Ex Parte Miller

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 30, 2017

12848279 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 30, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/848,279 08/02/2010 David Dodd Miller 2010P11056 US 5614
28524 7590 07/05/2017
SIEMENS CORPORATION
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT
3501 Quadrangle Blvd Ste 230
EXAMINER
SHEIKH, ASFAND M
Orlando, EL 32817 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3627
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/05/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdadmin.us@siemens.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAVID DODD MILLER
Appeal 2016-002698
Application 12/848,2791
Technology Center 3600
Before JASON V. MORGAN, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—8 and 10—24. Claim 9 has been
canceled. See App. Br. 11 (Claims App’x). We have jurisdiction over the
pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Siemens Industry, Inc.
App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2016-002698
Application 12/848,279
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s invention generally relates to a traffic control system.
Spec. 12. The traffic control system may include a roadside equipment
(RSE) system that can be used for detecting approaching vehicles and
controlling traffic control equipment, such as a traffic signal, based thereon.
Spec. 114, 23, 44. Claim 1, which is illustrative of the claimed invention,
reads as follows:
1. A method for traffic control, comprising:
wirelessly receiving vehicle data by a roadside equipment
(RSE) system and from an onboard equipment (OBE) system
connected to a vehicle, the vehicle data including location data,
time data, and vehicle identification data related to the vehicle;
determining a most recent location of the vehicle by the
RSE system and from the vehicle data;
comparing the most recent location of the vehicle to a
previous location of the vehicle, including making a first
determination as to whether the vehicle is within a detection
zone, making a second determination as to whether the vehicle is
on an opposite side of the detection zone as compared to the
previous location, and making a third determination as to
whether the vehicle is on a same side of the detection zone as
compared to the previous location;
producing a control signal based on the comparison,
including the first, second, and third determinations; and
determining, by the RSE system, an estimated time of
arrival of the vehicle to a base location.
Rejection
Claims 1—8 and 10—24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Hall et al. (US 5,539,398; issued
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Application 12/848,279
July 23, 1996) (“Hall”), Jones et al. (US 6,243,026 Bl; issued June 5, 2001)
(“Jones”), and Hale et al. (US 6,029,106; issued Feb. 22, 2000) (“Hale”).
Final Act. 4—10.
Issue on Appeal
Did the Examiner err by finding that the combination of Hall, Jones,
and Hale teaches or suggests
comparing the most recent location of the vehicle to a previous
location of the vehicle, including making a first determination as
to whether the vehicle is within a detection zone, making a
second determination as to whether the vehicle is on an opposite
side of the detection zone as compared to the previous location,
and making a third determination as to whether the vehicle is on
a same side of the detection zone as compared to the previous
location,
as recited in claim 1 ?
ANALYSIS
Appellant does not separately argue claims 1—8 and 10-24 but,
instead, relies on the same arguments for all the claims. App. Br. 4—8; Reply
Br. 1—5. We select claim 1 as representative. Accordingly, claims 2—8 and
10-24 stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2014).
Appellant contends the combination of Hall, Jones, and Hale fails to
teach or suggest the disputed limitations. App. Br. 4—8; Reply Br. 2—5.
Appellant argues Jones does not teach or suggest making a determination as
to whether a vehicle is within a detection zone, as required by claim 1, but,
instead, teaches a form of monitoring in which vehicle position is monitored
with respect to a point, which is not a zone. App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 2.
Appellant further argues Jones teaches determining whether a vehicle has
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Application 12/848,279
passed through an intersection, but does not teach determining specific
locations of the vehicle with respect to the detection zone (e.g., Jones’
preemption point) compared to previous locations of the vehicle. Reply
Br. 3^4 (citing Jones, Fig. 3: 12:41—61). Appellant argues “determining
whether a vehicle is at a preemption point or whether a vehicle has passed an
intersection is not determining whether the vehicle is on a same side (or an
opposite side) of the detection zone as compared to a previous location.”
App. Br. 7. With respect to the teachings of Hale, Appellant argues:
Hale may describe comparing current location data with previous
location data to determine heading of a vehicle, but even when
combined with Hall and Jones, one of ordinary skill in the art
does not arrive at Appellant’s method and system. Hale is used
to rely on comparing current location data with previous location
data of a vehicle, but Hale does also not teach or suggest
determining whether the vehicle is on an opposite side of the
detection zone as compared to the previous location, and whether
the vehicle is on a same side of the detection zone as compared
to the previous location as claimed by the Applicant.
App. Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 4—5.
We disagree with Appellant’s contentions and adopt as our own:
(1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from
which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2—10); and (2) the reasons set forth by
the Examiner in the Answer in response to the Appeal Brief (Ans. 3—4). We
highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis as
follows.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, Jones teaches monitoring a
vehicle’s position as the vehicle approaches an intersection, reaches a
preemption point, and passes through the intersection. Ans. 3 (citing Jones,
Fig. 3; 12:41—61). Jones teaches a preemptive route through the intersection
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Application 12/848,279
for activating preemption (e.g., “a detection zone”) is defined by a
termination band and includes a discretionary preemption window and a
mandatory preemption window. Jones, Fig. 4, 13:19-44. Jones teaches
when a vehicle approaching the intersection enters the discretionary
preemption window and requests preemption, the traffic signal subsystem
calculates an estimated position within the discretionary preemption window
at which switching to preemption mode should take place (i.e., the
preemption point) based on data received from the vehicle indicative of
vehicle position, speed and direction. Jones, Fig. 4; 11:60—62; 13:26—37.
Because Jones teaches calculating the preemption point when the vehicle
requesting preemption is within the discretionary preemption window (as
opposed to the vehicle requesting preemption while the vehicle is within the
mandatory preemption window (see Jones, Fig. 4; 13:38-44), we agree with
the Examiner (Ans. 3), Jones teaches or suggests “making a first
determination as to whether the vehicle is within a detection zone.”
Jones further teaches as the vehicle continues to approach the
intersection, determining whether the vehicle has reached the preemption
point and, if not, re-computing the preemption point based on the more
current position and speed data for the vehicle. Jones 12:48—53. As such,
we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 3) Jones, therefore, teaches or suggests
“making a third determination as to whether the vehicle is on a same side of
the detection zone” (e.g., a side of the detection zone beginning at the
portion of the termination band crossed as the vehicle entered the detection
zone and ending at the preemption point).
Jones further teaches when the preemption point is reached, the
vehicle position is monitored to determine when the vehicle has passed
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Application 12/848,279
through the intersection. Jones 12:54—58. We agree with the Examiner
(Ans. 3), that Jones’ teaching of determining that the preemption point has
been reached and monitoring the vehicle position to determine whether the
vehicle has passed through the intersection teaches or suggests making a
second determination as to whether the vehicle is on an opposite side of the
detection zone (e.g., a side of the detection zone beginning at the preemption
point and ending at the portion of the termination band crossed as the vehicle
travels through the intersection). Appellant argues Hale does not teach or
suggest the disputed limitations because Hale fails to teach making the
claimed first, second, and third determinations. See App. Br. 7—8. We find
this argument unpersuasive because, as discussed supra, the Examiner relied
upon Jones, not Hale, for teaching or suggesting making the claimed
determinations.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1; or claims 2—8 and 10—24, which fall with claim 1.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—8 and 10—24.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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