Ex Parte Lynn

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 29, 2013

11567440 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/567,440 12/06/2006 Richard Clifford Lynn BPRLN0001RL 7614
27939 7590 04/30/2013
PHILIP H. BURRUS, IV
460 Grant Street SE
Atlanta, GA 30312
EXAMINER
FRISBY, KEITH J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3616
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/30/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte RICHARD CLIFFORD LYNN
____________________

Appeal 2011-002368
Application 11/567,440
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before: WILLIAM V. SAINDON, NEIL T. POWELL, and
BEVERLY M. BUNTING, Administrative Patent Judges.

BUNTING, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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Application 11/567,440

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STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. §134 from a rejection of claims 1-
20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a detachable vehicle configured for
convenient towing or transport. Claims 1 and 17 are independent. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A three-wheel vehicle configured to
be selectively disassembled, comprising:
a. a chassis having two rear wheels
coupled thereto; and
b. a front fork assembly, separable from
the chassis, and stowable within the chassis, the
front fork assembly comprising:
i. a handlebar assembly;
ii. a fork assembly comprising two
fork members coupled by a steering member to a
chassis connecting member; and
iii. a detachable wheel.

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Parrett
Mathisen
Hill
Johnson
McReynolds
Paget
Di Blasi
US D185,901
US 2,614,857
US 2,812,227
US 3,212,596
US 3,282,365
US 3,513,926
US 3,580,348
Aug. 18, 1859
Oct. 21, 1952
Nov. 5, 1957
Oct. 19, 1965
Nov. 1, 1966
May 26, 1970
May 25, 1971
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Jackson
Brandenfels
Wilkins, Jr.
McCoy
US 4,119,331
US 4,750,578
US 5,314,202
US 5,727,806
Oct. 10, 1978
Jun. 14, 1988
May 24, 1994
Mar. 17, 1998

REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
I. Claims 1 and 7-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §102(b) as
being anticipated by Di Blasi. Ans. 4.
II. Claims 1 and 7-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Di Blasi and Mathisen. Ans. 4.
III. Claims 2-6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Di Blasi and Brandenfels. Ans. 5.
IV. Claims 12 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Di Blasi and Parrett. Ans. 7.
V. Claims 14 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Di Blasi and McReynolds. Ans. 8.
VI. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Di Blasi, McReynolds and McCoy. Ans. 9.
VII. Claims 17-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Di Blasi, McReynolds, McCoy, Wilkins and
Mathisen. Ans. 10.
VIII. Claims 1, 7, 10 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a)
as being unpatentable over Paget and Johnson. Ans. 12.
IX. Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Paget, Johnson and Hill. Ans. 13.
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X. Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Paget, Johnson, Hill and Jackson. Ans. 14.
XI. Claims 12 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Paget, Johnson and Jackson. Ans. 14.
XII. Claims 14 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Paget, Johnson and McReynolds. Ans.
15.
XIII. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Paget, Johnson, McReynolds and McCoy.
Ans. 16.
XIV. Claims 17-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Paget, Johnson, McReynolds, McCoy,
Wilkins and Mathisen. Ans. 16.

ANALYSIS
Rejection I – Anticipation by Di Blasi
Appellant argues claims 1 and 7-11 together as a group. App. Br.12-
16. We select claim 1 as representative of the group, and claims 7-11, which
depend from claim 1, will stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011).
Claim 1 encompasses a three-wheel vehicle having a front fork
assembly (handlebar assembly, two fork members coupled by a steering
member, detachable wheel) that is separable from a chassis and stowable
within the chassis. The Examiner found that Di Blasi discloses a three-
wheel vehicle having a chassis with two rear wheels and a front fork
assembly (handlebar assembly 20, two fork members 18, steering member
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18, chassis connecting member 24, 17, and detachable wheel 19) and the
front fork assembly is separable from the chassis by removing pins (16 and
35), and stowable within the chassis. Ans. 4, citing Di Blasi figs. 1- 4, 6, 8
and 9.
Appellant argued that Di Blasi does not teach a fork assembly (i.e.
front fork, wheel and handlebar) that is separable from the chassis, but rather
teaches the “opposite of a detachable fork assembly.” App. Br. 13-14.
Appellant points to column 1, lines 1-15 of Di Blasi as teaching “Many
types of collapsible frames for wheeled vehicles are known, such as frames
comprising a plurality of frame portions interconnected by screws allowing
the frame disassembly into a plurality of portions of elements ... .” App. Br.
15. Further, Appellant contends that the use of pins does not necessarily
mean that “the front fork ‘must’ be detachable” since pins in construction
and mechanical devices can be configured not to be removable. App. Br.
14-15. In response, the Examiner cited Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, Unabridged, as defining “separable” to mean “capable of being
separated or disassociated” and reasoned that “[t]he term separable does not
define any structure beyond that taught by Di Blasi.” Ans. 19. The
Examiner concluded that since front fork assembly and chassis are
connected by pins 16 and 35, they are capable of being separated. Ans. 19.
We are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s finding that Di Blasi
discloses a fork assembly (handlebar assembly 20, two fork members 18,
steering member 18, chassis connecting member 24,17, and detachable
wheel 19) that is separable from the chassis by the removal of pins (16, 35).
As the Examiner correctly noted, claim 1 fails to “require that the front fork
assembly be separated from the chassis prior to being stowed in the chassis”
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or “specify any particular conditions limiting the manner in which the front
fork assembly and the chassis are separable.” Ans. 20. Thus the Examiner
had a sound basis for finding that Di Blasi discloses a fork assembly that is
separable from the chassis and stowable within the chassis. As such, we
sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 7-11 under 35 U.S.C §102(b).

Rejections II-VI – Obviousness rejections based on Di Blasi
II. Claims 1 and 7-11, Di Blasi and Mathisen
Appellant argues independent claim 1 only, we select claim 1 as
representative and dependent claims 7-11 will stand or fall with claim 1.1
App. Br. 12, 16-20.
The Examiner alternatively found that Mathisen teaches a detachable
front wheel, and reasoned it would have been obvious to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to provide a “detachable wheel as taught by Mathisen
on the front of a vehicle as taught by Di Blasi in order to allow the wheel to
be removed or replaced.” Ans. 4, citing Mathisen (col. 2, ll. 23-28).
Appellant argues that the combination of Di Blasi and Mathisen fails to
teach the element of a front fork that is both “separable” from the chassis
and “stowable” within the chassis since the handlebar assembly of Di Blasi
“remains connected to the chassis at all times” and Mathisen teaches
detachable wheels and not a detachable fork. App. Br. 17. This argument is
not persuasive, as the Examiner only relied on Mathisen to teach a
detachable wheel, which Appellant does not contest. We agree with the
Examiner’s finding that Di Blasi discloses a fork assembly having a
detachable wheel, and the fork assembly is separable from the chassis and

1 Appellant limited arguments with respect to independent claims only.
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stowable within the chassis. For the reasons noted above directed to the
same argument raised with respect to claim 1, we find that the Examiner has
adequately articulated a reason to combine the teachings that is supported by
rational underpinnings.
Next, Appellant argues that there is no suggestion to modify the
combination to make either the front fork of Di Blasi or the plates of
Mathisen detachable, since such a modification “would eviscerate the
primary function of Di Blasi's invention, which is that of employing rotating
components so as to be collapsible.” App. Br. 18. Appellant also argues,
absent use of hindsight, there is no teaching in either reference to make the
modification, and such modification renders the references unsuitable for
their intended purposes. App. Br. 19. With respect to Appellants’ argument
based on Di Blasi’s purported purpose of collapsibility, it is not necessary
for the prior art to serve the same purpose as that disclosed in Appellant’s
Specification in order to support the conclusion that the claimed subject
matter would have been obvious. 2 In addition, it does not logically follow
that removable pins undermines the ability of Di Blasi’s invention to rotate
and/or collapse. The Examiner’s reason to combine the teachings is
expressly articulated and is supported by rational underpinnings, which is
what is required in making a rejection based on obviousness.3 As such, the
rejection of claims 1 and 7-11 under 35 U.S.C §103(a) is sustained.

2 See In re Linter, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016 (CCPA 1972). “A reference may be
read for all that it teaches, including uses beyond its primary purpose.” In re
Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012), citing KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-421 (2007).
3 See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
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III. Claims 2-6, Di Blasi and Brandenfels
Appellants did not provide a separate argument in addressing the
rejection of claims 2-6, which depend directly or indirectly from claim 1,
and instead relied on the arguments presented against claim 1. For the
reasons set forth with respect to the obviousness rejection of claim 1
discussed supra, we sustain the rejection of claims 2-6.

IV. Claims 12 and 13, Di Blasi and Parrett
Appellants did not provide a separate argument in addressing the
rejection of claims 12 and 13, which depend indirectly from claim 1, and
instead relied on the arguments presented against claim 1. For the reasons
set forth with respect to the obviousness rejection of claim 1 discussed
supra, we sustain the rejection of claims 12 and 13.

V. Claims 14 and 15, Di Blasi and McReynolds
Appellants did not provide a separate argument in addressing the
rejection of claims 14 and 15, which depend indirectly from claim 1, and
instead relied on the arguments presented against claim 1. For the reasons
set forth with respect to the obviousness rejection of claim 1 discussed
supra, we sustain the rejection of claims 14 and 15.

VI. Claim 16, Di Blasi, McReynolds and McCoy
Appellants did not provide a separate argument in addressing the
rejection of claim 16, which depends indirectly from claim 1, and instead
relied on the arguments presented against claim 1. For the reasons set forth
with respect to claim 1 discussed supra, we sustain the rejection of claim 16.
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Rejection VII – Obviousness over Di Blasi, McReynolds, McCoy, Wilkins
and Mathisen
Appellant argues the rejections of claims 17-20 together as a group.
App. Br. 24-25. We select independent claim 17 as representative of the
group, and claims 18-20, which depend directly or indirectly from claim 17,
will stand or fall with claim 17.
The Examiner repeated the earlier finding that Di Blasi discloses a
fork assembly that is separable from the chassis by the removal of pins, and
admits that Di Blasi does not teach a hitching member or a winch. Ans. 10.
The Examiner relied on McReynolds to teach a three-wheel vehicle with a
hitching member (44-45,48, 55-58, 60,62, 95, and 97-99) extending distally
from a front face (35) of the chassis and having at least two hitching pins
(shown as circles on hitch member 55). Ans. 10, citing McReynolds figs. 2,
3 and 7. According to the Examiner, it would have been obvious to modify
the three-wheel vehicle taught by Di Blasi with the hitch taught by
McReynolds “in order to make the vehicle easily and quickly adapted for
towing by an automotive vehicle.” Id., citing McReynolds, (col. 1, lines 7-
10). The Examiner acknowledged that McReynolds does not explicitly
teach that the hitch pins extend distally from opposite sides of the hitching
member and relied on the teachings of McCoy regarding a hitching member
with two hitching pins (38) extending distally from the sides of the hitching
member (18) and received within at least two hitching pin recesses (34 and
36). Ans. 10-11, citing McCoy, fig. 1. Thus, the Examiner reasoned it
would have been obvious to modify Di Blasi’s three-wheel with
McReynold’s hitch to have McCoy’s two pins so as to provide “an easily
attachable non-pivoting connection between a standard socket-type hitch
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connection and a hitch arm.” Ans. 11. The Examiner then relied on the
teachings of Wilkins regarding a hitching member with a winch and a
retractable cable (9). Ans. 11, citing Wilkins, col. 2, lines 58-66, fig. 3. The
Examiner stated it would have been obvious to “modify the collapsible
three-wheel vehicle taught by Di Blasi with the hitch taught by McReynolds
and McCoy and a winch and cable as taught by Wilkins in order to easily
raise one end of the vehicle to be towed.” Ans. 11. Finally, the Examiner
repeated his earlier finding that Mathisen teaches a vehicle having
detachable wheels and that it would have been obvious to provide a
detachable wheel on the front of a vehicle as taught by Di Blasi “in order to
allow the wheel to be removed or replaced.” Id., citing Mathisen, (col. 2,
lines 23-28).
Appellant argues that the combination of references “expressly
teaches that the front fork assembly should not be detachable from the
chassis” and repeats the previous argument from claim1 that Di Blasi
teaches away from detachable components. Ans. 24. Appellant admits that
the steering handle of McReynolds is detachable, but contends McReynolds
does not teach a fork assembly that is detachable. Id. Appellant maintains
that McCoy does not solve this deficiency, arguing McCoy teaches a trailer
hitch and not a fork assembly or wheel. App. Br. 25. Appellant asserts that
Wilkins does not teach either a detachable fork assembly or a detachable
wheel, but rather a hitch suitable for coupling to a golf cart. Id.
Appellant’s arguments improperly focuses on the teachings of each
cited reference individually (i.e., McReynolds, McCoy, Wilkins and
Mathisen) rather than addressing the Examiner’s proposed modification to
the Di Blasi's three wheel vehicle as a result of the combination of the
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teachings of Di Blasi, McReynolds, McCoy, Wilkins and Mathisen. The
Examiner’s reason to combine the teachings is expressly articulated and
Appellant does not apprise us of error in this articulation. Accordingly, we
are not apprised of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 17. As such, the
rejection of claims 17-20 is sustained.

Rejections VIII-XIII – Obviousness rejections based on Paget
VIII. Claims 1, 7, 10 and 11, Paget and Johnson
Appellant argues the rejections of claims 1, 7, 10 and 11 together as a
group. App. Br. 20-24. We select claim 1 as representative and claims 7, 10
and 11 will stand or fall with claim 1.
The Examiner found that Paget teaches a two-wheel vehicle having a
chassis (8,9), front fork assembly with handlebars (61,62), two fork
members (56,57), steering members (65, 66 and 69) and wheel(55), and the
front fork assembly is separable from the chassis and stowable within the
chassis, but does not teach a three-wheel vehicle or front foot plate. Ans.
12-13, citing Paget (col. 2, ll. 39-45; col. 4, ll. 27-29; col.5 ll. 30-43 and 63-
74; col. 5 l. 63-col. 6 l. 2; col. 6, ll. 40-44, 59-66); Abstract; figs. 1-8. The
Examiner relied on Johnson to teach a three wheel vehicle having a front
foot plate (80) and configured to be selectively disassembled. Ans. 13,
citing Johnson (col. 1, ll. 33-50). The Examiner reasoned it would have
been obvious to modify Paget’s vehicle by providing two rear wheels and a
front foot plate taught by Johnson in order for the vehicle “to be self-
supporting and capable of carrying a substantial number of persons and/or
loads.” Ans. 13, citing Johnson (col. 1, ll. 48-50.)
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Appellant argues that one of skill in the art “would not be motivated
to combine Padget with Johnson because the references themselves teach
that such a combination would be undesirable.” 4 Ans. 21. According to
Appellant, Paget teaches a collapsible two-wheeled vehicle meant to be
carried by a user with one arm, which precludes three wheels or changes to
the frame. App. Br. 21-23. Appellant challenges the Examiner’s articulated
reason for combining Paget and Johnson, arguing that the combination
“would change the operating principle of each reference, since the
combination would require an increased chassis size of Paget’s vehicle,
precluding storage in the desired compartments, or the ability to carry the
vehicle using one arm. App. Br. 23. Appellant asserts that Johnson
expressly states that his vehicle is not combinable with a two-wheeled
vehicle because such a combination would “change Johnson’s principle of
operation, i.e. the ability to carry large loads, large numbers of people, as
well as the ability to travel long distances at high speeds.” Ans. 23-24,
citing Johnson (col. 1 ll. 22-25).
Appellant’s arguments do not apprise or persuade us of error in the
Examiner’s findings or conclusion of obviousness, which is supported by a
rational underpinning. The Examiner correctly noted the desirability of
adding a third wheel to Paget’s vehicle “in order to make the vehicle self-
supporting” and “capable of carrying a greater load” and reasoned that such
modification would not make the vehicle unliftable or unstowable. Ans. 22,
citing Johnson (col. 1, ll. 47-50). In addition, we note that even assuming,
arguendo, that some benefits of Paget were reduced or eliminated by the
proposed modification, such would not necessarily bar the Examiner’s

4 We presume that Appellant is referring to Paget.
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proposed combination, as benefits lost and gained must be weighed. Thus,
we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that modifying Paget with
Johnson would render either Paget or Johnson unsatisfactory for its intended
purpose. As such, the rejection of claim 1 and 7-11 is sustained.

IX. Claim 8, Paget, Johnson and Hill
Appellants did not provide a separate argument in addressing the
rejection of claim 8, which depends indirectly from claim 1, and instead
relied on the arguments presented against claim 1. For the reasons set forth
with respect to claim 1 discussed supra, we sustain the rejection of claim 8.

X. Claim 9, Paget, Johnson, Hill and Jackson
Appellants did not provide a separate argument in addressing the
rejection of claim 9, which depends indirectly from claim 1, and instead
relied on the arguments presented against claim 1. For the reasons set forth
with respect to the obviousness rejection of claim 1 discussed supra, we
sustain the rejection of claim 9.

XI. Claims 12-13, Paget, Johnson and Jackson
Appellants did not provide a separate argument in addressing the
rejection of claims 12 and 13, which depend indirectly from claim 1, and
instead relied on the arguments presented against claim 1. For the reasons
set forth with respect to the obviousness rejection of claim 1 discussed
supra, we sustain the rejection of claims 12 and 13.

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XII. Claims 14 and 15, Paget, Johnson and McReynolds
Appellants did not provide a separate argument in addressing the
rejection of claims 14 and 15, which depend indirectly from claim 1, and
instead relied on the arguments presented against claim 1. For the reasons
set forth with respect to the obviousness rejection of claim 1 discussed
supra, we sustain the rejection of claims 14 and 15.

XIII. Claim 16, Paget, Johnson, McReynolds and McCoy
Appellants did not provide a separate argument in addressing the
rejection of claim 16, which depend indirectly from claim 1, and instead
relied on the arguments presented against claim 1. For the reasons set forth
with respect to claim 1 discussed supra, we sustain the rejection of claim 16.

Rejection XIV – Obviousness over Paget, Johnson, McReynolds, McCoy,
Wilkins and Mathisen.
Appellant argues the rejections of claims 17-20 together as a group.
App. Br. 25-26. We select independent claim 17 as representative of the
group, and claims 18-20 which depend directly or indirectly from claim 17
will stand or fall with claim 17.
The Examiner repeated the earlier finding regarding Paget Johnson,
McReynolds, McCoy, Wilkins and Mathisen. Ans. 16-19. Appellant asserts
the same arguments set forth with respect to the rejection of claim 1 in view
of Paget and Johnson. App. Br. 25. Appellant further argues that one would
not be motivated to combine McReynolds, McCoy, Wilkins or Mathisen
with Paget for the same reasons. Id. Additionally, Appellant argues that the
addition of the golf cart components of McReynolds would expand the size
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of Paget’s chassis and prohibit stowability or prevent the user from carrying
with one arm. Id. Appellant contends that one would not be motivated to
combine the trailer hitch of McCoy with “a vehicle configured to be
transported by one arm because that vehicle is meant to be transported by
one arm.” App. Br. 26. Finally, Appellant submits that Wilkins teaches a
trailer hitch, and that one would not be motivated to combine a towable
vehicle with Paget because it would detract from Paget's stated purpose of
providing “... a personnel transporter wherein the thrust axis of the engine
lines on the central axis of the vehicle ...” because there is no engine in
Wilkins vehicle. App. Br. 25.
Appellant’s arguments improperly focus on the teachings of each of
the references individually instead of addressing the Examiner’s stated case
for obviousness. These arguments do not apprise or persuade us of error in
the Examiner’s findings or conclusions of obviousness with respect to the
combined references, each of which are supported by a rational
underpinning. As such, the rejection of claims 17-20 is sustained.
DECISION
The rejection of claims 1, 7-11 under 35 U.S.C §102(b) is affirmed.
The rejections of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C §103(a) are affirmed
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2009).

AFFIRMED

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