Ex Parte MartinikDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 21, 201613706010 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 21, 2016) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/706,010 12/05/2012 Ivo Martinik VYS2658-002 6794 8698 7590 12/23/2016 STANDLEY LAW GROUP LLP 6300 Riverside Drive Dublin, OH 43017 EXAMINER WANG, XI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2661 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/23/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): standley docketing @ standleyllp.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte IVO MARTINIK Appeal 2016-003236 Application 13/706,010 Technology Center 2600 Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges. PER CURIAM. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of claims 1 and 3—18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claim 2 is canceled. See App. Br. 18 (Claims App’x). We affirm-in-part and enter new grounds of rejection within the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (2013). 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Vysoka Skola Banska Technicka Univerzita Ostrava. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2016-003236 Application 13/706,010 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Invention Appellant’s invention relates to “an improvement to the process whereby the user of the invention may capture images from a computerized device for later use.” Spec. 1 6. Claims 1,7, 16, and 17 are independent, of which claims 1 and 7 are illustrative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A system for capturing and storing images from a computing device comprising: a computing device comprising a processor, a storage system, and graphics control circuitry; at least one computer display monitor that is associated with and in electronic communication with said computing device for display of information contained in the graphics control circuitry; and an image capture algorithm which configures the computing device to monitor a stream of images communicated from the computing device to a computer display monitor in electronic communication with the computer device and store one or more individual images upon the satisfaction of predetermined capture conditions, said conditions comprising a change in the content of monitored images which exceeds a predetermined amount, before each storage. See App. Br. 18 (Claims App’x). 7. A method of automatically capturing and storing images, comprising the steps of: detecting a change in a monitored stream of images present in the graphics control circuitry of the system of claim 1; and automatically capturing and storing an image from said stream of images when the detected change exceeds a predetermined amount. See id. at 19 (Claims App’x). 2 Appeal 2016-003236 Application 13/706,010 Rejections on Appeal Claims 1, 3, and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Olah et al. (US 2003/0005072 Al; published Jan. 2, 2003) (“Olah”). See Final Act. 3—5. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Olah and Kuo et al. (US 7,139,107 B2; issued Nov. 21, 2006) (“Kuo”). See id. at 5—6. Claims 7—15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Olah and Oddiraju et al. (US 2012/0044137 Al; published Feb. 23, 2012) (“Oddiraju”). See id. at 6-10. Claims 5, 6, 17, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Olah and Nygren (US 2002/0106190 Al; published Aug. 8, 2002) (“Nygren”). See id. at 10-12. ISSUES The issues presented by Appellant’s contentions are as follows: Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), does the Examiner err in finding that Olah’s monitoring of a user’s online activity and saving of screen images at predetermined times discloses “an image capture algorithm . . . to . . . store one or more individual images upon ... a change in the content of monitored images which exceeds a predetermined amount,” as recited in claim 1? Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), does the Examiner err in concluding that the combination of Olah and Oddiraju teaches or suggests claim 7 because Olah’s monitoring a modem download or online activity does not teach or suggest “detecting a change in a monitored stream of images”? 3 Appeal 2016-003236 Application 13/706,010 ANALYSIS Claims 1, 3—6, and 16—18 The Examiner finds Olah discloses “an image capture algorithm ... to . . . store one or more individual images upon ... a change in the content of monitored images which exceeds a predetermined amount,” as recited in claim 1. More particularly, the Examiner finds Olah discloses (1) initiating the monitoring of a user’s online activity on a computer system once a modem download is detected; and (2) periodically capturing and saving images on the display screen of the computer system. See Ans. 14—15; Final Act. 4 (citing Olah Figs. 2—4, || 34—37, 44-46). According to the Examiner, “[w]hen there is online activity discovered, which means that the image must be changed according to online activity, then the screen capture execution is activated.” Final Act. 4. Appellant contends Olah does not disclose the “image capture algorithm” as recited in claim 1. See App. Br. 8—9; Reply Br. 2—3. More particularly, Appellant argues that Olah discloses capturing images in response to predefined time periods or network activity, but not based on “a change in the content of monitored images,” as required by claim 1. See App. Br. 8—9; Reply Br. 2—3. According to Appellant, Olah’s disclosure of online activity “is not analogous to a change in images communicated from the computer device to a computer display monitor” because “a modem download (or online activity) does not necessarily result in a change” in what is displayed, and “the content of images transmitted from a computer device to a computer display monitor may change without any modem or network activity.” App. Br. 9. 4 Appeal 2016-003236 Application 13/706,010 We find Appellant’s arguments persuasive. Olah discloses monitoring a stream of images, as well as storing individual images based on certain predefined points in time. See Olah Figs. 2-4, || 34—37, 44-46. Olah further discloses initiating the monitoring of a user once a modem download is detected, after which captured images may be retrieved. See id. 43, 45. But as Appellant contends, there is no evidence that Olah discloses storing captured images based on “a change in the content of monitored images” as required by claim 1. See App. Br. 8—9; Reply Br. 2—3. Rather, Olah discloses that captured images are saved either manually (i.e., at predefined points in time) or randomly, independent of “a change in content of monitored images.” See Olah Figs. 2 (item 16), 3; H 34, 42. In view of the foregoing, we find the Examiner errs in the rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1, as well as the rejection of dependent claims 3 and 4, each of which includes the same deficiency discussed above for the rejection of claim 1. See App. Br. 18 (Claims App’x); Ans. 13—16; Final Act. 4—5. Nor do we sustain the rejections of claims 5, 6, and 16—18, each of which include the same deficiency discussed above for claim 1 that has not been cured by Kuo, Nygren, or an adequate rationale to fill the gaps in the cited prior art. See App. Br. 18—19, 20-21 (Claims App’x); Ans. 17—20; Final Act. 10-12. Claims 7—15 Appellant contends the Examiner errs in concluding that the combination of Olah and Oddiraju teaches or suggests claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because Olah’s monitoring of a modem download or online activity does not teach or suggest “detecting a change in a monitored stream of images.” See App. Br. 11—12. We find Appellant’s argument 5 Appeal 2016-003236 Application 13/706,010 unpersuasive because it does not persuasively address or rebut the Examiner’s specific findings with respect to Oddiraju, which the Examiner combined with the teachings of Olah to teach or suggest claim 7. The Examiner found, and we agree, that Oddiraju teaches “detecting a change in a monitored stream of images” by disclosing an “[ajutomatic screen capture control system configured to detect. . . changes,” such as “a change in what is being displayed on [a] display screen.” Final Act. 7 (citing Oddiraju 154). Because Oddiraju teaches the disputed limitation, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 7 as well as the rejections of claims 8—15, which Appellant argues together with claim 7. See App. Br. 11—12. NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION WITHIN 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Claims 1, 3—6, and 16—18 We enter a new ground of rejection within 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) for claims 1,3, and 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Olah and Oddiraju. As per claim 1, we adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings, conclusions, and reasoning (see Final Act. 3—\\ Ans. 13—15) except, as discussed above, the finding that Olah discloses “an image capture algorithm . . . to . . . store one or more individual images upon ... a change in the content of monitored images which exceeds a predetermined amount.” We find that Oddiraju teaches or suggests this limitation by disclosing an automatic screen capture control system configured to automatically store a screenshot of what is being displayed on a display screen if a preselected 6 Appeal 2016-003236 Application 13/706,010 minimum percentage of what is being displayed on the display screen changes. See Oddiraju | 54. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention have modified Olah to include the teachings of Oddiraju in order to make the review of screen captures less tedious and time consuming. See Oddiraju || 1, 50. As per claim 3, which incorporates the limitations of claim 1, we find these incorporated limitations to be obvious in view of Olah and Oddiraju for the same reasons discussed above as per claim 1. Regarding the further limitation of claim 3, we do not adopt the Examiner’s finding that Olah discloses “after said initial change, the monitored images remaining predominantly unchanged for a period of time.” See Final Act. 4—5 (citing Olah || 44^45); Ans. 16 (citing Olah Fig. 3, || 35—36). However, we find that Oddiraju teaches or suggests this limitation. See Oddiraju 154. In particular, Oddiraju discloses capturing and storing a screenshot if there is a preselected minimum percentage of change in the content being displayed, which implies or suggests that a screenshot is not captured and stored if the amount of change in the content is less than the preselected minimum percentage. See id. Further, given this disclosure of Oddiraju, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that after capturing and storing a screenshot, another screenshot will not be captured or stored until the preselected minimum percentage of change in content is met again. See id.; KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (explaining that an obviousness analysis “can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ”); Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that an obviousness analysis “may include recourse to logic, judgment, and 7 Appeal 2016-003236 Application 13/706,010 common sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion”). Accordingly, during such a period of time between screenshots, one of ordinary skill in the art would also understand that Oddiraju’s monitored content would not exhibit the preselected minimum percentage of change and thus “remain[] predominantly unchanged,” as recited in claim 3. See id.; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; Perfect Web, 587 F.3d at 1329. We conclude that the combination of Olah and Oddiraju would have been obvious with regard to claim 3 for the same reasons articulated supra in the new ground of rejection for claim 1. As per claim 4, we adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings, conclusions, and reasoning (see Final Act. 3—5; Ans. 13—16) except as discussed above with respect to claim 1. We conclude that the combination of Olah and Oddiraju would have been obvious with regard to claim 4 for the same reasons articulated supra in the new ground of rejection for claim 1. We enter a new ground of rejection within 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) for claims 5, 6, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Olah, Nygren, and Oddiraju. As per claims 5, 6, 17, and 18, we adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings, conclusions, and reasoning (see Final Act. 10-12; Ans. 19—20) except as discussed above with respect to claim 1. We conclude that the combination of Olah and Nygren with Oddiraju would have been obvious 8 Appeal 2016-003236 Application 13/706,010 with regard to claims 5, 6, 17, and 18 for the same reasons articulated supra in the new ground of rejection for claim 1. We enter a new ground of rejection within 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) for claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Olah, Kuo, and Oddiraju. As per claim 16, we adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings, conclusions, and reasoning (see Final Act. 5—6; Ans. 17—19) except as discussed above with respect to claim 1. We conclude that the combination of Olah, Kuo, and Oddiraju would have been obvious with regard to claim 16 for the same reasons articulated supra in the new ground of rejection for claim 1. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 7—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1,3, and 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is reversed. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 5, 6, and 16—18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed. We enter new grounds of rejection for claims 1,3, and 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Olah and Oddiraju. We enter new grounds of rejection for claims 5, 6, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Olah, Nygren, and Oddiraju. We enter new grounds of rejection for claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Olah, Kuo, and Oddiraju. 9 Appeal 2016-003236 Application 13/706,010 Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides that Appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner.... (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 37 C.F.R, $ 41.50(b) 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation