Ex Parte Mishra et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 4, 201812628773 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 4, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 12/628,773 12/01/2009 SUJEET MISHRA 73109 7590 06/06/2018 Cuenot, Forsythe & Kim, LLC 20283 State Road 7 Ste. 300 Boca Raton, FL 33498 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. IN920090083US 1 8152-0166 CONFIRMATION NO. 6560 EXAMINER BELCHER, HERMAN A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2448 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/06/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): ibmptomail@iplawpro.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SUJEET MISHRA, RUCHIR P. IHA, and LOHITASHWA THYAGARAJ Appeal2018-000470 Application 12/628,773 1 Technology Center 2400 Before JOHN A. EVANS, CATHERINE SHIANG, and SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection of claims 33-50, which constitute all of the claims pending in this application. Claims 1-32 have been cancelled. App. Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We reverse and institute a new ground of rejection under the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 1 Appellants identify IBM Corporation as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1. Appeal2018-000470 Application 12/628,773 THE INVENTION The disclosed and claimed invention is directed to a method of recalling a message. Abstract. Claim 33, reproduced below with the relevant limitations emphasized, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 33. A method, performed within and by a publish/subscribe server, comprising: identifying a plurality of durable subscribers; sending a message, from the publish/subscribe server, to the identified plurality of durable subscribers; receiving, from a publisher of the message, a message recall request identifying the message; identifying, using a communication to the plurality of durable subscribers to which the message was sent, durable subscribers that have not consumed the message; and instructing each identified durable subscriber that have not consumed the message to delete the message. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Cullen Kay US 2008/0256553 Al Oct. 16, 2008 US 2008/0317228 Al Dec. 25, 2008 REJECTION Claims 33-50 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Cullen in view of Kay. Final Act. 6-23. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection in light of Appellants' arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have 2 Appeal2018-000470 Application 12/628,773 considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellants. We are persuaded by Appellants' arguments regarding the pending claims. However, for the reasons set forth below, we enter a new ground of rejection. Section 103 Rejection Appellants argue the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Cullen and Kay teaches the identifying and instructing steps recited in claim 33. App. Br. 8-12; Reply Br. 4--8. Specifically, Appellants argue the identifying and instructing steps require two separate communications between the publish/subscribe server and the plurality of durable subscribers: As previously argued on page 8, line 22 through page 9, line 3 of the Appeal Brief, the claims require "two separate communications" that are "from the publish/subscribe server to the durable subscribers. " The Examiner asserts that "the recall request to the given set of intended recipients to be a first communication and the delete message or instruction to storage to be a second communication." However, Kay does not teach a separate "delete message or instruction to storage," as alleged by the Examiner. Reply Br. 5 (emphasis added); see also App. Br. 8-9. The Examiner finds Kay teaches the disputed limitations. Final Act. 7-8 (citing Kay i-f 11, Fig. IA); Ans. 5---6 (citing Kay i-fi-14, 11). According to the Examiner: Kay discloses (par. 0004), a request to recall a particular message is sent to given set of intended recipients and (par. 0011, fig. 1) the message is recalled at step 18 for the intended recipient ... message can be deleted from storage. The Examiner considers the recall request to the given set of 3 Appeal2018-000470 Application 12/628,773 intended recipients to be a second communication, thus two separate communications. Ans. 5---6 (emphasis added). During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation while reading claim language in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard, we interpret claim terms using "the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant's specification." In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Additionally, it is improper to read a specific order of steps into method claims unless "as a matter of logic or grammar, they must be performed in the order written" or if the specification "directly or implicitly requires such a narrow construction." Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Based on the words recited in claim 33, we agree with Appellants that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim requires separate communications for the identifying and instructing steps. The instructing step requires the publish/subscribe server "using a communication to the plurality of durable subscribers to which the message was sent" for the purpose of "identifying ... durable subscribers that have not consumed the message." See App. Br. 15 (Claims App.). That is the first communication. 4 Appeal2018-000470 Application 12/628,773 The claim further recites "instructing each identified durable subscriber that have not consumed the message to delete the message." See id. That deletion communication is a second communication. Additionally, because the instructing step requires the deletion message to be sent to the users identified in the identifying steps, logic requires that the steps be followed in sequential order. Furthermore, we agree with Appellants that Kay teaches a single communication. A recall message is sent from the server to all users. Kay i-fi-1 4, 11. That message determines if the message has been accessed by the user, and if not, the recall message instructs that the original message is to be deleted. Id. Accordingly, a single communication is used to both identify and instruct. Therefore, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner's finding that Cullen in view of Kay teaches the disputed limitation is in error because it is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Examiner's burden of proving non- patentability is by a preponderance of the evidence); see also In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967) ("The Patent Office has the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for its rejection. It may not, because it may doubt that the invention is patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in its factual basis."). Because we agree with Appellants regarding this dispositive issue, we need not consider Appellants' remaining arguments. Accordingly, we are constrained on this record to reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 33, along with the rejections of claims 39 and 5 Appeal2018-000470 Application 12/628,773 45, which recite limitations commensurate in scope to the disputed limitations discussed above, and dependent claim 34--38, 40-44, and 46-50. New Ground of Rejection Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, "[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable [a PHOSITA] to which it pertains ... to make and use the same." To satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure must reasonably convey to skilled artisans that Appellant possessed the claimed invention as of the filing date. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en bane). Specifically, the description must "clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). [T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four comers of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed. Id. "[T]he hallmark of written description is disclosure." Id. "This inquiry ... is a question of fact," which "var[ ies] depending on the context" and "requires an objective inquiry into the four comers of the specification from the perspective of a [PHO SITA]." Id. (citations omitted). Demonstrating adequate written description "requires a precise definition" of the invention. Id. at 1350. However, the claimed invention need not be recited in haec verba in the original specification in order to satisfy the written description requirement. Id. at 1352. 6 Appeal2018-000470 Application 12/628,773 Having reviewed the Specification, we cannot find any disclosure of two separate communications from the subscribe/publish server that corresponds to the communications recited in the identifying and instructing steps. Instead, similar to the prior art, the Specification describes a single communication that acts to identify those messages that have not been consumed and then instructs them to be deleted: The message cleanup agent 145 determines those durable subscribers 125 in which the message to be recalled may be queued for consumption. Specifically, the message cleanup agent 145 uses the topic id of the message recall request to query the broker 130 for the subscribers 115 that are subscribed to the topicid and the durable subscribers 125 that the message to be deleted was sent to. The message cleanup agent 145 then pops or deletes all messages matching the messageid from the identified durable subscribers. If the message has already been consumed by the subscriber instance 120, the message cannot be recalled. Spec. i-f 23; 2 see also Fig. 2 (showing a single communication between the server and the user after the publisher requests a recall). As discussed above, claim 33 recites two separate communications for the identifying and instructing steps. See App. Br. 15 (Claims App.) Similarly, claim 39 requires a hardware processor configured to perform those step and claim 45 requires computer-usable program code which causes the publish/subscribe server to perform those steps. See App. Br. 16- 18 (Claims App.). Because the Specification does not convey to a person having ordinary skill in the art the publish/subscribe server performing two separate and distinct communications for the identifying and instructing 2 Appellants identify paragraph 23 for both the identifying and instructing limitations in the summary of claimed subject matter. App. Br. 2-3 7 Appeal2018-000470 Application 12/628,773 steps, claims 33-50 and unpatentable 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1 for not complying with the written description requirement. DECISION For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner's decisions rejecting claims 33-50. We enter a new ground of rejection for claims 33-50 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph as failing to comply with the written description requirement. This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides "[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review." Section 41.50(b) also provides: When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant, within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: ( 1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart. 8 Appeal2018-000470 Application 12/628,773 (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure§ 1214.01. REVERSED 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation