Ex Parte Macours et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 31, 2018

14698366 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/698,366 04/28/2015
65913 7590 01/03/2019
Intellectual Property and Licensing
NXPB.V.
411 East Plumeria Drive, MS41
SAN JOSE, CA 95134
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Christophe Macours
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
81639586US04 4090
EXAMINER
JOSHI, SUNITA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2656
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/03/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ip.department.us@nxp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHRISTOPHE MACOURS and
HAN SCHUURMANS 1
Appeal2018-004704
Application 14/698,366
Technology Center 2600
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
JOHN R. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judges.
KENNY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a final rejection of
claims 1-9, 11-14, and 17-22. Claim 16 was canceled. App. Br. 16. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 NXP USA, Inc. (Appellant) is identified as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 1.
Appeal2018-004704
Application 14/698,366
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant's claimed invention is directed to a motion sensor for a
mobile device. Spec. 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A motion sensor for a mobile device, the motion sensor
compnsmg:
a plurality of loudspeakers housed in a housing and each
configured to output an audio signal, the plurality of
loudspeakers each having a loudspeaker input, the housing
mechanically coupled to the loudspeakers, the housing being one
of a mobile phone housing, a tablet housing, and a laptop
housing;
a trigger detector having a plurality of trigger inputs
coupled to the loudspeaker inputs, and a trigger output,
wherein the trigger detector is operable to output a
detection signal on the trigger output in response to mechanically
induced signals on the loudspeaker inputs in response to user
movement of the housing.
Bengtsson
Arora
REFERENCES
US 2006/0211499 Al
US 2007 /0079206 Al
REJECTIONS 2
Sept. 21, 2006
Apr. 5, 2007
Claims 1, 7, 11, 13, 14, and 17-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I02(a)(l) as anticipated by Bengtsson. Final Act. 2.
Claims 2, 4---6, 8, 21, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combination of Bengtsson and Arora. Final Act. 12.
2 In the Answer, the Examiner withdrew a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Ans. 2.
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Appeal2018-004704
Application 14/698,366
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that Bengtsson does not disclose the limitation
recited in claims 1 and 7 of "wherein the trigger detector is operable to
output a detection signal on the trigger output in response to mechanically
induced signals on the loudspeaker inputs in response to user movement of
the housing" ("detection limitation"). App. Br. 9; Reply Br. 3. Bengtsson
describes using a speaker to detect user-induced taps on a housing.
Bengtsson ,r 28 ("a physical tap by an operator on the housing 101 can
generate a unique audible sound that can be sensed by the microphones
106a-c, the ear speaker 102, and/or the loudspeaker 104"), ,r,r 30, 48, 54. In
Bengtsson, tapping includes "an operator striking, rubbing, scraping, or
making any other physical contact with the housing 101 using, for example,
any object and/or a finger or another portion of operator's body to cause an
audible signal therefrom." Id. at ,r 30. The Examiner finds these descriptions
in Bengtsson disclose the detection limitation of claims 1 and 7. Ans. 2--4.
Appellant disagrees, arguing that although Bengtsson' s tapping may cause
vibrations, tapping does not cause movement of Bengtsson's housing. Reply
Br. 3. Appellant argues that page 10 of its Specification distinguishes
movement from vibrations caused by tapping. Id. at 2.
We agree with the Examiner. The vibrations caused by Bengtsson's
tapping constitute movement.
With ordinary usage, vibration is a form of motion.
https://www .merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/vibration, last accessed
December 28, 2018 ("vibration: ... 1 a: a periodic motion of the particles of
an elastic body or medium in alternately opposite directions from the
position of equilibrium when that equilibrium has been disturbed ... b: the
action of vibrating: the state of being vibrated or in vibratory motion . .. ,"
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Appeal2018-004704
Application 14/698,366
emphasis added.). And movement and motion are synonyms. Id. ("motion:
... 1. the action or process of moving or of changing place or
position; movement," emphasis added.). Therefore, in ordinary usage,
vibration is a form of movement.
Although an applicant can act as its own lexicographer and define a
term to have other than its ordinary meaning, to do so, the applicant must
provide its differing definition in the specification with reasonable clarity,
deliberateness, and precision. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa per Azioni,
158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Also, when the applicant chooses to
give a term an uncommon meaning, the applicant must set out the
uncommon definition in a manner within the patent disclosure, sufficient to
give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change. In re Paulsen, 30
F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Here, Appellant does not provide such a
definition in the Specification. Page 10 of the Specification does not clearly
define movement so as to exclude vibrations that result from tapping. The
Specification itself refers to tapping as a motion source. Spec. 10. And the
mere use of the term "Alternatively" on page 10 of the Specification, cited
by Appellant (Reply Br. 2), to refer to user-movement of the housing does
not provide a clear, deliberate, and precise definition of the term movement
that would exclude tapping. At best, it is ambiguous evidence that could
provide some support for the narrower construction that Appellant seeks
without disqualifying the broader construction that other portions of the
Specification support ( e.g., the disclosure of tapping as a motion source).
Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, the broader reasonable
construction prevails.
Therefore, under the broadest reasonable construction standard,
Bengtsson's detection of the vibration of the housing induced by a user's
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Appeal2018-004704
Application 14/698,366
tapping detects user-induced movement. Accordingly, we agree with the
Examiner that Bengtsson discloses the detection limitation of claims 1 and 7,
and we sustain the rejection of those claims.
Appellants present the same arguments for claims 2---6, 8-9, 11-14,
and 17-22 as for claims 1 and 7. App. Br. 5-10. Accordingly, we also
sustain the rejections of claims 2---6, 8-9, 11-14, and 17-22.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the rejections of claims 1-9, 11-14, and 17-22.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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