Ex Parte Nashida et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 6, 2017

14259643 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 6, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
1946-0665B 1032
EXAMINER
CERVETTI, DAVID GARCIA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2436
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
14/259,643 04/23/2014
60803 7590 03/07/2017
Paratus Law Group, PLLC
1765 Greensboro Station Place
Suite 320
Tysons Corner, VA 22102
Tatsushi NASHIDA
03/07/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TATSUSHINASHIDA and KUNIHITO SAWAI
Appeal 2016-002584
Application 14/259,643
Technology Center 2400
Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, NATHAN A. ENGELS, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2016-002584
Application 14/259,643
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims
39—60. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
THE INVENTION
In accordance with the movement operation of a remote controller
side display information done by the first operation unit 1004, the first
controller 1010 transmits the operational information associated with the
remote controller side display information Dl, namely, the command of
requesting the display of the last displayed channel on the display surface
2007, from the first communicator 1002 to the second communicator 2002.
See Spec. 17; Figs. 1 and 3.
Claim 39, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
39. An information processing apparatus, comprising:
a circuitry configured to:
initiate a communicating of information related to a content that
was previously displayed on a first display screen; and
initiate an execution of a process for controlling a displaying of
the content on the first display screen as a result of a user input
operation upon a displayed object, the displayed object being
based on the information and
displayed on a second display screen which is provided
separately from the first display screen, wherein the content is
not being displayed on the first display screen at a time when
the user input operation is performed.
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Appeal 2016-002584
Application 14/259,643
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Kushiro
Kligman
Asahi
Nashida ‘345
Nashida ‘964
US 6,285,357 B1
US 2001/0037509 A1
US 2002/0075198 A1
US 7,190,345 B2
US 2007/0152964 A1
Sept. 4, 2001
Nov. 1,2001
June 20, 2002
Mar. 13, 2007
July 5, 2007
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 39-60 stand provisionally rejected under the judicially created
doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting.
Claims 39-45, 47, 50-51, 53—55, and 57—60 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Asahi.
Claims 46, 49, and 56 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Asahi in view of Kligman.
Claims 48 and 52 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Asahi in view of Kushiro.
ISSUE
The pivotal issue is whether the prior art discloses the limitation of
“initiate a communicating of information related to a content that was
previously displayed on a first display screen” as recited in claim 39.
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Appeal 2016-002584
Application 14/259,643
ANALYSIS
Double Patenting
Appellants argue that the patent and co-pending application together
do not disclose “input operations” to specifically be “a user input operation
upon a displayed object, the displayed object being based on the information
and displayed on a second display screen,” and further that the
“information” has been communicated and relates to content that was
previously displayed on a first display screen (App. Br. 13).
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument. The Examiner has not
addressed whether Nashida ’345 and/or Nashida ’964 teach “information”
being communicated relating to content that was previously displayed on a
first display screen as required by claims 39, 59, and 60.
Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 39-60
under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting.
Claims 39—45, 47, 50—51, 53—55, and 57—60 rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
Appellants argue, inter alia, that the Examiner’s reliance on Asahi’s
window movement instruction means 5 (para. 50), does not disclose content
that was previously displayed on the first display means 156 (App. Br. 15).
Appellants explain, and we agree, the window that is being moved
between the first display means 156 and the second display means 157
would be that which is being currently displayed on the first display means
156 and not “‘previously displayed’” on display 157 (App. Br. 15 (emphasis
omitted), see also Fig. 2).
Accordingly, we agree with Appellants, that Asahi does not disclose
the limitation of “initiate a communicating of information related to a
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Appeal 2016-002584
Application 14/259,643
content that was previously displayed on a first display screen” as recited in
claim 39. Thus, we are constrained from the record before us to reverse the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 39 and for the same reasons the rejections of
claims 40-45, 47, 50-51, 53—55, and 57—60.
Claims 46, 48, 49, 52, and 56 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We also reverse the Examiner’s rejections of claims 46, 48, 49, 52,
and 56 for the same reasons as stated supra, because the additional
references of Kligman and Kushiro do not cure the above cited deficiency.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner erred in finding that the prior art discloses the
limitation of “initiate a communicating of information related to a content
that was previously displayed on a first display screen” as recited in claim
39.
DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 39—60 is
reversed.
REVERSED
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