Ex Parte McNeill et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 11, 2012

10905633 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 11, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
________________

Ex parte MATTHEW C. MCNEILL, KYLE E. NELSON, and
RICHARD A. HORTON
________________

Appeal 2010-001440
Application 10/905,633
Technology Center 2600
________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and THU A. DANG,
Administrative Patent Judges.

DANG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 1-4 and 7-24.1 Claim 5 contains allowable subject
matter and thus claims 5 and 6 depending therefrom are not under review in
this appeal (Fin. Rej. 19). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.

A. INVENTION
According to Appellants, the present invention relates generally to
distribution centers and, more particularly, to remotely controlling docking
station doors of such facilities (Spec. 1,¶[Para 1]).

B. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
Claim 1 is exemplary and reproduced below:
1. A loading dock remote control system comprising:

a facility having at least one dock station for exchanging
materials;

a dock component configured to operate in at least two
operational states;

an actuator configured to change the operational state of the
dock component in response to an activation signal;

1 Though the Examiner’s Answer and Appellants’ Briefs indicate that claim
6 is rejected, claim 6 depends from claim 5 which contains allowable subject
matter. Thus, claim 6 also contains allowable subject matter. We consider
the indication of claim 6 as rejected to be an oversight by the parties.
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a mobile remote control configured to generate the
activation signal to cause the actuator to change the operational
state of the dock component; and

at least one predefined non-activation zone wherein
changing operational states of the dock component is inhibited
when the mobile remote control is located within the at least
one predefined non-activation zone.

C. REJECTION
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Trickle US 5,168,267 Dec. 1, 1992
Telmet US 6,181,095 B1 Jan. 30, 2001
Pierce US 2003/0024998 A1 Feb. 6, 2003
Kemink US 6,563,430 B1 May 13, 2003
Larson US 2004/0056089 A1 Mar. 25, 2004
Carter US 2005/0024183 A1 Feb.3, 2005
Reynard US 6,975,226 B2 Dec. 13, 2005

Claims 1-4, 6-8, 14, and 18-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard,
Telmet, and Kemink.2
Claims 10 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard, Telmet, Kemink,
Pierce, and Larson.
Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard, Telmet, Kemink,
Pierce, Larson, and Carter.

2 Id.
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Claims 15-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard, Telmet, Kemink, and
Larson.
Claim 24 stands rejected under 35 U.S .C. § 112, second paragraph, as
being indefinite.
Additionally, the Examiner rejects claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard, Telmet,
Kemink, and Pierce, and rejects claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard, Telmet, Kemink, and
Trickle (Ans. 12-13 and 15; Fin. Rej. 14, 16-17). As noted by the Examiner
(Ans. 2-3), Appellants present no arguments against these rejections, and as
such, Appellants have waived any argument of error regarding these
rejections. We summarily sustain these rejections.

II. ISSUE
Has the Examiner erred in concluding that the combined teachings of
Reynard, Telmet, and Kemink would have suggested “at least one
predefined non-activation zone wherein changing operational states of the
dock component is inhibited when the mobile remote control is located
within the at least one predefined non-activation zone” (claim 1)? In
particular, the issue turns on whether changing the operational states of
Kemink’s controllable items such as remotely controllable lights is inhibited
when the remote control is in a non-activation zone.

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III. FINDINGS OF FACT
Reynard
1. Reynard discloses a docking apparatus which includes a single set of
controls to operate a vehicle restraint, a dock door, a barrier device, a
dock seal, and a loading light (Abstract).

Telmet
2. Telmet discloses a power actuated door opener with a beam break
system for detecting obstructions in a door opening (Abstract).
Kemink
3. Kemink discloses a user control interface that is location dependent
(Abstract).
4. Kemink’s Figure 2 is reproduced below:
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Kemink’s Figure 2 discloses a portable control device 100a that is
carried by a user, wherein as the user enters the house 300, the location
sensor in the control device 100a detects an emission from an emitter 301
that is mounted in the entry area 310 and notifies the communicator in the
control device 100a (col. 3, ll. 15-26; Fig. 2).
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5. The information source of the control device 100a and the information
source 240 in the house 300 may communicate a list of controllable items
such as lights in the vicinity of the entry area 310 that are remotely
controllable by the control device 100a, and the communicator in the control
device 100a relays this information to the user interface of the control device
100a , wherein the user turns the lights on and off by touching the area on
the pad corresponding to the particular list in this list (col. 3, ll. 35-45).
6. Until the control device 100a is located in the entry 310, the user
interface of the control device 100a is not encumbered by the list of (col. 3,
ll. 57-60).

IV. ANALYSIS
103(a) Rejection
Claims 1, 2, 7, and 8
As to claim 1, Appellants contend that “there is no teaching or
suggestion in Kemink et al. that the control device 100 is inhibited from
controlling various components based on its presence in that determined
area” (App. Br. 6). In particular, Appellants argue that “whether control
device 100 is in entry area 310 or not in entry area 310 is only controlling on
the list of menu options displayed on interface 110” but “there is no
‘predefined non-activation zone’ where operation of the control device 100
is inhibited when the control device is located within that predefined non-
activation zone, as is called for in claim 1” (id.). That is, according to
Appellants, “the appliances are controllable regardless of whether or not the
device is displayed on a particular interface” (id.).
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Appellants then contend that “there would be no motivation to
combine the references to achieve the present invention” (App. Br. 7) and
that “the Examiner has failed to provide such a ‘rational underpining’ to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness” (App. Br. 8). According to
Appellants, “the combination of Reynard et al., Telmet, and Kemink et al.
does not provide a solution for the problems in the art addressed by claim 1”
(id.).
However, the Examiner points out that “Kemink teaches multiple
embodiments in his invention” and that in one embodiment, “when the user
is not in the entry area (310), the user interface of the control device is not
encumbered by the list of lights” (Ans. 18). Thus, the Examiner finds that,
in this embodiment of Kemink, “lights are available for control on the user
interface (110) only when the control device is in entry area (310)” but “if
the lights are not available to be activated, the remote control of the lights
are inhibited” (Ans. 18-19).
The Examiner then concludes that “[a] location dependent interface
taught by Kemink et al. is very helpful for remote control systems such as a
garage door opener [as that of Reynard in view of Telmet],” and thus “[t]he
teachings of Kemink give one of ordinary skill in the art the motivation to
use the location dependent features on a remote control [as that of Reynard
in view of Telmet] to make the remote controls easier to manage and restrict
the usage of the remote control in unwanted locations” (Ans. 19).
After review of the records before us, we agree with the Examiner. In
particular, Kemink discloses a portable control device that is location
dependent (FF 3-4), wherein the user interface of the control device is
changed to provide the particular list of controllable items within the entry
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area (FF 5). Until the control device is located in the entry area, the user
interface of the control device is not encumbered by the list of the
controllable items (FF 6). We find no error in the Examiner’s finding that in
one embodiment of Kemink, “lights are available for control on the user
interface (110) only when the control device is in entry area (310)” but “if
the lights are not available to be activated, the remote control of the lights
are inhibited” (Ans. 18-19).
We find Kemink’s entry area to comprise a predefine activation zone,
and thus, find claim 1’s “predefined non-activation zone” to read on the
areas outside of the entry area. Since the control device is not encumbered
by the list of controllable items outside of the entry area/activation zone (FF
6), we find that the control device cannot control (i.e., is inhibited from
controlling) the controllable items outside of the activation zone. That is,
Kemink’s control device cannot control, i.e., make changes to the
operational states of the controllable items when the remote control is in a
non-activation zone.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the combined teachings
of Reynard, Telmet, and Kemink would have suggested “at least one
predefined non-activation zone wherein changing operational states of the
dock component is inhibited when the mobile remote control is located
within the at least one predefined non-activation zone” as required by claim
1.
Although Appellants contend that “there would be no motivation to
combine the references to achieve the present invention” (App. Br. 7) , we
find no error in the Examiner’s conclusion that “[a] location dependent
interface taught by Kemink et al. is very helpful for remote control systems
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such as a garage door opener [as that of Reynard in view of Telmet],” and
thus “[t]he teachings of Kemink give one of ordinary skill in the art the
motivation to use the location dependent features on a remote control [as
that of Reynard in view of Telmet] to make the remote controls easier to
manage and restrict the usage of the remote control in unwanted locations”
(Ans. 19).
That is, though Appellants contend that “the contradictory teachings
of the references themselves refute any reason(s) asserted by the Examiner”
(App. Br. 8), Appellants appear to have viewed the references from a
different perspective than the Examiner. The issue here is not whether the
ordinarily skilled artisan would have added Kemink’s system with
Reynard’s and Telmet’s system but whether the artisan, upon reading
Kemink, would find it obvious to use a location dependent remote control as
the remote control of the combined teachings of Reynard and Telmet. The
Supreme Court has determined that the conclusion of obviousness can be
based on the interrelated teachings of multiple patents, the effects of
demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace, and
the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in
the art. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
Here, Reynard discloses controlling the operation of a vehicle
restraint, a dock door, a barrier device, a dock seal, and a loading light (FF1)
and Telmet discloses controlling a door opener with a beam break system for
detecting obstruction in a door opening (FF 2). All the references are
directed to the same field of endeavor of providing a remote control of
controllable items. We conclude that such application of a location
dependent remote control as the remote control of the combined teachings of
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Reynard and Telmet is no more than a simple arrangement of old elements
with each performing the same function it had been known to perform,
yielding no more than one would expect from such an arrangement. KSR,
550 U.S. at 416. The skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle” since the skilled artisan is
“a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” Id. at 420-21. As stated
by the Supreme Court, an obviousness “analysis need not seek out precise
teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for
a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418. See also Dystar
Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d
1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S .C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard,
Telmet, and Kemink. Since Appellants do not provide any argument for
claims 2, 7, and 8 depending from claim 1, claims 2, 7, and 8 also fall with
claim 1.
Claims 14, 18, 19, and 21-24
As to independent claims 14, 19, and dependent claim 24 depending
from claim 2, Appellants repeat that Kemink et al. discloses that the control
device 100 is configured to turn on/off (i.e., actuate) all appliances in house
300, “regardless of the specific room location 310, 350, etc. where control
device 100 is located” (App. Br. 8, 9, and 11). However, as discussed above
with respect to claim 1 which recites similar limitations, we see no error in
the Examiner’s finding that “Kemink teaches multiple embodiments in his
invention” and that in one embodiment, “lights are available for control on
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the user interface (110) only when the control device is in entry area (310)”
but “if the lights are not available to be activated, the remote control of the
lights are inhibited” (Ans. 18-19).
Accordingly, we also affirm the rejection of claims 14, 19, and 24
under 35 U.S .C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined
teachings of Reynard, Telmet, and Kemink. Since Appellants do not
provide any argument for claims 18 and 21-23 depending from claims 14
and 19, respectively, claims 18 and 21-23 also fall with claims 14 and 19.
Claim 3
Appellants contend that “[c]laim 3 calls for an activation zone that
comprises a hot spot located within the non-activation zone” but “Kemink et
al. still does not teach or suggest a hot spot separate from an activation zone”
(App. Br. 9). However, the Examiner finds that “the hot spot in the claim [is
interpreted] to mean an activation zone surrounded by non-activation zones”
and thus Kemink discloses “an activation zone (via entry area 310)
comprising a hot spot (area 310) located within the non-activation zone”
since “entry area 310 is the only area to control lights in the particular
example, which make all the other areas non-activation zones” (Ans. 21).
We agree with the Examiner.
In particular, as discussed above, we find Kemink’s entry area (FF 4)
to comprise a predefine activation zone, and thus, find claim 1’s “predefined
non-activation zone” to read on the areas outside of the entry area. Thus, we
see no error in the Examiner’s finding that Kemink’s entry area comprises a
“hot spot” surrounded by non-activation zones.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S .C.
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§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard,
Telmet, and Kemink.
Claim 4
Appellants contend that “[c]laim 4 calls for the activation zone to
extend about a periphery of the at least one docking station” whereas “entry
area 310 [of Kemink] clearly does not extend about a periphery of any area
in the house 300” (App. Br. 10). However, the Examiner finds that “the
periphery of a remotely controlled device [is interpreted] to mean an area
just outside the remotely control device” and thus Kemink discloses “an
activation zone (via entry area 310) extending about a periphery of a
structure (via entrance of house 300)” (Ans. 21-22). We agree with the
Examiner.
In particular, claim 4 does not provide any definition as to what a
“periphery” is to mean, include or represent other than the activation zone
extend about the periphery of a structure such as a docking station. We thus
give the term periphery its broadest but most reasonable definition as any
area of a structure whereabout the activation zone extends. Accordingly, we
see no error in the Examiner’s finding that Kemink discloses “an activation
zone (via entry area 310) extending about a periphery of a structure (via
entrance of house 300)” (Ans. 21-22).
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S .C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard,
Telmet, and Kemink.
Claim 20
Appellants contend that “[c]laim 20 calls for the at least one non-
activation zone to encompass a given proximity to a given dock to restrict
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actuation” whereas Kemink “teaches that operation of appliances 210 is
allowed when the controller is within the given proximity” (App. Br. 11).
However, claim 20 does not provide any definition as to what “a given
proximity” is to mean, include or represent other than that the non-activation
zone encompasses such given proximity to a given controllable item such as
a dock. Thus, we give “given proximity” its broadest but reasonable
interpretation as to a particular distance close to a controllable item that is
encompassed by the non-activation zone, as defined by the claim.
As discussed above, we find “predefined non-activation zone” to read
on the areas outside of the entry area of Kemink. As shown in Kemink,
there are areas outside of the entry way that is of a particular distance from
controllable items such as appliances 210 (FF 4). That is, there are areas
that are of a “given proximity” to the appliances 210 that are not in the entry
area (id.). Thus, we see no error in the Examiner’s conclusion that Reynard,
Telmet, and Kemink would at least have suggested at least one non-
activation zone that encompasses a given proximity to a given dock, as
required by claim 20.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard,
Telmet, and Kemink.
Claims 10-12
As to claims 10-12, Appellants contend that “the Examiner merely
used improper hindsight reconstruction” (App. Br. 12). While we are fully
aware that hindsight bias often plagues determinations of obviousness,
Graham v. John Deere Co.of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966), we are
also mindful that the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the “combination
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of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious
when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 401.
This reasoning is applicable here. We agree with the Examiner that
the number of references applied is insignificant (Ans. 24). As the Examiner
concludes, the cited references “are prior art elements combined to yield
predictable results” (id.). Thus, we find unavailing Appellants’ contention
that the Examiner has relied on impermissible hindsight reconstruction.
That is, given the breadth of Appellants’ claims, we are not persuaded that
combining the respective familiar elements of the cited references in the
manner proffered by the Examiner was “uniquely challenging or difficult for
one of ordinary skill in the art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
Therefore, we find the Examiner’s proffered combination of familiar prior
art elements according to their established functions would have conveyed a
reasonable expectation of success to a person of ordinary skill having
common sense at the time of the invention.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claims 10 and 11 under 35
U.S .C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of
Reynard, Telmet, Kemink, Pierce, and Larson and of claim 12 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of
Reynard, Telmet, Kemink, Pierce, Larson, and Carter.
Claims 15-17
As to claims 15-17, though Appellants argue that “[n]owhere in
Larson et al., however, is the step of logging in to a mobile remote control
with at least one of a login, a password, and a pass-card taught or suggested”
(App. Br 14), Appellants appear to be arguing that Larson individually does
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not anticipate the claimed invention. However, the Examiner rejects the
claims as obvious over the combined teachings of the references. The test
for obviousness is not what each reference shows but what the combined
teachings would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We find no error in the
Examiner’s finding that “Larson teaches . . . allowing only specified
individuals to access particular areas using their security card” wherein
“[w]hen a person is presenting the security card to access a particular area, it
is equivalent to logging in using a pass-card” (Ans. 24). That is, we agree
with the Examiner that such combined teachings would at the least suggest
loggin in “using a pass-card” as required by claims 15-17.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claims 15-17 under 35 U.S .C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Reynard,
Telmet, Kemink, and Larson.
112, 2nd Paragraph Rejection
The Examiner finds that “visual verification” as recited in claim 24
“renders the claim indefinite” (Ans. 4). In particular, the Examiner finds
that “it is unclear what action or object is being verified visually” (id.). We
agree with the Examiner.
Though Appellants contend that “claim 24 sets forth that, in order for
the mobile remote control to generate the activation signal to cause the
actuator to change the operational state of the dock component, the mobile
remote control must be within an activation zone that is within a distance of
the dock station that allows for visual verification” (App. Br. 4), we find no
such language in claim 24. That is, claim 24 merely requires that “the
activation zone is within a distance of the dock station that allows for visual
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verification.” Thus, we agree with the Examiner that it is unclear what is
able to be visually verified in claim 24.
We are unpersuaded that the Examiner erred in concluding that claim
24 is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2nd paragraph.

V. DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-4 and 7-24 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) and rejecting claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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