Ex Parte Marynowski et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 31, 2018

14862839 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/862,839 09/23/2015
35811 7590 08/02/2018
IP GROUP OF DLA PIPER LLP (US)
ONE LIBERTY PLACE
1650 MARKET ST, SUITE 4900
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
John M. Marynowski
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
DCF-14-1059DIV-CON-CON2 4383
EXAMINER
FELTEN, DANIELS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3692
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/02/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pto. phil@dlapiper.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN M. MARYNOWSKI, CATALIN D. VOINESCU,
STEP AN PUSCASU, and THOMAS M. O'DONNELL
Appeal 2016-008508
Application 14/862,8391
Technology Center 3600
Before, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, MICHAEL R. ZECHER, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.
FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-36. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellants identify DCFB LLC as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2016-008508
Application 14/862,839
THE INVENTION
Appellants claim an automated trading system for use in an electronic
trading exchange network system (Spec. ,r 1 ).
Claim 1 reproduced below, is representative of the
subject matter on appeal.
1. A method of reducing a response time of an automated
trading system, comprising:
generating, by an electronic exchange system,
information related to a first traded item, said electronic
exchange system comprising one or more first backend
computers;
transmitting, by the electronic exchange system, the
information to an automated trading system, the automated
trading system comprising a second remote backend computer
solely performing automatic steps of:
receiving the information related to the first traded item
from the electronic exchange system;
retrieving trading parameters particular to the first traded
item, said trading parameters having been generated and stored
in said second remote backend computer, in a searchable
format, prior to receiving the information related to the first
traded item;
comparing at least a portion of the information related to
the first traded item and the trading parameters to determine
whether to execute one or more market transactions;
automatically generating a request for the one or more
market transactions within 1 millisecond of receiving the
information related to the first traded item upon determining to
execute the one or more market transactions;
outputting the request for the one or more market
transactions to the one or more first backend computers; and
causing the electronic exchange system to execute the
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one or more market transactions automatically generated for the
first traded item.
Appeal Br. 13 (Claims Appendix).
THE REJECTION
The following rejection is before us for review.
Claims 1-36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Final Act. 5---6.
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 1-36 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, ...
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts .... If so, we then ask, "[ w ]hat
else is there in the claims before us?" ... To answer that
question, . . . consider the elements of each claim both
individually and "as an ordered combination" to determine
whether the additional elements "transform the nature of the
claim" into a patent-eligible application. . . . [The Court]
described step two of this analysis as a search for an "'inventive
concept'"-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
"sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
itself."
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Application 14/862,839
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'!, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73
(2012)).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.
Although the Court in Alice made a direct finding as to what the
claims were directed to, we determine that the plain language of the claims
and the Specification provide enough information to inform one as to what
they are directed to.
The steps in representative claim 1 result in2 : "causing the electronic
exchange system to execute the one or more market transactions
automatically generated for the first traded item." App. Br. 13.
The Examiner found that the claims are directed to "a trading system
which has been automated by a computer to perform trading activities."
(Final Act. 3). More specifically, the Examiner states,
The reason that the claimed trading system was considered a[]
judicial exception ( or abstract) was because the claim
limitation[ s] were clearly directed to trading-which is
considered a method of organizing human activity which is also
a fundamental economic practice of exchange. It should be
respectfully noted by the applicant that some methods of
orgamzmg human activities can also be a fundamental
economic practice. Trading is considered herein as a
2 Our analysis is made based on considering the claims as a whole, but for
purposes of this discussion, we note the result phrase of the independent
claim to point to what the claims are directed to.
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Application 14/862,839
fundamental economic practice similar to the decision of the
Supreme Court, in Bilski, which described hedging as both a
method of organizing human activity and a fundamental
economic practice.
(Id. at 3--4) (emphasis added).
The Specification states:
In a typical set-up, trading information received from the
exchange is processed by general purpose backend computer
equipment. The backend computer may, among other things,
( 1) act as a gateway by communicating market information
from the exchange to various types of client equipment,
(2) submit, delete, and modify orders and quotes to the
exchange from the various client equipment, (3) receive real-
time trade confirmations and end-of-day back office reports,
and ( 4) perform risk analysis, position management, and
accounting functions.
Spec. ,r 5. The Specification further states:
Backend computer 225 may also be equipped with
software and/or hardware that facilitates communications with
the exchange site. Some exchanges, for example, such as the
EUREX (the German and Swiss Derivatives Exchange),
recommend installation of a redundant on-site backend
computer in the event that the primary communication backend
computer 220 fails.
Id. ,r 47. The Specification then describes,
In one preferred embodiment, backend computer 225 is
dedicated or substantially dedicated to performing automated
trading-related functions, as discussed in greater detail below.
Backend computer 220, rather than backend computer 225, may
be assigned trading-related tasks, such as (1) serving as a
gateway to communicate market information from the exchange
site 100 to trader stations 230, (2) submitting, deleting, and
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modifying orders and quotes to exchange site 100 from the
trader stations 230, (3) receiving real-time trade confirmations
and end-of-day back office reports, and/or (4) performing risk
analysis, position management, and accounting functions. In
this way, backend computer 225 may perform automated
trading functions with limited interruption or delays associated
with other tasks the backend computers ( such as backend
computer 220) may be requested to perform. This increases the
response speed for automated trading operations.
Id. ,I 48.
We further find that the claims simply dedicate trading tasks to
surplus equipment, which otherwise would be performed by devices
conducting plural tasks so as to increase trading response speed. See Spec. ,r
48. It follows from prior Supreme Court cases, and Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63 (1972), in particular, that the claims at issue here are directed to
an abstract idea. Trading activities and allocating trading tasks between
resources to increase response speeds in trades are fundamental economic
principles because according to Appellants, "[ t ]raders who can quickly
identify opportunities and act on them generate the largest profits." Spec. ,r
3. The patent-ineligible end of the spectrum includes fundamental economic
practices, Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357.
Also, we find the steps of:
1. retrieving trading parameters particular to the first traded item,
said trading parameters having been generated and stored ... in
a searchable format, prior to receiving the information related to
the first traded item; [ and]
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11. comparing at least a portion of the information related to the
first traded item and the trading parameters to determine
whether to execute one or more market transactions,
constitute "analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds,
or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental
processes within the abstract-idea category." Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also buySAFE, Inc.
v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims directed to
certain arrangements involving contractual relations are directed to abstract
ideas). Thus, allocating trading tasks between resources to maximize trading
response speed is an "abstract idea" beyond the scope of§ 101.
As in Alice, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the
"abstract ideas" category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is
no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction between the concept of
an intermediated settlement, as discussed in Alice, and the concept of
allocating trading tasks between resources to maximize trading response
speed, at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of "abstract ideas"
as the Court has used that term. That the claims do not preempt all forms of
the abstraction or may be limited to trading executions, do not make them
any less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) ("And that the claims do not
preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the
e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.").
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Claim 1, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses
generic computer technology to perform data reception, transmission, and
linkage and does not recite an improvement to a particular computer
technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because they
"focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation").
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the
analysis at Alice step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it"' is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea "'to a particular technological environment."'
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a
computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to "implemen[ t ]" an abstract idea
"on . . . a computer," that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of "additional
featur[ e ]" that provides any "practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [ abstract idea] itself."
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
Instead, "the relevant question is whether the claims here do more
than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea ... on a
generic computer." Id. at 2359. They do not.
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Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify
the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval----one of
the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
trading industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d 1354; see also In re Katz
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2011) ("Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms 'processing,'
'receiving,' and 'storing,' ... those functions can be achieved by any
general purpose computer without special programming"). In short, each
step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. As to the data operated upon, "even if a process of
collecting and analyzing information is 'limited to particular content' or a
particular 'source,' that limitation does not make the collection and analysis
other than abstract." SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1022
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted).
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellants' method add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis-
access/ display is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be
abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display,
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Application 14/862,839
allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor
Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification,
generation, display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v.
Comcast Cable Commc 'ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was
abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field. The Specification spells out different generic
equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the
particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the
concept of information access under different scenarios. See, e.g.,
The automated trading system software may run in a text-based
environment or a Windows or Windows-like environment. For
example, the automated trading system may be run on an
operating system, such as VMS, DOS, or LINUX, or in a
WINDOWS or similar operating system, which is more user-
friendly.
Spec. ,r 51. In fact, the Specification confirms that the claimed "second
remote backend computer" is a known redundant computer tasked with
trading operations:
Backend computer 225 may also be equipped with
software and/ or hardware that facilitates communications with
the exchange site. Some exchanges, for example, such as the
EUREX (the German and Swiss Derivatives Exchange),
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recommend installation of a redundant on-site backend
computer in the event that the primary communication backend
computer 220 fails.
Spec. ,r 4 7. Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more
than instructions to apply the abstract idea of information access using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2360.
We have reviewed all the arguments (Appeal Br. 4--12; Reply Br. 1-
5) Appellants have submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims
before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellants argue:
In this manner, the claimed invention avoids recalculating ( or
re-determining) decision information, which enables the
claimed invention to generate decisions and transaction requests
in as little as 1 millisecond (see Claim 1 and para. [0022]). This
is to be contrasted with conventional systems ( that do not
comprise the claimed dedicated 'second backend computer' or
the 'pre-generated and pre-stored' decision parameters) which
take several to many milliseconds to calculate or determine a
single decision parameter. When considered in the context of
tens of millions of transactions in a typical day, the savings
provided by the claimed invention is indeed significant and
substantial.
Appeal Br. 4--5 (underlining omitted).
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We disagree with Appellants. The question here is whether the claims
as a whole "focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology" or are "directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea
and merely invoke generic processes and machinery." McRO,, 837 F.3d at
1314. In this case, the claims, as a whole, are focused on satisfying certain
contingencies for "automatically generating a request for ... one or more
market transactions within 1 millisecond of receiving the information related
to the first traded item upon determining to execute the one or more market
transactions." We find this limitation to be a result or an affect, and not an
improvement in the technology of how a processor, memory, and program
works. Appellants' claims merely allocate different computational tasks to
known system elements-namely, a second backed computer. See Spec.
,r 47. Thus, we find no improvement in device technology here, but rather
only the idea of redirecting workflow to an otherwise redundant, known
device.
Appellants argue,
By introducing the new, uniquely configured and
dedicated "second backend computer" component (in
conjunction with the other claimed elements), the claimed
invention completely removes the automated-trading functions
from the backend equipment, leaving the backend equipment
solely to perform the general tasks noted above."
Appeal Br. 5(underlining omitted).
We disagree with Appellants. Our review of the Specification reveals
that the claimed "second backend computer" is not new to the combination.
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Again, according to the Specification, the "second backend computer" is a
known redundancy to the system available for functions "in the event that
the primary communication backend computer 220 fails." Spec. ,r 47. Thus,
the elements of the system are well-known and all that remains is a re-
designation of tasks on the computers, which, as we found above, is an
abstraction. The recitation of a practical application for an abstract idea is
not sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2011) ("The Court [in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)]
rejected the notion that the recitation of a practical application for the
calculation could alone make the invention patentable.").
Appellants further argue, "[ s ]till further, the Appellant's invention
includes the innovation of pre-generating and storing, in a searchable format,
certain decision-making trading parameters that are used in generating near-
real-time transaction decisions and requests in as fast as 1 millisecond."
Appeal Br. 5 (underlining omitted).
We disagree with Appellants. First, automation to reduce the burden
on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper, e.g.
formatting of data, does not qualify an idea for patent eligibility because it is
still a mental process. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375. The subject
matter of mental thought, pre-generating and storing of data in a given
format, cannot distinguish one mental process from another because an
abstraction does not change its essence because of its subject matter and the
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way it is remembered. A claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract
idea. See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151.
Also, "[ a ]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of
abstraction." Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240-1241 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Limiting a process to particular content does not make the
collection and analysis other than abstract. See SAP Am. Inc., 890 F.3d at
1022.
As to the argued speed of the "real time decisions," as we found
above, this goes to an affect which does not make an otherwise patent
ineligible idea eligible.
Appellants argue,
These (and other) computer problems associated with
conventional computer trading systems are overcome by the
Appellant's claimed invention which provides a completely
new and unique system topography that completely removes
many of the burdensome functions from the backend
equipment, leaving the backend equipment solely to perform
general trading related tasks.
Appeal Br. 7 (underlining omitted).
We disagree with Appellants because "the addition of merely novel or
non-routine components to the claimed idea [does not] necessarily tum[] an
abstraction into something concrete." Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715. As we
found above, element by element, the topography of the claimed devices is
unchanged from known systems - all that is changed is assignment of work
to these devices, which is an abstraction.
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Appellants argue,
Separating functions, particularly with a remote second backend
computer, is completely unconventional and represents a
substantial innovation in this field. Further, the claimed
functions performed by the second remote backend computer
are initiated only under specified conditions, including
selectively activating the electronic exchange system.
Appeal Br. 9.
First, as found above, we have engaged in "ordered combination"
findings, which determined the claim steps/elements to be ordinary and
conventional. Second, the Examiner correctly cited to precedent in In re
TL! Communications, LLC Patent Litigation, 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
in addressing the analogous, conventional nature of the claims at issue. See
Answer 5---6. Third, the Examiner found that separating functions to
different computers is no more than a generic parallel processing computing
concepts (see Ans. 5), and neither the claims nor the Specification call for a
parallel processing concept different from those available in existing
systems. See SAP America, 890 F .3d at 1023 ("to the extent that parallel
processing is discussed in the [S]pecification, it is characterized as generic
parallel processing components"). To the contrary, as discussed above, the
Specification provides that the second, backend system is known. See Spec.
To the extent that Appellants argue that the use of a "remote" backend
server makes the claims analogous to the claims at issue in Bascom ( see
Reply Br. 4 ), we disagree with Appellants because the claims in Bascom
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Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) are
distinguishable from those before us here. That is, in Bascom the
technology at issue was a
filtering system [] located on a remote ISP server that associates
each network account with (1) one or more filtering schemes
and (2) at least one set of filtering elements from a plurality of
sets of filtering elements, thereby allowing individual network
accounts to customize the filtering of Internet traffic associated
with the account.
Bascom Global Internet 827 F.3d at 1346. In contrast, all that the claims
before us cover is using a known computer for working a different task
without a device improvement. We note too, "remote" is a term of degree
and, neither the claims or the Specification define it to provide a standard for
measuring that degree. See Seattle Box Company, Inc. v. Industrial Crating
&Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818,826 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Appellants further argue that "[ t ]he instant claims stand next to
Diehr. [3] As noted above, the automated trading system provides a
mechanism for determining and controlling when the electronic exchange
system is activated and what functions it performs." Appeal Br. 9
(underlying omitted).
We disagree with Appellants. In Diehr, the Court established
eligibility under § 101 for claims containing mathematical formulas when
the claim "implements or applies that formula in a structure or process
which, when considered as a whole," causes or performs "(e.g., transforming
3 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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or reducing an article to a different state or thing) .... " 450 U.S. at 192-
193. In contrast, we fail to see how executing a trade constitutes
transforming or reducing an article into a different state or thing.
Lastly, Appellants argue that "the Examiner has not met the burden of
establishing a rejection under § 101. The Administrative Procedure Act
mandates the production of evidence by government agencies, such as the
USPTO [United States Patent and Trademark Office]." Appeal Br. 11.
We disagree with Appellants. To the extent Appellants argue that the
Examiner erred in adequately supporting this determination by not providing
evidence, we are unpersuaded. In this regard, there is no requirement that
Examiners must provide evidentiary support in every case before a
conclusion can be made that a claim is directed to an abstract idea. See, e.g.,
para. IV "July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility" to 2014 Interim
Guidance on Subject Matter Eligibility (2014 IEG), 79 Fed. Reg. 74618
(Dec. 16, 2014). 4
All that is required of the USPTO to meet its prima facie burden of
production is that the Examiner set forth the statutory basis of the rejection
and the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently articulate and
4 See, also, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 2106.07(a)(III) (2018)
("The courts consider the determination of whether a claim is eligible ( which
involves identifying whether an exception such as an abstract idea is being
claimed) to be a question of law. Thus, the court does not require 'evidence'
that a claimed concept is a judicial exception, and generally decides the legal
conclusion of eligibility without resolving any factual issues." ( citations
omitted.))
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informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132.
As the statute itself instructs, the Examiner must "notify the applicant,"
"stating the reasons for such rejection," "together with such information and
references as may be useful in judging the propriety of continuing
prosecution of his application." 35 U.S.C. § 132; see also In re Jung, 637
F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (declining "to impose a heightened burden
on examiners beyond the notice requirement of§ 132). Here, as we found
above, the Examiner has made these findings as required by the statute. s~ee
Final Act. 2-6.
Specifically, in rejecting the pending claims under§ 101, the
Examiner analyzed the claims using the Mayo/Alice two-step framework,
consistent with the guidance set forth in the USPTO's 2014 INTERIM
GUIDANCE ON PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY and the JULY 2015
UPDATE: SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY. See id. Specifically, the Examiner
notified Appellants that the claims are broadly directed to
a trading system which has been automated by a computer to
perform trading activities. The reason that the claimed trading
system was considered a[] judicial exception (or abstract) was
because the claim limitation were clearly directed to trading-
which is considered a method of organizing human activity
which is also a fundamental economic practice of exchange. It
should be respectfully noted by the applicant that some methods
of organizing human activities can also be a fundamental
economic practice.
(Final Act. 3--4). Turning to step two, the Examiner determined
[i]t was also submitted that the elements in the applicant's
claims where insufficient to ensure that the claim as a whole
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amounted to "significantly more" than the judicial exception
because the electronic exchange system provided for one or
more computers performing generic computer functions
previously stated that []generating, storing, rece1vmg
transmitting and executing instruction, in particular trading
information which do not provide improvement to the trading
technology, but apply the abstract idea of trading to computer
technology that is ubiquitous in the computer industry.
(Final Act. 4 ). Therefore, we find that the Examiner met the notice
requirement of§ 132.
For the reasons identified above, we determine there are no
deficiencies in the Examiner's prima facie case of patent ineligibility of the
rejected claims based on the record before us.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-36 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-36 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED.
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