Ex Parte NguyenDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 29, 201610949021 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 10/949,021 0912412004 13214 7590 08/31/2016 The Carter Law Firm, c/o: Jeffrey D, Carter, Esquire 1107 Caroline Street, Suite 2000 Fredericksburg, VA 22401 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR JinoNguyen UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. PF030149 4868 EXAMINER LANGHNOJA, KUNAL N ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2427 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/31/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): carterlaw@cox.net PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte IINO NGUYEN Appeal2015-005311 Application 10/949,021 Technology Center 2400 Before CATHERINE SHIANG, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges. SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's rejection of claims 13-30, which are all the claims pending and rejected in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction The present invention relates to content transmission systems. See generally Spec. 1. Claim 13 is exemplary: 13. A method implemented in a digital data stream receiver, said method comprising steps of: Appeal 2015-005311 Application 10/949,021 receiving, via said digital data stream receiver, a plurality of digital data streams including data of a list of services provided by said digital data streams, wherein for each of said services in said list, said data includes an original network identifier, a transport stream identifier and a service identifier; storing said data in a memory of said digital data stream receiver; detecting, via said digital data stream receiver, a condition in which at least two different said received digital data streams include a same original network identifier and a same service identifier, but a different transport stream identifier; in response to detecting said condition, detecting a digital signal quality rating for each of said at least two different received digital data streams to thereby determine which one of said at least two different received digital data streams has a best digital signal quality rating; and updating said data in said memory based on said determination to indicate one of said at least two different received digital data streams having said best digital signal quality rating. References and Rejections Claims 13-18 and 22-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Uchida (JP 2001-21l126A; Aug. 3, 2001), Van Horck (US 2006/0230429 Al; Oct. 12, 2006), and Ludvig (US 7,216,170 B2; May 8, 2007). Claims 19, 21, 28, and 30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Uchida, Van Horck, Ludvig, and Inose (US 6,687,308 Bl; Feb. 3, 2004). Claims 20 and 29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Uchida, Van Horck, Ludvig, Inose, and Cao (US 2004/0187161 Al; Sept. 23, 2004). 2 Appeal 2015-005311 Application 10/949,021 ANALYSIS On this record, we find the Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 13. We disagree with Appellant's arguments, and agree with and adopt the Examiner's findings and conclusions in (i) the action from which this appeal is taken and (ii) the Answer to the extent they are consistent with our analysis below. 1 Appellant contends the cited references do not collectively "detecting, via said digital data stream receiver, a condition in which at least two different said received digital data streams include a same original network identifier and a same service identifier, but a different transport stream identifier; in response to detecting said condition, detecting a digital signal quality rating for each of said at least two different received digital data streams to thereby determine which one of said at least two different received digital data streams has a best digital signal quality rating, " as recited in claim 13 (emphases added). See App. Br. 5-8, Reply Br. 2--4. In particular, Appellant asserts: [Ludvig's paragraph 16, lines 62-67] mention[] absolutely nothing about actually "detecting" any type of condition as claimed, much less detecting a specific condition in which at least two different received digital data streams include a same original network identifier and a same service identifier, but a different transport stream identifier, as recited by the independent claims under appeal. Moreover, this passage of Ludvig nowhere discloses or suggests that such identifiers may be used to identify or detect identical services being transmitted at the same time by different received digital data streams. 1 To the extent Appellant advances new arguments in the Reply Brief without showing good cause, Appellant has waived such arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). 3 Appeal 2015-005311 Application 10/949,021 Appellants further submit that the instant rejection appears to be the result of improper hindsight reconstruction ... the relied upon teachings of Ludvig have absolutely nothing to do with detecting a situation where an identical service is being transmitted by different received data streams (as relied upon in Uchida and Van Horck). As such, the Examiner is improperly combining isolated teachings of Ludvig, related to potential network conditions that may exist "when ... services are re- multiplexed" in a network, with teachings of Uchida and Van Horck related to detecting a condition when identical services are simultaneously transmitted by different received data streams in a network, in an ostensible effort to merely meet the claim language and deprecate the present invention. App. Br. 7-8; see also Reply Br. 2-3. Appellant has not persuaded us of error. First, because the Examiner relies on the combination of Uchida, Van Horck, and Ludvig to teach the disputed claim limitations, Appellant cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking Ludvig individually. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Examiner finds-and Appellant does not offer any substantive argument to dispute-the following: (i) Uchida teaches "detecting, via said digital data stream receiver, a condition in which at least two different said received digital data streams [providing similar content]"; (ii) Van Horck teaches "in response to detecting said condition, detecting a digital signal quality rating for each of said at least two different received digital data streams to thereby determine which one of said at least two different received digital data streams has a best digital signal quality rating." See Ans. 5---6; claim 13 (emphases added). The Examiner further finds-and Appellant does not offer any substantive argument to dispute-Ludvig 4 Appeal 2015-005311 Application 10/949,021 teaches "[data] includ[ing] a same original network identifier and a same service identifier, but a different transport stream identifier." See Ans. 6-7. Therefore, the Examiner finds Uchida, Van Horck, and Ludvig collectively teach "detecting, via said digital data stream receiver, a condition in which at least two different said received digital data streams include a same original network identifier and a same service identifier, but a different transport stream identifier; in response to detecting said condition, detecting a digital signal quality rating for each of said at least two different received digital data streams to thereby determine which one of said at least two different received digital data streams has a best digital signal quality rating," as recited in claim 13 (emphasis added). The Examiner has provided articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning as to why one skilled in the art would have modified the teachings of Uchida and Van Horck to include Ludvig's technique. See Final Act. 5; Ans. 6-7; KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Appellant has not persuasively demonstrated why the Examiner's reasoning is incorrect. Second, we disagree with Appellant's argument that the proposed combination is motivated by impermissible hindsight. Our reviewing courts have not established a bright-line test for hindsight. The U.S. Supreme Court guides that "[a] factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning." KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966)). Nevertheless, the Court has also qualified the issue of hindsight by stating "[r]igid preventative rules that 5 Appeal 2015-005311 Application 10/949,021 deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it." KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. In the present case, we see the hindsight question before us as a balancing test: whether (1) the Examiner's proffered combination of references is merely "the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions" (KSR, 550 U.S. at 417), consistent with common sense; or (2) an artisan would not have reasonably combined the cited references in the manner proffered by the Examiner but for having the benefit of the claim to use as a guide (i.e., impermissible hindsight). Appellant has not demonstrated the Examiner's proffered combination of references would have been "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art." See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). Further, after reviewing the respective teachings and suggestions of the cited references, we find weight of the evidence shows the proffered combination is merely a predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions, because the combination uses prior art elements based on their well-known functions. Therefore, on this record, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner engaged in impermissible hindsight. Because Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 13, and independent claim 22 for similar reasons. We also affirm the Examiner's rejection of corresponding depending claims 14--21 and 23-30. Appellant does not offer separate substantive arguments for those claims, as Appellant merely argues additionally cited 6 Appeal 2015-005311 Application 10/949,021 references do not cure the alleged deficiencies discussed above with respect to claim 13 (App. Br. 8-9). DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 13-30. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation