Ex Parte Maybee et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 18, 2018

12136053 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 18, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/136,053 06/10/2008
69316 7590 07/20/2018
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Paul Maybee
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
323794.01 4875
EXAMINER
BODDEN, EVRAL E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2197
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/20/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usdocket@microsoft.com
chriochs@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PAUL MAYBEE, JOHAN MARIEN, BRIAN
CRAWFORD, and JOHN CUNNINGHAM
Appeal2017-004896
Application 12/136,053
Technology Center 2100
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, DENISE POTHIER, and JASON J. CHUNG,
Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
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Application 12/136,053
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of
claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A method which may be used to help application developers
and other software developers configure a debugger for debugging
software that was written using a particular programming model, the
method comprising the steps of:
providing a debugger that is architected to be extended by a
debugger extension which includes debugger viewing routines that are
specific to the particular programming model, the debugger
extensions- providing functionality for viewing state information of a
debuggee program while using the debugger, the particular
programming model being one of multiple programming models,
including programming models applicable with multiple programming
languages which are not necessarily the same programming
languages for each of the programming models, the particular
programming models being within at least one of the following
categories:
coroutine programming models, multicore programming
models, parallel programming models, game development
programming models, custom hardware programming models,
GUI programming models, presentation programming models,
event-driven programming models, messaging framework
programming models, wide area network programming models,
web application programming models, rich internet application
programming models, handheld device programming models,
cell phone programming models, database programming
models, managed execution environment programming models,
1 Appellants indicated that Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC is the real
party in interest. (App. Br. 1 ).
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native code programming models, script programming models;
configuring the debugger to recognize a debugger environment trigger
event, thereby allowing automatic loading of the debugger extension
for use with the debugger in response to occurrence of the trigger
event in the debugger's execution environment.
App. Br. 34 (Claims Appendix) (formatting altered for clarity).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Camey et al.
(hereinafter "Camey")
Romer et al.
(hereinafter "Romer")
Bogle et al.
(hereinafter "Bogle")
Lindsey et al.
Alpern et al.
(hereinafter "Alpern")
us 5,774,729
us 5,953,534
US 6,353,923 Bl
US 6,671,875 Bl
US 7,107,578 Bl
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
June 30, 1998
Sept. 14, 1999
Mar. 5, 2002
Dec. 30, 2003
Sept. 12, 2006
Claims 1, 2 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Bogle. (Final Act. 6-15).
Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Bogle in view of Camey. (Final Act. 15-17).
Claims 5-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Bogle in view of Lindsey. (Final Act. 17-26).
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Claims 14--16 and 18-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bogle in view of Lindsey in view of Camey. (Final
Act. 27--42).
Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bogle in view of Lindsey in view of Camey in view of
Romer. (Final Act. 42--43).
Claims 12 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bogle in view of Lindsey in view of Alpern. (Final Act.
43--46).
ANALYSIS
With respect to independent claim 1, the Examiner relies on the single
reference of Bogle for the general teachings of a "debugger that is
architected to be extended by a debugger extension which includes viewing
routines that are specific to a particular programming model" as recited.
(Final Act. 7-8). Further, the Examiner relies on Bogle to teach the
particular programming model being one of multiple programming models
and the particular programming model being within an identified category,
as recited in the claim. (Final Act. 9-10). In addition, the Examiner relies
on Bogle alone to show an automatic loading of the debugger extension for
use with the debugger in response to occurrence of the trigger event in the
debugger's execution environment. (Final Act. 12).
In the prosecution history, Appellants contend the Examiner has
"ignored relevant evidence and arguments that were properly submitted for
consideration." (App. Br. 10-12). Appellants stated in the June 18, 2015
response, Applicant submitted Evidentiary Declarations of Paul Maybee and
Brian Crawford, and the Declarations were not considered properly by the
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Examiner. Appellants contend that Bogle is concerned with programming
languages, not programming models. (App. Br. 13-15). See also
Declaration Under Rule 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 ("Maybee Deel.") ,r,r 10-12 and
25; see also Declaration Under Rule 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 ("Crawford Deel.")
,r,r 10-12 and 22-23 ( explaining that programming languages and
programming models are not the same thing and that Bogle refers to
programming languages not to programming models). Appellants further
contend Bogle does not teach any one of the listed program model
categories, as recited in claim 1. (App. Br. 15-17; see also Maybee Deel.
,r 26; see also Crawford Deel. ,r 27 ( explaining that Bogle does not mention
programming model categories at all)).
Appellants further contend Bogle does not teach the claimed
"debugger extension which includes debugger viewing routines that are
specific to the particular programming model, the debugger extensions
providing functionality for viewing state information of a debuggee program
while using the debugger" because Appellants argue Bogle does not teach
one or more programming models and program model categories as recited.
(App. Br. 19; see also Maybee Deel. ,r 27-28; see also Crawford Deel. ,r 28-
29 ( explaining that Bogle does not show an algorithm or mechanism to
identify which debugger extension is appropriate for use with a given
programming model)).
We are persuaded by Appellants that the Examiner failed to explain
specifically why the evidence provided in the declarations was insufficient.
(App. Br. 10-12 and 13-15). We find the Examiner has failed to consider
adequately the testimony of Maybee and Crawford related to how a typical
debugger (Bogle col. 10, 11. 56-65) as shown in Bogle with a single inherent
programming model (Bogle col. 1, 11. 55---60) is different from the claimed
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debugger that is architected to be extended by a debugger extension that is
specific to a particular programming model and where the particular model
being one of multiple programming models, as claimed.
The Examiner has not responded to or rebutted the evidence submitted
in the Maybee and Crawford Declarations. (See App. Br. 12).
Appellants also contend Bogle does not teach configuring the
debugger to recognize a debugger environment trigger event, thereby
allowing automatic loading of the debugger extension for use with the
debugger in response to occurrence of the trigger event in the debugger's
execution environment as recited in claim 1 because Bogle does not teach
events that trigger the loading of a debugger extension (App. Br. 22; see also
Maybee Deel. ,r 29; see also Crawford Deel. ,r 30 (explaining that Bogle
does not teach a trigger event to load programming model specific debugger
extensions)).
We agree with Appellants that the Examiner has also failed to
consider the configuring of the debugger to recognize an event thereby
automatically extending the capabilities of the debugger to assist in the
debugging software written in the extension's supported programming
model. (App. Br. 21-22; see Maybee Deel. ,r 18). Moreover, we are also
persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner has failed to consider
that Bogle does not provide information that would be needed to extend a
debugger in ways specific to the particular programming model. See
Maybee Deel. ,r 28; see Crawford Deel. ,r 29. We note that the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP)2 §§ 716 and 716.0l(B) set forth the
proper handling of declarations by the Examiner. The Examiner did not
2 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, Ninth Edition, March 2014, Rev.
January 2018 [R-08.2017]
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appear to provide, in the next succeeding action or in the Examiner's
Answer, a discussion as to why the evidence submitted in the declarations
was insufficient, as set forth in the MPEP. Therefore, for the foregoing
reasons, we find the Examiner erred in concluding that Bogle alone renders
obvious the subject matter of independent claim 1, as well as those claims
that depend therefrom.
Moreover, we find the Examiner's articulated reasoning for modifying
the language of Bogle lacks a rational underpinning. (Final Act. 8; see In re
Kahn, 441 F .3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR Int 'l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007) "[R]ejections on obviousness
grounds ... [require] some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness."). That is, the
Examiner has not provided a clear articulation of the reason why the claimed
invention would have been obvious because the Examiner has not articulated
the differences in the claim over the reference and how the proposed
modification of the applied reference is necessary to arrive at the claimed
invention. See Ex parte Clapp, 227 USPQ 972, 973 (BP AI 1985). As a
result, we do not sustain the Examiner's decision in rejecting independent
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Additionally, we note that in contrast with the Examiner's assertion
that Bogle suggests a logical interface "spanning multiple separate
programming models which are based on different technologies" (Final Act,
4 ), Bogle appears to suggest otherwise.
For example, Bogle states that the COM program model establishes a
common paradigm for interactions and requests among different applications
regardless of the programming languages or components involved. (Bogle
col. 1, 11. 55---60). Bogle discloses in Figure 2 "a standard object interface
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example 200 in block diagram form." (Bogle col. 7, 11. 60-62, Fig. 2). Bogle
shows the object interfaces 214--218, 234--238 and 252-254, as standard
COM interfaces that each expose at least one method. (Bogle col. 8, 11. 1-25,
Fig. 2). Bogle states that "key to each of the above referenced interface calls
is that they are calls to common interfaces that are made in a common
manner from any application or process." (Bogle col. 8, 11. 22-24). Bogle
further discloses "the script 304 runs and language engine 301 references
standard COM binding mechanisms" and "debugging environment 400
functions equally well with any COM designed active scripting run-time
environment." (Bogle, col. 9, 11. 65-67, col. 10, 11. 1--4, col. 13, 11. 35--40;
Fig. 6). Therefore, the evidence in Bogle suggests the reliance on a COM
program model, rather than multiple models, so to allow for common
communications between standard interfaces and scripts using the same
COM program model.
Claims 2 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Bogle and claim 3 stands rejected over the combination of
Bogle in view of Camey. (Final Act. 6-12 and 15-17). The rejection of
these claims rely on the Examiner's erroneous conclusion that Bogle renders
obvious the subject matter of claim 1, from which claims 2--4 depend. Id.
The Examiner does not explain how Camey cures this underlying deficiency
with respect to independent claim 1. Accordingly, we do not sustain the
Examiner's rejection of claims 2--4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Bogle and Bogle in view of Camey.
The rejections of claims 5-13 rely on the same Examiner's erroneous
conclusion that Bogle renders obvious similar subject matter as in claim 1,
let alone disclosing a second debugger extension and a second programming
model. (App. Br. 25-28). The Examiner does not explain how Lindsey or
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Alpern cures the underlying deficiency in Bogle with respect to independent
claims 1 or 5. Accordingly, we also do not sustain the Examiner's rejection
of claims 5-11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Bogle in view
of Lindsey and claims 12 and 13 over Bogle in view of Lindsey in view of
Alpern.
The rejections of claims 14--20 rely on the same erroneous conclusion
by the Examiner that Bogle renders obvious similar subject matter as in
claim 1, let alone an automatic loading of an extension including debugger
viewing routines that are specific to a particular programming model and
automatic determination that a trigger event has occurred. (App. Br. 28-29).
The Examiner does not explain how Lindsey, Camey, or Romer cures the
underlying deficiency in Bogle. Accordingly, we also do not sustain the
Examiner's rejection of claims 14--20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Bogle in view of Lindsey in view of Camey or Bogle in
view of Lindsey in view of Camey in view of Romer.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we reverse the decision by the Examiner
rejecting claims 1-20 based upon obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
REVERSED
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