Ex Parte Munoz-Bustamante et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 19, 2016

12749942 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
121749,942 03/30/2010 Carlos Munoz-Bustamante
63203 7590 10/21/2016
ROGITZ & AS SOCIA TES
750B STREET
SUITE 3120
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
RPS920100015-US-NP 7941
EXAMINER
NAW AZ, ASAD M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2468
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/21/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
Noelle@rogitz.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
J ohn@rogitz.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Exparte CARLOS MUNOZ-BUSTAMANTE,
JOSEPH MICHAEL PENNISI,
RANDALL SCOTT SPRINGFIELD,
EPHRAIM D. STARR, YASUSHI TSUKAMOTO,
andRODD. WALTERMANN
Appeal2015-005272
Application 12/749,942
Technology Center 2400
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ST. JOHJ'.J COURTEI'LA.Y III, and
NORMAN H. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal2015-005272
Application 12/749,942
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1--4, 6, 8-11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, and 22. Claims 5, 12, 16, and 18 have been
canceled. The Examiner indicated that claims 7, 14, and 20 stand objected
to and would be allowable if rewritten in independent form. (Ans. 6). We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
The claims are directed to a noise reduction system and method
during Voice over IP sessions. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
predicting a keyboard event prior to the keyboard event,
the predicting based at least in part on input from a proximity
sensor;
reducing a volume of an audio input channel from a first
volume level to a lower volume level in response to the
predicting of the keyboard event;
after the volume of the audio input channel is reduced,
waiting until a system event occurs, wherein the system event is
based at least in part on a first event; and
increasing the volume of the audio input channel from the
lower volume level to a higher volume level in response to the
occurrence of the system event.
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Application 12/749,942
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Rabe et al.
Hinckley et al.
Rui
Marton
us 5,655, 127
US 2005/0275637 Al
US 2006/0167995 Al
US 2010/0027810 Al
Aug. 5, 1997
Dec. 15, 2005
July 27, 2006
Feb.4,2010
Roger Morrison, "Design of a True Random Number Generator Using
Audio Input," JOURNAL OF CRAPTOLOGY, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1--4,
June 2001.
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1-3, 8-10, 15, 17, and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rui in view of Hinckley.
Claims 4 and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rui in vie\'l/ of Hinckley and fi.1rther in vie\'l/ of !vfarton.
Claim 22 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Rui in view of Hinckley and further in view of Rabe.
Claims 6, 13, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rui in view of Hinckley and further in view of Roger
Morrison.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1-3, 8-10, 15, 17, and21
With respect to independent claims 1, 8, 15, and 21, Appellants
present arguments to the claims as a group. (App. Br. 4). As a result, we
select independent claim 1 as the representative claim for the group and will
address Appellants' arguments thereto. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 (c)(l)(iv).
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Application 12/749,942
With respect to representative independent claim 1, Appellants
contend that the claims recite "predicting a keyboard event prior to the
keyboard event, the predicting based at least in part on input from a
proximity sensor." Appellants' main contention is:
The causal chain required by the claims is not taught or
suggested by the references. More specifically, after the
rejections concede that Rui does not discuss anything
approaching the prediction limitations of these claims, the
rejections then resort to Hinckley for this shortfall. However,
Hinckley at relied-upon paragraphs 108-110 does not discuss
reducing volume in response to the "predictions" allegedly
disclosed therein, and indeed the rejections do not even allege as
much. What becomes clear then is that neither Rui nor Hinckley
at the relied-upon portions discuss reducing volume in response
to a "prediction", meaning and element recited in the claims is
altogether missing from the cited portions of the references.
(App. Br. 4--5). Appellants further contend that the "reducing volume" and
"predicting" are linked by a causal chain of volume being reduced in
response to the claimed prediction. (App. Br. 5; see generally Reply Br. 1-
2).
The Examiner responds to Appellants' contention and maintains that
"Hinckley discloses a keyboard with all surfaces covered with proximity
sensors to detect when a user's hand is near the sensor without requiring the
hand to actually contact the sensor. Hinckley, [0014] describes the
proximity sensors are predicting the will of the user." (Ans. 2). The
Examiner further identifies that Appellants do not dispute that the primary
reference "Rui teaching the reduction of microphone volume based on the
use of keyboard." (Ans. 2). The Examiner further maintains:
[T]he primary reference Rui disclosing reducing the microphone
volume based on pressing keys on the keyboard and the
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Application 12/749,942
secondary Hinckley disclosing performing functions based on
proximity sensors located on the keys of a keyboard. The
functions are initiated by the proximity sensors are intended to
predict the will of the user. Clearly, Rui and Hinckley are in the
same field of endeavor and clearly Hinckley provides motivation
to combine.
Assuming, arguendo, that Hinckley must disclose
reducing volume in response to the "predictions" as alleged by
Appellant at page 5, first paragraph of the 3/17/2015 Appeal
Brief. Hinckley [0133-0134] describes in detail how the volume
control is covered with proximity sensors to detect a user's
fingers approaching the control device and providing a GUI
display of the current volume level, the user can then use the
mouse to alter the volume level within the GUI.
(Ans. 3). We agree with the Examiner that the Hinckley reference teaches
and suggests a causal link between the prediction of user preparatory actions
with the control of the touch sensitive controls for a device. Moreover, in
combination with the basic teachings of the Rui reference regarding muting
of the microphone audio in response to keyboard actuation and noise, we
agree with the Examiner that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would have looked to combine the teachings of the two references
to make the control of the audio faster and more responsive to user actuation
to reduce noise which is the primary concern of the Rui reference.
We also find that it would have been well within the skill of one
skilled in the art to combine such known techniques to utilize Hinckley's
prediction using touch sensitive controls for preparatory actions with Rui' s
teaching of muting or reducing volume when a participant to a
teleconference's typing on the keyboard. See KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) ("[I]f a technique has been used to improve one
device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
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improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill."). We are not
persuaded that combining the respective familiar elements of the cited
references in the manner proffered by the Examiner would have been
"uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art" at the
time of Appellants' invention. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). As a
result, we sustain the rejection of representative independent claim 1 and
independent claims 8, 15, and 21, which have not been separately argued,
along with dependent claims 2, 3, 9, 10, and 17.
Appellants have not set forth separate arguments for patentability of
dependent claims 4, 6, 11, 13, and 19, which have been rejected over
additional prior art references. Arguments not made are considered waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 (c)(l)(iv). Therefore, we sustain the second-stated
and fourth-stated grounds of rejection for claims 4, 6, 11, 13, and 19 for the
same reasons discussed above regarding claim 1.
Dependent claim 22
With respect to dependent claim 22, Appellants contend that the Rabe
reference merely discusses switching power states based upon input from the
input devices to switch the device from a low-power mode to a high-power
mode. (App. Br. 5-6). Appellants further contend that the relied upon
portions of the Rabe a reference do not mention the word volume and fail to
disclose any causal chain of increasing volume in response to meeting a
criterion responsive to being in one of the various power modes. (App. Br.
6).
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The Examiner provides a general discussion of the well-known use of
different power modes and the use of different criteria for different power
modes. (Ans. 5---6). We note that the Rabe reference teaches the well-
known recognition of different criteria for low-power mode and full-power
mode, and the Rabe reference acknowledges the use of two durations for the
clock signals in the two distinct operational modes. (Abst.).
Appellants further contend that the Examiner has relied upon
improper hindsight. (Reply Br. 2-3). We disagree with Appellants and find
that the Examiner's reliance upon figure 3 and associated description in
columns 3 and 4 of the Rabe reference evidences the well-known use of the
two operational modes (low and full) and that there are different operating
criteria between the fully operational events and the low-power events.
Appellants further contend that the Examiner's statement that
"[a]ssuming arguendo, that Rabe cannot be combined with Rui and
Hinckley, it would be inherent for the computer systems of Rui and
Hinckley to have the three power modes of Rabe" (Ans. 5), would be a new
ground of rejection. (Reply Br. 4). We disagree with Appellants and find
that the Examiner actually relies upon the background of the Rabe reference
for these general teachings and suggestions. Additionally, we note that
Appellants did not file a petition to the Technology Center Director
regarding any new grounds of rejection. Consequently, Appellants have
waived this contention. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
The Examiner's legal conclusion of obvious relies upon a general
well-known premise in the computer area to have varied modes of operation
and treatments by computers thereto. (Ans. 5---6). We agree with the
Examiner's finding that the use of at least two power modes was well known
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in the art and that different criteria exist within the computer for the different
power modes. Consequently, we agree with the Examiner that it would have
been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to
have combined Rabe with the Rui and Hinckley references. As a result,
Appellants have not shown error in the Examiner's reasoned conclusion of
obviousness of dependent claim 22.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1--4, 6, 8-11, 13, 15, 17,
19, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner's rejections of claims
1--4, 6, 8-11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, and 22.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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