Ex Parte Mukherjee

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

May 23, 2012

10418533 (B.P.A.I. May. 23, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte DEBARGHA MUKHERJEE
____________

Appeal 2009-011809
Application 10/418,533
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and
ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, Administrative Patent Judges.

BLANKENSHIP, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-35, which are all the claims in the application. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.

Appeal 2009-011809
Application 10/418,533

2
Invention
Appellant’s invention relates to collaboration session communications
methods. Spec. ¶ [0001]. “Collaboration session” refers to data
communications within a communications system between a plurality of
participants or users. Id., ¶ [0026].

Representative Claim
1. A collaboration session communications method
comprising:

coupling a plurality of groups of participants with a
collaboration infrastructure;

providing a plurality of communications rules to the
collaboration infrastructure to control communications of data within
a collaboration session;

outputting a communication from a first one of the groups for
communication to a second one of the groups;

receiving the communication within the collaboration
Infrastructure after the providing;

identifying the communication as originating from the first one
of the groups and intended for communication to the second one of
the groups; and

forwarding the communication to a third one of the groups
using the collaboration infrastructure and responsive to the identifying
and in accordance with one of the communications rules.

Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1-9 and 21-29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
being anticipated by Stephens (US 7,023,465 B2).
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Appeal 2009-011809
Application 10/418,533

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1. Figure 1 depicts a block diagram of a video network platform
10 interfaced with a video call network 12. Col. 5, ll. 34-35.
2. Video call network 12 includes twelve video end points 14 that
display video calls to end users, five multi-call units (MCUs) 16 that
coordinate multi-point video conference calls, and two gateways 18 that
coordinate interfaces with endpoints using different protocols. Col. 5, ll. 36-
40.
3. Video network platform 10 provides automated configuration
and scheduling of video calls based on queries received through a scheduling
graphical user interface 20. Col. 5, ll. 52-54.
4. Configuration engine 26 is an expert system that accepts
queries and applies rules and data to determine video call configurations and
schedule the calls. Col. 6, ll. 16-19.
5. For example, a user inputs a request into scheduling graphical
user interface 20 for a one hour video conference call at noon among six end
points 14, including H.320 protocol end points 10-12 and H.323 protocol
end points 1-3. Col. 7, ll. 10-13.
6. Configuration engine 26 may, for example, apply a rule from
rules database 30 that states that video call requests between end points with
different protocols require the use of a gateway. Col. 7, ll. 30-33.

Salesky
7. Salesky describes a computer conferencing system having a
shared visual display and additional communication capabilities such as
video, shared drawing, audio, and text chat. A “presenter” may be able to
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modify the shared images while an “attendee” might not be so enabled. Col.
1, ll. 9-17, 55-62.

ANALYSIS
Section 102(e) -- Claims 1-9
Claim 1 recites, inter alia, identifying the communication as
originating from the first one of the groups and intended for communication
to the second one of the groups, and forwarding the communication to a
third one of the groups using the collaboration infrastructure and responsive
to the identifying and in accordance with one of the communication rules.
The Examiner submits:
In regards to forwarding to a third one of the groups, Stephens
discloses setting up communication between an originator (first
group) and six endpoints. Stephens further shows that the
endpoints are split into more groups wherein the second group
requires the H.323 protocol and an MCU, and the third group
requires the H.320 protocol and a gateway and MCU (see
column 7, lines 20-30). Therefore, the collaboration
infrastructure would necessarily provide a communication from
the first group (i.e. originator) to the second group (i.e.
endpoints 1-3) and also forward the communication to the third
group (i.e. endpoints 10-12), in order to allow the video
conference call to reach all the participants.

Ans. 10.
Stephens discloses that the scheduling graphical user interface may be
presented as a web browser page or through end points 14 (Fig. 1) using an
internet or other network interface 22 that supports communications between
video network platform 10 and video call network 12. Col. 5, l. 66 - col. 6,
l. 3. Even assuming that Stephens might describe three groups as proposed
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by the Examiner, the rejection fails to identify any express or inherent
description in the reference of forwarding the communication to a third one
of the groups (endpoints 10-12; Fig. 1) responsive to identifying that the
communication originates from the first one of the groups (the originator)
and intended for communication to the second one of the groups (endpoints
1-3).2
We therefore agree with Appellant that the rejection fails to show
anticipation of the subject matter of claim 1. We cannot sustain the § 102(e)
rejection of that claim, nor of claims 2 through 9 which depend from claim
1.

Section 102(e) -- Claims 21-29
Appellant argues that Stephens does not disclose programming
configured to control processing circuitry to forward a communication of a
collaboration session to an appropriate recipient participant corresponding to
the respective collaboration rules for the respective collaboration session as
recited in claim 21.
However, Stephens discloses, for example, that configuration engine
26 may apply a rule from rules database 30 that states that video call
requests between end points with different protocols require the use of a

2 In earlier rejections over Stephens the Examiner relied on material that
included Figure 5 and column 8, line 26 et seq. of the reference. Appellant
submits that Figure 5 and the text at column 8, line 26 et seq. was added in a
continuation-in-part and does not represent prior art. Appellant does not
dispute that the remainder of the Stephens disclosure is prior art with respect
to the instant claims.
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gateway. FF 6. We therefore agree with the Examiner that Stephens
describes circuitry within the ambit of claim 21.
Appellant alleges that the Examiner relied on inherency in the
rejection of claim 21 and that “other techniques exist for routing of calls
apart from the use of communication rules.” Reply Br. 5. However, the
Examiner specifically pointed to Stephens’ description of forwarding
communications in accordance with communication rules. Ans. 10.
We therefore sustain the § 102(e) rejection of claim 21. Claims 22
and 25, not separately argued, fall with claim 21.
Appellant argues that claim 23 distinguishes over Stephens because
the claim recites forwarding a communication to less than all of the
participants or groups of participants. However, we agree with the Examiner
that Stephens’ description that some devices might not be used due to
reliability issues (col. 7, ll. 2-6) anticipates the limitation in controversy. We
sustain the rejection of claim 23.
Appellant argues that claim 24 is not anticipated because it recites
prohibiting communications from a participant. We agree with the
Examiner that prohibiting an endpoint from making an international call
(Stephens col. 7, l. 64 - col. 8, l. 6) is a form of prohibiting communications.
We decline to read disclosed details from the Specification into the claim
(Reply Br. 8) in an effort to limit the broad claim terms presented on appeal.
We sustain the rejection of claim 24.
Appellant argues that claim 26 is not anticipated because it recites
forwarding a communication to a participant not indicated in the
communication. The Examiner relies on column 7, lines 50 through 53 of
Stephens for describing the limitation, which indicates that once a
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determination is made of possible call configurations, those call
configurations are passed to scheduling graphical user interface 20 for
approval by the user. The Examiner submits that “Stephens shows that the
conference call configurations are up to approval by the user. If the user
doesn’t approve then a participant not indicated in the communication can be
necessarily added.” Ans. 11. However, claim 26 recites forwarding a
communication to a participant not indicated in the communication. We
agree with Appellant that anticipation has not been shown for the subject
matter of claim 26 and cannot sustain the rejection.
Appellant argues that independent claim 27 is not anticipated because
it recites that at least one of the sets of communication rules define some
communications from at least one of the participants “of the respective
collaboration session are applied to less than all of the participants of the
respective collaboration session.” The Examiner finds that Stephens
describes the limitation in controversy because the reference discloses that
communication rules using an H.323 protocol and an MCU are applied to
endpoints 1-3 and not to endpoints 10-12 (Ans. 10; Stephens col. 7, ll. 20-
30). In view of the broadly recited “communications,” we agree with the
Examiner that a selected protocol is a type of “communication” within the
meaning of claim 27. We sustain the rejection of claim 27. Claim 28, not
separately argued, falls with claim 27.
Appellant argues that claim 29 is not anticipated because it recites that
the communication rules configure the server means to control transmission
and reception including specifying whether the participants of the respective
group are permitted to transmit data and “the groups which receive the
transmitted data if transmission is permitted.” We agree with the Examiner
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that by prohibiting international calls, the group which would otherwise
receive the transmitted data is prohibited from receiving the data and the
groups not so prohibited would receive the transmitted data. Stephens col. 7,
l. 64 - col. 8, l. 6. We sustain the rejection of claim 29.

Section 103(a) -- Claims 10-20, 30-35
Appellant submits that the Examiner has offered no evidence or
explanation as to how the flow of a meeting of Stephens would be improved
by the modification in accordance with the teachings of Salesky.3 The
allegation is unfounded, as the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in
the art would recognize that employing a control over an individual
participant to output messages would better control the flow of a meeting as
taught by Stephens. Ans. 7-8.
Appellant argues that claim 10 is patentable because Salesky fails to
teach controlling whether an attendee is permitted to output any messages.
However, we find that Salesky at least suggests the element alleged to
be missing. Salesky teaches that, preferably, only one conferee at a time is
the presenter that can modify images. Col. 1, ll. 55-63. Initial privileges
granted to an attendee can include whether the conferee can be a presenter
and whether the conferee has a pointer. The privileges in general terms
include those that conferees might enjoy in person at a conventional,
physical meeting. Col. 2, ll. 9-25. As Salesky’s system includes a shared
visual display and additional communication capabilities such as video,
shared drawing, audio, and text chat (col. 1, ll. 11-17), we agree with the

3 Appellant also alleges that the Examiner’s “Official Notice” has been
traversed, but the § 103(a) rejection does not rely on Official Notice.
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Examiner that Salesky teaches controlling whether an attendee is permitted
to output any messages. We therefore sustain the § 103(a) rejection of claim
10. Claims 11 through 14, not separately argued in response to the § 103(a)
rejection, fall with claim 10.
Appellant argues that claim 15 is patentable because Salesky fails to
teach communication rules configured to control, for an individual
participant of one of the collaboration sessions, which messages
communicated using the collaboration infrastructure are received by the
individual participant.
We agree with the Examiner that Salesky’s description of controlling
communication privileges and enabling private conversations among
attendees (col. 2, ll. 55-65) teaches the communication rules for selective
reception of messages as claimed. We sustain the § 103(a) rejection of
claim 15. Claims 16-20 and 35, not separately argued in response to the
§ 103(a) rejection, fall with claim 15.
Appellant submits remarks for claims 30 through 34 in the Appeal
Brief in response to a rejection not made against those claims -- § 102(e)
over Stephens. As the claims are rejected under § 103(a) over the
combination of Stephens and Salesky, we find the remarks unpersuasive of
error and sustain the § 103(a) rejection of claims 30 through 34.4

DECISION
We affirm the rejection of claims 21-25 and 27-29 but reverse the
rejection of claims 1-9 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated

4 We have not considered the untimely arguments Appellant adds in the
Reply Brief. See Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473 (BPAI 2010)
(informative).
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by Stephens .
We affirm the rejection of claims 10-20 and 30-35 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Stephens and Salesky.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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