Ex Parte Maurischat et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 30, 2014

12399332 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 30, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte CHRISTIAN MAURISCHAT and ROBERT PRADEL
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Appeal 2012-007561
Application 12/399,3321
Technology Center 3600
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Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, MICHAEL W. KIM, and
SCOTT C. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

MOORE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final rejection of claims 1-7.2 We have
jurisdiction to review this dispute under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 and 6.
The claimed invention relates to a suspension with adjustable
damping force for a vehicle having a front axle, a rear axle, and a

1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is ZF Frierichshafen AG.

2 Our decision will make reference to the Examiner’s Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed Apr. 14, 2011), Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,”
filed Oct. 28, 2011), the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Dec. 6, 2011),
and Appellants’ Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Feb. 6, 2012).
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longitudinal axis separating the vibration dampers on each axle. (Spec. ¶ 1.)
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter.
1. Suspension for a motor vehicle having
a front axle, a rear axle, a longitudinal axis, and a
transverse axis, the suspension comprising at least
two vibration dampers separated by the
longitudinal axis on each axle, each vibration
damper having a damping force, the sum of the
damping forces being adjustable, at least one of the
vibration dampers being nonadjustable.

Claims 1-6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious
and unpatentable over Borschert (U.S. Patent No. 5,721,681) in view of
Suchta (U.S. Patent No. 7,275,750 B2).
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious
and unpatentable over Borschert in view of Suchta, and further in view of
Colarelli (U.S. Patent No. 6,178,358 B1).
We REVERSE.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
During examination of a patent application, a pending claim is given
its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the Specification, and
claim language is read “in light of the specification as it would be interpreted
by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr.,
367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quotation and citations omitted).
Judges are free to consult technical resources and dictionaries in order to
better understand the relevant technology, and may also rely on dictionary
definitions to construe claim terms so long as those definitions do not
contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent
Appeal 2012-007561
Application 12/399,332

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documents. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n. 6
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
Vibration Damper
The Examiner asserts that the “droplink” component of Suchta
corresponds to the “at least one of the vibration dampers being
nonadjustable,” as recited in each of independent claims 1 and 4. (Final Act.
3, citing Suchta, col. 3, ll. 35-45.) Appellants respond by arguing that the
claim term “vibration damper” refers to a shock absorber, and does not
encompass a fixed attachment element such as a droplink. (App. Br. 4-5.)
A proper construction of a claim term begins with its plain and
ordinary meaning. The term “vibration damper” is understood in the art to
refer to a device, such as a shock absorber, that is designed to reduce
vibration.3 This ordinary meaning is consistent with the usage of this term
in Appellants’ Specification.4
The Examiner offers no evidence in support of a broader construction.
In fact, the Examiner now additionally argues that the “at least one of the
vibration dampers being nonadjustable” limitation is met by a different
component disclosed elsewhere in the Suchta reference. See infra.

3 See, e.g., “Damper,” The Penguin English Dictionary (2007), available at
http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/penguineng/damper/0 (last
visited on July 29, 2014.) (“a device, e.g. a shock absorber, designed to
reduce vibration or bring a mechanism to rest with minimum oscillation.”)
4 See, e.g., Spec. 7, ¶ 17 (“Vibration dampers . . . which damp [i.e., reduce] a
suspension movement of each wheel . . . .”)
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We construe “vibration damper” as “a device, such as a shock
absorber, that is designed to reduce vibration.” We acknowledge that, in one
sense, any element is capable of reducing some vibration, and thus that a
fixed attachment element, such as a droplink, could be considered a
“vibration damper.” However, based on the above, we are not persuaded
that one of ordinary skill would have considered a fixed attachment element,
such as a droplink, as being designed to reduce vibration. Thus, we
determine that the “at least one of the vibration dampers being
nonadjustable” limitation does not encompass fixed attachment elements,
such as the droplink of Suchta.
Whether Claim 1 requires four vibration dampers
The Examiner also disputes Appellants’ position that claim 1 requires
four vibration dampers. (Ans. 11-12.)
Claim 1 is directed to a suspension having “a front axle,” “a rear
axle,” and “at least two vibration dampers separated by the longitudinal axis
on each axle.” Any system with fewer than four vibration dampers would
not include “two vibration dampers separated by the longitudinal axis” on
each of the two axles. We, therefore, agree with Appellants that claim 1
requires at least four vibration dampers.

ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claims 1-6 as Obvious over Borschert and Suchta
Rejection of Claim 7 as Obvious over Borschert, Suchta, and Colarelli
The Examiner argues that the droplink of Suchta corresponds to the
“at least one of the vibration dampers being nonadjustable” element of
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claims 1-7. (Final Act. 3, citing Suchta, col. 3, ll. 35-45.) We determine
supra that the droplink of Suchta does not meet a broadest reasonable
construction of the nonadjustable “vibration damper” element recited in
independent claims 1 and 4.
Alternatively, the Examiner argues that the “MR actuator” of Suchta
corresponds to the recited “at least one of the vibration dampers being
nonadjustable.” (Ans. 11-12, citing Suchta col. 6, ll. 24-26.) But the MR
actuator has two states: a powered state, and an unpowered state. In the
powered state, the MR actuator exerts a maximum holding force of about 2
to 6 kN (kilonewtons) under very low velocity. (Suchta col. 6, ll. 24-30.) In
the unpowered state, the MR actuator exerts a low damping force of about
20-600 N (newtons) at a higher velocity. (Id.) Thus, even if the MR
actuator could be considered a “vibration damper,” it would be a switchable
(i.e., adjustable) vibration damper, and thus would not correspond properly
to the “at least one of the vibration dampers being nonadjustable” recited in
independent claims 1 and 4. The Examiner does not cite either Borschert or
Colarelli for remedying this deficiency.
We do not sustain the rejection of independent claims 1 and 4, or their
respective dependent claims.

DECISION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Examiner to
reject claims 1-7.

REVERSED

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