . . The data acquisition process 270 further can
store the acquired presence awareness data and place awareness
data in a data store 290. Finally, the server computing platform
230 can include a data reduction process 280. The data reduction
process 280 can be enabled to process the presence awareness
data and the place awareness data in the data store 290 to provide
for strategic IT and HR management including accurate
employee time card tracking beyond merely logging into and out
of a network.
(Id. ,I 20).
Unlike DDR Holdings, here, the solution comprises components of
the claimed computing system, i.e., "client computing platform 21 O" in
communication with "server computing platform 230" operating in their
normal capacities to receive, process, and provide data. The Specification
discloses that these components are generic (see Spec. ,r,r 25-26; see also
Fig. 2), without any particular inventive technology, to implement the
abstract idea. Appellant does not direct attention to, and we do not see,
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where the Specification provides for an improvement in the technology or
technical functioning of these components. The claims recite an invention
that is merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet to perform an
abstract business practice. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258-59.
Step two is "a search for an 'inventive concept'-i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself."' Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355 ( citing Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294).
And, similar to the situation in Electric Power, we find nothing
sufficient to remove the claims from the class of subject matter ineligible for
patenting. As the court explained in Electric Power, "merely selecting
information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and display does
nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes,
whose implicit exclusion from § 101 undergirds the information-based
category of abstract ideas." Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355.
Here, as the Examiner points out, "[ t ]he additional elements or
combination of elements in the claims other than the abstract idea per se
amounts to no more than a mere instruction to implement the idea on a
computer" (Final Act. 8). Appellant argues that "the innovative
concept ... of monitoring employee's work activity and use of employer's
resources of Appellant['s] claims are achieved by the complicated process
and sub-process" (Reply Br. 10) recited by limitation [b] of independent
claim 1. However, as discussed above, we agree with the Examiner that
independent claim 1 is directed broadly to "monitoring employee's work
activity and use of employer's resources" (Ans. 15) including steps for
setting a baseline, i.e., "initially setting a status," collecting and analyzing
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data, and presenting data, i.e., "generating ... a time card"-none of which
add inventiveness because they merely require the application of
conventional, well-known analytical steps. See Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d
at 716 ("[T]he claimed sequence of steps comprises only 'conventional
steps, specified at a high level of generality,' which is insufficient to supply
an 'inventive concept."') (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357). There is no
indication in the record that any specialized computer hardware is required
or evidence that the programming related to these "improvement[ s ]" would
entail anything atypical from conventional programming. Instead, the
Specification discloses utilizing conventional computer components (see
Spec. ,r,r 15, 18, 20, 25-26).
Appellant last argues that the present "claim language indicates how
the innovative concept is achieved without foreclosing other ways of solving
the problem solved by Appellant['] claims" (Reply Br. 10 (emphasis
omitted)). However, Appellant's preemption argument does not alter our
§ 101 analysis. Preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot
where a patent's claims are deemed to disclose patent ineligible subject
matter under the two-part framework described in Mayo and Alice. Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
"While preemption may signal patent ineligible matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility." Id.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner's rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 of independent claim 1, and claims 2-9 and 11-19, which
fall with independent claim 1.
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Obviousness
We are persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), because Skinner,
upon which the Examiner relies, does not disclose or suggest "initially
setting a status of an employee to idle," as recited by limitation [a] of
independent claim 1, and similarly recited by independent claims 9 and 12
(see Appeal Br. 15-21; see also Reply Br. 10-15).
The Examiner maintains that the rejection is proper, and cites Skinner
at column 17, lines 20-40, as well as Figure 13, as disclosing the argued
limitation (see Final Act. 11; see also Ans. 17-18 (citing cols. 17-18, Figs.
14--15). More particularly, the Examiner finds that "idle status can be
determined based on time lap[s] condition or depends on when the system
start doing timeline tracking of employee's activity (id.). In the Answer, the
Examiner also appears to rely on Mcfarlane at paragraphs 36-41 (see Ans.
17-18). However, we agree with Appellant that there is nothing in the cited
portions that discloses or suggests the argued limitation.
In making this determination, we note that Skinner is directed to a
system "for automatically recording time and work performed on a computer
by monitoring file activity and by monitoring various input devices"
(Skinner, col. 1, 11. 24--26). Skinner discloses that its system includes "a
data analyzer which provides for the exclusion of time where there is no
activity on the computer" (id. at col. 2, 1. 67 - col. 3, 1. 1 ). More
particularly, Skinner determines "active times" using the following logic:
Block 1302 starts a timing loop for each job. Block 1304
calculates the difference in time between activities. Block 1306
tests if the allowable idle time is exceeded to stop that stop watch.
If not, the routine loops back to Block 1302 for another job. If
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the idle time is exceeded, Block 1308 accumulates the job
time. If it's time to stop that stop watch, then we accumulate the
total time in Block 1310 and go back to do the next job. If it's
not time to stop the stop watch, we go on to the next task. All
tasks are looked at to determine if there's any activity. If any
files are updated, Block 1312 writes the data out to the file.
(Id. at col. 17, 11. 20-32). Skinner further discloses "[i]f one imagines each
"start" as the detection of activity for a certain task" (id. at col. 18, 11. 31-
32). Additionally, Figure 14 of Skinner depicts "an illustrative timing
diagram illustrating starting, restarting, and ending of an analyzer time for a
task," where for example, "[a]t time a, the timer is started" (id. at col. 18, 11.
12-14, 22).
We also note that McFarlane is directed to "an employee monitoring
system that provides convenient and detailed reporting on the online activity
of employees, such as employee Internet, e-mail (in/out) and dial-in activity,
in a manner that corresponds to the particular organizational structure of the
company" (Mcfarlane ,r 1 ). Mcfarlane discloses "log files 28 are generated
which provide detailed information on all activity passing through the
firewall 20," e.g., "Internet, e-mail (sent and received) and dial-in activity
for all persons having authorized access to the company computers" (id.
,r 22). McFarlane's system generates summary reports which show usage
information (id. ,r,r 11, 23-26). McFarlane further discloses that the
summary reports also include links to more detailed information which can
provide, e.g., "the number of times the employee dialed into the company
computer using remote dial-in/out services" and the number of inbound and
outbound emails (id. ,r,r 31-34; see also Tables 1-3).
We have reviewed the cited portions of Skinner, in view of
Mcfarlane, and agree with Appellant that none of the cited portions of
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Skinner or Mcfarlane discloses or suggests the argued limitation. Instead,
we agree with Appellant that the "Examiner's analysis incorporates the
'setting' limitation with a limitation directed to 'determining whether the
employee is idle"' (Appeal Br. 20). Thus, we agree with Appellant that the
combination of Skinner and Mcfarlane fails to disclose or suggest "initially
setting a status of an employee to idle," as recited by limitation [a].
Responding to Appellant's argument in the Response to Argument
section of the Answer, the Examiner takes the position
Mcfarlane demonstrated the mechanism for logging time, date
and application the employee was interacting with at any time ( at
least ,r 36-41). Although Mcfarlane does not explicitly teaches
the triggering condition (i.e. in response to determine a particular
employee is idle), Skinner shown that it is obvious to record
activities after determination of an idle status ( col. 17-18 and
fig.15 i.e. the system constantly tracks the time laps to determine
employee's idle status.
(Ans. 17).
The difficulty with the Examiner's reasoning is that limitation [a] does
not merely require "determining whether the employee is idle," as recited by
limitation [b ]; but rather requires "initially setting a status of an employee to
idle" prior to making such a determination. Although we agree with the
Examiner that Skinner's data analyzer determines whether or not there is
activity for a certain task (Skinner, col. 17, 11. 20-32, col. 18, 11. 31-32), we
cannot agree with the Examiner that Skinner "initially set[ s] a status of an
employee to idle," as independent claims 1, 9, and 12 require. Instead, we
agree with Appellant that "Skinner only relates to the detection of when a
job or task is idle and starting and stopping a timer based upon that
determination" (Reply Br. 15). Thus, we fail to see, and the Examiner does
not adequately explain how Skinner's ability to detect activity for a certain
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job or task discloses or suggests "initially setting a status of an employee to
idle," as required by independent claims 1, 9, and 12. The addition of
McFarlane's "mechanism for logging time, date and application the
employee was interacting with at any time" (Ans. 17 ( citing Mcfarlane
,r,r 3 6-41)) does not cure this deficiency.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection
of independent claims 1, 9, and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same
reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner's rejections of claims 2-8, 11,
and 13-19, which depend therefrom.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 9, and 12 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, second paragraph, is reversed.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-9 and 11-19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner's rejections of claims 1-9 and 11-19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) are reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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