Ex Parte MARTIN et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 22, 2018

15050932 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 22, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
15/050,932 02/23/2016
28395 7590 06/26/2018
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Douglas Raymond MARTIN
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83642390 6330
EXAMINER
HENZE-GONGOLA, DAVID V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/26/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DOUGLAS RAYMOND MARTIN
and WILLIAM DAVID TREHARNE
Appeal2017-011042
Application 15/050,932
Technology Center 2800
Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, MICHAEL P. COLAIANNI, and
MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., Administrative Patent Judges.
HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant 1 requests review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner's
final decision rejecting claims 1-3, 5, 8-10, 12, 15, 16, and 18 under pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Boyer et al. (US 2013/0015812
Al, published Jan. 17, 2013) (hereinafter "Boyer"), and claims 4, 6, 7, 11,
13, 14, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Boyer in
view of Shiozaki et al. (US 2010/0013320 Al, published Jan. 21, 2010). We
have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellant is the applicant, Ford Global Technologies, LLC, which is also
stated to be the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 3).
Appeal 2017-011042
Application 15/050,932
Claim 1 is representative of the claimed invention (emphasis added to
highlight key limitation in dispute):
1. A vehicle comprising:
a battery;
a secondary coil; and
a controller programmed to, in response to a
transmission shift into a torque enabled state during charge
current flow from the secondary coil to the battery, interrupt
the charge current flow to discontinue charging of the battery
prior to drive off of the vehicle.
At the outset, we note that independent claim 1, corresponding
method claim 8, and corresponding controller claim 15 are not argued
separately, nor are any arguments directed to any dependent claims.
Accordingly, we select independent claiml as representative of the subject
matter before us for review on appeal and independent claims 1, 8, and 15
and all the dependent claims, including those separately rejected, stand or
fall together.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed Appellant's argument for patentability. However,
we determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's
finding that the claimed subject matter of representative claim 1 (as well as
its corresponding method claim 8 and controller claim 15) is anticipated
within the meaning of§ 102 in view of the applied prior art of Boyer.
Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner's rejections for essentially those
reasons expressed in the Examiner's Response to Argument section in the
Answer, and we add the following primarily for emphasis.
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Appeal 2017-011042
Application 15/050,932
Appellant's sole argument is that Boyer does not describe, within the
meaning of§ 102, "a controller programmed to, in response to a
transmission shift into a torque enabled state during charge current flow
from the secondary coil to the battery, interrupt the charge current flow to
discontinue charging of the battery prior to drive off of the vehicle" as
recited in independent claim 1 and corresponding language in claims 8 and
15.
However, the Examiner points out in the Answer that Boyer at least
implicitly describes this scenario in paragraphs 68, 80, and 82 when read as
a whole, because paragraph 68 states that a fault condition includes the
vehicle not being in the "park" position (i.e., being in a torque enabled state
such as drive or reverse), and paragraph 82 indicates that battery charging
will cease upon detection of a fault condition (e.g., the vehicle not being in a
park position, that is, being in a torque enabled state) (e.g., Ans. 3-5, which
further discusses the reasonable inference of paragraph 80' s teaching that the
charging station needs to know whether the transmission of the vehicle is in
a parked position). Appellant's repeated assertion that Boyer describes
interrupting charging once it has started for reasons that do not include a
transmission shift into a torque enabled state (Appeal Br. 8, 9; Reply Br. 2,
3) is not persuasive of reversible error in the Examiner's anticipation
rejection. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's
position that one of ordinary skill in the art would have readily
recognized/inferred that the system depicted and described in Boyer is
indeed encompassed by the claim language in dispute (Ans. 5, 6). In re
Preda, 401F.2d825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (In determining whether a reference
anticipates the subject matter recited in a claim, "it is proper to take into
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Appeal 2017-011042
Application 15/050,932
account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences
which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw
therefrom."); Cf In re Schaumann, 572 F.2d 312, 317 (CCPA 1978) (In
order to anticipate, a reference must identify something falling within the
claimed subject matter with sufficient specificity to constitute a description
thereof within the purview of§ 102.).
Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's
position that one of ordinary skill in the art would have at once envisaged or
inferred from Boyer's disclosure that battery charging would cease when the
vehicle was not in a parked position, i.e., was in a torque enabled state such
as drive or reverse, as recited in each of claims 1, 8, and 15 (Ans. generally).
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner's anticipation rejection. No
further substantive arguments were made regarding the § 103 rejection.
Thus, we also affirm the § 103 rejection.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136.
ORDER
AFFIRMED
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