Ex Parte McGowan et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 30, 201311303990 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/303,990 12/19/2005 Neil McGowan 7000-670 7558 27820 7590 12/30/2013 WITHROW & TERRANOVA, P.L.L.C. 100 REGENCY FOREST DRIVE SUITE 160 CARY, NC 27518 EXAMINER UDDIN, MOHAMMED R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2167 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/30/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte NEIL McGOWAN, BRADLEY JOHN MORRIS, and EDWARD KEN KIU MAH ____________________ Appeal 2011-004589 Application 11/303,990 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, DAVID M. KOHUT, and MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judges. DESHPANDE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-004589 Application 11/303,990 2 STATEMENT OF CASE1 Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of a final rejection of claims 1-22, the only claims pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Appellants invented compression of complex signals within telecommunications. Specification ¶ 0001. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below: 1. A method of bit conversion and transmission of a digital complex signal over a physical medium, said method comprising: receiving a digital complex signal; compressing said digital complex signal into a series of bits by sharing a common exponent across real and imaginary components of said complex signal; transmitting said series of bits across a physical medium; and expanding said series of bits to reconstitute said digital complex signal by again sharing said common exponent across said real and imaginary components of said complex signal. REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following prior art: Lindh Wegener US 7,212,583 B2 US 7,394,410 B1 May 1, 2007 Jul. 1, 2008 Onggosanusi US 2003/0063654 A1 Apr. 3, 2003 1 Our decision will make reference to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed Mar. 3, 2010), the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Sep. 16, 2010), and Final Rejection (“Final Rej.,” mailed Mar. 5, 2009). Appeal 2011-004589 Application 11/303,990 3 REJECTIONS Claims 9-22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed towards non-statutory subject matter. Claims 1-3, 5, 9, 10, 15, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Wegener. Claims 4, 6, 11, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wegener and Lindh. Claims 12, 13, 17, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wegener and Onggosanusi. Claims 7, 8, 14, 18, 20, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wegener, Onggosanusi, and Lindh. ISSUES The issue of whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 9-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed towards non-statutory subject matter turns on whether claims 9-22 recite an abstract idea. The issue of whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-22 as being anticipated by or unpatentable over the cited prior art turns on whether Wegener describes the limitations of claim 1. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ contentions that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from Appeal 2011-004589 Application 11/303,990 4 which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following arguments for emphasis. Claims 9-22 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 as being directed towards non- statutory subject matter The Examiner found that claims 9, 15, and 19 are directed towards a compression module and claims 12, 17, and 21 are directed towards an expansion module, and therefore the claims are nothing more than software per se. Ans. 28. Appellants contend that the claims (1) recite an apparatus that transmits a signal over a physical medium and therefore is tied to a particular machine to satisfy the machine prong of the machine-or- transformation threshold test and (2) the claims transform a signal into bits and therefore satisfy the transformation prong of the machine-or- transformation threshold test. App. Br. 5-6. We disagree with Appellants. As found by the Examiner, claims 9, 12, 15, 17, 19, and 21 are directed to either a compression or expansion module. The Specification illustrates that a module “may be an encoder/decoder device that implements the present invention in terms of software.” Specification ¶ 0018. While the claims include a recitation of an “apparatus” and a “physical medium” in the preamble, the claims fail to recite any structure such that the apparatus is anything more than a general purpose machine. As such, we do not agree with Appellants that these claims are tied to a particular machine. Additionally, Appellants fail to provide sufficient rationale or evidence to illustrate how the compression of a signal into bits is a transformation. Furthermore, we find that the claims Appeal 2011-004589 Application 11/303,990 5 are directed towards an abstract idea. As such, we do not agree with Appellants that claims 9-22 satisfy the machine-or-transformation test2 and, in the absence of sufficient evidence or argument in support of their contention that the claims are directed to statutory subject matter, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9-22 as being directed towards non- statutory subject matter. Claims 1-3, 5, 9, 10, 15, and 19 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by Wegener Appellants contend that Wegener fails to describe “compressing a digital complex signal,” as per claim 1. App. Br. 12-13. Appellants specifically argue that Wegener fails to describe both that the signal is complex and the signal is compressed. Id. We disagree with Appellants. As found by the Examiner, Wegener clearly describes that a sample signal is compressed and a complex-to-real transformation logic transforms the complex sample signal. Ans. 30 (citing Wegener col. 65, ll. 55-65; col.41, ll. 55-60). As such, Wegener describes that the sample signal is complex and is compressed. Appellants do not rebut these findings by the Examiner. Accordingly, we do not find Appellants’ argument to be persuasive. Appellants further contend that Wegener fails to describe “sharing a common exponent across real and imaginary components of said complex signals,” as per claim 1. App. Br. 13. We disagree with Appellants. As 2 While the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), ruled that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for determining whether a claimed method is a statutory process, it nonetheless indicated that the machine-or-transformation test is a useful tool for making the determination. Appeal 2011-004589 Application 11/303,990 6 found by the Examiner, Wegener describes that “[a]n analytic signal generation logic 212 converts the sampled input single 104 into a real part of analytic signal 214 and an imaginary part of analytic signal” 216. Ans. 31 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wegener col. 40, ll. 65-67). The Examiner further found Wegener describes that “each compressed sample is represented by a mantissa and an exponent that is shared or dedicated.” Ans. 31 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wegener col. 66, ll. 16-22). Since each complex signal consists of a real part and an imaginary part and is further represented by a shared exponent, it follows that the real and imaginary parts of each signal share an exponent. While Appellants interpret Wegener’s teachings differently, Appellants do not demonstrate error in the Examiner’s application of Wegener’s teachings to disclose the claimed limitations. Appellants also contend that Wegener fails to teach “expanding said series of bits to reconstitute the digital complex signal by again sharing the common exponent across real and imaginary components of said complex signal,” as per claim 1. App. Br. 14. Appellants argue that Wegener fails to specifically disclose “again sharing said common exponent across said real and imaginary components of said complex signal.” App. Br. 14. We are, however, not persuaded by this argument for the same reasons discussed above. Appellants additionally contend that Wegener fails to describe the limitations of claims 2, 3, and 5. App. Br. 15-18. However, we disagree with Appellants’ conclusions and accordingly adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as our own. Ans. 5-7. Appeal 2011-004589 Application 11/303,990 7 Appellants further contend that Wegener fails to describe the limitations of claims 9, 15, and 19. App. Br. 18-19. However, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ assertions. Appellants restate the limitations of claims 9, 15, and 19 and generally allege that Wegener fails to describe the limitations of these claims. Id. Accordingly, we do not find Appellants’ statements to be arguments in support of patentability. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”); In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”). Claims 4, 6, 11, and 16 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Wegener and Lindh Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 4, 6, 11, and 16 for the same reasons asserted in support of claims 1-3. App. Br. 19. We disagree with Appellants. Appellants’ arguments in support of claims 1- 3 were not found to be persuasive above and are not persuasive here for the same reasons. Claims 12, 13, 17, and 21 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Wegener and Onggosanusi Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 12, 13, 17, and 21 for the same reasons asserted in support of claims 1 and 2. App. Appeal 2011-004589 Application 11/303,990 8 Br. 19-21. We disagree with Appellants. Appellants’ arguments in support of claims 1 and 2 were not found to be persuasive above and are not persuasive here for the same reasons. Claims 7, 8, 14, 18, 20, and 22 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Wegener, Onggosanusi, and Lindh Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 7, 8, 14, 18, 20, and 22 for the same reasons asserted in support of claims 1 and 5. App. Br. 21-22. We disagree with Appellants. Appellants’ arguments in support of claims 1 and 5 were not found to be persuasive above and are not persuasive here for the same reasons. CONCLUSIONS The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-22. DECISION To summarize, our decision is as follows. The rejection of claims 9-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed towards non-statutory subject matter is sustained. The rejection of claims 1-22 as anticipated by or obvious and therefore unpatentable over the cited prior art is sustained. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010). Appeal 2011-004589 Application 11/303,990 9 AFFIRMED msc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation