Ex Parte Mueller et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 14, 201412714866 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte JOERG MUELLER, YESSICA DE NARDIN, URSULA CHRISTINA GLASER, ROBERT M. HUBBARD, LAMIA DELPHINE MIMASSI, CORNELIA SCHMIDT, and NAKA SEIDEL ___________ Appeal 2012-010090 Application 12/714,866 Technology Center 3700 ____________ Before MARC S. HOFF, DANIEL S. SONG, and ERIC B. CHEN, Administrative Patent Judges. CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2012-010090 Application 12/714,866 2 This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of claims 29–48. Claims 1–28 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ invention is related to a container including a dispensing opening or a closure element of the container that includes a reservoir. The reservoir transfers a transferable material, such as a fragrance composition or skin health benefit ingredient, to the container’s content. (Abstract.) Claim 29 is exemplary, with disputed limitations in italics: 29. A container for containing and dispensing consumer wipes, the container comprising: a body with walls that define a cavity for containing consumer wipes; a wall opening in one of the walls for dispensing consumer wipes; a reservoir attached to the container and disposed adjacent to the wall opening; wherein the reservoir: is a solid material that includes a fragrance composition impregnated within the solid material; includes a contact transfer surface; is configured to diffuse the fragrance composition to the contact transfer surface; and is configured to transfer the fragrance composition to consumer wipes by contact with the contact surface. Claims 29–31 and 39–41 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Cordis (US 3,368,522; Feb. 13, 1968), Mahoney (US 4,458,810; July 10, 1984), and Jones (US 2006/0249417 Al; Nov. 9, 2006). Appeal 2012-010090 Application 12/714,866 3 Claims 29, 32–39, and 42–48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over De-Vries (US 2004/0099545 Al; May 27, 2004), Mahoney, and Jones. ANALYSIS § 103 Rejection — Cordis, Mahoney, and Jones We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments (Br. 3–4) that the combination of Cordis, Mahoney, and Jones would not have rendered obvious independent claim 29, which includes the limitation “the reservoir . . . is a solid material that includes a fragrance composition impregnated within the solid material.” The Examiner acknowledged that Cordis does not disclose the limitation “the reservoir . . . is a solid material that includes a fragrance composition impregnated within the solid material,” and thus, relied upon Mahoney for teaching a box with an impervious covering with fragrance composition coated thereon that transfers a scent to a stack of tissues (Ans. 5) and relied upon Jones for teaching either coating the surface of the container with fragrance composition, or impregnating the container with such composition (Ans. 6; see also Ans. 12). The Examiner concluded that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it . . . obvious to impregnate the reservoir with fragrance composition rather than coat a surface of the reservoir with fragrance composition since . . . substituting equivalents known for the same purpose would have been obvious.” (Ans. 6.) We agree with the Examiner. Cordis relates to an “apparatus for storing [cleansing and wiping] sheets in a wetted condition and for dispensing the sheets on demand ready Appeal 2012-010090 Application 12/714,866 4 for use.” (Col. 1, ll. 17–19.) Cordis explains that “[a]n important object of the invention is to provide a multiple supply of such pre-wetted sheets and a dispenser” (col. 1, ll. 32–34) for applying a scented fluid or an antiseptic with or without healing properties (col. 2, ll. 1–2). Figure 2 of Cordis illustrates a dispenser that includes a housing 20 and “a sump 22 for the treating fluid” (i.e., the claimed “reservoir”). (Col. 2, ll. 58–60.) Mahoney relates to “[s]cent impregnated tissues . . . provided in a substantially airtight container having a resealable lid.” (Abstract.) In describing the prior art, Mahoney explains that tissues are packaged in a container (e.g., a cardboard box) with an impervious covering. (Col. 1, ll. 37–40.) “The stack of tissues [is] usually not scented prior to stacking, and are impregnated with a scent of material coated on the inner surfaces of the impervious covering.” (Col. 1, ll. 40–43.) Thus, Mahoney teaches the limitation “a solid material . . . configured to transfer the fragrance composition to consumer wipes.” Jones relates to a “shoe package assemblies include a scent-generating material.” (Abstract.) Jones explains that “[t]he fiberboard of box 40 and/or lid 50 can be impregnated with the scent-generating material.” (¶ 38.) Thus, Jones teaches the limitation “a fragrance composition impregnated within the solid material.” The combination of Cordis, Mahoney, and Jones is nothing more than incorporating the known solid material of Mahoney for transferring a scent to tissues and the known fragrance composition impregnated within the solid material as taught in Jones, into the apparatus of Cordis for storing cleansing and wiping sheets, to yield predictable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“The combination of familiar elements Appeal 2012-010090 Application 12/714,866 5 according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”). Thus, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 6) that modifying Cordis to incorporate the solid material of Mahoney for transferring a scent to tissues and impregnating the same with a fragrance composition, as taught in Jones, would have been obvious. First, Appellants argue that “the cited references only suggest impregnating scent into a fiberboard box (Jones); the cited references, independently or in combination, do not describe, teach, or suggest, impregnating scent into an impervious covering (Mahoney), and thus do not describe, teach, or suggest a solid reservoir impregnated with a composition.” (Br. 3–4.) However, the Examiner cited Cordis for teaching the claimed “reservoir” and the desirability thereof (Ans. 5) and cited Jones for teaching the claimed limitation “a solid material that includes a fragrance composition impregnated within the solid material” (Ans. 6). Second, Appellants argue that “the claims are nonobvious over the Cordis, Mahoney, and Jones references, because combining the references as cited would change the principle of operation of Mahoney, from sealing the scent within an ‘impervious covering,’ to causing an impregnated covering to disperse scent.” (Br. 4.) Contrary to Appellants’ arguments, the rejection of claim 29 is based on modifying the reservoir of Cordis to incorporate the impervious covering (i.e., solid material) of Mahoney, further modified so that the inner surface is impregnated with a scent composition, as taught by Jones. (Ans. 5–6.) Third, Appellants argues that “the claims are nonobvious over the Cordis, Mahoney, and Jones references, because combining the references as cited would change the render Mahoney unsatisfactory for Appeal 2012-010090 Application 12/714,866 6 its intended purpose, from ‘minimizing the escape of the scent’ to allowing the scent to disperse both inside and outside of the covering.” (Br. 4 (citation omitted).) Again, the rejection of claim 29 is based on modifying the reservoir of Cordis to incorporate the impervious covering (i.e., solid material) of Mahoney, further modified so that the inner surface is impregnated with a scent composition, as taught by Jones. (Ans. 5–6.) Fourth, Appellants argue that “the claims are nonobvious over the Cordis, Mahoney, and Jones references, because the Jones reference (scent impregnated in box) teaches away from the claimed embodiment (scent impregnated in a reservoir element, which is separate from the walls of the body of the container).” (Br. 4.) Again, the rejection of claim 29 is based on modifying the reservoir of Cordis to incorporate the impervious covering (i.e., solid material) of Mahoney, further modified so that the inner surface is impregnated with a scent composition, as taught by Jones. (Ans. 5–6.) Whereas Jones discloses a different implementation wherein the box is impregnated, we are not persuaded that mere disclosure of this differing implementation teaches away from the combination of Cordis, Mahoney and Jones, as suggested by the Examiner. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). Fifth, Appellants argue that “the claims are nonobvious over the Cordis, Mahoney, and Jones references, because substituting the impervious covering (Mahoney) for the fluid in the sump (Cordis) would change the principle of operation of Cordis (from wet material transfer to Appeal 2012-010090 Application 12/714,866 7 dry material transfer).” (Br. 4.) However, the basic principle under which the device of Cordis operates is by transferring a substance (e.g., scented fluid or antiseptic) to a wiping sheet as it is dispensed. (See col. 1, ll. 32–34, col. 2, ll. 1–2.) Accordingly, the Examiner’s modification maintains this same basic principle of Cordis in that it transfers the scent to the wiping sheet as it is dispensed, and thus, does not change the principle of operation. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Cordis, Mahoney, and Jones would have rendered obvious independent claim 29, which includes the limitation “the reservoir . . . is a solid material that includes a fragrance composition impregnated within the solid material.” Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 30 and 31 depend from claim 29, and Appellants have not presented any substantive arguments with respect to these claims. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 30 and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for the same reasons discussed with respect to independent claim 29. Independent claim 39 recites limitations similar to those discussed with respect to independent claim 29, and Appellants have not presented any substantive arguments with respect to this claim. We sustain the rejection of claim 39, as well as dependent claims 40 and 41, for the same reasons discussed with respect to claim 29. § 103 Rejection — De-Vries, Mahoney, and Jones We are also unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments (Br. 4–5) that the combination of De-Vries, Mahoney, and Jones would not have rendered obvious independent claim 29, which includes the limitation “the reservoir Appeal 2012-010090 Application 12/714,866 8 . . . is a solid material that includes a fragrance composition impregnated within the solid material.” The Examiner acknowledged that De-Vries does not disclose the limitation “the reservoir . . . is a solid material that includes a fragrance composition impregnated within the solid material,” and thus, relied upon Mahoney for teaching a box with an impervious covering (i.e., a solid material) with fragrance composition coated thereon that transfers a scent to a stack of tissues (Ans. 8) and relied upon Jones for teaching either coating the surface of the container with fragrance composition, or impregnating the container with such composition (Ans. 8; see also Ans. 14). The Examiner concluded that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it . . . obvious to impregnate the reservoir with fragrance composition rather than coat a surface of the reservoir with fragrance composition since . . . substituting equivalents known for the same purpose would have been obvious.” (Ans. 8.) We agree with the Examiner. De-Vries relates to a tissue containers for dispensing tissues and “dispensers which readily offer use of an associated preparation” (¶ 1) (e.g., ointments, moisturizers, anti-bacterial compositions, perfumes (¶ 3)). Figure 2B of De-Vries illustrates a rigid cylindrical container 70 (¶ 39) with a cover 72 having an annular groove 78 as an auxiliary compartment 78 (¶ 40). The auxiliary compartment 78 has “a U-like cross section which permit for easy access by a fingertip for scooping an ointment” (i.e., the claimed “reservoir). (¶ 41.) The combination of De-Vries, Mahoney, and Jones is nothing more than incorporating the known solid material of Mahoney for transferring a scent to tissues and the known fragrance composition impregnated within Appeal 2012-010090 Application 12/714,866 9 the solid material of Jones, into the known cylindrical container of De-Vries for dispensing issues, to yield predictable results. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Thus, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 8) that modifying De-Vries to incorporate the solid material of Mahoney for transferring a scent to tissues and impregnating the same with a fragrance composition, as taught in Jones, would have been obvious. Appellants reiterate five similar arguments previously presented with respect to the rejection of claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Cordis, Mahoney, and Jones. We are not persuaded by these arguments for the same reasons as discussed previously. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 32–38 depend from claim 29, and Appellants have not presented any substantive arguments with respect to these claims. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 32–38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for the same reasons discussed with respect to independent claim 29. Independent claim 39 recites limitations similar to those discussed with respect to independent claim 29, and Appellants have not presented any substantive arguments with respect to this claim. We sustain the rejection of claim 39, as well as dependent claims 42–48, for the same reasons discussed with respect to claim 29. DECISION The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 29–48 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). Appeal 2012-010090 Application 12/714,866 10 AFFIRMED msc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation