Ex Parte Najafabadi et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 31, 2017

14471524 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/471,524 08/28/2014 Soheil Karshenas Najafabadi V274 1007
72623 7590 11/02/2017
MOSFR TAROADA / VON A OF HOT DTNOS OORP
EXAMINER
1030 BROAD STREET MAPA, MICHAEL Y
SUITE 203
SHREWSBURY, NJ 07702 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2645
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/02/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@mtiplaw.com
llinardakis @ mtiplaw. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SOHEIL KARSHENAS NAJAFABADI,
JAYA MEGHANI, and TZAHI EFRATI
Appeal 2017-0032251
Application 14/471,524
Technology Center 2600
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
SHARON FENICK, Administrative Patent Judges.
PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1—19. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 The real party in interest is identified as Vonage America Inc. See App.
Br. 3.
Appeal 2017-003225
Application 14/471,524
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The Application is directed to “terminating telephony
communications to a mobile telephony device associated with a first native
telephone number.” Abstract. Claims 1, 8, and 12 are independent. Claim 1
is reproduced below for reference (emphasis added):
1. A method for terminating telephony communications to a
subscriber's mobile telephony device associated with a first
native telephone number, comprising:
receiving, from a native mobile telephony provider
network associated with the first native telephone number, a
first telephony communication that was originally directed to
the first native telephone number but which has been forwarded
to a general forwarding access number, where the first
telephony communication includes a header comprising the
first native telephone number, wherein the general forwarding
access number is used by a plurality of subscribers',
retrieving the first native telephone number from the
header;
mapping the first native telephone number to a mobile
telephony device of a subscriber; and
terminating the received telephony communication to the
mobile telephony device associated with the first native
telephone number.
References and Rejections
Claims 1, 3—12, 14, and 16—19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fighel (US 2013/0165090 Al; June 27,
2013), McLarty (US 2007/0041550 Al; Feb. 22, 2007), and Juhola (US
6,631,187 B1; Oct. 7, 2003). Final Act. 11.
2
Appeal 2017-003225
Application 14/471,524
Claims 2, 13, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Fighel, McLarty, Juhola, and Takahashi (US
2010/0146096 Al; June 10, 2010). Final Act. 24.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). Any other arguments Appellants could have made but chose
not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2012). We are not persuaded the Examiner erred; we
adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as our own, and we add the
following primarily for emphasis.
Appellants argue “the cited combination fails to render obvious
Appellants’ independent claim 1.” App. Br. 8. Particularly, Appellants
contend the Examiner erred in relying on Juhola to teach the recited
“wherein the general forwarding access number is used by a plurality of
subscribers,” because “Juhola teaches forwarding calls received at a plurality
of different users devices to a same target device” using a target address, and
“a target address is the phone number to which the call is being terminated,
NOT the general forwarding access number” as claimed. Reply Br. 4
(emphasis removed); App. Br. 7—8. Thus, Appellants contend that, rather
than teaching the limitations recited by claim 1, “[t]he cited combination
teaches forwarding calls to a forwarding access number specifically assigned
to a specific user and using a SIP header to identify the number assigned to
said user’s target device,” and “the cited combination teaches that if calls
from more than one calling party are forwarded to the user’s target device,
3
Appeal 2017-003225
Application 14/471,524
the phone number from which the call was forwarded is displayed.” App. Br.
7 (emphasis removed).
Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive of error because they focus
on the individual teachings of each reference, whereas the Examiner’s
rejection is based on the combined teachings of Fighel, McLarty, and Juhola.
See Ans. 3 (emphasis removed) (“the rejection is based on the combination
of the teachings of Fighel in view of McFarty in view of Juhola as a
whole”); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test
for obviousness is not. . . that the claimed invention must be expressly
suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.”).
For example, Appellants argue, with respect to the recited “wherein
the general forwarding access number is used by a plurality of subscribers,”
that “the Examiner relies on a single piece of prior art to complete an
obviousness rejection.” Reply Br. 4. The Examiner, however, relies on
Fighel in view of McFarty and Juhola to teach the claimed general
forwarding access number: Fighel for teaching “each time a call is received
on the forwarding access number, the call is terminated to the subscriber
mobile device in the most appropriate manner” (emphasis added) and “that a
plurality of mobile devices are registered,” McFarty for teaching “messages
that comprise[] a header which is used to retrieve the telephone number from
the header,” and Juhola for teaching call forwarding “from a plurality of
home address[es] which are disclosed as a telephone number (i.e. ‘plurality
of subscribers’).” Ans. 7, 8, 11, 13; see also Ans. 9, 14; Fighel Figs. 1, 7,
1142, 46, 60, 63; McFarty H 56—58; Juhola 3:23—33, 5:2—8. Appellants
4
Appeal 2017-003225
Application 14/471,524
have not persuasively shown the Examiner erred in finding “one of ordinary
skill in the art would clearly recognize that the invention of Fighel can be
implemented to utilize the forwarding access number to accommodate
multiple subscriber numbers” in view of the teachings of Juhola. Ans. 14.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art the
general forwarding access number, within the meaning of the claim. See
Ans. 16; Keller, 642 F.2d at 425.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
limitations of claim 1 are taught or suggested by the combination of Fighel,
McLarty, and Juhola. See Final Act. 13—14. We sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1, and the rejections of claims 2—19, as Appellants do not
present additional substantive arguments for the remaining claims. See App.
Br. 8-9.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—19 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
5