Ex Parte Nollet

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 24, 2014

11640180 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 24, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/640,180 12/18/2006 Michel Nollet 4005-0294PUS1 7356
60601 7590 07/25/2014
Muncy, Geissler, Olds & Lowe, P.C.
4000 Legato Road
Suite 310
FAIRFAX, VA 22033
EXAMINER
OMAR, AHMED H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/25/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte MICHEL NOLLET
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Appeal 2012-007719
Application 11/640,180
Technology Center 2800
________________

Before TERRY J. OWENS, PETER F. KRATZ, and
CHRISTOPHER M. KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges.

OWENS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1, 3, 4 and 6-10. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
The Invention
Appellant claims a battery having an integral self-discharge circuit
and claims equipment including a battery discharge circuit. Claims 1 and 8
are illustrative:
1. A battery integrally provided with a self-discharge circuit, the battery
comprising:
at least one current-consuming element;
a comparator connected to the terminals of the battery for the purpose
of detecting a voltage;
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an interrupter, connecting the current-consuming element to terminals
of the battery, that can be actuated manually to go into a self-discharge
circuit connection state or that can be actuated automatically by the
comparator when the voltage is less than a predetermined threshold to go
into a self-discharge circuit [disconnection state]; and
a consumption management circuit integrated therein, at least a
portion of which is arranged to form the self-discharge circuit.

8. Equipment including an electrical unit powered by a battery, said
equipment further including a discharge circuit for discharging the battery,
which circuit includes at least one current-consuming element connected to
terminals of the battery via a connection member that can be actuated
manually selectively to go into a self-discharge circuit connection state or to
go without manual input into a self-discharge circuit disconnection state, and
that is caused to disconnect the self-discharge circuit at a predetermined
charge state that is less than a rated charge state of the battery and that is
compatible with storage of the battery.

The References
Hagiuda et al. (Hagiuda) US 5,594,314 Jan. 14, 1997
Kokuga US 5,608,305 Mar. 4, 1997
Patino et al. (Patino) US 6,242,894 B1 June 5, 2001
The Rejections
The claims stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as follows: claims 1,
3, 4, 6 and 9 over Kokuga in view of Hagiuda, claim 7 over Kokuga in view
of Hagiuda and Appellant’s admitted prior art and claims 8 and 10 over
Patino in view of Kokuga.
OPINION
We affirm the rejections.
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Appellant argues the claims in two groups: 1) claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7
and 9,1 and 2) claims 8 and 10 (Br. 10-12). We therefore limit our
discussion to one claim in each group, i.e., claims 1 and 8. Claims 3, 4, 6, 7
and 9 stand or fall with claim 1, and claim 10 stands or falls with claim 8.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2007).
Claim 1
Kokuga discloses a battery pack (P) comprising a battery (3), a self-
discharge circuit including a discharge resistance (6) (which Examiner relies
upon as corresponding to Appellant’s current-consuming element (Ans. 5)),
a CPU (7) (which Examiner relies upon as corresponding to Appellant’s
comparator (Id.)), and a discharge controlling section (5) (which Examiner
relies upon as corresponding to Appellant’s interrupter (Id.)) (col. 4, ll. 25-
38; Fig. 4).
Hagiuda discloses a discharge commencement button (10) which,
when pushed, electrically disconnects a battery (3) from a charging unit and
connects it to a discharge circuit (col. 3, ll. 34-36).
Appellant argues that Kokuga’s CPU is not a comparator but, rather,
merely detects the presence of the battery (col. 2, l. 64 – col. 3, l. 1) and that
“[t]he CPU of Kokuga at best is only connected to one terminal” (Br. 10).
Kokuga’s CPU controls “the operations of the charge controlling
section 2, the discharge controlling section 5 and the like” (col. 2, ll. 58-59)
and, therefore, controls the battery’s compulsory discharging (col. 1, ll. 52 –
60). The compulsory discharging occurs only when the battery’s charge

1 Although Appellant addresses claim 9 under a separate heading, Appellant
relies upon the same argument set forth with respect to claim 1 from which
claim 9 depends (Br. 11).
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remains above a predetermined value after a predetermined time (col. 4,
ll. 43-47). Determining whether the battery’s charge is above the
predetermined value necessarily requires comparing the battery’s charge to
the predetermined value. Thus, Kokuga’s CPU is a comparator. Because
the battery’s charge is indicated by the battery’s voltage (col. 3, ll. 38-39),
Kokuga would have led one of ordinary skill in the art, through no more than
ordinary creativity, to provide connections to the battery’s terminals for
transmitting the battery’s voltage to the CPU. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (in making an obviousness determination one
“can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ”).
Appellant argues that neither Kokuga nor Hagiuda discloses both
manual actuation and automatic deactivation by a comparator (Br. 10).
That argument is deficient in that Appellant is attacking the references
individually when the rejection is based on a combination of references. See
In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981); In re Young, 403 F.2d 754,
757-58 (CCPA 1968). Examiner relies upon Hagiuda for manual actuation
and Kokuga for automatic deactivation by a comparator (Ans. 5-6).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of reversible error in the rejection
of claim 1.
Claim 8
Patino discloses equipment including a portable radio (306) (which
Examiner relies upon as corresponding to Appellant’s electrical unit
(Ans. 8)) powered by a battery (302), and a battery discharge circuit (308)
which can be manually actuated and is automatically deactivated when the
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battery (302)’s voltage falls below a predetermined value (col. 2, ll. 32-38;
col.3, ll. 1-23; Fig. 3).
Appellant argues that Examiner improperly relies upon Patino’s
battery discharge unit (308) as corresponding to both Appellant’s discharge
circuit and current consuming element (Br. 11).
That argument is not well taken in view of Appellant’s disclosure that
Appellant’s discharge circuit (4) includes the current consuming element
(resistive element 5) (Spec. 4:29-30; Fig. 1).
Appellant argues that Patino neither discloses nor suggests a discharge
circuit that can go into a self-discharge circuit disconnection state that is
compatible with storage of the battery (Br. 11).
Appellant is improperly attacking the references individually when the
rejection is based on a combination of references. See Keller, 642 F.2d at
426; Young, 403 F.2d at 757-58. Examiner relies upon Kokuga for a
disclosure of a self-discharge circuit disconnection state that is compatible
with storage of the battery (Ans. 13).
Hence, we are not convinced of reversible error in the rejection of
claim 8.
DECISION/ORDER
The rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 1, 3, 4, 6 and 9 over
Kokuga in view of Hagiuda, claim 7 over Kokuga in view of Hagiuda and
Appellant’s admitted prior art and claims 8 and 10 over Patino in view of
Kokuga are affirmed.
It is ordered that Examiner’s decision is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED

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