Ex Parte Mauri et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 8, 2019

14389168 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/389,168 09/29/2014
466 7590
YOUNG & THOMPSON
209 Madison Street
Suite 500
Alexandria, VA 22314
02/12/2019
UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Alessandro Maria Mauri
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2512-1368 3851
EXAMINER
MCCROSKY, DAVID J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3791
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/12/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
DocketingDept@young-thompson.com
yandtpair@firs ttofile. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ALESSANDRO MARIA MAURI,
FLAVIO MUTTI, and PAOLO BELLUC0 1
Appeal 2017-011577
Application 14/389,168
Technology Center 3700
Before DONALD A. ADAMS, RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, and
RYAN H. FLAX, Administrative Patent Judges.
FLAX, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involving claims directed
to a system for the acquisition and analysis of an individual's muscle
activity. Claims 1-15 are on appeal as rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
and second paragraphs, and§ 103. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify the Real Party in Interest as "BlONIX S.R.L." Appeal
Br. 3. Herein we reference the (substitute) Specification of Sept. 20, 2016
("Spec."); Final Office Action ofNov. 14, 2016 ("Final Action"); Appeal
Brief of Mar. 29, 2017 ("Appeal Br."); Examiner's Answer of July 20, 2017
("Answer"); and Reply Brief of Sept. 20, 2017 ("Reply Br.").
Appeal2017-011577
Application 14/3 89,168
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Independent claim 1 is representative and is reproduced below:
1. A system for the acquisition and analysis of an
individual's muscle activity, the system comprising:
an electromyographic acquisition section configured to
acquire through one or more first sensors first electric signals of
an individual's muscle group, and a video acquisition section
configured to acquire through one or more second sensors second
digital video signals of at least said muscle group;
a computer processor; said computer processor
compnsmg
a communication interface with said
electromyographic acquisition section and said video
acquisition section,
a database of deductive rules related to one or more
of a specific field of activity and a specific type of
application, and
an analysis and processing device configured to
correlate said first and second signals of the muscle group
from said electromyographic acquisition section and said
video acquisition section applying said deductive rules
related to one or more of the specific field of activity and
the specific type of application provided in said database;
at least one detection sensor of the individual's skin
impedance configured to determine an impedance value to be
used as a correction parameter of a gain of the first sensors of the
electromyographic acquisition section; and
a user interface through which to supply an output
processed by said computer processor.
Appeal Br. 22-23 (Claims Appendix).
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The following rejections are appealed:
Claims 1-15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as
failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Action 2.
Claims 1-15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph,
as indefinite. Id. at 4; see also id. at 5---6 (interpreting claim language under
35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, as means-plus-function limitations).
Claims 1, 4--12, and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) over
Gracovetsky, 2 Ahsan, 3 and Bums. 4 Final Action 6.
Claims 2, 3, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) over
Gracovetsky, Ahsan, Bums, and Lutz. 5 Id. at 10.
Claim13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) over Gracovetsky,
Ahsan, Bums, and Sol. 6 Id. at 11-12.
DISCUSSION
"[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or
on any other ground, of presenting aprimafacie case ofunpatentability. If
that burden is met, the burden of coming forward with evidence or argument
shifts to the applicant." In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Arguments made by Appellants in the Appeal Brief and properly presented
in the Reply Brief have been considered in this Decision; arguments not so-
presented in the Briefs are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) (2015);
see also Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010)
2 US 4,971,069 (issued Nov. 20, 1990) ("Gracovetsky").
3 Rezwanul Ahsan et al., EMG Signal Classification for Human Computer
Interaction a Review, 33(3) EURO. J. SCI. RES. 480--501 (2009) ("Ahsan").
4 US 2011/0251817 Al (published Oct. 13, 2011) ("Bums").
5 US 6,366,805 Bl (issued Apr. 2, 2002) ("Lutz").
6 US 6,231,527 B 1 (issued May 15, 2001) ("Sol").
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(informative) ("Any bases for asserting error, whether factual or legal, that
are not raised in the principal brief are waived."). 7
I. MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIM INTERPRETATION AND INDEFINITENESS
The presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph six, does not apply
where the term "means for" is not used is overcome when there is "no
structural context for determining the characteristics of the [ claim element]
other than to describe its function." Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550
F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For example, "the unadorned term
'mechanism' is 'simply a nonce word or a verbal construct that is not
recognized as the name of structure and is simply a substitute for the term
'means for."" Id. ( quoting Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,
382 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Here, the Examiner has interpreted
certain claim language, discussed below, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph six, and Appellants have not contested that doing so was proper.
Final Action 5---6; Appeal Br. 11-12.
"A computer-implemented means-plus-function term is limited to the
corresponding structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents
thereof, and the corresponding structure is the algorithm." Harris Corp. v.
Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Aristocrat
7 Appellants' Reply Brief cites new evidence, i.e., the Baldauf and Fahy
references, not presented with or discussed in the Appeal Brief. See Reply
Br. 4. Appellants have not shown good cause for this Panel to consider this
evidence, which is not responsive to any new positions taken by the
Examiner in the Answer. Therefore, this new evidence has not been
considered.
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Techs. Aust!. Pty Ltd. v. Inter. Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(mere reference to using "appropriate programming" imposed no limitation).
For means-plus-function limitations where the disclosed
structure is a computer programmed to implement an algorithm,
the patent must disclose enough of an algorithm to provide the
necessary structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph ....
The patentee may express this algorithm in any understandable
manner, including as a flowchart, so long as sufficient structure
is disclosed. . . . Sufficient structure must simply "permit one of
ordinary skill in the art to know and understand what structure
corresponds to the means limitation" so that he may "perceive
the bounds of the invention."
In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Finisar
Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523, F.3d 1323, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
Section 112, paragraph 6 provides that a patentee [or applicant]
may define the structure for performing a particular function
generically through the use of a means expression provided that
it discloses specific structure(s) corresponding to that means in
the patent specification. . . . As such, [ the court has] referred to
section 112, paragraph 6 as embodying a statutory quid pro
quo .... If a patentee [or applicant] fails to satisfy the bargain
because of a failure to disclose adequate structure, the claim will
be rendered ... indefinite under section 112, paragraph 2.
Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir.
2000). A claim limitation written in means-plus-function form, directed to
software to be implemented using a computer processor, is indefinite if the
specification does not disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed
function. See Ex parte Andrea J. Rodriguez et al., 92 USPQ2d 1395, WL
3756279 (BPAI 2009) (precedential opinion).
The Examiner interpreted the following claim language,
an analysis and processing device configured to correlate said
first and second signals of the muscle group from said
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electromyographic acquisition section and said video acquisition
section applying said deductive rules related to one or more of
the specific field of activity and the specific type of application
provided in said database[,]
in claim 1, and the claim language, "a synchronization system with a
reference clock, by which said first and second digital signals are divided
into time frames and synchronized in time," in claim 2, to be means-plus-
function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, "because they
use a generic placeholder ('device', 'system') coupled with functional
language ('correlate[,]' 'applying[,]' 'divided[,]' and 'synchronized')
without reciting sufficient structure to achieve the function. Furthermore,
the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier." Final
Action 5. Further, the Examiner determined, upon a review of the
Specification, no corresponding structure was described with respect to these
claimed functions. Id. (referencing the Spec. 6: 14--22, 12:31-13: 1 ). As
noted above, Appellants do not contest the propriety of interpreting this
claim language as invoking a means-plus-function interpretation.
In view of the above-discussed claim interpretation, the Examiner
determined that the Specification lacked a disclosure of the corresponding
structures for these means-plus-function limitations; thus, the Examiner
determined that the claims are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph. Final Action 4--5. Specifically, the Examiner determined:
Claim 1 recites a means-plus-function limitation for an
analysis and processing device. It is unclear whether there is
sufficient supporting structure to perform the entire claimed
function. The specification states "with analysis and processing
means 9 an artificial intelligence application is associated .... "
(p. 6, ln 30-33). The disclosure only refers to undisclosed
"deductive rules" and an undisclosed "algorithm" to implement
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the claimed functions of the analysis and processing device (p. 7,
ln 1-16). There does not appear to be an algorithm or explanation
of appropriate programming to carry out the claimed function.
Id. at 5. Thus, to summarize, the Examiner determined that the Specification
does not disclose an algorithm, or other sufficient disclosure, describing
programming "configured to correlate said first and second signals" and
"apply[] said deductive rules," as claimed.
Appellants argue that claim 1 is not indefinite and point to the
Specification at pages 6-7, and by reference to their written description
argument, possibly page 8, as clarifying the corresponding structure for the
analysis and processing device. Appeal Br. 11. Appellants argue "the
specification recites that an artificial intelligence application is associated
(artificial intelligence methods and tools are typically 'machine learning',
ANN, SVM, HMM etc.) with the analysis and processing means 9, which
clearly is inherently implemented by a processing device." Id. at 11-12.
Thus, Appellants argue this disclosure in the Specification of "analysis and
processing means" having an artificial intelligence application satisfies a
disclosure of a corresponding structure for the Examiner's identified means-
plus-function limitation of claim 1.
Appellants' argument is not persuasive. The disclosure of the
Specification cited by Appellants amounts to mere identification of types of
programming that could work in its muscle activity analysis system. This is
not a description of a necessary algorithm for how the claimed processor and
its "device" is programmed to both correlate the two signals from its sensors
and apply some, only generally identified, deductive rules. It is also not a
sufficient prose substitute for such an algorithm. Knowing that various
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types of artificial intelligence could be useful in such a system does not
explain how the sensor signals are correlated and how deductive rules, or
what rules, are applied to this data. Therefore, the claims are indefinite.
IL WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
"The 'written description' requirement serves a teaching function, ...
in which the public is given 'meaningful disclosure in exchange for being
excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of time."'
University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Another "purpose of the 'written description'
requirement is ... [to] convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the
art that, as of the filing date [], [the applicant] was in possession of the
invention." Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563---64 (Fed. Cir.
1991); see also Enzo Biochem Inc. v. GenProbe Inc., 296 F.3d 131 6, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
The requirement is satisfied when the specification "set[ s] forth
enough detail to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand
what is claimed and to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed."
University of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 928. "[A]pplicants have some
flexibility in the 'mode selected for compliance' with the written description
requirement" (University of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 928), and it is well
settled that actual reduction to practice is not necessary to satisfy the
requirement (id. at 926). Whether or not a specification satisfies the
requirement is a question of fact, which must be resolved on a case-by-case
basis (Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1562---63), and it is the examiner's "initial
burden [to] present[ ] evidence or reasons why persons skilled in the art
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would not recognize in the disclosure a description of the invention defined
by the claims" (In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257,263 (CCPA 1976)).
"The written description requirement is not met if the specification
merely describes a "desired result."' Vasudevan Software, Inc. v.
MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 682 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Ariad
Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
The Examiner determined
[ t ]he specification does not provide sufficient detail for
"applying said deductive rules related to one or more of the
specific field of activity and the specific type of application
provided in said database." The specification refers to
undisclosed deductive rules and an undisclosed algorithm at p. 6,
ln 30 top. 7, ln 16. The specification does not describe the details
needed to perform the claimed function with the deductive rules
such that one skilled in the art would understand that a joint
inventor, at the time the application was filed, had possession of
the claimed invention.
Final Action 3 ( emphasis added). The Examiner's position is that merely
including the claim terms "deductive rules" in the Specification is not a
sufficient written description of such rules and that, as with the
indefiniteness rejection discussed above, an algorithm identifying how the
applying of deductive rules, as claimed, should have been provided in the
Specification. Id. Similarly, with respect to claims 7, 9, and 14, the
Examiner determined
[ t ]he specification does not provide sufficient detail for "an
expert system employing the inferential motor with which said
first and second digital signals are correlated applying
deductive rules provided in the database connected to said
computer processor." The specification mentions an expert
system and refers to undisclosed deductive rules and an
undisclosed algorithm at p. 6, ln 30 top. 7, ln 16. The
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specification does not describe the details needed to perform the
claimed function with the expert system, inferential motor,
deductive rules and methods of artificial intelligence such that
one skilled in the art would understand that a joint inventor, at
the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed
invention.
Id. at 3--4 (emphasis added). Again, it is the Examiner's position that the
skilled artisan would not recognize that the claimed deductive rules and their
use, as claimed, was disclosed in the Specification because no steps
necessary to performance according to such rules are disclosed. The
Examiner also determined "[ t ]he claim can be interpreted as covering any
field of activity and any type of application. Therefore, the scope of the
claim reaches beyond that disclosed in the specification, which only
discloses gym and videogame applications." Id. at 4 (citing Spec. at 7:29--31
as discussing only these applications).
Appellants argue that claim 1 meets the written description
requirement, pointing to the Specification at pages 7-8 where it discusses
"an expert system" as "comprising an inferential motor" that applies
"deductive rules" "to the data coming from the analysis and processing
means." See Appeal Br. 8 (citing Spec. 7-8). This portion of the
Specification, as quoted by Appellants, states that an "'inferential motor' [is]
a standard or proprietary application ... [that] implements an algorithm
capable of drawing logical conclusions based on the user's actions detected
through the incoming data from the acquisition sensors." Id. Further, the
quoted Specification portion states "[t]hrough the inferential motor, the
signals deriving from the two acquisition sections A and B are correlated
applying deductive rules typical of the methods and tools of artificial
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intelligence (such as machine learning, ANN, SVM, HMM and so on)." Id.
Appellants argue that the skilled artisan would have understood how this
expert system, inferential motor, and database of rules would be used. Id.
As to the database of rules, Appellants argue the Specification, at pages 7-8,
clarifies that the contents is context-specific for the application, i.e., the
context of the field of activity for the muscle movement being analyzed, e.g.,
in a gym or playing a video game. Id.
Appellants' arguments are not persuasive. As with the indefiniteness
rejection, discussed above as affirmed, the portions of Appellants'
Specification cited as a supporting written description of the claimed
invention is vague as to how the claimed sensor signals are correlated and
how, or what, deductive rules are then applied to such correlated signals
based on some specific filed or activity and specific type of application. No
rules are described and the software discussed, e.g., the artificial intelligence
architectures ANN, SVM, etc., are mere platforms for applying some
undefined rules, not an explanation of the rules or how they are to be
applied, and certainly not an algorithm. Such a disclosure merely alludes to
some vague desired result, but does not identify the specific ( and claimed)
means of accomplishing it. See Vasudevan Software, 782 F.3d at 682.
Appellants contend that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood how to program the computer, how to apply deductive rules, and
how to implement the claimed invention (Appeal Br. 4--5), but did not
provide objective evidence that the skilled worker, reading the Specification,
would understood that such steps are described in the Specification in such a
way that they would be recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art. The
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issue before is not enablement, but whether the Specification "convey[ s]
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date [],
[the applicant] was in possession of the invention." Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at
1563---64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Appellants essentially present the same arguments, though more
generally, with respect to the Examiner's rejection and determinations
regarding claims 7, 8, and 14. Appeal Br. 9--10. These arguments are not
persuasive for the reasons discussed above.
Regarding the "field of activity" disclosure, Appellants argue the
Specification, at page 24, indicates various fields where the invention may
be used, e.g., for gyms, training, rehabilitation, video games, etc. Appeal Br.
10. "Thus, [argues Appellants,] the specification clarifies that the invention
could be utilized in a variety of different fields and types of applications."
Id. at 10-11 ( citing Spec. 7, 24 ). Whether or not this argument is persuasive
is not determinative because we find no error in the Examiner's other
rationale for the rejection for lack of written description.
III. OBVIOUSNESS
"In determining whether the subject matter of a patent claim is
obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the
patentee controls. What matters is the objective reach of the claim. If the
claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under§ 103." KSR Int'! Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,419 (2007).
The Examiner determined the Gracovetsky-Ahsan-Bums combination
taught and suggested the claimed system. Final Action 6-10 and Answer 5-
9, 15-16 (collectively citing Gracovetsky Abstract, 11:27-39, 13:14--19,
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13:44--49, 15:23-35, 16:7-17, 17:45--48, 17:56-60, Fig. 1; Ahsan 487,488,
490,493, Fig. 3; Bums Abstract, ,r,r 6, 16, 19, 41, 64). In particular, the
Examiner cited Gracovetsky as disclosing a system for the acquisition and
analysis of an individual's muscle activity and, in particular, the portions of
the claimed system directed to EMG sensors and their respective first signals
relating to a muscle group, the video sensors and their respective second
signals of the muscle group, and processing components for analysis and
processing these signals, and correlating the signals of the EMG and video in
relation to an activity, such as" a very specific exercise." See supra Final
Action, Answer, and cited portions of Gracovetsky. Noting that
"Gracovetsky does not explicitly teach a database of deductive rules related
to one or more of a specific field of activity and a specific type of
application," as claimed, the Examiner cited Ahsan in combination with
Gracovetsky for its teaching of EMG systems using artificial intelligence
(such as ANN, HMM, LLGMN, PNN, FMMNN, RBFNN, or Bayes
Network, for example) applying deductive rules to EMG signals for a
specific purpose, such as moving a cursor on a computer screen or
interactive computer gaming based on muscle signals. See supra Final
Action, Answer, and cited portions of Ahsan; see also Spec. 20 ( citing
Ahsan for such teachings). Further, noting that "Gracovetsky and Ahsan do
not teach at least one detection sensor of the individual's skin impedance
configured to determine an impedance value to be used as a correction
parameter of a gain of the first sensors of the electromyographic acquisition
section," the Examiner cited Bums for its teaching of such a sensor to
provide a "gain correction factor." See supra Final Action, Answer, and
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cited portions of Bums. We discern no error in the Examiner's
determinations and we adopt the Examiner's findings of fact and rationale
on obviousness. Final Action 6-12; Answer 5-11, 15-16.
Appellants argue Gracovetsky does not disclose EMG sensors and
cameras measuring a muscle group, but that they are taught as measuring
different muscle groups to provide a full dynamic evaluation of the
flexibility of the spine. Appeal Br. 15-16. Appellants further argue that,
"while Gracovetsky discloses correlating all of the data together to provide a
comprehensive analysis ... Gracovetsky does not disclose or suggest
correlating signals of the same muscle group from an EMG acquisition
section and a video acquisition section." Id. at 16. Appellants also argue
Gracovetsky does not disclose the claimed database of deductive rules or
applying the deductive rules related to a specific field of activity and type of
application. Id. at 16-17.
These arguments are not persuasive. As explained in more detail
below, Gracovetsky discloses collecting data as a first signal from EMG
sensors and data as a second signal from cameras of a single muscle group.
Appellants' Specification describes a muscle group as the muscles involved
in the movement dynamics of a specific part of an individual's body, for
example, an arm. See Spec. 4. Gracovetsky's Figure 1 illustrates providing
EMG sensors and visual markers on an individual in very close proximity to
one another, for example, along the lower back at the thoraco-lumbar fascia
or along the sides of the back at the latissimus dorsi. A portion of
Gracovetsky' s Figure 1 is reproduced below:
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The portion of Gracovetsky's Figure 1 reproduced above shows EMG
sensors attached to an individual as stars and visual markers attached to the
individual for sensing by a camera as dots. As shown above, the stars and
dots attached at the individual's lower back and side back are in close
proximity such that a single muscle group's electrical EMG signals and
visible movement would both be sensed by the EMG sensor and cameras.
As acknowledged by Appellants, this data, as all data disclosed by
Gracovetsky, is correlated. See, e.g., Gracovetsky Abstract, Figures 4 and 5;
see also Appeal Br. 16. As for the claimed deductive rules and related
database, while Gracovetsky discloses a database, it was not cited by the
Examiner for its disclosure of the claimed rules and their application. Ahsan
was cited for this purpose. Final Action 7.
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Appellants argue Ahsan does not teach or suggest correlating first and
second signals, or applying deductive rules related to a specific field of
activity and application, as claimed. Appeal Br. 17. Appellants argue
"Ahsan only discloses using various techniques to apply deductive rules, but
does not indicate that the deductive rules are applied in relation to particular
fields or types of activity, in relation to correlating first and second signals."
Id. at 18.
These arguments are not persuasive. Ahsan is not cited for a teaching
correlating EMG and video signals----Gracovetsky is cited for this. Also,
Ahsan teaches the same artificial intelligence systems, i.e., the deductive
rules, as and to the extent they are described in Appellants' Specification, for
the same purpose as claimed-for analyzing EMG signals from an
individual's muscles in relation to a specific activity, e.g., video gaming or
computer operation.
Regarding Bums, Appellants argue only that it "fails to cure the
deficiencies in Gracovetsky and Ahsan." Appeal Br. 20. As we are
unpersuaded there are deficiencies in Gracovetsky and Ahsan as Appellants
contend, we remain unpersuaded.
Regarding the second and third obviousness rejections, adding Lutz
and Sol to the Gracovetsky-Ahsan-Bums combination, respectively,
Appellants present no separate arguments. Therefore, for the same reasons
set forth above regarding the first obviousness rejection, we affirm these as
well.
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SUMMARY
The rejection for lack of written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
first paragraph, is affirmed.
The rejection for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, is affirmed.
The obviousness rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are each affirmed.
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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