Ex Parte MoulckersDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 17, 201611103888 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 17, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/103,888 04/12/2005 Ingrid M. Moulckers AUS920040719US1 9019 48916 7590 08/17/2016 Greg Goshorn, P.C. 9600 Escarpment Blvd. Suite 745-9 AUSTIN, TX 78749 EXAMINER LOUIE, JUE WANG ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2193 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/17/2016 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte INGRID M. MOULCKERS ____________ Appeal 2015-002572 Application 11/103,888 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JAMES R. HUGHES, and JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges. JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 8 and 21–36. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention defines, categorizes, and manages reusable components for solving business problems. In one aspect, a deployment package is generated based on, among other things, a practice manifest derived from a previously generated practice manifest. See generally Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 28–33; Figs. 2–3. Claim 8 is illustrative: 8. A method, comprising: defining a plurality of reusable components; Appeal 2015-002572 Application 11/103,888 2 defining categories based upon types of business problems, associated with a business solution, solved by the plurality of reusable components, wherein each reusable component corresponds to one or more of the categories; generating a derived practice manifest, from a previously generated practice manifest corresponding to a different business solution, stored on a physical memory, the derived practice manifest describing a subset of the components and the corresponding categories assigned to each of the subset, wherein each component of the subset represents a portion of the business solution and collectively the subset represents functionality necessary to address the entire business solution; modifying the derived practice manifest based upon the categories; producing a package descriptor and a custom build assets list based upon the derived practice manifest; generating a deployment package based upon the package descriptor and the custom build assets list; and storing the deployment package on the memory for delivery to a computing system. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner rejected claims 8, 23, 24, 26, 28–30, 32, 35, and 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Carlson (US 7,149,734 B2; Dec. 12, 2006), Jhanwar (US 7,562,346; July 14, 2009), and McGinnes (US 2005/0289524 A1; Dec. 29, 2005). Ans. 3–7.1 The Examiner rejected claims 21, 22, 27, 33, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Carlson, Jhanwar, McGinnes, and Miller (US 6,175,948 B1; Jan. 16, 2001). Ans. 8–9. 1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Appeal Brief filed August 17, 2014 (“App. Br.”); (2) the Examiner’s Answer mailed November 4, 2014 (“Ans.”); and (3) the Reply Brief filed January 2, 2015 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2015-002572 Application 11/103,888 3 The Examiner rejected claims 25 and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Carlson, Jhanwar, McGinnes, and Gianluigi Caldiera & Victor R. Basili, Identifying and Qualifying Reusable Software Components, 24 IEEE COMPUTER 61–70 (1991) (“Caldiera”). Ans. 9–10. THE REJECTION OVER CARLSON, JHANWAR, AND MCGINNES Regarding independent claim 8, the Examiner finds that Carlson defines reusable components and categories based on types of business problems, and modifies a project based on the categories. Ans. 3–4. The Examiner acknowledges that Carlson does not (1) generate a derived practice manifest from a previously generated practice manifest; (2) produce a package descriptor and custom build access list based on the derived manifest; (3) generate a deployment package based on the descriptor and assets list; and (4) store the deployment package as claimed, but cites Jhanwar for principally teaching these features. The Examiner acknowledges that although Jhanwar generates a practice manifest, it is not derived from one that is previously generated. See Ans. 4–5. Nevertheless, the Examiner cites McGinnes for teaching this manifest derivation, namely by developing a new application definition by using an existing one containing similar business concepts. Ans. 5. Appellant argues that McGinnes works with application definitions and business concepts which are not analogous to the recited manifest. App. Br. 8–10; Reply Br. 2–4. According to Appellant, the Examiner’s position that McGinnes’ business concepts are “components” runs counter to the Specification’s description of components as hardware and software. App. Br. 8–9. Appeal 2015-002572 Application 11/103,888 4 ISSUE Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 8 by finding that Carlson, Jhanwar, and McGinnes collectively would have taught or suggested generating a derived practice manifest from a previously generated practice manifest corresponding to a different business solution? ANALYSIS We begin by noting that the Examiner’s reliance on Carlson and Jhanwar for teaching various limitations of claim 8 is undisputed, as is the cited references’ combinability. As such, the Examiner’s finding that Jhanwar, among other things, generates a practice manifest describing a subset of components and corresponding assigned categories (Ans. 4–5) is uncontested. What is contested is the Examiner’s reliance on McGinnes for generating a derived practice manifest from a previously generated practice manifest and, in particular, whether McGinnes teaches or suggests a manifest. We, therefore, begin by construing that term. Paragraph 33 of Appellant’s Specification defines the term “manifest” as a high-level list of components that the proposed business solution requires. Accord Ans. 10; App. Br. 10 (quoting this definition). Moreover, business “components” include, but are not limited to: (1) hardware; (2) executable logic for performing specific functions; (3) user manuals; (4) procedural manuals; and (5) other documentation corresponding to particular hardware or software. Spec. ¶ 7. For example, component types can include Appeal 2015-002572 Application 11/103,888 5 (1) “off-the-shelf” software or hardware products, and (2) custom products developed for other projects and stored in a component library. Id. Given this broad and open-ended description, we see no error in the Examiner’s mapping McGinnes’ application definitions to the recited manifest, for these definitions are effectively a list of components, namely business concepts, that the proposed business solution requires. Ans. 10–11 (citing McGinnes ¶¶ 27, 77, 299, 417). As McGinnes explains in paragraph 298, an application definition can be a grouping of business concepts which at least suggests a list of those concepts. That McGinnes explicitly states that business concepts are structured components used to provide application functionality in paragraph 105 as the Examiner indicates (Ans. 11) only further bolsters the Examiner’s position that McGinnes’ application definitions are “manifests” listing required concept-based components. Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (App. Br. 8–10; Reply Br. 2–4) are unavailing and not commensurate with the scope of the claim. First, the Examiner’s reliance on Jhanwar’s generating a practice manifest (Ans. 4–5) is undisputed as noted above. But leaving these uncontested findings aside, Appellant’s contention that the Examiner incorrectly equates manifests and components as synonymous (Reply Br. 2–3) is inapposite, for the Examiner does not equate those terms. Rather, as noted above, the Examiner equates the recited manifest to McGinnes’ application definition that lists components, namely business concepts. See Ans. 10–12. Under the Examiner’s mapping, then, McGinnes’ “manifest” is not a component, but rather lists concept-based components and, therefore, reasonably comports with Appellant’s definition of “manifest” in paragraph 33 of the Specification. Appeal 2015-002572 Application 11/103,888 6 Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 8, and claims 23, 24, 26, 28–30, 32, 35, and 36 not argued separately with particularity. THE OTHER OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 21, 22, 25, 27, 31, 33, and 34. Ans. 8–10. Appellant reiterates similar arguments made in connection with claim 8 and alleges that the additional cited references fail to cure those purported deficiencies. App. Br. 12–13. We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons previously discussed. CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 8 and 21–36 under § 103. DECISION The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 8 and 21–36 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation