Ex Parte Lu et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 25, 2017

12998041 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 25, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/998,041 03/11/2011 Xiuping Lu PU080163 2381
24498 7590 09/27/2017
Robert D. Shedd, Patent Operations
THOMSON Licensing LLC
4 Research Way
3rd Floor
Princeton, NJ 08543
EXAMINER
ITSKOVICH, MIKHAIL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2483
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/27/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspto@technicolor.com
pat. verlangieri @ technicolor.com
russell. smith @ technicolor.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte XIUPING LU, SHEMIMON MANALIKUDY ANTHRU, and
DAVID ANTHONY CAMP ANA
Appeal 2017-002983
Application 12/998,0411
Technology Center 2400
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
BAIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—4, 6—14, 16—20, 31, 32, 34, and 35, which
constitute all claims pending in the application. Claims 5, 15, 21—30, 33,
and 36 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Thomson Licensing. App.
Br. 3.
Appeal 2017-002983
Application 12/998,041
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Claimed Invention
The claimed invention relates to delivering video data in
communications systems, and specifically, shifting delivery of “enhanced”
layers of video data to off-peak times in order to make more efficient use of
available bandwidth. Spec. 1—8. For example, in one embodiment of the
invention, low-bandwidth “standard definition” (SD) programs may be live-
streamed to a user’s set top box, whereas some of the data for high-
bandwidth “high definition” (HD) programs has already been pre­
downloaded to the set top box in “enhancement layer files” during off-peak
times. Id. at 126. Claims 1 and 11 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative
of the invention and the subject matter of the appeal, and reads as follows:
1. A method of reproducing a scalably encoded digital video
signal transmitted in first and second layers, the method
comprising:
receiving at a user terminal data units of the second layer;
storing the received data units of the second layer in an
enhancement layer media container file at the user terminal;
receiving at the user terminal a stream of data units of the
first layer corresponding to the data units of the second layer;
combining at the user terminal the data units of the first
layer with those corresponding data units of the second layer that
are received and stored before the corresponding data units of the
first layer are received, the data units of the first and second
layers comprising digital samples and the combining step
including:
identifying digital samples in the first layer and digital
samples in the second layer having matching synchronization
information, including:
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Application 12/998,041
determining a temporal displacement of an access point of
the first layer from the start of the stream of first layer data units
using a timestamp of the access point; and
identifying the data unit of the second layer whose
temporal displacement from the start of a track timeline matches
the temporal displacement of the access point of the first layer
from the start of the stream of first layer data units, including
determining the temporal displacement of the data unit of the
second layer from the start of the track timeline by accessing a
time-to-sample table of the enhancement layer media container
file, the time-to-sample table comprising samples of the second
layer and a corresponding duration for each of the samples', and
wherein a decoding time of the each of the samples is determined
by adding all of the corresponding durations of all preceding
samples in the time-to-sample table; and
generating output video frames by decoding the combined
data units at the user terminal,
wherein the data units of the second layer include scalable
video enhancement layer data units comprising information for
enhancing at least one of a resolution, frame rate and quality of
the first layer, the first layer including at least one of a scalable
video base layer and a scalable video enhancement layer and the
second layer including a scalable video enhancement layer
higher than the first layer.
App. Br. 14—15 (Claims App.) (emphases added).
The Rejection on Appeal
Claims 1—4, 6—14, 16—20, 31, 32, 34, and 35 stand rejected under pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Takeuchi et al. (US
2002/0051581 Al; May 2, 2002) (“Takeuchi”), Gupte et al. (US
2006/0282864 Al; Dec. 14, 2006) (“Gupte”), and Forecast et al. (US
7,096,481 Bl; Aug. 22, 2006) (“Forecast”). Final Act. 8—16.
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellants’
arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments which Appellants could
have made but did not make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). On the record before us, we are unpersuaded
the Examiner has erred. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set
forth in the rejections from which the appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s
Answer, and provide the following for highlighting and emphasis.
Independent Claims 1 and 11
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches or
suggests “accessing a time-to-sample table of the enhancement layer media
container file” in order to determine temporal displacement of a data unit
from the start of the track timeline, as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 8—12;
Reply Br. 2—7.2 * 4Appellants also argue the Examiner erred in finding the
prior art teaches or suggests a “decoding time of the each of the samples is
determined by adding all of the corresponding durations of all preceding
samples” in the time-to-sample table, as further recited in claim 1. Id.
Appellants further argue the Examiner erred in finding a rationale to
combine the references. App. Br. 9-12. We, however, are unpersuaded of
error.
Appellants’ arguments regarding each of the disputed limitations do
not demonstrate error, because each argument alleges deficiencies in
individual references, rather than the combination relied upon by the
2 Appellants argue independent claims 1 and 11 as a group, and we choose
claim 1 as representative of the group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Examiner. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references
individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a
combination of references.”). Specifically, Appellants first contend each of
Gupte, Takeuchi, and Forecast individually lack any teaching of “accessing
a time-to-sample table of the enhancement layer media container file.” App.
Br. 9 (“there is no teaching or suggestion that the section data 172 in Gupte
are related to durations for decoding”); id. (“Takeuchi is silent as to the
time-to-sample table”). The Examiner, however, relies on the combination
of Gupte’s teaching of video coding and synchronization, with Takeuchi’s
teaching of “accessing time stamp information in each layer stream” from a
time-to-sample table. Ans. 13—14.
Similarly, Appellants argue the “decoding time” limitation is not
taught in Takeuchi or Gupte, App. Br. 9, but the Examiner finds it would
have been obvious to modify the Takeuchi-Gupte combination using the
teachings of Forecast regarding “video encoding and transmission
standards.” Ans. 16—17; see also Forecast col. 27,11. 1—10. As the
Examiner finds, the modification would “determine a decoding time of
. . . each of the samples by adding all of the corresponding durations of all
preceding samples in the time-to-sample table [as recited in claim 1] in order
to avoid decoding discontinuity.” Ans. 17 (citing Forecast col. 2,11. 27—30).
Accordingly, Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us the Examiner erred.
Appellants also argue that even if all of the claim limitations are
taught or suggested in the prior art, the Examiner erred in combining the
references because the combination is “conclusory” and without any
“rational underpinning.” App. Br. 10. Specifically, Appellants argue the
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Application 12/998,041
combination is hindsight, and that the Examiner “has not made the necessary
factual findings and associated reasoning.” Id. at 11. We disagree.
In the Answer, the Examiner provides detailed findings setting forth
“articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support” the
combination of references, and conclusion of obviousness. KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). As the Examiner finds, Appellants’
claims “do not elaborate on the [specific] steps of decoding SVC video,”
which suggests a person of ordinary skill in the art is “someone [who]
understands video signal processing, data flow architecture, and the
mathematics of video compression and encoding, with an operable
knowledge of established video standards such as MPEG and SVC.” Ans. 7.
As the Examiner finds, Takeuchi teaches synchronization of layers
(including an enhancement layer) that had been segmented in a video data
stream, and Gupte similarly teaches “segmenting” media content “such as
audio or video” into sections for efficient distribution. Takeuchi 148; Gupte
Abs. Similarly, Forecast is directed to “splicing” of encoded MPEG video,
and decoding the video based upon time stamps. See, e.g., Innovention Toys
LLC v. MGA Entertainment Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1322—23 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(finding sufficient basis for combining references that share the “same
purpose,” “goal,” or “objective”). We discern no error in the Examiner’s
finding that, in order to determine the decoding time of each sample in
Takeuchi and Gupte’s segmented (layered) video, a person of ordinary skill
would consult Forecast’s teaching of adding corresponding durations of
preceding samples in a time-to-sample table (as taught in Gupte) to avoid
decoding discontinuity. Ans. 17; KSR, 550 U.S. 421 (person of ordinary
skill in the art is “a person of ordinary creativity” in the pertinent field).
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Further, although Appellants’ arguments quote the legal standards for
obviousness and the teachings of the cited references, Appellants do not
explain why the Examiner allegedly erred in combining them. See In re
Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (attorney argument with no
meaningful explanation or evidence is unpersuasive of error); In re Lovin,
652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Appellants have not provided
persuasive evidence to show combining the features of Gupte with Takeuchi
and Forecast would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR Int 7 Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398,418-19 (2007)).
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the obviousness rejection of
claims 1 and 11.
Remaining Claims
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in rejecting the remaining
claims, all of which are dependent, for the same reasons as independent
claims 1 and 11. App. Br. 12. For the reasons discussed above, we are not
persuaded of error.
Accordingly, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 2-4, 6—
10, 12-14, 16-20,31,32, 34, and 35.
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Application 12/998,041
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—4, 6—14, 16—20, 31,
32, 34, and 35 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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