Ex Parte LineaweaverDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJul 27, 201812557242 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 27, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/557,242 09/10/2009 110239 7590 07/31/2018 Edell Shapiro & Finnan LLC 9801 Washingtonian Blvd., Suite 750 Gaithersburg, MD 20878 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Sean Lineaweaver UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 3065.0178C 4038 EXAMINER LEE, ERICA SHENG KAI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3762 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/31/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): epatent@usiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SEAN LINEA WEA VER Appeal2017-006982 Application 12/557,242 Technology Center 3700 Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, and RYAN H. FLAX, Administrative Patent Judges. FITZPATRICK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Sean Lineaweaver ("Appellant") 1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a decision finally rejecting claims 1-25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE According to Appellant, the claimed invention "relates generally to stimulating medical devices, and more particularly, to fitting a stimulating medical device." Spec. i-f l. The stimulating medical device may be, for example, a hearing or cochlear prosthesis. Id. at i-f2. 1 The real party in interest is identified as Cochlear Limited. App. Br. 3. Appeal2017-006982 Application 12/557 ,242 Of the pending and finally rejected claims, claims 1, 19, 16, and 24 are independent. App. Br. 21-27. Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows, with a limitation critical to this decision, in italics: 1. A method for fitting a stimulating medical device to a recipient, comprising: transmitting a signal to cause the stimulating medical device to apply stimulation to the recipient; displaying, to the recipient, a graphical user inteiface configured for someone whose capacity for intuiting how to use the graphical user interface is that of a person lacking specialized training in the field of fitting stimulating medical devices; receiving a response to the applied stimulation from the recipient via the graphical user interface; determining a stimulation level parameter using the recipient's response; and transmitting the stimulation level parameter to the stimulating medical device for use in applying stimulation to the recipient. Id. at 21. The following rejections are before us for review: (1) Claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 i-f2 as indefinite (Final Act. 4); (2) Claims 1-7, 9-14, 16-22, 24 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as anticipated by Litvak2 or, alternatively, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the same (Final Act. 5); and (3) Claims 8, 15, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Litvak and Wakefield3 (Final Act. 8). 2 US 2008/0033507 Al (published Feb. 7, 2008) ("Litvak"). 2 Appeal2017-006982 Application 12/557 ,242 DISCUSSION Rejection 1 The Examiner rejected all claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112 i-f2 for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. Final Act. 4. For claims under examination, "a claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear," i.e., "ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention." In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1310-13 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also MPEP § 2173.02(I) (Rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015) (advising examiners that a rejection for indefiniteness is appropriate "after applying the broadest reasonable interpretation to the claim, if the metes and bounds of the claimed invention are not clear"). Moreover, "if a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the US PTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite." Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 2008 WL 5105055, at *5 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). The independent claims recite, and the dependent claims incorporate, "a graphical user interface [GUI] configured for someone whose capacity for intuiting how to use the graphical user interface is that of a person lacking specialized training in the field of fitting stimulating medical devices." App. Br. 21-27. The Examiner rejected the claims as indefinite "because it is unclear to what degree 'specialized training' should entail for someone." 3 US 8,301,259 B2 (issued Oct. 30, 2012) ("Wakefield"). 3 Appeal2017-006982 Application 12/557 ,242 Final Act. 4. We agree, and conclude the claims are also indefinite for further reasons, as discussed below. Applicant does not substantively address Examiner's point regarding the degree of "specialized training." See Final Act. 4. Instead, Applicant asserts a binary universe of people: "namely: a first class of people, each of whom 'lack[ s] specialized training in the field of fitting stimulating medical devices;' and a second class of people, each of whom has received specialized training in the field of fitting stimulating medical devices." App. Br. 9-10. Applicant argues that "the first class includes people who receive the stimulating medical devices, i.e., people to whom the devices are fitted, namely the recipients; and the second class includes people who are trained to fit stimulating medical devices to the recipients, for example, clinicians, e.g., an audiologist." Id. at 10 (emphasis added). By Applicant's own argument, and in particular Applicant's open-ended description of the purported two classes of people using the word "includes," Applicant concedes the indefinite scope of the claims. Further, Applicant concedes that it is not enough to identify a person as a clinician (or not) because not all clinicians will necessarily have "specialized training." Id. ("[T]he adjective 'specialized' modifying the phrase 'training in the field of fitting stimulating medical devices' [describes] training (in the field of fitting stimulating medical devices) that would typically have been provided to members of the second class (clinicians, etc.) and not to members of the first class (recipients)." ( emphasis added)). We see no error in the Examiner's rejection of the claims as indefinite. 4 Appeal2017-006982 Application 12/557 ,242 Moreover, the claims are indefinite for a further reason. That is, even if it were clear who is "a person lacking specialized training in the field of fitting stimulating medical devices," it would nonetheless be unclear to the skilled artisan, as it is to us, the meets and bounds of "a graphical user interface configured for someone whose capacity for intuiting how to use the graphical user interface is that of' that person, as recited in the independent claims. In that regard, it is unclear how a graphical user interface configuration would be different for a person having specializing training in the recited field than for a person lacking such training. For example, any person can press or slide his or her finger against a touchscreen, such as the one disclosed in Litvak Figure 12 and asserted by Examiner (see infra), regardless of his or her training or lack thereof. 4 The claim language is ambiguous. The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 i-f2 is affirmed. Rejection 2 The Examiner rejected claims 1-7, 9-14, 16-22, 24, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Litvak or, alternatively, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the same prior art. Final Act. 5. As determined by the Examiner, Litvak discloses systems and methods "for fitting an implantable cochlear stimulator to a patient include 4 To the extent that such a difference in configuration would be based on the technical level of the information communicated by the GUI, such information likely would constitute "printed matter," namely, "matter claimed for what it communicates." In re Distefano, 808 F.3d 845, 850 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus, such information would not necessarily be entitled to any weight for patentability purposes. Id. 5 Appeal2017-006982 Application 12/557 ,242 an interface unit configured to display a graphical representation of an implant fitting line as part of a graphical user interface." Litvak i-f57; see also Final Act. 5. The Examiner explained how Litvak discloses the subject matter and each element of claims 1-7, 9-14, 16-22, 24, and 25 under 3 5. Final Act. 5-8. We discern no error is the Examiner's determinations. In its Appeal, Applicant argues purported error only in Examiner's finding that Litvak discloses the limitation we concluded above to be indefinite, namely "a graphical user interface configured for someone whose capacity for intuiting how to use the graphical user interface is that of a person lacking specialized training in the field of fitting stimulating medical devices." App. Br. 9, 18. Although this limitation is ambiguous, for the sake of complete examination in view of the prior art, we understand that a patient, as opposed to a clinician, would fall within its scope of "a person lacking specialized training .... " Against that limitation, the Examiner mapped Litvak' s graphical user interface 170, which is described in paragraph 61 and illustrated in Figure 12 of Litvak. See Final Act. 2-3 (citing Litvak i-f61 and Fig. 12), 5---6 (same). The Examiner pointed out that Litvak discloses that "the GUI is used by a clinician or a patient." Id. at 2 ( citing Litvak i-f 61 ). Litvak paragraph 61 indeed describes this, stating: The slope and/or the position of the fitting line (161; FIG. 8) may be adjusted by the cochlear implant patient, by a clinician, or by any other person using a variety of different control interfaces. For example, FIG. 12 illustrates an exemplary graphical user interface (GUI) (170) that may be used to adjust the slope and/or the position of the fitting line (161). The GUI (170) may include a graphical depiction (177) of the fitting line (161 ). The graphical depiction (177) may be configured to 6 Appeal2017-006982 Application 12/557 ,242 update automatically to reflect any change made by the patient or clinician in slope and/ or position of the fitting line ( 161 ). Litvak i-f6 l ( emphasis added). Notwithstanding this disclosure, Applicant argues there are "many aspects [of] GUI 170 that would not have been understood by the layman which are determinative of whether GUI 170 as a whole is NOT configured for the layman but instead is configured for the clinician." App. Br. 11. Applicant concludes that the Examiner "has erred by focusing incorrectly on the few 'layman-intelligible' aspects [of Litvak's GUI] rather than [its] many 'layman-unintelligible' aspects. Id. These arguments are not persuasive. Applicant's argument belies explicit description and illustration set forth in Litvak. Litvak states that its control interfaces may be used not only by a clinician, but also by a "cochlear implant patient" and even "any other person." Litvak i-f6I. Further, at Figure 12, reproduced below, Litvak illustrates a GUI that is consistent with that description: BASE . , 15 I I I ; I ,~'1 ~ ""'"[7~ :::): 4:/: > ' I t ' ' ' VJ --~- .... ~ ). . : ! : I i /.- I i ' ''/ ' : S··· ·[lft+t················/··················i·····1 APEX (' Ill ~· - um 5{it?O /J1 FRtQJ..fi;.WCY {4,) 172 SLOAt: / X--AXIS WlEF?t~Pl f l~D·······~·J (-D·········l [)[CRUSE 1,¥CREA.S[ J 74 lJ£CRfJSE lNCR::.-.~5f 176 / t> ,,J'!lJ ........... . p~ l;J j ................ ,...175 / . . P/.AY SOl,W{) FIG. 12 Appeal2017-006982 Application 12/557 ,242 Figure 12, reproduced above, "illustrates an exemplary graphical user interface that may be used to adjust the slope and/or the position of the fitting line according to principles described [in Litvak]." Litvak i-fl9. It has simple labeled slider bars 171 and 172 and labeled buttons 173-176, none of which are labeled with technical jargon. Id. at i-f 61 ("A first sliding bar (171) may be included to allow the user of the GUI (170) to adjust the slope of the fitting line ( 161 ). A second sliding bar ( 172) may also be included to allow the user to adjust the X-axis intercept or position of the fitting line (161). The GUI (170) may also include buttons (173, 175), the selection of which plays a musical tune or a sound used in determining whether the slope and position of the fitting line (160) are correct. The GUI (170) may further include buttons ( 17 4, 176) configured to allow the user to select a musical tune from a list of available tunes and/or a sound from a list of available sounds."). Applicant's ultimate argument is that "a person lacking specialized training in the field of fitting stimulating medical devices" would not understand and be able to interface with each and every aspect of Litvak's GUI 170. App. Br. 11-19. For example, Applicant argues that "Litvak's statement in paragraph [0061] that GUI 170 could be used by the layman is DIFFERENT than disclosing that GUI 170 is configured specifically for the layman." Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Applicant's argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claims ( as best we can discern their indefinite scope) and is not persuasive, in any event. The claims recite "a graphical user interface configured for someone whose capacity for intuiting how to use the graphical user interface is that of a person lacking specialized training in the field of fitting stimulating medical devices." The claims do 8 Appeal2017-006982 Application 12/557 ,242 not recite that the GUI is configured specifically or exclusively for that person. The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-7, 9-14, 16-22, 24, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as anticipated by Litvak or, alternatively, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the same, is affirmed. Rejection 3 The Examiner rejected claims 8, 15, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Litvak and Wakefield. Final Act. 8. The only purported error identified by Applicant in this rejection is that the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims from which claims 8, 15, and 23 depend. App. Br. 19-20. We disagree in that respect, as discussed above. Accordingly, the Examiner's rejection of claims 8, 15, and 23 is also affirmed. SUMMARY For the reasons discussed, we affirm each of the Examiner's rejections. TIME PERIOD No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation