Ex Parte LYU et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 21, 2013

11836506 (P.T.A.B. May. 21, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________
Ex parte JAE-JIN LYU, KYEONG HYEON KIM,
HEA-RI LEE, and JIAN-MIN CHEN
____________________

Appeal 2011-006909
Application 11/836,506
Technology Center 2800
____________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
CARLA M. KRIVAK, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 60-62, 64-68, 70-78, 80, 90, 91, and 99-107. Claims 1-59, 63, 69, 79,
81-89, and 92-98 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.

INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention is generally related to a liquid crystal
display (LCD) having a wide viewing angle. (Spec. 1:4-5.)
Independent claim 60, reproduced below, is representative of the
subject matter on appeal:
60. A liquid crystal display comprising:

a first substrate comprising a common electrode;

a second substrate opposite the first substrate;

a pixel electrode formed on the second substrate;

a black matrix pattern formed along a boundary of a pixel
region on the first substrate;

a light shielding part formed on the second substrate, and
disposed inside the pixel region and under the pixel electrode;

a first domain divider and a second domain divider
formed on at least one of the first substrate and the second
substrate; and

a liquid crystal layer comprising liquid crystal molecules
having negative dielectric anisotropy and aligned substantially
in a vertical direction to the first substrate when no electric field
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is applied to the liquid crystal layer, and the liquid crystal layer
being interposed between the pixel electrode and the common
electrode, and divided into a plurality of domain areas by the
first domain divider and the second domain divider inside the
pixel region when an electric field is applied to the liquid
crystal layer,

wherein the first domain divider and the second domain
divider are linear, respectively, are substantially arranged in a
shape of chevron and are slantingly extended with respect to the
gate line or the data line, respectively, and

wherein at least one of the first and the second domain
dividers is arranged in a parallel direction with an extending
direction of the light shielding part.

REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejected claims 60-62, 64-68, 70-78, 80, 90, 91
and 99-103 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the
combined teachings and suggestions of Lien (U.S. Patent No. 5,309,264) in
view of Hirakata (U.S. Patent No. 6,771,342 B2) and Iwata (U.S. Patent No.
5,976,639). Ans. 3-8.
2. The Examiner rejected claims 104-107 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a)
as being unpatentable over the combined teachings and suggestions of Lien,
Hirakata, Iwata, and Gibbons (U.S. Patent No. 5,846,452). Ans. 9-10.

CLAIM GROUPING
At the outset, we observe that Appellants repeatedly assert that “Lien
does not disclose, teach or suggest” various claimed features without
providing substantive arguments in support. (App. Br. 15-16). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim
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recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the
claim.”); In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that
the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the
prior art.”).
To the extent that Appellants advance substantive arguments, we
address the issues raised infra. Because Appellants have grouped all the
independent claims together, we consider independent claim 60 as the
representative claim for the first-stated rejection.1 See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

ANALYSIS
Combinability of the references under §103
Issue 1: Under § 103, did the Examiner err in combining the
references under §103?
Appellants contend “the portion of Lien cited by the Office does not
apply to the type of LCD presently claimed, and in fact, the absence of a
light blocking layer in the homeotropic cells, and the alternative use of a
compensating film, teaches away from the cited invention.” (App. Br. 17).
Appellants additionally contend the Examiner has relied on impermissible
hindsight. (Id.).
To teach away, prior art must “criticize, discredit, or otherwise
discourage the solution claimed in the [patent] application.” In re Fulton,

1 See App. Br. 16: “As the rejections of the independent claims are similar,
Applicants will address the rejections of all independent claims herein.”

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391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Mere disclosure of alternative
embodiments is not a teaching away. (Id.).
Here, Lien’s Figures 2-9 are directed to various embodiments of
electrode patterns of multi-domain homeotropic cell LCDs. (Lien, col. 3, ll.
22-24). Moreover, Lien expressly teaches “[a]s is well known in the art,
homeotropic cells use a compensating film to reduce light leakage for light
that travels through the liquid crystal display panel in a direction other than
perpendicular to the substrates.” (Id., col. 3, ll. 36-40). Lien also teaches
that “[t]wisted nematic [LCDs] generally use no compensating film
(although it can be used if needed). (Id., col. 7, ll. 14-16).
As pointed out by the Examiner (Ans. 6), Lien expressly teaches “as is
well known in the art, a black matrix material is used for normally white
applications.” (Lien, col. 7, ll. 20-21). We find Lien describes both types of
LCD cells (“FIGS. 10-15 illustrate various embodiments of electrodes for
twisted nematic LCD cells.”) (id., col. 7, ll. 22-23). We observe the
Examiner additionally relies on Hirakata, for teaching “the use of black
matrix structures as capacitor electrodes to efficiently use area to gain
adequate capacitance [Abstract and col. 5, lines 34-47].” (Ans. 6). The
Examiner also relies on Iwata as teaching “a black matrix pattern formed
along a boundary of a pixel region on the first substrate to prevent unwanted
light leakage [Figure 11 and col. 1, line 62 through col. 2, line 5 . . .]” (Ans.
7). Therefore, on this record, we find Appellants’ “teaching away”
argument unavailing. (App. Br. 17).
While we are fully aware that hindsight bias often plagues
determinations of obviousness, Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966), the Supreme Court guides that the “combination of
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familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when
it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (citation omitted). Here, given the familiar
LCD elements taught by the aforementioned references, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner has relied on impermissible hindsight in
formulating the obviousness rejections.
Further, Appellants have not provided any factual evidence of
secondary considerations, such as unexpected or unpredictable results,
commercial success, or long felt but unmet need. On this record, we are not
persuaded that the claimed invention would have been “uniquely challenging
or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious
step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485
F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19).

Issue 2: Under § 103, did the Examiner err in finding that the cited
references, either alone or in combination, would have taught or suggested:

a black matrix pattern formed along a boundary of a pixel
region on the first substrate; [and]
. . . .

wherein the first domain divider and the second domain
divider are linear, respectively, are substantially arranged in a
shape of chevron and are slantingly extended with respect to the
gate line or the data line, respectively,

within the meaning of representative claim 60?
Regarding the first disputed limitation, we have addressed above how
the disputed black matrix pattern is taught or suggested by the cited
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combination of references. We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s
underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness
regarding this first disputed limitation. (See Ans. 6-7). We also agree with
the Examiner that Appellants focus their arguments on the teachings of the
primary Lien reference, and do not substantively traverse the Examiner’s
findings regarding the secondary Hirakata and Iwata references.2 (See App.
Br. 18).
Regarding the second disputed limitation, we observe that claim 60
recites: “substantially arranged in a shape of chevron” (emphasis added).
Our reviewing court guides that “[t]he term ‘substantial’ implies
‘approximate.’” Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,
442 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). See also Playtext
Products, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 400 F.3d 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“The term ‘substantial’ is a meaningful modifier implying ‘approximate,’
rather than ‘perfect.’” (citing Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 355
F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ) ).
Here, we agree with the Examiner that at least Lien’s Figures 5 and 6
would have taught or suggested the disputed first and second linear domain
dividers that we find are substantially (i.e., approximately) arranged in a
shape of a chevron between adjacent rows or columns of pixels, and are
slantingly extended with respect to the gate line or the data line. (Ans. 4-5).
Regarding the independent claims that recite the additional storage
capacitor limitation (67, 73, and 78), we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 6)
that Hirakata teaches or suggests this limitation. (Hirakata, col. 5, ll. 38-43).

2 Attacking the references individually does not show nonobviousness where
rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Merck & Co., 800
F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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Appellants’ arguments notwithstanding, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and
ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of representative independent claim 60, and
independent claims 67, 73, 78, 90, and 91, which recite the aforementioned
limitations in commensurate form. The associated dependent claims that
stand rejected under the first-stated rejection fall therewith. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding the second-stated rejection of dependent claims 104-107,
Appellants urge that these claims are patentable for the same reasons
previously advanced regarding the independent claims. (App. Br. 18).
However, we do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive regarding the
base claims for the reasons discussed supra

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 60-62, 64-68,
70-78, 80, 90, 91, and 99-107 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

ORDER
AFFIRMED

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