Ex Parte Murray

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 27, 2013

11091278 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_____________

Ex parte PAUL MURRAY
____________________

Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before: DAVID M. KOHUT, BRYAN F. MOORE, and TREVOR M.
JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
2
STATEMENT OF CASE1
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1-
31.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
Introduction
The claims are directed to a method and system for coordination of
lifecycle state changes of system components, where each component
maintains lifecycle-state information and provides it to a state-disseminator.
Spec., Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations in
italics, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system comprising:
at least one processing node for providing a plurality of
components each arranged to operate according to a respective
life cycle comprising a plurality of lifecycle states, each
component being further arranged to maintain and provide
lifecycle-state information indicative of its current lifecycle
state; and
a state state-dissemination arrangement comprising a
state-dissemination server associated with the at least one
processing node, the state-dissemination arrangement for
disseminating lifecycle-state information provided by each
component to all other components that have indicated an
interest in that information, the state-dissemination
arrangement being such that all components receiving a
particular item of lifecycle-state information can, within a
defined time, rely on all interested components having received
the information;
at least one component being arranged to receive
lifecycle-state information about another component from the

1 Throughout the Decision, we make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal
Brief (“App. Br.,” filed Dec. 1, 2009), and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed
Apr. 19, 2010), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Feb. 18, 2010).
2 The real party in interest is Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
3
state-dissemination arrangement and to use it in determining
whether to change its current lifecycle state.

References
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Jeffords
Rostron
Gorur
US 2001/0042139 A1
US 2004/0001431 A1
US 2008/0065443 A1
Nov. 15, 2001
Jan. 1, 2004
Mar. 13, 2008

Rejections
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1-31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §112 second paragraph as
being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the
subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. Ans. 3-4.
Claims 1-6, 8-18, 21-23 and 28-31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C
§103(a) as being unpatentable over Jeffords, Rostron and Gorur. Ans. 4-14.

ANALYSIS
Claims 1-31 – 35 U.S.C §112, Second Paragraph
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the terms “lifecycle state”
and “can…rely on” as recited in claim 1 are indefinite?
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred because the claim term
“lifecycle state” is used with its ordinary meaning. App. Br. 6. The term
lifecycle state appears in independent claims 1, 28 and 29. Id. Appellant’s
Specification provides that “a ‘lifecycle state’ is a state of a lifecycle.” App.
Br. 6 (citing Spec. 19, l. 24 – Spec. 21, l. 19 – Spec. 25, l. 8 and Figs 7 and
9.) Specifically, Appellant notes that the Specification indicates that “states
Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
4
of a life cycle may include, but are not limited to, Starting, Standby, and
Active.” Reply 4 (citing Spec. 19:24-28). The Examiner argues that the
“term ‘lifecycle state’ has no ‘ordinary meaning’ in the context of computer
networking or state machines in general” and “is only defined circularly.”
Ans. 14.
Appellant also contends that the term “can rely on” as used in
independent claims 1 and 29 is used with its ordinary meaning, but notes
that the term does not appear in independent claim 28. App. Br. 7.
Appellant argues that “can… rely on” in the claims refers to the
Specification reference that discloses “a component can be sure that the
lifecycle-state information that the component receives is also received
within a predetermined time limit by all other components that are interested
in that information.” Reply 5 (citing Spec. 23:6-10).
We disagree with the Examiner. The Examiner failed to establish
with respect to the terms “lifecycle state” and “can rely on” that “those
skilled in the art would [not] understand what is claimed when the claim is
read in light of the specification” See Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel
Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). “All
words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that
claim against the prior art. If no reasonably definite meaning can be
ascribed to certain terms in the claim, the subject matter does not become
obvious – the claim becomes indefinite.” In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385
(CCPA 1970). Accordingly, when read in light of the Specification, the
terms “lifecycle state” and “can…rely on,” while broad, are not indefinite
under 35 U.S.C §112 second paragraph.
Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
5
Based on the foregoing, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.3

Claims 1-6, 8-18, and 21-23 – 35 U.S.C §103(a)
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Jeffords, Rostron and
Gorur in combination teach or suggest “a plurality of components each
arranged to operate according to a respective life cycle comprising a
plurality of lifecycle states, each component being further arranged to
maintain and provide lifecycle-state information indicative of its current
lifecycle state” limitation as recited in claim 1?
Appellant contends that Jeffords does not mention states or lifecycle
states in relation to resource objects 20 identified by the Examiner as
teaching or suggesting being “arranged to operate according to a respective
life cycle” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 8. Appellant also contends that
“[e]ven though Jeffords discloses RRM processes exchanging relative state
information, this is not lifecycle state information,” the RRM is not arranged
to operate according to a respective life cycle. App. Br. 9, 10 (citing
Jeffords ¶[0057]). In sum, Appellant contends that neither Gorur, Jeffords
nor Rostron, teach “or suggest lifecycle-state information indicative of a
component’s current lifecycle state.” App. Br. 11.
The Examiner responds that Jeffords teaches or suggests “the use and
information provision of states” (Jeffords ¶[0059]) while Gorur “teaches the
use of lifecycle states.” The Examiner found that Jeffords’s Replicated
Resource Management (RRM) processes are components given a broad

3 Since claims 7, 19, 20, and 24-27 were only subject to the 35 U.S.C. § 112
rejection and not the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection, the Examiner’s rejection as
to claims 7, 19, 20 and 24-27 is reversed.
Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
6
reasonable construction of components as meaning a constituent part. Ans.
15. The Examiner also found that Gorur teaches business objects that are
components and that “state machines can be suitable vehicles for processing
business objects and the various states encountered during the objects’ life
cycles.” Gorur ¶ [0008]; Ans. 16.
Having reviewed Appellant’s arguments and the Examiner’s response,
we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Gorur, Rostron and
Jeffords teaches or suggests components each arranged to operate according
to a respective life cycle where each component is arranged to maintain and
provide lifecycle-state information indicative of its current lifecycle state.
We find that the Examiner has sufficiently shown that the Jeffords’s RRM
processes “learns about the relative state of all other RRM processes in the
network” and disseminates its own information to other RRM processes.
Ans. 5, 15 (citing Jeffords ¶¶[0057],[0075]). We also agree with the
Examiner that RRM processes fall within the scope of components as recited
in claim 1. Ans. 15. In addition, Gorur teaches lifecycles for business
objects that are composed of various states. Gorur ¶ [0008]; Ans. 16.

Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Jeffords, Rostron and
Gorur teach or suggest “the state-dissemination arrangement being such that
all components receiving a particular item of lifecycle-state information can,
within a defined time, rely on all interested components having received the
information” limitation as recited in claim 1?
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in finding that Rostron’s
teaching that dissemination of states occurs within a defined time (Rostron
¶[0036]). App. Br. 12. Such dissemination, Appellant argues, is not the
same as “all components receiving a particular item of lifecycle-state
Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
7
information can, within a defined time, rely on all interested components
having received the information.” Since Rostron fails to mention that the
components “can rely on receipt of disseminated information” or suggests
such a relationship, Rostron does not teach or suggest the disputed
limitation. App. Br. 13.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. We agree with the
Examiner’s finding that Rostron teaches or suggests that dissemination
occurs within a specified time X. Ans. 16. In addition, the Examiner relies
on the combination of Jeffords and Rostron to teach or suggest the
dissemination of state information via the RRM process in a specified time.
For example, Jeffords teaches a confirmation that all active processes report
the same state. Jeffords ¶[0057]. Thus, the disseminated information has
been received. Appellant’s argument that Jeffords merely teaches
confirmation of receipt rather than reliance on receipt of state information,
narrowly construes the claim term “can…rely on” as recited in claim 1 to
exclude confirmation of receipt as taught in Jeffords. See App. Br. 14. We
find that a confirmation is an indication of receipt and, therefore,
components can rely on that confirmation. We find that the combination of
Rostron suggesting a defined time for dissemination and Jeffords
dissemination and confirmation of receipt of state of information teaches or
suggest the “all components receiving a particular item of lifecycle-state
information can, within a defined time, rely on all interested components
having received the information” limitation as recited in claim 1.

Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Jeffords, Rostron and
Gorur teach or suggest that a component is “arranged to receive lifecycle-
Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
8
state information about another component . . . and to use it in determining
whether to change its current lifecycle state” as recited in claim 1?
Appellant argues that the switch controller in Jeffords is not a
component similar to a resource object or RRM as taught in Jeffords. App.
Br. 15. In addition, Appellant asserts that Jeffords does not teach that the
switch controller receive lifecycle state information from the state
dissemination arrangement. Id.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the
switch controller in Jeffords is a component. As the Examiner found, a
broad and reasonable interpretation of component includes a constituent
part. See Ans. 15, 18. Given this construction, Jeffords teaches or suggest
that a constituent part, the switch controller, receives lifecycle state
information to perform hot-standby duties in the event of a failure. Jeffords
¶[0075]; Ans. 17-18. We find that Jeffords suggests by way of an example,
active switch controllers are components running RRM processes where
state information is used to recover from failure and utilize the failed
controllers lifecycle state. Jeffords ¶[0075]; Ans. 17-18. Thus, RRM
processes and the switch controller identified by the Examiner are not
mutually exclusive components.

Issue: Did the Examiner err in combining Jeffords and Rostron
because there is no motivation to combine the references aside from
Appellant’s Specification?
Appellant contends that the combination of Jeffords and Rostron is
improper because there is no motivation to combine. App. Br. 16. We
disagree.
Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
9
The Supreme Court in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007), rejected the rigid requirement of a teaching or suggestion or
motivation to combine known elements in order to show obviousness. KSR
Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415. Instead, “there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418. The relevant inquiry is
whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of
ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of those
references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
We find that the Examiner has provided a rational underpinning for
the combination of Jeffords and Rostron, which both describe distributed
fault tolerant systems. Ans. 18. The Examiner found that it would have
been obvious to combine the timing scheme of Rostron with the state
dissemination system of Jeffords to allow for ease of synchronization. Ans.
18. We find that the combination is nothing more than a substitution of
known elements by known methods that produce nothing more than
predictable results. See KSR Int’l Co. at 406. Thus, we find that the
Examiner did not err in combining Jeffords and Rostron.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Examiner did not err in
rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being unpatentable over
Jeffords, Rostron and Gorur. Because Appellant argued claim 1 as
representative of claims 2-6, 8-18, and 21-23 (App. Br. 17), we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-6, 8-18, and 21-23 under 35 U.S.C §103(a).

Independent Claim 28 – 35 U.S.C §103(a)
Appellant’s arguments for independent claim 28 recite substantially
the same arguments presented above for claim 1. See App. Br. 17-22; Reply
Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
10
Br. 8 (including claims 28-31 in the discussion of claims 1-6, 8-18, and 21-
23).
Appellant’s separate argument with respect to claim 28 presents the
issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Gorur teaches or suggests that
the object “is arranged to transit upon fulfillment of a corresponding
condition set …. the condition set associated with at least one state transition
of first said component comprising a condition concerning the existence or
current lifecycle state of a second component, and the first component being
arranged to receive state information from the second component via the
state-dissemination arrangement and to use it in checking whether said
condition has been fulfilled” as recited in claim 28.
Appellant argues that the composite objects the Examiner identified in
Gorur ¶[0012] do not correspond to a component and are not “arranged to
operate according to a respective life cycle” nor “arranged to maintain and
provide lifecycle state information indicative of its current lifecycle state” as
recited in claim 28. App. Br. 17-18.
We disagree with Appellant’s contentions. As discussed above,
Gorur’s teachings regarding composite objects fall within the Examiner’s
broad and reasonable construction of the term “component.” See Ans. 15,
18 (construing component). In addition, we agree with the Examiner that
Gorur teaches a composite object that is based on the individual states of
other objects. Gorur also teaches or suggests aggregation of these various
objects. Ans. 19-20 (citing Gorur ¶[0012]). Thus, we agree with the
Examiner that Gorur suggests that composite objects require knowledge of
the state of other objects (or children objects). Gorur expressly teaches “a
mechanism for propagating state information in a hierarchical (e.g., multi-
tiered) business object.” Gorur ¶[0012].
Appeal 2010-007513
Application 11/091,278
11
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Examiner did not err in
finding that Gorur teaches or suggests the object “is arranged to transit upon
fulfillment of a corresponding condition set” limitation of claim 28.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 28 under 35
U.S.C §103(a).
Claim 29-31 – 35 U.S.C §103(a)
Appellant’s arguments for independent claim 29 and dependent claims
30 and 31 recite substantially the same arguments presented above for claim
1. See App. Br. 23-31; Reply Br. 8 (including claims 29-31). Based on the
arguments presented for claim 1, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 29-31 under 35 U.S.C §103(a).

DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of:
(a) Claims 1-31 under 35 U.S.C §112 second paragraph are
REVERSED, and
(b) Claims 1-6, 8-18, 21-23 and 28-31 are AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

tj